

No. 9335. v A. 165 A

pts. 9-11



93354A765A

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 11

MARCH 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 25, AND 27, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



Kirstein Business Repr.

DEC 24 1952

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1952

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, *Chairman*

HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey

J. G. SOURWINE, *Counsel*

INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, *Chairman*

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina

HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah

SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada

HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel*

BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Chi, Harriet Lavine.....	3949
Fairbank, John K.....	3715
Greene, Jerome D.....	3849
Holland, William L.....	3889
Lockwood, William W.....	3862
Matusow, Harvey M.....	3823
Rowe, Professor David N.....	3967
Thorner, Daniel.....	3955

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 12 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran and Smith.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the hearing with respect to Mr. Lattimore is called to order, may I call attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that another witness, Mr. John K. Fairbank, has been subpoenaed to appear at this time, on the expectation that by this time we would have concluded hearing Mr. Lattimore's testimony.

I should like respectfully to ask the Chair briefly to open a record on Mr. Fairbank, for the purpose of determining if he is here in response to the subpoena and instructing him with respect to returning.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend the hearing on Mr. Lattimore momentarily so that Mr. Fairbank may make his presence known, if he is here.

Mr. Fairbank.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am here, sir, but not in response to subpoena; in response to a request to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Were you not subpoenaed?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that Mr. Fairbank be instructed to return at 3 o'clock tomorrow for his executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that convenient for you, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; it can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about as convenient as we can possibly conjecture here at this hearing now, if you will kindly return at 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon for executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Fairbank has furnished the committee with a voluntary statement, and I now ask that this statement be admitted into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement will be admitted in the record.

(The statement referred to was read by John K. Fairbank, 41 Winthrop Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., on March 12, 1952.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make this statement in connection with the statement presented, and all others from now on: It will not be read by the witness. Under the rule of the committee and under the rule of the Senate, it will be submitted to the committee and its staff for consideration, and interrogation will follow the witness' presence here tomorrow in executive session.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that this statement is admitted as a part of the record in the executive hearings? I think that ought to be clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator SMITH. Therefore, it will not be made public now; is that right?

The CHAIRMAN. It will not be made public now.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do I understand, Mr. Chairman, that it will be part of the public record later?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter the committee will have to determine.

At the present time it will be in executive hearings.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then may I enter a protest for not being allowed to make that public statement, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may enter your protest, if you want it, but the rule is as I have stated.

Senator SMITH. I judge that what Mr. Fairbank is raising is whether or not he will be prohibited from giving that statement after he testified in executive session.

Is that what you want to do?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would like to have the opportunity to present it in the public session, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter the committee will have to consider and determine.

Do you want Mr. Fairbank sworn at this time, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not think it is necessary, sir. We can do that when he comes in for executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(Thereupon, at 2:10 p. m., the committee proceeded to other business.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senators Smith, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order.

I would like to say that Senator McCarran is not able to be here this morning, so he asked me to open the hearing and preside, at least, for the time being, until he can get here.

The other day when Mr. Fairbank was here, Chairman McCarran made a ruling as to the admission of statements. He has talked to me over the phone about that, and he wishes me to make this statement:

One of the problems that this committee is concerned with and has to face is the bulk of the record, and the recent statement which we have gone over was a very bulky document with many charges and accusations against committee members and others.

The committee has felt that in the future we should accept no statements except the statements, oral statements, made under questioning by this committee.

However, the witness this morning, Mr. Fairbank, had had no notice of the committee's decision to restrict statements to be received by the committee, even though statements may be submitted to the committee and filed for future reference.

So Senator McCarran wishes me to say that, lest there be some misapprehension, in perfect good faith, on the part of Mr. Fairbank and others, as to the committee's ruling the other day, we are going to allow Mr. Fairbank to read the statement and then he will be cross-examined on the statement as we go along and at the end of it. But that is not a change in the decision of the committee concerning the future not to allow statements to be read verbatim because of the great length of time it takes and the possibility that a witness who is not acting in good faith might load the committee up with such tremendous bulk that we could never finish this job.

But for the present, Mr. Fairbank will be allowed to read his statement and then he will be examined. It may be that there will be breaks in the statement at which we can stop him and have cross-examination on a part of it.

There is one thing that you have not done that you should have done, Mr. Fairbank. Under the rules of the Senate, there should have been enough copies filed for one for each Senator. Do you have extra copies here which you could pass around to us now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir, Senator. I just gave, I believe to Mr. Mandel——

Mr. MORRIS. You sent in three or four copies to the Senators just this morning.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, and I believe previously I sent in one a week or 10 days ago, and two on Monday morning.

Senator SMITH. How many is that all together that you have sent in?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Three previous to today, and I just gave three, I think, a moment ago.

Senator FERGUSON. We have seven members, Mr. Fairbank.

Senator SMITH. We have seven members besides the members of the staff. Therefore, we need several more copies of your statement. Do you have some available now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator SMITH. Will you let us have those?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. For the purpose of the record, since you made the statement about the ruling of the committee, I want to say that I was not present when that ruling was made, and I did not know there was going to be any such ruling.

I have heretofore stated that this is a seven-man committee and that I make up my own mind on whatever is to be done here, and I may be overruled by the majority.

But I was not present, I did not know such a ruling was going to be made. I have a feeling that when a witness comes before the committee and seems to go out of his way to be contemptuous of the committee and abuse the committee from the very first, almost the very first, sentence, that he is offering in his statement, that there may be some consideration to refusing him to submit insults to the committee and to the Senate, and to the people who send the Senators here. After all, we are speaking for them.

But I feel on the whole that witnesses should be given a pretty fair latitude, particularly when their reputations have been questioned, to make some answers as they would like to make within the rules of decency and fair play.

I do not think they should be permitted to come in and accuse a lot of other people, unless they have the evidence to back it up, and I do not think they should be permitted to abuse the Senate.

Senator SMITH. I may say to the Senator that my cursory examination of the first part of Mr. Fairbank's statement does not seem to be of quite the flavor of Professor Lattimore's statement.

Senator WATKINS. I think it is entirely different, from what I have read of it.

Senator SMITH. What did you say?

Senator WATKINS. I said I think it is entirely different, from what I have read of it.

Senator SMITH. Of course, I think we all have to be reminded that one of the procedures so frequently adopted, as was demonstrated in the Communist case before Judge Medina in New York, the Communist case in California, the hearing going on now before the Sub-

versive Board, and perhaps that has been tried before this committee, is to vilify and abuse the committee with the hope that attention may be distracted from the person who is being examined, if there is anything against him.

I think all of us who had any experience in trying a lawsuit know that one of the favorite stunts of anybody charged, or his counsel charged, is to try the prosecuting attorney or some witness on the other side. So I did not take too seriously, although I resented them, the suggestions of Professor Lattimore.

But I do wish that Mr. Fairbank may have every opportunity to explain anything he wishes to say about the facts. After all, what we are here to do is to collect facts.

I can realize that a person whose name may have been mentioned in one of these matters cannot quite stick to the facts always because human emotions are involved.

But I do want to be certain that Mr. Fairbank may have every opportunity to state any fact that he wishes to.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to finish my statement.

I wanted to make the statement now because, as I heard the statement that the Chair made, as I understood it, it may refer to cases coming in the future. I want to be on record now that I do not agree with the point that they cannot read these statements. But, with some reasonable limitation on the matter that I mentioned, that they cannot come in here and insult the Senate and the committee from the very first.

If they have a fair statement and want to give a factual statement, I do not see any reason why they should not read it.

I would not want to be bound by what was said here on any future rulings on any future witnesses, because we may have a lot of witnesses here before we finish these hearings, not only this hearing but other hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I feel this way about a statement: The witness should understand that what he is filing he is willing to swear to. You see, when these statements are prepared, they are not sworn to and they are filed. But if a witness is willing and it is competent and relevant evidence rather than just conclusion that a witness has, he ought to be able to put it before the committee as sworn testimony.

I think that is what we are facing this morning. If the witness does not read it, then it is not really sworn testimony, and it gets into our record and becomes a part of the official record. But it is never sworn to.

Then you come to the question, let us say, of immunity. As soon as it becomes a part of our record, he has the right of immunity even though it is not sworn to. Our practice in this particular hearing has always been that the witnesses are always sworn.

Mr. Fairbank yesterday, when I presided in an executive session, was sworn. Of course at that time I did not know of the statement having been filed because I was not present when it was put into the record the other day.

But if a man is willing to read a statement, under his oath, that is one thing, and if it is material and relevant. I do not think we ought to just take a statement and put it in the record and make it a part of the official record when a man is not swearing to it.

Therefore, I think he ought to read it so that we can cross-examine him as he goes along. I noticed here that he was complaining of hearsay.

Senator SMITH. Before we get to the body of it, do you not think the witness might go ahead, and then we will cross-examine him?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But I think we ought to examine whether his statements are hearsay, because that is the only way you can tell what the facts are.

Senator SMITH. I think Senator McCarran's ruling the other day, because I was present and I quite agreed with him, that we should not take up the time of the committee reading long, long statements that will keep up from ever finishing these hearings, is rather important. But apparently Mr. Fairbank's statement is 17 pages, with some exhibits, whereas Professor Lattimore's statement was some 50 pages with a great deal of abuse in it.

But now I am sure Mr. Fairbank understands that everything he is submitting in his statement is sworn testimony for which he is responsible as an individual.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I should be sworn now, I believe, too.

Senator SMITH. We will do that. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give in this hearing before a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD WAIT, ESQ.**

Mr. WAIT. Should I identify myself?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. WAIT. Richard Wait, of the firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart, in Boston, counsel for Mr. Fairbank.

Senator SMITH. All right. I do not know, Mr. Wait, whether you know the rules under which we have been allowing counsel to participate here.

Mr. WAIT. My understanding is that I am not to interrupt.

Senator SMITH. That is it. If the witness wishes to ask you something as to his rights, and whether he should answer this or that question or not, then he is to have the right to ask you that question. But you are not to prompt his answers.

Mr. WAIT. I will not prompt his answers.

Senator SMITH. And you will not attempt to suggest answers to him. I am sure that you can understand the committee has to have that sort of a rule because sometimes we have counsel that are not hesitant about being obstreperous in places they should not be, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think also if counsel wants to ask a question, if he will put it to the Chair, the Chair will then rule as to whether or not it ought to be asked, and the Chair will ask it or not ask it, as the Chair believes relevant.

Mr. WAIT. It is entirely within the decision of the Chair. I will not be obstreperous.

Senator SMITH. All right, sir. Mr. Fairbank, you will proceed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Some 7 months ago this subcommittee began its investigation of the question whether subversive Communist influence on our far eastern policy may have operated through the Institute of Pacific Relations. Many accusations have been made by witnesses and many documents read into the record. Having been accused of communism by witnesses last August and having requested a hearing at that time, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and testify in answer to those accusations.

Throughout these hearings the subcommittee has been grappling with the problems posed by Communist subversion. We know today that this is a real and vitally serious problem. Communist totalitarianism stands fully exposed as a form of statism which would trample down the legal safeguards of the individual and grind all persons under the heel of an all-powerful government. We Americans are basically opposed to statism—Nazi, Communist, or any other kind. I should like to quote briefly a statement on "Freedom of Speech" inserted in the Congressional Record last October 2 by Senator Bridges and 24 other Senators, including Senator Ferguson, Senator Jenner, and Senator Watkins of this subcommittee—

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, the Chair observes right here an illustration of what Senator McCarran had in mind about loading the record with extraneous matters.

This is not a statement of fact as to whether or not you ought to be suspected or charged. This a precise illustration of one of the difficulties the committee has met in wishing to give everybody a full chance to be heard, and yet being faced with quotations from the Congressional Record or what somebody said.

I mention that now because I am sure that I want to be very clear why such a ruling must be recognized and enforced in the future to prevent just such statements that have no bearing on the facts in your particular case.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I should be happy to shorten this quotation.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been read on the Senate floor and it is familiar to the Senators.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. My object is to call attention to the statement of the Senators, which I think is an excellent statement in support of the freedom of speech.

So I will omit this quotation, although I think it is an excellent quotation, and I put it in here because I support it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Fairbank, when you come to the question of the freedom of speech, it is your freedom and the other people's freedoms. It concerns both freedoms, is that not right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you feel that you have the same right to say things in this hearing, even though they might be considered by the other people to be accusations, is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; if I feel they are true.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you start out by saying, "Many accusations have been made by witnesses * * *." That all depends upon the viewpoint of the witness, is that not true?

A person who thinks a statement is false says it is an accusation. The person who makes the statement and contends it is true does not say it is an accusation. He says it is the truth, does he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is true psychologically. I don't want to argue about this.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know your view on it. That is why I stated it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think there are statements that can be called factual, more factual, and other statements that can be called more accusatory. For example, a hearsay statement, it seems to me, is more in the nature of being accusatory.

Senator FERGUSON. But if the person says and designates that it is hearsay, and the committee wants to accept it, that is something else. You see, there is no rule here in the committee, and I think that is something worth while knowing, saying that you cannot receive hearsay.

For instance, in courts of law certain hearsay statements are admissible. One of them is when a man was born. He can state when he was born by what somebody told him. Do you understand?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So hearsay is a relative term. So you get down here on the case of whether we want to admit hearsay. We may say that hearsay, under the circumstances, is good evidence, and we may say it is bad evidence.

For instance, this statement, I think, that you put in here is hearsay about this Congressional Record. Or did you read it yourself?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read it from a sheet of the Congressional Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have knowledge that it was in the Record?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not feel that I am coming here to make accusations in the sense that I understand them.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that that is true. And you say a statement here now under oath, you say it is because you believe it to be true, is that not right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. May I make one observation of the witness?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. About that understanding that we have freedom of speech in this country, when witnesses go before a tribunal such as a court, for instance, they do not have complete freedom of speech. They are not free to go in there and berate the court and abuse the court in the presence of the court, or all respect for institutions would fall down.

So they do not have the freedom to say anything they please to the judge and the court. They might get outside and say it, but they do not say it in his presence in the courtroom. So you are coming before a tribunal of the United States Senate. It is not a court, it is an investigating group which sometimes may hear hearsay evidence that may lead to other evidence. That is the investigatory process. It is not a case like when you are on trial where you have certain rights to present your case this way or that way. It is just one of those matters that is incidental to investigations.

Sometimes people are accused of things because it comes out in the investigation. We do not pass judgment on whether the accusations are right or wrong, true or false, but we do have to hear them.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, you understand that all testimony taken before this committee has been sworn testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you understand, of course, as long as this committee requires a witness who is to testify to be sworn, that that is all the committee can do. The committee cannot guarantee the truth or untruth of his statements.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am fully aware, and I fully support the concept that a senatorial investigation cannot be bound by judicial procedure. It must be absolutely free to admit any sort of evidence.

Senator SMITH. I do not mean that. I meant that when this committee requires a person to be sworn, to tell the truth before they do testify, that is as far as this committee can go toward being responsible for the truth or untruth of the testimony. You, of course, understand that.

We do not know this morning whether you are going to tell the truth or not. We have presumed that you would tell the truth. But somebody that you may make some statement against may say it is not the truth. Therefore, all we can do is to swear you to tell the truth.

When we have done that, we have done all we can do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we agree on the principle here.

Senator SMITH. All right, let us go ahead, then, and get through this statement.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then I will continue after the quotation.

Senator SMITH. The quotation from the Congressional Record is just discussing the freedom of speech. If you want to read it, go ahead and read it. But we do want to hurry.

I notice the first six pages of your statement are discussion and conclusions, and it is on page 7 before you get to any real facts about yourself. But go ahead whichever way you want to do it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This declaration of 25 Senators last October was, of course, directed against the danger of Government withholding of facts which the American public ought to have. Unless we have access to the facts, in all their variety and diversity, our free democratic process cannot go on.

You are of course aware that the IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations, claims to be interested in getting at the facts and making them available. It claims—

to stand for objective fact-finding, free discussion in which many viewpoints are represented, and the dissemination of reliable up-to-date information.

The question which this subcommittee has been pursuing is the question whether and, if so, how far the IPR may have been subverted from this worthy aim by conspiratorial Communists, and used as a tool to mislead and confuse the American public, and undermine our far eastern policy in the Soviet Russian interest. This question indicates a fact we must face, that Communist subversion tried to make use of freedom of speech in order to set up a statism which, once in power, would deny freedom of speech and all our other freedom. The Communist technique of using freedom to subvert freedom is more insidious and cunning than any we have faced in the past.

Americans are beginning to agree that when confronted with the "clear and present danger" of this new Communist totalitarian subversion, we must set certain limits to our individual freedoms in order to preserve our general freedom. Obviously this doctrine if carried to excess could lead us astray. Yet the fundamental dishonesty of

the Communist, his effort to seem loyal and democratic while really conspiring and obeying a foreign totalitarianism, leave us little alternative. It is on this basis, I assume, that this committee has felt it desirable to admit hearsay testimony as evidence, which is compatible with the fact that this is a legislative fact-finding investigation and not a judicial procedure.

Many Americans facing this problem are reaching the conclusion that proved Communists cannot be trusted in positions of responsibility as teachers any more than they could be as Governmental officials. In other words, an honest and loyal Communist does not exist. The FBI, the loyalty and security boards, and congressional committees each in their own way are therefore investigating American personnel in the Government and now to some extent in the research centers and universities, including private research agencies such as the IPR. I do not see how objection can be raised against the principle that some procedure of investigation is desirable in the public interest.

However, the manner of investigation is important. An inefficient investigation may do the public interest more harm than good. Unwise procedures may really confuse the issue and weaken us instead of getting at the facts. If 1,000 loyal non-Communists were seriously damaged in the process of finding one Communist, for example, it might prove to be an inefficient operation, not really helping the public interest.

With these considerations in mind I should like to take myself as one example—

Senator FERGUSON. Before you take that, I think you have agreed in this statement so far that the committee has a right and really a duty to look into the question of whether or not Communists did infiltrate the IPR because the IPR was an institution that was trying to form opinion in Government as well as opinion among the public. Is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe I would not want to make so blanket a statement as that. I would be happy to give you my formulation of that.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say here? You say that—

* * * the Government and now to some extent in the research centers and universities, including private research agencies such as the IPR.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I say that because there is investigation going on of individuals all of the time, insofar as they are of potential value to the Government. The Government is investigating them in order to use them.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think that the Government has a right to investigate an institution like the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think the senatorial committee has a right to investigate anything, it seems to me.

Senator FERGUSON. But particularly the IPR, where it was taking information, distributing among the public, distributing to public officials that information?

For instance, we have an example here of Mr. Carter advising them to be sure and get to General Marshall and other people a certain book, and to see that certain Senators got it and read it.

If that was the province, and I say it was the province, if they wanted to do it, of the IPR doing that, is it not then proper that the

Senate of the United States, through this committee, look into the question as to whether or not that book—let us take that particular book—was written by a person that had pro-Soviet Communist leanings or even was a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that is perfectly proper, if the Senate committee so decides.

Senator FERGUSON. That, I think, is what they have decided. You may proceed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am discussing a matter of judgment in the case.

Senator SMITH. Let us get along. If you can read a little bit faster, Mr. Fairbank, it will assist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. With these considerations in mind I should like to take myself as one example, the example I know most about, and indicate, with due respect, certain places where I think the committee on reflection may agree that their procedure has caused unnecessary damage or failed to gain effective results. I am aware from the record that I am probably regarded here with grave suspicion as a Communist or Communist sympathizer. I challenge such a view in the most absolute terms, and I appreciate the chance to testify against it.

I am a loyal American. I am engaged in one form of American free enterprise. My university is a private American corporation and I work under it with a responsibility as a professor to use my own initiative and ingenuity, to inaugurate and carry on my own researches, and run my own professional activities. My university exercises great care in the selection of professors but, once selected, it gives them maximum opportunity to use their own judgment and follow their own inspiration in carrying on their work. We believe that the individual professor can contribute most when given both the opportunity and the responsibility of freedom. This is the American system. As a China specialist I have been engaged for over 20 years in this kind of intellectual enterprise.

Now I submit that, just as our American process of government requires freedom of speech and freedom to criticize the Government, as the declaration of 25 Senators has stated, so our American process of education and research cannot go on without certain freedoms—specifically, the freedoms of thought and contact. A China specialist like myself must dig into all aspects of a question, just as a news reporter should seek to dig into all aspects of a news story. Like a journalist, a university research worker must have and exercise freedom of contact—freedom to talk to people of all shades of opinion, even when he violently disagrees with them. Only by examining all sides can we keep that intellectual grasp on our problems which will keep us intellectually better-based and more flexible, adaptable and powerful than our totalitarian Communist enemy.

The point of all this is in my case that I have exercised my American freedom of contact throughout my 23 years as a China specialist. Year after year I have consistently tried to meet and talk with persons of all shades of opinion, including Communists and pro-Communists. I have considered this my duty, and I feel sure that on reflection this committee will not question the necessity that a China specialist under our American system should have such freedom of contact. Contact with all sorts of persons is especially necessary for sound study of a foreign area, like China, on which we need all the information we can get.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings us to the point, then, of agreeing with you that you have and should have this right of contact. Then there should never be any question on the part of a witness to be examined on those contacts and, if it is true, freely admit that he had contacts with Communists, pro-Communists, and so forth. Is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I agree; very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. So there is nothing that should be hidden with that freedom, that it was exercised, is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I see no reason to hide.

The question before this committee, I submit, is not whether I should have had such broad contact with persons of all sorts connected with China, but whether I engaged in such contact as a loyal American or engaged in it subversively.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not the nub of the whole situation?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

The fact of my contact with all sorts of persons concerning China should be assumed as a matter of course, just as it is assumed for a press correspondent. The real question is whether I used this contact disloyally, or in the course of this contact was used by others with disloyal intent.

Getting down to cases, I should like first to state my own anti-Communist view for the record. Last September I sent Senator McCarran a notarized denial of communism dated September 6, 1951, with the request that he file it in the public record of this committee. Since I never received any acknowledgment of this letter, I now reaffirm for the record my original unacknowledged statement:

I, John King Fairbank, resident at 41 Winthrop Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., do hereby solemnly declare under oath that I am not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party, that I do not now subscribe, believe in or adhere to the doctrines of communism or Marxism-Leninism, that I have never done so in the past, and that I have never knowingly attended or participated in activities of the Communist Party.

In the intervening 5 months since I submitted this denial the subcommittee has published and distributed five printed volumes of testimony in which a series of witnesses, after having executive sessions with the committee, have testified here publicly in such a way as to slander or defame me.

Senator FERGUSON. There you claim it is slander and defamation because it was untrue, the testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If the testimony was true, then, of course, it would not be slander or defamation?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. But your testimony is that they are untrue?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Using these five volumes of testimony, a columnist like Fulton Lewis, Jr., has been able, as on December 6, 1951, to repeat a long list of these defamatory statements about me which have been given congressional immunity. I am happy to say that other journalists, the press services and the newspapers had taken note of my denial of communism at the time I first made it.

Further, I believe the committee's information concerning me has been made inaccurate by the inclusion in the record of erroneous testimony. Out of several examples I submit the following—

Senator FERGUSON. When you use the word "erroneous" there, what do you mean by that?

Mr. FAIRBANKS. Well, statements of something contrary to fact. I don't say lies because that means the intent is to be erroneous. But the fact is not as stated in such a case.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand it, you are not criticizing the committee's taking, but the testimony itself is what you are criticizing?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I say the information has been made inaccurate because this testimony has come before the committee.

Senator WATKINS. Of course, you understand we get a lot of testimony and some of it is not worth very much, but some of it may be worth something. We cannot determine at the time it is being presented whether it is worth very much or not. That is, in advance we do not know.

Senator SMITH. In other words, Mr. Fairbank, if we limited the right of another witness who might be antagonistic to you to say what he believed to be the truth, then we would have to limit you.

Of course, no one should be limited in presenting his side of the question.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir. I think my criticism, and which I come to later and which I want to put in, is as to the general discretion that has been used in the procedure of the committee; not as to principle.

Senator SMITH. You understand, of course, that we cannot hear but one witness at a time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

1. In response to committee questions, William M. McGovern testified publicly under oath on September 18:—

Senator FERGUSON. William M. McGovern is also a professor in a school, is he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think the committee is probably all right in asking a professor to come down here and testify?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not want a ban on professors testifying.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not put a ban on professors testifying?

Mr. FAIRBANK. But I think some professors are better than others.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have to agree because I have been in college.

Senator SMITH. Where is Mr. McGovern?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Northwestern University.

Senator SMITH. All right. Proceed, Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is the quotation of Mr. McGovern's testimony:

I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937-38. He and Mr. Lattimore went to Peking at the same time for a very short period. At the same time, Mr. Reischauer, Mr. Lattimore, and Mr. Fairbank were all in Peking. * * *

The actual fact is that I was not in Peking at any time between the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1946. I was not in China any time between 1935 and 1942. I spent the winter of 1937-38 at Harvard.

I have never gone to Peking with Mr. Lattimore. I have never been in Peking at the same time as Mr. Reischauer. I do not recollect ever having seen Dr. McGovern in Peking. His sworn testimony is entirely untrue, false, and erroneous.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever been in Peking when Mr. Lattimore was there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I met him there.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I met Mr. Lattimore in 1932 in Peking, and he went away later that year, and he came back subsequently, 1933 or 1934, and I saw him again.

I am not sure exactly which years he was there. He moved around.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever go to Peking with Mr. Lattimore at the same time for a very short period? Forget the dates for a moment.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not recall ever having traveled to Peking with Mr. Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. But at one time you were there for a short period with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I was there for 4 years, and during that 4-year period, from early 1932 to the end of 1935, Mr. Lattimore was there at different intervals.

Mr. MORRIS. So you were there in 1935 with Mr. Lattimore and not 1937-38, is that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Whether he was there in 1935 I don't recall, because he had taken this job of editor of Pacific Affairs. I can ask my wife whether she recalls.

Well, I could research that. I can try to recollect. She thinks he was.

Senator SMITH. Let us see what his answer was.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My wife thinks he probably was there in 1935.

Senator SMITH. If you should discover that that was in error as to the date, you can advise the committee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to Mr. McGovern, I assume that you have corroboration in the records at Harvard University showing you were there during the period you so testified, and you probably refreshed your recollection on that. You checked to see where you were at that particular time when Mr. McGovern said you were in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I did. I have been in China only three times and I remembered, of course, exactly when. But my wife was with me, and we checked back and forth.

Senator WATKINS. If it became highly material to any question before the committee, the committee might deem it necessary to have corroboration because we have the flat statement that you were there and you say you were not.

It would be a help to the committee if you could submit to us some record evidence that you would have that you were in Harvard at that time. We would appreciate it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to now leave the words "entirely untrue" in here when you think that you were in Peking at the same time Lattimore was, in the year 1935? You take it that if he used the wrong date, that that makes it entirely wrong.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I wouldn't like to give way to Mr. McGovern particularly. There are other things that he said that are also wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. You can point out what you claim to be wrong. But I am wondering on this one point whether you now want to leave the record "entirely untrue" when you do say that you were there with Mr. Lattimore at the same time, in 1935, instead of 1937-38.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would still say, judging by his text, which is all I have to go by, that it is entirely untrue.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any significance to the date 1935 as opposed to 1937-38? He did not imply anything about that particular time that would not be equally true about a different time? The dates have no significance whatever, do they?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, his first statement is: "I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937-38."

I was not there, I did not see Mr. McGovern there, and that statement is completely wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him in the winter of 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know McGovern in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't recall meeting him in Peking. I met him first when he came to Harvard to lecture.

Senator SMITH. When was that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Either 1939-40 or 1940-41.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, did you have to go back to refresh your recollection as to whether it was 1935 or what date that you were in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I remember that. I have often put that on statements of my life history, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. What professorship does Professor McGovern hold?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is in political science.

Senator FERGUSON. At Northwestern University?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Northwestern University.

Senator FERGUSON. He is a full professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Recognized in the trade as a professor in political science?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He has his critics.

Senator FERGUSON. And I suppose you find you have yours?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I do. But he is criticized for some things I am not.

Senator SMITH. The point that I understood Senator Ferguson was trying to make was that the date 1937-38 might have been an error of time as to Mr. McGovern's statement.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, if he substituted any other years it would be equally wrong.

Senator SMITH. Any other years other than 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He says: "I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937-38."

If you put in 1934, '35, '36, '37, '38, '39, '40—any of those years—it would be wrong. In my recollection, I did not see him in Peking.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not say he did not see you.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. He says "I saw." He is not saying you saw him.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He may well have seen me across a room somewhere, and I didn't notice him. But he then goes on to say he has had long discussions with me, in his testimony.

Senator WATKINS. In Peking, does he say that he had these discussions with you in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that comes up later. He says that he saw me—and I have left this out to shorten the record—he says he saw me in China in the spring and summer of 1945, when I was not in China. That is what the record seems to say. It is a little bit ambiguous. But it is just another of these imaginings of his.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, what you are trying to say is that you never did see him in Peking, and you were not there when he was there, at least when he was visible to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. But you did not have any discussions with him in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Ever?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, ever.

Senator WATKINS. That makes it clear. We want to make it clear, we want to be sure that that is what you testify.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In other words, I can only conclude that his imagination has played him falsely on this at great length.

Senator WATKINS. We want to get that straightened out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. McGovern says, in his testimony on page 1025, "I have met the Fairbanks. I first saw them in Harvard when I was teaching at Harvard."

Senator FERGUSON. Is he wrong on that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; that is correct. And I haven't picked that up because that is when I first saw him, when he was teaching in Harvard. But when was that? In my recollection, I am quite certain it was 1939-40 or 1940-41. I think he just has things jumbled.

2. As an example of a distorted half-truth let me call attention to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony about me on August 14, 1951. She stated that I carried a letter from Madame Sun Yat-sen (whom she called "a top Chinese Communist") to the China Aid Council, which was a constituent member of United China Relief, but is termed by Miss Bentley a "spy ring."

My answer is, first, that in 1943 competent American observers definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist, nor did I.

Senator FERGUSON. Elizabeth Bentley was a spy herself. Do you not think that she may have known what she was saying there, that Madame Sun Yat-sen was a top Communist, Chinese Communist? Could that not have been true, she being a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. On that kind of question, the conflict of testimony, it seems to me the circumstances of the witness have to be taken into account, whether the witness is acquainted with the subject at close hand or at distant hand.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but here she is a Communist spy in this country. Do you not think that she might know that this Madame Sun Yat-sen was a Communist and, further, that she knew that the China Aid Council was a member of the United China Relief, and that that was a spy ring?

She being a spy herself, would she not have more knowledge than the general public?

You say, in 1943 competent American observers definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist, "nor did I."

Senator SMITH. The point about that, Mr. Fairbank, is that Miss Bentley might have been in a better position to know whether or not she was a spy than you would have been in a position to know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let's leave me out of it because, of course, I am not interested. But let us compare Miss Bentley's testimony with that of A. T. Steele. I have a low opinion of spies, and I think Miss Bentley, having been in this spy business, may not be as reliable in the thought processes.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think she had an opportunity for a better knowledge than a lot of people outside of it? Is it not true that a lot of Communists do work outside in devious ways, and particularly when they are spies?

Here was our Government, FBI and all, G-2, and all of the other agencies, that did not know that she was a spy, apparently did not know it, until she personally went and confessed that she was a spy.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was in the United States. Now, A. T. Steele was in China. Miss Bentley was not. Let's compare Mr. A. T. Steele as a witness with Miss Bentley.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you feel Professor Steele is qualified to testify, Mr. Fairbank, to know whether a secret Communist is a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think he is qualified to have an opinion as to a person like Madame Sun Yat-sen, and more qualified than Miss Bentley, who had never met Sun Yat-sen and, so far as I know, had never been in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the madame is a Communist now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know now.

Mr. MORRIS. She is an official of the Chinese Government.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Government is a so-called coalition, so they can take in the others. There is a fiction for their control. But whether she is a Communist, that is a different matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get down to what a Communist is. Are you talking here of a Communist only if they are party members?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I recall your definition of the other day. In my own thinking, that definition is a double thing, and has to be applied in both its parts.

Senator FERGUSON. There is an "or" in there.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I mean both parts should be considered. One part of the definition is that the person takes Communist Party discipline. And in that case, I would say that is a Communist Party member. I mean, that is a genuine Communist.

Now, the "or" part—could we have that definition read? It is a person who furthers the aims.

Senator SMITH. Let us take your definition as you set out on page 7 of your statement:

* * * never have been a member of the Communist Party, that I do not now subscribe, believe in, or adhere to the doctrines of communism or Marxism-Leninism * * *

Is that not a pretty all-embracing definition of communism, what you said there? I thought you covered that quite well. I noticed it when I read it this morning.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would include in my denial both being a Communist and being a fellow-traveler.

Senator SMITH. Yes; I understood that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And the term "fellow-traveler," I think, is included in your definition of Communist. We could operate on that basis, if you would like.

Senator WATKINS. You understand a fellow-traveler to be the person who has the same ideas, who does not actually become a member of the party. Is that not what you have in mind?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say a fellow-traveler is a person within a certain zone, and there are gradations in that zone. A person who is not a member of the party and does not receive orders, but receives suggestions, or is sympathetic and picks up ideas, and finds out what is being thought by Communists, and then goes along with them—

Senator WATKINS. Does not the fellow-traveler suggest the very idea that he is traveling with the Communists in the same direction?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I thought a fellow-traveler meant, someone who is moving right along with the Communists. He would not be in the party necessarily, and he would not need to be called a Communist. But he would be going right along with the same idea.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But when the term "fellow-traveler" is used, I think you have a shading off into people who don't realize that they are accepting Communist inspiration or stimulus, who think that they are liberals.

Senator WATKINS. They may be thinking independently and still going along the same lines, and yet they would be fellow-travelers. Their aim is exactly the same.

They want to go to the same place, and they travel in the same direction.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In my definition, you have this gradation of people, and the aim of the fellow-traveler may be in much more idealistic terms and much less discipline, and much less concrete than the Communist aims.

Senator WATKINS. A shading between different types of fellow-travelers. But within the class there are fellow-travelers and fellow-travelers.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed, and you shade off from that into fuzzy-minded liberals and other categories.

Senator WATKINS. They are almost as dangerous as these fuzzy-minded liberals, are they not, if they are going to the same place and want to arrive at the same place as the Communists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Perhaps a liberal is more dangerous than a Communist.

Senator WATKINS. And perhaps the fuzzy-minded is not quite so dangerous because he cannot quite say it so convincingly. But at the same time, he is going in the same direction.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get into the second part of this paragraph?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, with respect to your statement there about the China Aid Council, I have a question. In connection

with Miss Bentley's testimony that Mildred Price, the executive secretary of the China Aid Council, was in fact the Communist agent running that, we subpoenaed Miss Price before this committee, and she refused to answer whether or not she was a Communist on the ground that her answer might incriminate her.

Do you not think that there is reason for someone to conclude, in view of that testimony, not only the testimony of Miss Bentley but the subsequent deportment of Miss Price before this committee, that there was some ground for believing the truth of those allegations?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Which allegations, sir?

Mr. MORRIS. Namely that the China Aid Council was a Communist organization.

If the executive secretary refuses to answer whether or not she, in fact, was a member of the Communist Party, would there not be a question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Miss Price refusing to answer has distressed me, as you can understand. I had believed, judging by what she said and her conduct, that she was not a Communist.

Now, the fact that she refused to testify suggests to my mind that, at some time, she had had some connection which she is now reluctant to divulge.

Senator FERGUSON. Not only reluctant but refuses on the ground it would tend to incriminate her.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. That is possible, perhaps, for an earlier period than when I knew her. I met her in 1946, and I became—whatever you call it—on this list of the China Aid Council in 1947. We will come to that later, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you having trouble now with the proposition as to whether or not Miss Price deceived you? Is that what is wrong?

Mr. FAIRBANK. How do you mean having trouble?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, you say that you are distressed over the fact that she refused to answer, and that you now think that she could be a Communist.

Do you now think that, with her testimony that she refuses to answer, leaves you in the position now that she deceived you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is possible, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not more than possible? Is it not probable?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure it is probable.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think yet that she deceived you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; because I have certain other evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she ever tell you that she was not a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall any such conversations on the subject at all.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that you never asked her, "Are you a Communist?"

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is no use asking a person if they are a Communist.

Senator WATKINS. In those days back there, they probably would have admitted it. They were rather proud of it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think so.

Senator WATKINS. We had a fellow around here that seemed to have been in very high esteem at the time, with the Communists, and they did not object at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think it is possible, Professor that Madame Sun Yat-sen was deceiving you at the same time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I must go by the evidence I have. I must form my judgment and take the risk in contact with anyone.

Mr. MORRIS. The fact that she is an official of the Chinese Communist Government, and together with the other testimony before this committee, that she was, in fact, a Communist since 1926 to the contrary?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I have other evidence. For the record, she is not in the category of a Communist but of a democratic personage, and so on. I should like, if you wish, to go into the China Aid Council.

Senator SMITH. No, I think the point Mr. Morris was trying to bring out was that it is entirely possible and maybe probable that Madame Sun Yat-sen has fooled you as to whether or not she was or was not a Communist in the light of present situations and her connections.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir. That possibility applies to thousands of people. I mean the possibility is always there.

When you are dealing with an area which is having a Communist revolution, you have always got the question, "Is this person possible under cover and one of them?" But you have to make up your mind as best you can because you just cannot avoid contact with everybody.

Senator SMITH. What you meant when you were saying down here about not relying on Miss Bentley and any other spy, you meant what we would say down our way that you would take what they say with a grain of salt.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A very large grain of salt, very unpalatable.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you would not take it at all?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, not in opposition to the testimony of a man like Art Steele, A. T. Steele. He is, I think, a very fine and reliable person.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead and read the statement, and we will proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. What then is the distorted half-truth, Professor Fairbank, that you mentioned there after No. 2?

I mean, you did take the message, did you not, to the China Aid Council?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the half that is true, and the half that I believe is untrue is that Madame Sun was a Communist at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the China Aid Council?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did not consider it a spy ring at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not whether you considered it, it was whether Miss Bentley knew whether it was or not, as to what she testified to. You are saying that is a half-truth.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am willing to set myself up for my own purposes as a judge for the China Aid Council in opposition to Miss Bentley because I must go by all of the evidence I have, not just by Miss Bentley. And on all of that basis, I judge it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. You are saying as far as Miss Bentley's testimony was concerned it was a distorted half-truth—

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When she said that the China Aid Council was a constituent member of the United China Relief.

Mr. FAIRBANK. She didn't say that. She said it was a spy ring.

Senator FERGUSON. You say here, I am reading your text, not hers, "which was a constituent member of the United China Relief but is termed by Miss Bentley a spy ring."

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the way the text reads.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say she said a half-truth when she said that and it was distorted?

Mr. FAIRBANK. When she said it was a spy ring; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though the executive secretary comes in here and refuses to answer as to whether or not she was a Communist when she was operating that organization?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Perhaps we should define spy ring. You have front organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. Aren't they all spy rings? Do they not function as such? If there is any knowledge that they get, do they not funnel it over to the Kremlin?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wouldn't think so in all cases because a spy ring has to operate on a certain operational basis of spying, and a front may be just for publicity.

Senator FERGUSON. And it may be for spying, too.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A spy ring in the China Aid would get statistics on child care in China, and not much else.

Senator FERGUSON. If it did get anything else.

Mr. FAIRBANK. They were wasting their time if they had a spy ring in the China Aid Council. I think we should distinguish between a front and an organized spy ring and different kinds of these things.

Senator WATKINS. Will it not be a good cover up for a spy ring to be enlisted in aid for children?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They could find out all about children.

Senator WATKINS. Yes, and they could find out about a lot of other things while they were there, could they not? Would that not be an excellent front, an excellent cover for an intelligence investigator?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know. I was trying to collect some intelligence during the war, and I wouldn't have gone to a child welfare organization particularly.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your cover?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I didn't have to have a cover. I was under the American Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. The American Embassy was your cover.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is not a cover. It is right out in the open.

Senator WATKINS. This other was out in the open, too. It was an aid society.

Mr. FAIRBANK. An embassy is supposed to collect intelligence. The China Aid Council is not supposed to be a spy ring.

Senator SMITH. I think what they are getting at, Mr. Fairbank, as you doubtless know, we did have in the South an organization known as the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. That sounded awfully good to a lot of people. It turned up finally as a Communist organization and so declared. I am sure you remember that. It was in the press generally. That is an illustration of a group taking a grandiose sounding name, Southern Conference for Human Welfare. Nothing could have appealed to us any more than that if that was what it was, but it turned out to be a Communist-front

organization. I think that is what some of the gentlemen are getting at when they said you probably didn't know that this was a spy ring. I understood you were not——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it might be useful to distinguish an infiltration effort which has not taken over an organization but is trying to, and, second, a front which has been taken over, and third, a spy ring which is really set up for espionage, for passing material. Those are three different things.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not true that they use all of their organizations in the obtaining of facts and evidence which is considered spying?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. From all I understand of communism, I don't believe that they use a front for espionage necessarily. It may be too dangerous. It may be just not feasible, if you have a front operating, to do a publicity job and then to try to do an espionage job of passing secret messages and that kind of thing that you have to do in espionage. In this case here, because of Miss Price's testimony, I would say that there was an effort at infiltration. That would be the indication, probably. This effort of infiltration may have got to a certain extent. I don't know. That is just the question that is raised by her testimony. But you then get to a second point where the thing is a front. I don't think the China Aid Council had got to that point. If I thought so, I certainly would not have had anything to do with it. Then you get to the third point where it is a spy ring, and that is where I say it is untrue.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that when this Price girl was executive secretary of the China Aid Council, that it was not a front?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I did not think it a front at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you, Professor, whether you thought it was. I am now asking you whether it was a front.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. One possible Communist in a thing does not make a front, according to the definition I am giving you where infiltration is being attempted but the thing has not yet been captured. There are many places where the Communists are trying to infiltrate.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this China Aid Council was captured?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The successor agency is a captured Communist front, and that is why I have had nothing to do with it. It is called the China Welfare Appeal. One of my reasons for thinking Miss Price probably was not a Communist at the time I went into the China Aid Council was that she was the person thrown out by this real front that was organized, the China Welfare Appeal at the time that the China Aid Council ceased to operate. Miss Price was on the receiving end of a very dirty deal there and thrown out of her job. That is her testimony that I take into account in thinking that her refusal to incriminate herself indicates perhaps an earlier connection, but not that she was organized as a Communist when I knew this thing in 1946 and 1947.

Senator WATKINS. On the contrary, could it not be possible that under the circumstances if they had taken Miss Price in this obviously Communist outfit, it would have been a revelation that she had previously been a Communist? They wouldn't have taken her unless she was. It would have been giving away what had been going on if they had taken her.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There was a fight there of some kind. There was great acrimony. The Communist group who had infiltrated just broke out and took the contact with Madam Sun away.

Senator WATKINS. Miss Price refused to testify about the activities of this organization and her own connection simply on the basis that it might incriminate her. That is fairly strong evidence to most Americans of what the realization was.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, and Mr. Chairman, at the risk of laboring this point I have the letterhead of the China Aid Council, and I see on the six-man executive committee you have Dr. Ch'ao-Ting Chi who is now an official of the Communist government. Will you concede that he is a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is a man who was reported to me to have been either a Communist or connected with the Communists quite early in his career in the early thirties or perhaps earlier than that, and many Chinese, of course, have done that and broken away. When I saw him in Chungking in 1943 he was the highly trusted official under the Premier, Dr. Kung, who was in charge of the management of the foreign currency stabilization, which was the key operation of the Chinese Nationalist Government. At that time this man, Dr. Chi, told me, and in fact he pulled out and showed me his Kuomintang Party card. Maybe he was doing that just to make an effect. It just happens that he did that.

Senator SMITH. The question now is will you now concede that he was? Is that your question?

Mr. MORRIS. That is my question, Senator.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Knowing how many Chinese have shifted back and forth, I cannot claim that Chi was necessarily a Communist at that time in the sense of this definition. He may be just a gifted opportunist who is able to land on his feet. He may be a man who had dual membership in both the Communist and the Nationalist Parties.

Senator SMITH. Let's read that question again. Mr. Morris, state it again. I thought it was a simple question whether or not you would not concede now that he was or had been a Communist regardless of these explanations that might be made.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is no question now he is working with the Communists, and for the purpose of this definition he is either a fellow traveler or a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say the same thing for Israel Epstein?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say the same thing for Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; as of now.

Mr. MORRIS. And they were all active in the China Aid Council.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I have here a list of the persons on the letterhead of the China Aid Council at the time that I gave it my name. This is a letter from the head of it, Mrs. Carter, whom I have never regarded as a Communist or a fellow traveler, it is dated January 23, 1947. On this letterhead the first person is Madam Way Dow Ming, who was the wife of the Chinese Ambassador to the United States. I knew Madam Way and, of course, she is not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, is it not true—

Mr. FAIRBANK. There are other people of that type.

Mr. MORRIS. That in every organization of this nature where you do have a group of Communists—and I have named Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Israel Epstein, Ch'ao-ting Chi, Mildred Price—that they for strategic purposes will take people into the organization who are not Communists, and from the point of their advantage conspicuously not Communists? So when you cite the names of people who are not Communists on oath, are you not in fact bringing out the precise nature of the Communist organization, namely, something that is operated by a small score of Communists and which in fact have other people who are not Communists identified with it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are there describing a front which has been captured by the Communists. That is the way it would work. However, there is this other category that I have mentioned of an organization that is being infiltrated by the Communists before they have got it. Infiltration is very difficult to avoid, and in this particular case this infiltration was well known to me because I saw Epstein's name on this letterhead at the time I joined this thing.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. 1947. That infiltration in my view had not taken over the China Aid Council at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think it was well known at that time that Epstein was what you say a fellow traveler of the Communists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say so because he had been with the American Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which was rightly named a subversive organization by the Attorney General. My reason for joining this thing at the time when General Marshall came back from China was along the line of General Marshall's effort to hold the two sides together. I believed in that Marshall policy in China. I know it has been criticized. I think it was worth trying. I joined this just 3 weeks after Marshall had come back and made his statements in January 1947 saying that the hope of China was to keep the sides together and to avoid a civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Fairbank—

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is in that spirit that I went into this.

Senator FERGUSON. On the question that we are investigating, as to whether or not IPR was penetrated or was circulating Communist propaganda or fellow-traveling propaganda—pro-Communist propaganda—I wonder whether you will answer the question as to the weight to be given to the fact that Edward C. Carter wrote a letter on June 12, 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same time that you knew Israel Epstein, is it not, Professor Fairbank, in 1947? You just testified that you considered Epstein to be a Communist in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Or a fellow traveler.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Or a fellow traveler.

Senator FERGUSON. June 12, 1947.

DEAR MISS FORD: This is to acknowledge Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles, and John Carter Vincent, of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject

might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

What do you think of that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As to the proposition of reading a book by a Communist, I urge my students to read the writings of Mao, and I think all of us ought to read the writings of Lenin and of Stalin.

Senator FERGUSON. But why do you think Mr. Carter, as the head of IPR, was trying to use that means of getting a Communist book read by these officials? What do you think he was trying to do?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't feel like taking the responsibility for Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not say to a student if you gave him a Communist book, "This is by a Communist," but were they going to tell my colleagues that this was by a Communist? No; they were getting Little-Brown to do it because Senator Vandenberg might have been suspicious, Carter thought, if he would try to get them to read it. What do you think of that kind of business?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I admire Mr. Carter for certain good qualities and things that he has done.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this one of them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not have done that myself. I do not want to take responsibility for everything that he has done along that line.

Senator FERGUSON. Professor, you wouldn't send to me a book by a Communist to get me to read it, would you, and not tell me it was by a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read the P. S. on this letter?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

P. S.—I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

So that indicates that Mr. Epstein was in on this, does it not, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sorry, I didn't follow that.

Mr. MORRIS. I will read it again:

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

Does that not indicate to you that Epstein was in on this with Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was informed by Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think on this whole thing it would help if we looked at the book—

Senator FERGUSON. Let us forget what is in the book.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because the book was the thing that was going to have the influence. That book, if you will look at it you can see, is based on the hand out stuff from the Chinese Communists and it doesn't pretend not to be. It quotes time after time the Chinese Communist radio, and all their phony statistics and that kind of stuff. It is perfectly obvious that that is a book which is pro-Communist, which

has been reviewed that way. I tell my students that is a book that puts together the Communist story on the liberated areas. Epstein was putting together this story and putting it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not just what Carter was trying to keep away from the Senators when he said——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't gather it was suppressed.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

A letter from me might lead a few of them to think I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

Then going over in the same letter :

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, this has come up before in the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you have not been here before.

Mr. FAIRBANK. You want my opinion on that?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I am going to read and then I will ask you some questions:

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he was generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically.

That is the book that you describe as phony Communist propaganda.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sorry. I said with phony Communist statistics. Communist statistics are always phony.

Senator FERGUSON. Communist statistics are phony. Here is the head of the institute saying this about John Carter Vincent. Don't you think he was trying to get the Communist line to Vincent in a well organized logical way and that he was trying to get it to these Senators and to the Secretary of State so as to influence their opinion on the Chinese policy? Is there anything else that you can read from that letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a question of Mr. Carter and his personality and the way he does things.

Senator FERGUSON. No, it is a question of what the IPR was doing under Carter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't see that that follows, sir, because IPR is a much broader organization than Edward C. Carter, and this one letter of his may have been balanced by a number of others on other books. I haven't seen the files of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Just look at the next sentence. "If he were sold"—talking about Carter—"on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover." Here is a book that you recognize as Communist sending it to the Secretary of the Far Eastern Division here in 1947—this is June 1947. Marshall is then over in China trying to create a combination of the two governments.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He had come back then. In the beginning of 1947 he came back. He came back in January 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. He is still working on it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we disagree here about what is a book. I think that a book of this kind is something that you can take and look at and not be infected by. I think that General Marshall in particular is well able to look at a book from any source and make up his mind about it and not be overwhelmed or infected or led astray.

It seems to me that Mr. Carter's idea of spreading this book and I don't know how many other books he may have spread on other aspects, anti-Communist or anything else—this is only one book, I don't know the rest of the record on Mr. Carter and his book spreading, but it seems to me the spreading of this particular book is allowing people in the Government to see material which is pretty plainly pro-Communist. I don't believe that that is an undercover job.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, if you had wished to get a copy of this book into the hands of the men who have been mentioned by Senator Ferguson, you would have been willing to have done it on your own initiative openly and above board, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. You would not have sought the intervention of Little-Brown & Co. to have gotten it to them without their appreciating or having been told that it was in effect Communist propaganda. You wouldn't have done that yourself, would you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I might well have asked my publishers to distribute it. I don't know what was in the mind of Mr. Carter in that ambiguous phrase about having the publisher do it instead of himself.

Senator SMITH. You heard what was read there about what his plans were.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Let me read you more of his plans. The thing that I am having difficulty with this morning is your defense of the IPR on this item.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let's establish what is my defense of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. From your answers, is all I can say.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't said that.

Senator FERGUSON. I have some of your answers. Let's go a little further. He says: "Of course many will say that Epstein is a special pleader." You have said that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is how I described him.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders.

He is in a way advocating a sound analysis of the world with these phony statistics in this Communist-written book; is he not? He is advocating that in that sentence; is he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is advocating that it be seen, that it be looked at.

Senator WATKINS. Read from cover to cover also.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all? Is that all he is trying to do? Let's go a little further and find out. "I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice."

He certainly wanted a favorable report on this book, didn't he, and he thought the one man who could do it was Owen Lattimore.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say that Mr. Carter was promoting that book.

Senator FERGUSON. I think your answer——

Senator WATKINS. Is obviously correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure that the promotion of a book which is pretty obviously pro-Communist——

Senator FERGUSON. Not if it is out in the open. Why did he not say "Here is a pro-Communist book. Here is a book that has phony

statistics in it. Let's get it to the Senators; let's get it to the Secretary of State, to try to influence their opinion. Tell them that it is a phony." He didn't do that; did he?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have forgotten the phrase he uses there about his publisher sending it instead of himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Let's go on a little further, what he knows about this book. "I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the 'forbidden' list for import in China."

You would have thought so, too, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Probably.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Yat-sen, and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

In other words, get it in before the Government prohibits it from going in.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I ask, Senator—excuse me, do you want to continue?

Senator FERGUSON. No; that is the end of it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do you want me on the basis of this letter to condemn the IPR?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this question: Do you not think that the IPR on this particular case—let's isolate it—through Mr. Carter, was trying to influence the foreign policy of the United States of America in its relation to China and the Far East?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. I think that Mr. Carter was trying to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you isolate Carter from the IPR and why do you do it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because of the nature of the IPR. It is a private organization. It is a very disjointed decentralized kind of thing. It has these two main lines of work, one that Carter has organized, mainly of conferences, the other that William Holland has organized, mainly of a publication program which I think has made a real contribution in getting materials published, sound materials.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I tried to isolate this and get it in one case. Didn't Carter, the IPR, try to do this? It is among the IPR papers that we take.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say Mr. Carter was making that effort to promote that book, but I don't believe it is fair to say that the IPR as an organization is characterized by that incident.

Senator FERGUSON. You know that an organization must be responsible to its officers for what they do, is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. And its members.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, its members, if they know what is going on. Were you on the board at this time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In 1947 I became a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. I take for granted you were not consulted about this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not. That was not an official act in my view. That was not an act of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me why the IPR does not rise up in righteous wrath against Carter on this particular isolated case?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There have been criticisms.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had known he wrote that letter, what would you have said as a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would have said that is a private letter.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you have said? How are you going to take him away from the organization that he is so closely allied with? What would you have said? Did you know about this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I never heard of it. If the IPR were better organized we would have written "personal" at the top of that because I suppose it was on IPR stationery. It is a Government procedure which is very desirable.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did not.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is true, I imagine.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I have the book for a minute? I will ask you some more questions later.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, let me ask you this: Who in the IPR exercised more authority or performed more services for and in the name of the IPR than Mr. Carter? Anyone?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is a rather broad question because of the nature of the IPR. I don't mean to take your time unnecessarily, but you know how it is set up with these 10 different councils.

Senator SMITH. I am just asking who in all that group acted for and in behalf of the IPR more than Mr. Carter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wouldn't say that any one person acted for and on behalf of the whole organization. It wasn't set up to operate that way. It had groups and these numbers operated, and then it had committees and the committees operated, very loosely.

Senator SMITH. Regardless of how loose it may have been, and I can quite agree that that is probably true, is it not a fact that Mr. Carter acted to a great extent for and on behalf of the IPR than any other individual?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not be certain about his acting for and on behalf in a formal sense. There is no question that he was very active as a person.

Senator SMITH. Who else performed to a greater extent for and on behalf of the IPR than Mr. Carter? I put that question that way.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is a head of the American Council of the IPR, which he was not. There is a head of the International Council of the IPR, which he was not. There is a head of each national council in each country, which he was not.

Senator SMITH. Can you name the names of those men offhand?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can get them out of a book.

Senator SMITH. Can you name them offhand?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He has had continuity.

Senator SMITH. Can you name them offhand yourself? You can't, can you, no one else can, but you can name Mr. Carter, can you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I think he has been associated with the IPR continuously over a long period.

Senator SMITH. And represented in more different ways than any other one individual.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you need to distinguish what is formal representation and what is Mr. Carter's activity being known as an IPR man.

Senator SMITH. What you are trying to say as I understand is that there may have been times when Mr. Carter acted beyond the scope of his authority.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There again I don't know that his authority was ever specifically statutorily limited because of this looseness of organization.

Senator SMITH. I was trying to help you out a little.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question. Was he the spokesman for the IPR, internationally, and generally regarded as such?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say in human terms he was one of the most active people among the group who tried to build up this private organization to have conferences and promote research. He was one of the most active.

Senator WATKINS. He was in charge of the office, he was the executive secretary, he wrote the letters, he carried out the policies decided upon by the board, did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He did at certain times.

Senator WATKINS. While he was the executive secretary he did whatever the board wanted him to do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There have been others.

Senator WATKINS. They gave him a lot of general authority, as a matter of fact, according to the testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There had been other executive secretaries. There were other people in a statutory position who had superior power to him.

Senator WATKINS. But they were not the spokesman. They didn't speak. They did not write for it. They were not active, were they?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, one point about the IPR has always been that it has no spokesman because it does not take a position in the Constitution and in every book it publishes it is stated the IPR does not take a position on matters of policy of any kind.

Senator FERGUSON. But when they publish the book and circulate it they take a position in publishing it, do they not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Like any magazine, like Foreign Affairs or the New York Times. They say we put this out as something that may contribute, but they put out a tremendous number of these things and only a very small proportion have any leftist tinge.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you the question: With respect to this letter I believe you said you had never heard of it before.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I saw it in the testimony.

Senator SMITH. Therefore it was not authorized to be written by the governing board or the trustees of the IPR.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not.

Senator SMITH. Therefore, to that extent that was a surreptitious maneuver by Mr. Carter, was it not, to do just what he was saying should be done there about getting this book across to these people without saying openly this is a Communist propaganda book?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Carter has been associated with the IPR and has been so useful partly because he is a promoter by temperament.

Senator SMITH. But you would say that was a surreptitious maneuver by him, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think so. He sent a copy to one person and to other people the letter is in the file. The whole thing is wide open.

Senator SMITH. It was surreptitious as far as you were concerned, was it not, because you did not know about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surreptitious means you are trying to keep it from somebody. He did not try to keep it. If I called him up he would send me a copy.

Senator SMITH. I am not talking about the book now. There is a difference between the book and the maneuver, the method. He didn't tell you he was doing this, did he?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not; but I didn't ask him.

Senator SMITH. To that extent he kept it from you, did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wouldn't want him to send me copies of everything he does.

Senator SMITH. I didn't say the book. I said the maneuver, the method he adopted.

Mr. FAIRBANK. As far as his relation to me, I being a trustee and he writing this letter, I don't feel that it was surreptitious of him not to send me a copy of this letter because his letter was a personal letter, a personal act.

Senator SMITH. Has the board ever repudiated that maneuver of Mr. Carter's?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator SMITH. Why?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It has been under fire ever since this came out. No board under fire wants to start repudiating people.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you not come out when you are under fire and say this was a mistake?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, personally, I would be happy to say so.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you say now.

Mr. FAIRBANK. From my personal point of view, but purely in a personal matter of judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not true that the trustees held Carter out to do this or similar acts, to circulate books, to get information about the Far East out to the public, out to public officials? Was that not one of his jobs? You said you hired him because he was a promoter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We didn't hire him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he was hired by somebody.

Senator SMITH. Who hired him? That may be interesting. Who did hire Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a question, how does a private organization get born?

Senator SMITH. He "borned" it, did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't believe he was one of the first founders. I believe it began in Hawaii about 1925 with some people in the YMCA and in business. They brought in some professors. They have always had this tripartite business, scholarship, and so on. Mr. Carter became interested in it—I don't know why I should repeat his life history. I don't know it as well as he does.

Senator FERGUSON. Now answer my question.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He began to work in it.

Senator FERGUSON. You said he got working in it and was being paid by you. Now answer my question. Did not you people on the board of directors hold out to the public that he was authorized to promote just such matters concerning the Far East? Did you not hold it out to the public and to the public officials?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Being a trustee, I in effect gave him or any other officer a vote of confidence.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think I would still give them a vote of confidence.

Senator FERGUSON. After seeing this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; because this letter, while I don't approve of it, I don't think tore down the foundations of our state. I don't think it is highly subversive. I think it was an error in judgment in my own view—

Senator FERGUSON. You said they were phony statistics about the Communists in China.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we have got to know more about the Communists, including their phony statistics. We have to know more about them in every possible way in order to deal with them. The IPR is committed to that proposition, that you put out as much information as you can.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to say that the policy in the Far East was the proper policy as far as you, as a historian, are concerned?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Now we leave the IPR, I trust, because the policy of the State Department is one that I supported when General Marshall was trying—I do support that policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You support that policy?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in China at the time and I saw no alternative to head off the civil war except that effort.

Senator FERGUSON. So if this book influenced our policy in the Far East it was perfectly all right as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let me put it this way: As a professor I favor books of all kinds being available to all kinds of people. If a publisher is willing to put out a book and if a fellow is willing to spend any time looking at it, I think that is up to him. I think everybody has to have that opportunity to look at this stuff.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that the public ought to know who his author is, who he really is, whether he is a Communist? Is that not just the purpose of this letter, to keep them from knowing that? The people he wanted to influence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have said—

Senator SMITH. Let us see if you cannot answer that question because we have been getting a little far afield. Answer yes or no.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say "yes"?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. FAIRBANK. The question is, should not Mr. Carter have advertised Epstein as a Communist when he advertised the book or when he promoted it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Epstein was following the Communist line.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have said here that I regarded him as either a fellow traveler or a Communist. Mr. Carter did not take the stand of labeling Epstein as a subversive character.

Senator SMITH. The question is, when that was put in circulation should he not have done that?

Senator FERGUSON. Should he have?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say he should have only if he had evidence, only if he believed that Epstein was a subversive character. Maybe his opinion of Epstein disagrees with mine. Who am I to judge Mr. Carter's opinion of a third party?

Senator FERGUSON. You were not so careful about McGovern in your testimony this morning, were you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was as to a matter of fact. This has to be a matter of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. Now wait a minute.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you knew the facts here about Epstein.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I testified I do now.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the facts about being in China.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I distinguish between the fact of a man's being in Peking in 1937, which is a physical thing, and the fact or opinion, whichever you want to call it, that a man is a Communist? My opinion was that Epstein was a Communist; but I had no factual proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this letter of Carter's not indicate that he knows what this fellow is, this special pleader, as he calls him, and so forth, and how he has organized it so well? He knows it is going to be prohibited by the Chinese from coming in. Now let's get it in first.

I will ask you this question: Isn't this exactly how the Communists do things? Isn't it exactly like they do things?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't follow that exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that this is what is known as the party line to get material that is communistic into the hands of people who do not know or have reason to believe it is communistic? Is that not part of the party line?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have pointed out, first, this book was pretty obviously pro-Communist.

Senator SMITH. Let us see if we cannot answer the questions as we go along.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have three in succession. Let's have them one after the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this not exactly the party line?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that the Communists do not try to get Communist literature out in the hands of people who do not know or have reason to believe that it is the Communist literature, but that is their line, that is the way they penetrate public opinion. Is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I am well aware of that effort of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I ask you whether that is not the party line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A line is a policy. The operation is what you are describing, I think. The line is a policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this not the way they do it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is the way they operate; yes. Others also——

Senator FERGUSON. As far as this particular case was concerned Carter was following the party line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. The party line——

Senator FERGUSON. Party operation.

Senator SMITH. You mean the method of party operation.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The question is was Carter following the Communist method.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We define that Communist method as putting out——

Senator FERGUSON. This kind of method.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Putting out something without indicating its source.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Knowingly.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowingly or having reason to believe it was the Communist propaganda.

Mr. FAIRBANK. First, I don't know whether Carter thought that Epstein was a Communist or not. I can't testify to that.

Senator FERGUSON. That wasn't what I asked you, whether you knew it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am trying to answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you whether it was the party line and whether he was following the line. Whether he did it consciously or unconsciously we will have to determine.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That word "line," sir, ought to be modified.

Senator FERGUSON. I know you do not like the word "line."

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a technical term.

Senator FERGUSON. You know what I mean.

Senator SMITH. They were following the Communist method of operation. That is the question you are willing to answer, rather than the party line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. He was following the Communist method.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think many promoters follow a Communist method of operation in these terms. Many promoters follow that method. All kinds of lobbyists around the country.

Senator SMITH. That is what Mr. Carter was doing here, was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; but that doesn't indicate he is doing a Communist operation. Because there are all kinds of American promoters.

Senator FERGUSON. We will draw that conclusion. We will have to.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. What is the next question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I trust I have made myself clear on that. You can have a parallel type of operation, where a man is trying to promote something, and many Americans do it but they are not necessarily Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You read this letter; did you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read it before; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think there is evidence in this letter that Carter knew that this fellow was a Communist or a fellow traveler, as you describe him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not know how Mr. Carter would state that in his own mind. It seems to me plain that Mr. Carter knew he was sympathetic to the Communists and this was a Communist view, and he said so in the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. But he said to conceal that part and get it over there before they close in on them and put the bronze curtain down, get it to these Senators and the Secretary of State and this adviser to the Secretary.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was promoting it. There is no question about that.

Senator WATKINS. You do not think that was a function of Mr. Carter as executive secretary of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sure it was a personal act.

Senator WATKINS. Purely personal? It would not have been carrying out any of his duties in the IPR in doing that, according to your version.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't believe that is a regular function of his to undertake personal promotion.

Senator WATKINS. You were a trustee at the time and you would know.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There were 60 trustees scattered around the country and we met maybe once a year.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, the trustees left the operation of the IPR almost entirely to Mr. Carter, didn't they, to the executive secretary?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Only—

Senator WATKINS. They met once a year, scattered all over the country and they necessarily could not follow it if they returned over the operation to him and he in effect was their spokesman.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In one respect.

Senator WATKINS. And so held himself out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In the organization of the conferences. In the same way they left to a vote of confidence of a committee the question of research. Then they had the question of finance and international organizations and so forth.

Senator WATKINS. When they met once a year how long would they meet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. All day.

Senator WATKINS. Spend 1 day on it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is all.

Senator WATKINS. And then turn this plan loose with the operation. He was the voluble member of the IPR, the vocal member I should have said.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it would be a misconception to consider the IPR as a highly integrated network, with a centralized head who could manipulate this thing and just make bells ring all over the country and influence opinion that way.

Senator WATKINS. He apparently did. You say you did not think it was organized that way, but that is the way it was actually operating, was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not to my knowledge, sir. I think it is a distorted thing, loosely organized.

Senator WATKINS. We did not know about it but we are now calling it to your attention.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read that and I know it is the kind of thing Mr. Carter would do as an individual.

Senator WATKINS. He did not make any distinguishing remarks to indicate that that was purely personal on his part and not as secretary of the IPR, did he?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We are operating here with a private agency, and I agree it is not tightly organized.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you now, Mr. Fairbank, the question I asked you away back and we sort of lost track of it. Mr. Carter was a full-time employee of the IPR. There were a few other full-time employees, were there not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Not very many?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Most of the work of the IPR was done by the people who were on committees and who donated their time, people like research committees and others who were handling publications. Most of the work is in publications.

Senator SMITH. I am trying to pin this down to get what were the duties and necessarily opportunities of Mr. Carter. He was really what we might call, determine as, and call the head man of the IPR organization.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not think so, sir.

Senator SMITH. Who——

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was not set up that way.

Senator SMITH. Among all the employees or officers of the IPR, who exercised more authority or more control or spent more time on the IPR affairs than Mr. Carter? Just give us the name because we certainly would like to get him up here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If you take William L. Holland, he was then in charge of the research and publications much of the time. That was a full-time job.

Senator SMITH. All right, he was a subordinate of Mr. Carter, was he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not always.

Senator SMITH. Sometimes, we will say. We will say it that way.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure how that subordination works.

Senator SMITH. Did he recognize himself as subordinate to Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, we are discussing a 20-year period here. These people shifted around.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he eventually succeed Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In which position, secretary general?

Mr. SOURWINE. In any position.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have briefed myself on my own affairs here, but I haven't briefed myself on the IPR.

Senator SMITH. You were a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The way these people shifted around is sometimes confusing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a trustee, and you have at least shown some interest in defending Mr. Carter, which, so far as I am concerned, is entirely all right. Now I am asking you who in the IPR organization, if anybody, was over and above Mr. Carter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is very plain.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us that. If it is plain, tell us that.

MR. FAIRBANK. The Pacific Council of the IPR. It is called that. It represents all the different constituent bodies that had a head. The constituent head of it was the head of the IPR.

MR. SOURWINE. Who was that?

MR. FAIRBANK. For a long time it was Dr. Dafoe, a man in Canada. At another time it was Dr. Tarr. Another time it was Corbett, professor from Yale.

MR. SOURWINE. You don't mean to compare the extent of their activities with Mr. Carter's, do you?

MR. FAIRBANK. In my office, I come in 1 hour a day, and my secretary works all the time. The amount of work done——

MR. SOURWINE. You better leave that out because, you see, I am a university trustee, too, and I have always said that professors work an hour a day and the rest of us do the work. Some of my professors won't like that.

MR. FAIRBANK. Sir, I spend the rest of the time in the library.

MR. SOURWINE. Oh. Anyhow, can you name anybody who was over and above Mr. Carter in directing the affairs of the IPR?

MR. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed. I can very definitely do that.

MR. SOURWINE. Who?

MR. FAIRBANK. The head of the Pacific Council. That was a man elected about every 3 years and he had the authority of being the head of the IPR. Mr. Carter was a paid secretary general.

MR. SOURWINE. What was this man's name?

MR. FAIRBANK. The man shifted every 3 years. Dr. Tarr, from Canada, is one man. Another one I remember——

MR. SOURWINE. During the term of his office——

MR. FAIRBANK. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. He didn't move to New York to the headquarters?

MR. FAIRBANK. No. This is a case where you have a private organization. There are paid employees of it. The heads of the organizations take the responsibility. They met twice a year, usually, at an international gathering. It has to be. It traveled to England this past month, or wherever it was. They set down the main policies. They approve the main research program and the conference program, and then the paid people have to do the operating.

MR. SOURWINE. Who would you say is the head of Harvard University? I believe that is your school, is it not?

MR. FAIRBANK. This is a very interesting point. The head of Harvard University is the Harvard Corp.

MR. SOURWINE. That is the organization.

MR. FAIRBANK. And not President Conant. He is the president.

MR. SOURWINE. Who is the administrative head of Harvard University?

MR. FAIRBANK. The provost, who acts for the president. Even Harvard University is a little bit disjointed.

SENATOR SMITH. It really has gotten that reputation, not to my way of thinking, maybe. Don't you know, Mr. Fairbank, just simply and plainly, that Mr. Carter, whatever way he may have been denominated, was really the head man in the IPR when it came to exercising the functions that were supposed to be exercised by the IPR?

MR. FAIRBANK. No, sir.

SENATOR SMITH. You do not think Carter was the head man then?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is a constitutional question. The constitution of the IPR does not set him up as the head man.

Senator SMITH. Do you not know that the records which we seized were seized on his farm, in his barn, and he had custody of them? How can you sit there and say——

Mr. FAIRBANK. My secretary has my files. She does not run me.

Senator SMITH. Does she have a farm she secrets them in, or a barn?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They are not that big.

Senator SMITH. You know that is not comparable, Mr. Fairbank. Do you not know that Mr. Carter was the head administrative officer of the IPR in its dealings with the public and with everybody else, that he was the head administrative officer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't mean to quibble here.

Senator SMITH. That is what you are getting to. I do not want you to quibble, either, because I want to give you a chance.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would have to say no to your question specifically but I would like to explain it.

Senator SMITH. Who then is over and above Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Pacific council.

Senator SMITH. The individuals. What individual has authority?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The head of the Pacific council.

Senator SMITH. What individual has authority over and above Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The head of the Pacific council.

Senator SMITH. Have you read the evidence of the efforts which Mr. Carter made to get money hither and yon for this institute and to carry on its work? You know he was the main ramrod, to put it another way, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was certainly the most active person. And there were other people very active.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you become a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was elected first on April 11, 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. 1944.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did no active participation in any trustee activities. I was in Government service.

Senator FERGUSON. When did Kohlberg make certain charges against the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I met Mr. Kohlberg in China——

Senator FERGUSON. No. When did he make the charges?

Mr. FAIRBANK. After that.

Senator FERGUSON. After you became a trustee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. After I met him in China in 1943. I think it was about 1944 or after.

Senator FERGUSON. He made some charges about the IPR; did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did the trustees investigate them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let me get straight my position as a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. I am not asking you about your position as a trustee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was not a trustee in 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they investigate him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The investigation went on, as I understand it, in 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not going on in 1945?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It may well have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not go on in 1947?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure how much further it went on in 1947, because the whole thing was discussed and voted on before 1947. Isn't that right? I don't remember these dates.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not voted on when you were there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As to that, I am not sure. There was a gap, you see, when I was not a trustee after 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you have investigate this thing; Carter?—when Kohlberg made his charges.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My recollection is that a committee of businessmen connected with the American council of the IPR formed an investigating committee, and they went into that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. When did you file this letter in the barn?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I guess it wasn't in the barn yet; was it? It was in the New York office.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't they find it in the New York office?

Senator SMITH. I would have been a lot easier.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say that for them to find that letter would have taken much more money and time than they had.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was too big a job to be done, so they just went blithely over it, whitewashed it, and said everything was fine. We are being accused here for finding these things, as I understand it; that we are going too deeply into this thing. Is that not one of the charges?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I didn't know you were being accused, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not accusing anybody of that.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but is that not one of the charges against the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, I don't know what that investigating committee may have found. They may have read this letter and they may have said, "Here is Carter promoting again, and God help us," or something.

Senator FERGUSON. But they didn't tell the public "God help them."

Mr. FAIRBANK. They had to decide on the basis of that letter and all the other letters. There were lots of them. You haven't put out all the other letters because it is this one letter that you have pointed to.

Senator SMITH. We have not got to all of them yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Should this not be criticized by the trustees, this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think, if you are going to scrutinize an executive officer who has been a paid employee, you have to take this into account the total picture of what he has done. It is only fair to the man.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the cagey letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was written back in the 1930's from Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. It was in 1938; yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was 8 years before.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a designation as to what he was doing. He didn't resent that. He went right along with it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have had a lot of discussion here, and I don't want to take the responsibility for this cagey letter you speak of.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you to. I am wondering whether or not now you are satisfied with the investigation that was made by the IPR itself. Are you satisfied with that investigation?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am afraid so. I think that investigation was judging on the broad proportions, the main content of the activity of the IPR vis-à-vis Mr. Kohlberg's charges. Mr. Kohlberg's charges were quite specific in some cases and they were quite general in other cases. Those people dealt with him as best they could.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a charge by Kohlberg that there was penetration of the Communists into this organization. We now find that 11 of those people that did write and penetrated this organization have refused to testify on the ground that it would tend to incriminate them as to whether or not they were Communists.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't that list. May I get that list of 11, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you can get that list.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because I have heard of only three or four.

Senator FERGUSON. It is 11; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir; it is 11.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is the fact. The IPR membership is something like—what is it?—1,500 or so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am not talking about the membership; I am talking about Kohlberg's charges. The membership didn't penetrate this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. These 11 are all employees?

Senator FERGUSON. No; the writers for it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Some are just members or some are writers.

Senator FERGUSON. No; they are writers. The 11 had something to do with writing for the IPR, and that was Kohlberg's charge.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Is it possible that there were perhaps 200 or 300 writers in all?

Senator FERGUSON. It could be.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And that this is maybe 2 or 3 or 4 percent of those writers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So, then, you think Kohlberg wasn't justified unless they got more than 50 percent Communists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am quite ready to state that I think an infiltration effort was made in the IPR and I don't think it got very far.

Senator FERGUSON. If it got 11 in there.

Mr. FAIRBANK. As indicated by 11. Eleven is a very small number of writers out of 200 or 300 or maybe 500 that they have had.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not indicate now that the secretary knew of the penetration and that he was helping it along by this letter that I just read to you here, the Epstein booklet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that is going rather far.

Senator FERGUSON. How far do you want to go?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not that far.

Senator FERGUSON. How far?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you have to build this up by specific instances, as you are doubtless doing, but not just one specific instance.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about this letter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We are trying to generalize here about hundreds of articles and books and hundreds of people. You name 11 persons, and then you say there is this one letter. I think that indicates——

Senator FERGUSON. I can show you many letters, but you can't do it all at once.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What about this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we are debating here a question of proportion.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your answer now to my question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure I remember your question.

Senator SMITH. We have just had a quorum call. I think we will now recess. There is one question I would like to ask you. Senator Ferguson can come back to these others later. When you were talking about these records, did you ever attend a meeting in Mr. Carter's barn in Lee, Mass., of people interested?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I have never been to his barn, and have never been to Lee, Mass.

Senator SMITH. Wherever it is, you have never been to Mr. Carter's barn where the papers are?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator SMITH. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order.

Where were we at the time of recess?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 9, I think, after the word "I" on line 5.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right. You would like me to continue reading, Senator?

Senator SMITH. Yes; if that is your wish, Mr. Fairbank.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD WAIT, ESQ.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I had just referred to Miss Bentley's statement, and I was replying that competent American observers definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist in 1943, nor did I. This continues.

As the widow of Sun Yat-sen, the so-called Father of the Chinese Republic and the so-called permanent director of the Kuomintang, Madame Sun seemed to be trying to stay above party. I attach below the expert opinions of reputable American correspondents, beginning with A. T. Steele of the New York Herald Tribune.

Senator SMITH. There is a question there. We don't want to cut anything out that you want to put in, but that manifestly is an unsworn opinion of somebody. If his evidence is going to be here, he ought to be here to cross-examine.

Mr. FAIRBANK. All of these people I am quoting are out of the country, I think; so it isn't possible.

Senator SMITH. From the standpoint of the committee we ought to have only facts here. I do not want to cut you off or quibble about

little things. But you are starting out to quote somebody who isn't here for us to cross-examine. The question is whether or not we should go ahead and put that in.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if I have it right, the exhibit is October 5, 1951; so, it couldn't have been possibly known by the witness at the time that he brought this matter over. That was in what year?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't follow on this, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have the Steele article—you did not know what his opinion was—when you brought the parcel over, or whatever it was.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let me explain. This letter from Steele is written to me at my request.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Over his signature.

Senator FERGUSON. But in 1951—

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; and I have a photostat of it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not know at the time that the fact occurred that Miss Bentley was talking about.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is testifying as to his recollection. I am testifying as to mine. He is corroborating me; that is all I am proposing.

Senator SMITH. But the point is that he is not sworn.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He can't be; he isn't in the country.

Senator SMITH. That is the point. I know you appreciate the situation.

Mr. WAIT. Sir, may I suggest something to the witness? I think it could be shortened down and kept within its limits here.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, I have consulted my counsel, and I would say this: That I have received certain letters, and I have here, if the committee would like to see them, photostatic copies, and I believe these letters to be genuine; they were in response to queries that I made, and they, in my view, are from reputable correspondents who were named in the statement here. As a basis of having received these, I feel they corroborate my view. It isn't necessary to quote the unsworn testimony of these persons; so, I can move on to another page.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but, so the record is clear, they are all dated after the fact; they are dated just recently.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, can't we agree on this: Beginning with the words "I attach," on page 9—if your counsel will observe there—the rest of that page and all of page 10 is a quotation from letters or newspaper statements? Now, if you wish to submit those for further examination by the committee, that will be all right. But, could not those two pages be stricken out and get down to page 11, where you are beginning to talk about the facts?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Might it be usual, sir, if I gave you these transcripts and they were put into the record of the committee. They are not very long, and they do bear on this point, which I think is a matter of fact that you want to get at, and we won't have to read them and take your time.

Senator SMITH. The committee will be glad to consider them. Whether we should load the record with the opinion of somebody else not sworn is a different thing. In other words, a person could bring

in here a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand letters from people which would be ex parte statements, and one which we would not have a chance to cross-examine unless they were present. Manifestly, the committee cannot go that far. But you may file those letters, and the staff members will examine them. If you wish to make any further point later about them, I for one would be perfectly willing to let you do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have a question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was consulting them.

Mr. WAIT. I agreed with the chairman that these should be filed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I pass these over to you, sir. This is a letter from Archibald Steele, dated Ankara, Turkey, October 5, 1951, a photostat. This is a letter from Tillman Durdin, dated Hong Kong, September 21, 1951, a photostat. This is a letter from Brooks Atkinson, dated New York Times, New York, September 26, 1951, a photostat. This is a letter from Christopher Rand, dated Hong Kong, October 23, 1951.

This is a letter from Robert P. Martin dated Nieman Foundation, Cambridge, Mass., October 4, 1951.

This is a photostat of the New York Times editorial page for Saturday, August 21, 1948, an editorial headed "China Reports." That is what is covered in this.

Senator SMITH. That is material, as I understand, Mr. Fairbank, which you gathered in preparation for this hearing.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And which you are going to tender to our committee so that we may make whatever use we wish to with it. Then that would mean that you will not have to go through reading pages 9 and 10, but can go to the top of page 11 where you start on the facts again.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. All right, we will proceed that way.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 557A, B," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 557-A

CHINA REPORTS

(New York Times editorial on Mme. Sun, August 21, 1943)

If there is one person in China who is recognized by most Chinese as standing above party and politics it is Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the father of modern China but a great lady in her own right. If there is one activity to which no ideological strings are attached, although a great deal of its work is done in areas held by the Communists, it is the China Welfare Fund, which she heads. Its work is told in a small booklet recently released by the China Aid Council, Inc., 1790 Broadway, which forwards American contributions to Madame Sun at the Fund's headquarters, 86 Kwantung Lu, Shanghai.

The booklet explaining the work of the China Welfare Fund is titled "Madame Sun Reports." It might well have been called "China Reports." For one of Madame Sun's cardinal principles is that help shall be given by the Fund only to those who help themselves. As an earnest of this attitude the Fund's strongest drive is made in China itself, where one-quarter of its money is raised. The booklet itself explains how Chinese of all political creeds cooperate in Madame Sun's work and how the recipients of grants from the Fund use its money only as a starting point for organization of their activities.

The most spectacular work of the China Welfare Fund has been in the Communist-held areas of North China—not to help communism but to aid innocent and suffering people. Through the impetus of money and materials sent in

by the Fund, a system of hospitals—called International Peace Hospitals or, just by their initials, IPIH's—and medical schools have been established in areas that have never had such service before. They are all small. They all have been harassed, first by the war against Japan and since 1945 by civil war. But they have continued to grow and to carry to people who never before had known relief from pain in illness, or even the rudiments of sanitation and preventive medicine, the marvels of modern medical care and of sanitary practices that can keep in check the epidemic diseases that in ages past have decimated whole areas almost overnight.

No American who has been in China and who has had an opportunity to investigate the work of Madame Sun's Welfare Fund but who has enthusiastically endorsed it. Contributors can know that their money will go to help the Chinese people regardless of creed or political party.

EXHIBIT No. 557-B

COGITATIONS OF A SPY

(Copy of article in Moscow journal New Times, January 18, 1950, p. 23)

Last year's summer conference of the Harvard University staff heard four papers on U. S. policy in the Far East. These papers have now been published in the form of a pamphlet entitled "NEXT STEP IN ASIA."

One of them—"Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia," by a certain John K. Fairbank—outlines a program of action which amounts in brief to this—that the United States must try to undermine the Asian national-liberation movements from within.

"The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China," Fairbank writes, "cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defence lines nor by arms shipments from abroad, but only by competition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power."

Fairbank wants to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the democratic, anti-imperialist camp. In regard to China, he realizes, the United States is most unlikely to achieve results. "Our more active policy," he therefore declares, "should centre on non-Communist Asia"—Southeast Asia, Japan, Southern Korea, and also India. For these countries he proposes a rapid mobilization and allocation of American "specialized personnel," who would be able to "develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities" and "assist local leaders."

Thus, according to Fairbank's plan, the American intelligence service is to seek out traitors and agents-provocateurs of the Hatta and Shahrir type, and to worm its men into the Communist Parties and other progressive organizations. Besides the training of special agents for this purpose, Fairbank proposes that the American missions, and such American organizations as the YMCA, should become more active. He also suggests establishing American "research institutes," tourists' "field stations," and similar footholds in the Asian countries.

The meaning of Fairbank's plans becomes still more evident after a glance at this Harvard history professor's record. The war found John K. Fairbank in China, where he had been living for seven years, and where he remained during the war, and for some time after its conclusion. In 1942-43, he was special assistant to the American Ambassador at Chungking; in 1945-46, head of the "U. S. Office of War Information in China"—in other words, an American intelligence agent of no small calibre. And this, it seems, remains his basic trade at Harvard as well. His professorial thoughts turn persistently in one direction; that of using learned institutions and scientific study as cover for espionage and sabotage.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Beginning at the top of page 11:

Secondly, regarding Miss Bentley's half truth as I have already stated on my own initiative to the Department of the Army, I did indeed accept a letter from Madame Sun and bring it back to the head of the China Aid Council when I returned from Chungking in December 1943. I understood Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work, to which the China Aid Council contributed. I brought back several other letters or pack-

ages along with Madame Sun's letter, as travelers usually did in war-time China, and they all passed through the regular customs censorship inspection. I have no recollection or knowledge of what was in Madame Sun's letter in 1943. If I had thought it was Communist, I would not have carried it.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I just inquire then, about your statement, that "I understand Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report." If you did not know what was in it, how do you get that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. An understanding, in my view, is a possible basis of one's action, whereas knowledge by seeing is something a little bit more.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a conversation with her as to what was in the letter or package or whatever it was you were bringing over in 1943?

Mr. FAIRBANK. My recollection of that period is not very precise. I was leaving Chungking in a great hurry, seeing a great many officials. I believe I went to call on her to say good-by. I had seen her once or perhaps twice before. I don't recall precisely the details of that period, I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is the difficulty with receiving a statement like that in the record: I understood you to say in the statement, and it is under oath, "I understand Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work, to which the China Aid Council contributed." Now, what is the basis of that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, the basis, very definitely, is my experience in that period at the end of November, and the beginning of December 1943, in Chungking, when I was preparing to come back to this country. Now we come to the question what exactly was that experience? You see I obtain the impression from that experience, and I testify as to that.

Senator SMITH. I think, though, Mr. Fairbank, we ought to get down to the specific question asked. You say, "I understood Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work." Now, how can you say that, we are asking you, how can you say that in view of the further fact you stated just now that you did not read the letter and did not see the letter? How do you know what was in the letter, whether it was a report or not? She might have been asking for more funds and not reporting at all.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't want to repeat myself unnecessarily, but I distinguished, I think, a moment ago, between understanding, which is an intellectual impression, a conviction one receives.

Senator SMITH. It is supposed to be derived from some observation of facts, though, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Now, what are the facts that you observed that caused you to reach the conclusion that this was a perfectly proper report?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Those are the things that I do not recollect, and I am testifying as to the impression that I received from that experience of those facts. I think that is a very common thing in this kind of testimony. This is one very small incident, a long time ago, in a very crowded period of my activity.

Senator FERGUSON. But are you not also making objections to this committee receiving that kind of testimony? Isn't that your criticism of the Budenz testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't believe my testifying as to my understand—it is hearsay, I didn't hear it from anyone else, it is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but you have to get it from facts.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. What are the facts?

Mr. FAIRBANK. My experience at that period.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the experience?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, there are a number of different possible experiences I may have had, and I am not sure which one I had, either in talking to Madame Sun or not.

Senator SMITH. The point about it is, Mr. Fairbank, you made a statement that you understood it was a perfectly proper report, how come you make such a statement unless you say the report or read it, or had it read to you, or had it explained to you? How come you make such a statement, that it was a perfectly proper report?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can make such a statement only on the basis of memory.

Senator SMITH. You say you do not have a memory.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I do have a memory.

Senator SMITH. About what was in the letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; about my understanding.

Senator SMITH. We are talking about the letter now.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have testified now—let me read it again. "I have no recollection or knowledge of what was in Madame Sun's letter."

Senator SMITH. I am willing to take that as a statement of fact, if that is true.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then I also testify I understood her letter was perfectly proper. Those are both facts, in my view.

Senator FERGUSON. But you say "I brought back several other letters or packages along with Madame Sun's. Were they from somebody else, or were they Madame Sun's letters?"

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, someone else. People in my office, friends of mine, and I don't recall precisely who they were. One was from my photographer, who was working there, to his girl.

Senator FERGUSON. You say it was unsealed, this letter, Madame Sun's letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't have the recollection of those details.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least you didn't read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recollect that I did.

Senator SMITH. Did you have it read to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recollect that it was.

Senator SMITH. Did you have anybody read it and tell you what was in it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recollect that.

Senator SMITH. You see, we are just testing the reasonableness of your statement and your conclusion here, to see whether or not you really had any foundation for the statement as to what you understood. Now, of course, if you had heard it read, or if Madame Sun had told you what was in the letter, that might have been one way of communicating what was in the letter, and therefore you would have an understanding from it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In other words, you want to test on what basis I achieved this understanding.

Senator SMITH. That is it, precisely.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And I am sorry I don't have details to offer.

After several years of testimony concerning Communists Louis Budenz remembered my name for the first time, so far as I know, in response to the committee counsel's question last August. He disclaimed any personal direct knowledge but referred to official party "reports" which were obviously unavailable. The entire interchange of two sentences hardly took 15 seconds and was as follows [reading]:

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, particularly in 1945.

No further questions were put to Budenz by committee counsel as to the specific factual evidence for his very serious charge, and may I suggest this is rather similar to the point you just made about me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he not say they were official reports, and you say now apparently they were unavailable because they were Communist reports and he is no longer a Communist and wouldn't have them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is what I say. I will continue. No further questions were put to Budenz by committee counsel as to the specific factual evidence for his very serious charges, which was left hanging in the public record, unsubstantiated and yet unassailable for libel. This allegation has of course been associated with my name ever since in the press and in the public mind, and I cannot help feeling that the committee's procedure has been a bit out of line with the American tradition of fair play.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now explain that. What was the fair play that you thought was violated by the committee's procedure?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If I were in the committee's position, I would want a witness like Mr. Budenz, in making a charge, which is so very damaging, to offer a little more, at least in the way of the circumstances, in which he received a basis for this charge. I really would. I think it would be only proper to the American rights of the individual, who should not be needlessly attacked, because this is, I think, a very damaging charge. I have suffered under it. It has been very expensive to me. It has damaged my university, it has damaged my work, which is more important, perhaps, than myself. I think my work is very important for this country, I really do. This sort of damage, before I would have it inflicted or executed in a committee session, I think I would try to get more circumstances as a basis.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not the answer say "Yes" and then he explained it? It was not from personal knowledge, he said, it was only—I am paraphrasing his words it was only by official reports, particularly in 1945.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I suggest, for example—

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is the American tradition there that is violated? That is, of fair play.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Suppose, sir, that it were a legal proceeding, just for supposition, and you were questioning this man. You were representing a client, suppose you were representing me, and you were cross-questioning Mr. Budenz. You would hardly have stopped at

this point. Would you not have said, "Official reports of what kind?" It doesn't even say Communist Party reports. And reports from whom and to whom? And are they reports based merely on the press, or based on something in this country or reports coming from China or what? You see, there are many questions to be asked.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the press print that answer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The press printed only this.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That I have quoted.

Senator FERGUSON. The quotes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because there was nothing else in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not that indicate that all he knew about it was from an official report?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If this is all he knew, then he would suggest that the committee is a bit out of line with the American tradition of fair play in putting that out.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee does not put this out, it becomes part of the record. It is just like your statement last night, when you released it to the press, Dr. Fairbank. You released it. These official meetings that are held in open session, the press is here, and they print it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Perhaps I am under a misapprehension, but I have understood that the committee has followed a practice of having executive sessions, such as I had yesterday, partly for the purpose of going over prospective points of testimony to avoid unnecessary damage to American citizens. I just heard that.

Senator SMITH. You approve of that system, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I do.

Senator SMITH. The point, I think, Mr. Fairbank, and I can appreciate what you were getting at, is that you seem to think that Mr. Budenz was used as a witness against you in an action where you were being tried. You, of course, know we are not trying you, we are not trying anybody.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. So that you think we should go further and cross-examine Mr. Budenz to see what the basis of this is, and whether he knows anything else about it. That is what you mean, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir; if it is correct, as I have understood.

Senator SMITH. The point is, when you make a statement here to us today, if we are satisfied, if we know nothing else except what you said, then that is your statement under oath.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. Of course, we might say something that would draw all sorts of implications that were unfounded. Of course, we should not do that as a committee. We asked Budenz a question, he gave us an answer. Now, we are not responsible for whether that is truthful or not. When we finally wind up this whole hearing we may get to the point of expressing our opinion of what parts of the testimony are true and what parts are not. But we have not gotten that far yet. We have given you this chance to refute the very things Budenz said. I do not know what else we can do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I appreciate this chance to refute it, which I am attempting to do. Shall I continue?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. As for recent assertions that I was proposed along with my wife, but without our knowledge, for some kind of project of the Central Intelligence Agency, to work in some fashion along with Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and others, I never heard of this proposal before it was recently made public.

Senator FERGUSON. You draw a conclusion that there is an assertion that you and your wife had been on some kind of a project of the Central Intelligence Agency. Is that where you were proposed by Mr. Davies? How do you account for Mr. Davies proposing this, if you did not know anything about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sorry, I don't want to hold you up. I was looking, sir, for a five-column headline of the Boston Post, and this derived from testimony here, as I understood from the news story, by a certain Mr. Munson.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, a responsible, as far as the committee knew, former agent of the CIA appeared before this committee, and he had, as evidence to refresh his memory, a statement to the effect that John Davies proposed you to him. Now, what should the committee do, refuse to take that testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, I have not suggested that the committee should not have done that, in this statement of mine here. And I believe you had a question just a moment ago about Davies' proposing this: How could he do it without my knowledge?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, he did without my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, he did it without your knowledge. But how could we refuse to take Munson's testimony that this is what Davies did? Davies was an employee of the United States Government in the State Department. He proposes your name, and I think your wife's name, to the Central Intelligence Agency, along with Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong and others.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In making this statement, I am not, by any means suggesting that every act of this committee has been unfair, by no means.

Senator FERGUSON. What could we have done in that case?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have only mentioned that in this previous connection with Budenz. Now, in this connection with CIA I am going on to build up your record for you. Since I am here today, and Munson was here before, I am offering my testimony. And it is not testimony which criticizes the committee, as far as I read it.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any personal knowledge as to whether Davies did what Munson said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have no knowledge, no.

Senator SMITH. Then so far as you know, Davies might or might not have done that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And is it a fact that Davies sent a recommendation for you along with Anna Louise Strong and others, and you say you didn't know anything at all about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator SMITH. And at the time this committee did not know anything about it, so it is testimony that has been adduced here, after the events took place, if in fact it did take place.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Department of State, evidently quoting CIA has pointed out "that the controlled use or exploitation of persons of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in the business of intelligence, and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implications of disloyalty.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. From a release of the Department of State, a press release.

Senator FERGUSON. When? Have you got the press release?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Department of State, for the press, No. 128, February 18, 1952. The third paragraph has that statement in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently the State Department issued a press release after Mr. Munson testified, isn't that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, that is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. And they give, apparently, "the Department is advised". They don't say who advised them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, that is why I say "evidently" quoting CIA.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any evidence here that they were quoting CIA?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Someone must have advised them, and who would advise them about CIA? That was my thought. That is why I put "evidently" in as my word in the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The facts given by Mr. Lyle M. Munson's appearance before the Senate Internal Security Committee on February 15, versions of which appeared in the press, have been known to the Department and to the subcommittee.

Who are they talking about? Do you know?

Mr. FAIRBANKS. I am not certain. Perhaps it is this subcommittee, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

This matter was thoroughly examined by the Department at the time it occurred, more than 2 years ago, and found to be groundless in any implication that Mr. John P. Davies was suggesting anything inimical to the security interests of the United States.

Senator SMITH. There has not been any suggestion here in the suggestion of these names, that they were inimical, was there? There is no charge such as that made by the committee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This committee does not make charges, I know.

Senator FERGUSON. The Department said that they knew about him sending your name in there. Is that not right? They say "has been known to the Department and to the subcommittee." Isn't that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the Department is advised, they go on—that the controlled use or exploitation of persons of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in the business of intelligence, and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implication of disloyalty.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They are talking about Davies.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not in that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. They are trying to clear Davies by a press release.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I say that last paragraph you just quoted—
Senator FERGUSON. "Of all political shades."

Mr. FAIRBANK. That refers to people like myself, does it not?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Exploitation of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in the business of intelligence and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implication of disloyalty.

They are talking about Davies' disloyalty, are they not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I read that to mean that I am not disloyal just because Davies proposed, without my knowledge, that I should be used in connection with somebody who is pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the way I understand that, yes. The press, you see, played up, as you may recall, the idea that Davies had suggested that some accused or alleged Communists should be all put together in master-minding some propaganda. The people mentioned were Smedley, Strong, Snow, and myself, and two others who have not been accused of being Communists. But now you see, in the public press, because of the statement of Budenz here, I am now labeled as a person who has been accused of being Communist. That is the tag for my name in the press. What else could the press do?

Senator FERGUSON. Did they not only print the testimony of Munson?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There was a report on Munson's testimony, stories were written.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you think this committee knowing this press release—it is a subcommittee, that would be this subcommittee, and the State Department has known this for several years—of what Davies did, would not bring it to the public attention, as part of the IPR hearings?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I don't get any connection with the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not know that Davies had some connection with the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I had not heard that.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. He was in the Far East, on this question of policy, as to whether or not—

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in China but I did not because the Chinese revolution—I mean, you know, people are there. People even go to IPR conferences without really being a part of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, what would you say if Mr. Davies acknowledged before this committee that he did in fact recommend you for CIA work?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That would be further evidence of a factual nature. And you see, my testimony here is not to criticize the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you dispute his statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir, that is his statement, if it is his statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Do I take it you are disputing Mr. Munson's statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am trying to get the record straight, and I haven't seen Mr. Munson's statement in detail.

Senator SMITH. In this press release which you have produced here, it starts off by saying—

The facts given by Mr. Lyle H. Munson's appearance, "the facts" before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on February 15, versions of which appeared in the press, had been known to the Department and to the subcommittee.

That is a statement of fact that they did know these facts which Mr. Munson testified about.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is quite possible.

Senator SMITH. Did you not know about it, maybe, but whoever testified did know about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. All right, go ahead, Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My statement continues, sir. My friend John P. Davies had cabled me as follows:

Security considerations prevent me from adding to Department statement but if qualified officers want details they should approach top CIA and State officials. In general can say never regarded you [or] Wilma as having same outlook as Smedley, Strong or potentially their collaborators but as presenting views and approaches widely divergent from theirs.

Senator SMITH. What he is saying there is that even if your name was recommended he did not put you in the same classification as Smedley and the others?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read the statement that Munson put in the record?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I have had no access to that, sir. I haven't been in Washington enough to come up here and look at it. I don't know whether it would be available to me.

Senator SMITH. I will come back and let you see that, because I think you ought to see that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have never met Anna Louise Strong, nor had any contact with her. At the risk of being accused of making a so-called incriminating confession or a so-called startling revelation, I wish to volunteer the statement that I did know Agnes Smedley. Our acquaintance illustrates what I mean by "freedom of contact" as one of the freedoms necessary for research workers as well as for journalists. Among many hundred people I have seen professionally in the past 20 years, I saw the late Agnes Smedley on several occasions. She was always outspokenly pro-Communist, with which I never agreed. She was also a writer with unique first-hand experience among the Chinese Communist guerrillas.

I first met Miss Smedley in 1932 in Shanghai through an introduction from my aunt. My uncle—Gilbert E. Roe—had at one time given her legal advice in New York. In January 1933 Miss Smedley came to Peking, where my wife and I were living in a Chinese house, and arranged with us to stay several days in our extra courtyard, which we normally rented to a succession of paying house guests. She busied herself in organizing the China League for Civil Rights, and interviewed Dr. Hu Shih and other liberals for the purpose. From her conversation there was no doubt whatever of her strong pro-Communist views. We saw her a third time in Shanghai in late 1934, and did not see her again for 12 years.

On January 12, 1947, Miss Smedley spoke at the Boston Community Church and I recall I was invited to luncheon to meet her. She had

traveled with Chinese guerrilla forces as a war correspondent and written about it, but had contracted serious dysentery and seemed broken in health. In March 1947 she came to receive treatment at the Lahey Clinic in Boston and at that time stayed a few days in my house. I invited in some of the local people interested in China and Miss Smedley spoke of her interviews with the Chinese Communist general, Chu Teh, whose biography she was writing. She was, as usual, outspokenly pro-Communist so that her bias was self-evident.

Over the years I have similarly invited numerous non-Communists and anti-Communists to my house for similar informal sessions, including ambassadors, cabinet ministers, and other officials of the Chinese Nationalist Government, as well as American officials and scholars. Such contact has never meant that these persons agreed politically with me, nor I with them. At an American university we are not afraid of ideas from any quarter. We oppose the totalitarian statist kind of orthodoxy which some Americans, in a panic of fear, have been encouraging.

I shall be glad to take up in detail all the testimony and documentation concerning me which have been presented to this committee.

They have generally stressed my contacts rather than my views. This is perhaps understandable because my writings and speeches are a matter of public record, available for all to see, and they have been distinctly non-Communist or anti-Communist. For your record I submit a body of excerpts which include practically everything I have written on the subject of communism. I should be glad to be questioned further about my views. I think they are more important than incidental individual contacts.

My book, *The United States and China*, received the Willkie Award of the American Political Science Association as the best book on international relations published in 1948. This is a high honor, not carelessly conferred, by the American Political Science Association. My part of another book, *Next Step in Asia*, published in 1949, was so constructively anti-Communist that it was denounced in the Moscow journal *New Times*, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit, as the "cogitations of a spy." In particular, Moscow denounced my assertion in that book in 1949 that—

The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defense lines nor by arms shipments from abroad, but only by competition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power.

Moscow also denounced me because I proposed that in non-Communist countries of Asia there should be, and here they are quoting me—

a rapid mobilization and allocation of American "specialized personnel," who would be able to "develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities" and "assist local leaders."

This is the end of their quotation of me, and my quotation of them. As the Russian Communists put it, in their own terminology, and this is a quotation from them, "Fairbank wants to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the democratic, anti-imperialist camp." End of quotation from the Russians.

This is, of course, quite true: I do want to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the Soviet camp. A glance at my writings will indi-

cate how definitely they have aimed at this anti-Russian purpose. I think I can say without immodesty that my knowledge of modern China and the contacts I have had over the past 20 years make it possible for me to be of help in checking communism in Asia. I want to be of help. I am gratified to know that the Russians fear my activities and writings as a threat to their success. But I cannot be of help in this fight if I am discredited and repudiated by my own people. Prior witnesses before this committee have sought to do just this, and they have done it through irresponsible and unsubstantiated charges. Unless they are right, they are helping Russia. I know they are wrong. I believe also that upon a consideration of the entire record this committee must inevitably come to the same conclusion.

The Russians also say, and this is a quotation—

professional thoughts turn persistently in one direction, that of using learned institutions and scientific study as cover for espionage and sabotage.

That is the end of the quotation from the Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. From what source?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The same source, the New Times. I have a photograph.

Mr. MORRIS. It is all in there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The dates are clearly marked.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, January 8, 1950. This Russian charge must be noted in connection with some of the insinuations spread abroad as a result of testimony before this committee. It produces a confusing picture: I am charged by Communist Russia with being a secret agent of the west, and I am charged before this Senate committee with being a secret agent of Russia. These charges are equally absurd and false. But there is a disquieting similarity between one aspect of the procedures of the Communist Russians and of this committee—both have been jumping to conclusions on the basis of hearsay evidence and scattergun accusations.

Senator WATKINS. Just a moment. You are saying that the committee has jumped to a lot of conclusions?

Senator SMITH. Tell us what conclusion. I think that is a good point.

Senator WATKINS. I just wondered. I had not thought the committee had made any expression. We had not written a report on this yet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I consult my counsel?

Senator SMITH. All right, go ahead.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I agree, the committee has not made a conclusion, and my statement here represents a criticism which I maintain. I think the wording of it is not precisely correct. I would be happy to reword it.

Senator WATKINS. What do you intend to say there? Let us get that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that the committee—

Senator WATKINS. You assume such a fair attitude all along on this matter, that I was quite disturbed when I see you going off.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I agree with your point, that this is literally not a correct statement. I would like to express my view, which is, nevertheless, I am afraid, a critical one on this point.

Senator WATKINS. You have a right to be critical, if you wish to be, yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that the committee has made possible a situation, and done it unnecessarily in some cases, where these scattergun accusations, and hearsay evidence, are put forth, and the public is led to a conclusion, by the fact of this evidence being put forth.

Senator WATKINS. We call in witnesses here, we ask them to answer questions, we swear them to tell the truth, and we try to get at these matters that we are directed by the Congress to investigate. We can't be responsible for what the answers are that they come up with. We simply have a duty to perform, and then we go along. We can't take them all at once. The newspapers play them up whenever we hold public hearings. If we do not hold public hearings, the people are dissatisfied, and if we do, the people named are dissatisfied. So no matter which way we go, we get into difficulty. As far as I can see, the committee has been fair. We have not made conclusions. There may have been individual members that have made statements, but that is their right to do so. But the committee has not made any conclusions, and won't do so, until they write a report, if they do write a report on this matter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I subscribe to the committee's system, and I wish to have it confirmed, if you wish to confirm it, the system of having executive sessions so that unnecessarily damaging or relatively unsubstantiated scattergun accusations, hearsay evidence, that does not seem warranted entirely, that kind of thing can be sifted out and not put into the public record.

Senator WATKINS. I can confirm that we have held many executive sessions on many other lines other than the investigation of the IPR, and its influence, that have been going on all of the time. I have taken part and have presided over many of those. I know that in many instances there, I am satisfied that the testimony that was brought in, the investigation showed that that matter should not be released, that there was very little justification for some of the statements that were made. But they have not all been made public, and all of them probably will never be made public.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then the committee made a decision, did it not, that the accusation of Budenz, for example, was a substantial accusation which should come out through the committee procedure, attacking me as Budenz did, in effect.

Senator WATKINS. He made a statement on a lot of people, and he was a man who was on the inside on this thing, and he was a witness who had the information. Wherever that information led, if he was willing to swear directly, and his testimony had been taken by the courts, had been believed by the juries, there is no reason for us to completely discredit him on our judgment alone, after he had been used by the Government itself on prosecutions.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, what you say here today is tantamount to saying that Mr. Budenz is just a liar, is it not? That is what you say, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As regards me, very definitely.

Senator SMITH. That is what I mean. That is what you said.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Now, do you think that we should jump to a conclusion that you are right and he is wrong, any more than we should

jump to a conclusion that he was right and you were wrong? It is sworn testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That does not operate equally. It is not that I call him a liar or that he calls me a liar. But he calls me a Communist, and he is an expert on communism. When I call him a liar, it doesn't hurt him the least. It is when he calls me a Communist that hurts me.

Senator WATKINS. What was the quote that you have pertaining to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is two pages back here, page 11. Committee counsel says: "Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?" Budenz says, "Yes, sir." That is about all he says. Now, I think that not to screen that out not only did me a disservice but was, I would think, jumping to a conclusion in the sense that you decided, you sort of jumped to a conclusion, that this was worth putting in a public record without any more substantiation. You have evidently decided that in your executive session, and then it went ahead and it came out. Committee counsel asked a question. Committee counsel wouldn't do that unless the thing had been on the docket, so to speak, I mean the list of persons. Mr. Morris wouldn't bring it up just off his own back.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fairbank, there were documents introduced into the record at the same time. You have read the testimony, have you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have not seen any documents about me being a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. There are documents in here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But no connection with Mr. Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. But there were documents introduced at the same time, were they not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You mean they are the basis for the committee's concluding I was a Communist?

Senator SMITH. We have not concluded that at all.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am glad to hear that.

Senator SMITH. What you are fussing about is because Mr. Budenz came here and testified against you. There have been other witnesses who have testified against him, and I imagine there will still be some disparity of statements between people that continue to come before us. But we haven't reached a point in deciding who is right and who is wrong. If it is sworn testimony, I do not know how we could refuse to hear Mr. Budenz on his sworn testimony any more than we have a right to refuse to hear you on your sworn testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have just had an exchange on that same point. I think that his testimony is much more damaging as testimony than my testimony is damaging as testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Mr. Fairbank, do you not in effect accuse him of perjury? You say lying. Well, lying under oath is perjury.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course, I have my private view of him as a liar. But in this statement I don't need to go as far as to say it is perjury on his part because I just don't know what basis he had, if any.

Senator WATKINS. But he says, "I know that he is a Communist." That was all he said.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If he had a basis, it seems to me it should have been indicated.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know if I was here when he stated it. Senator FERGUSON. He gave as the basis that it was in a record.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think you can accept anything from me that is a statement of reports.

Senator FERGUSON. You want it definitely opened to show all the surrounding facts and circumstances; is that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I want it left out because it isn't true.

Senator FERGUSON. How could we strike that out now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, specifically on this point of jumping to conclusion, and, in answer to your question, I think this committee, in the case of Budenz' testimony about me, if it was no more in executive session than it is in the public session here recorded, would have been following a better procedure, more fair, to say, "Well, we just won't bring that into the public session because it doesn't get us anywhere."

Now, you have there, to balance, the fact that it does damage an operation of which I am responsible for training American personnel to deal with the Asian problem. That is at Harvard University. I am not just an isolated individual. I operate in a university. There is a big investment there and a lot of people. We shouldn't damage it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Davies said about you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You read there, in sworn testimony, the statement referred to.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Which Davies is that?

Senator FERGUSON. John P. Davies, Jr. I have marked the parts in a statement that was made by Munson right after the conversation he had with Davies. He is going to put you as the head of these people, and he is going to put you in an office. Now you read it.

Senator SMITH. You mean read it into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It is official.

Senator SMITH. Suppose you read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it aloud.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is Friday, February 15, 1952, this subcommittee. And this is a public session?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. John P. Davies—you know who he is?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is a good friend of mine. And he wouldn't do me any damage.

Senator FERGUSON. Read what he said about you.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is what Mr. Munson says that Mr. Davies says, is that correct?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should be used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists, but only very politically sophisticated.

And the word "politically" is in parentheses.

It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington, probably New York or Boston, and that, through a cut out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance but actually produce materials for OPC utilization.

That is Mr. Munson's statement, and whether Mr. Davies said that is still another question, is it not?

Senator FERGUSON. I know you do not believe Davies said it. But Munson swears to it and files this memorandum that he made at the time. And the State Department release indicates that they knew about it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I comment that Mr. Davies seems to think that the more politically sophisticated you get, the more leftist you are, which I wouldn't agree with. I don't know that Mr. Davies would say that either, really. It is a sort of a silly statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Does he not really say that they are going to put you in an office and, as heading up this group, that Munson says that he is going to put you in the office; that that is the suggestion of Davies, and that is what Davies is saying?—you are to head up the group, and you are to be unknown because you are going to have a cut-out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Munson says that is what Mr. Davies says. What are we talking about, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. You are criticizing the committee taking testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. About Mr. Budenz; not about this.

Senator FERGUSON. I know; you want to pass this over, but I am going back to it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will go back to it; I don't know what the point is.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the same thing that you are criticizing Budenz about. Whom are we going to believe, Mr. Fairbank, on this Munson-Davies story?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you should take Mr. Munson's story. I think that is fine to put in the record. I think I should have a chance to reply to it. I am having a chance; that is good.

Senator FERGUSON. We are going to give you a chance.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you do not object, then, to our putting this statement in of what Mr. Davies said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. What Mr. Munson said Mr. Davies said.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't object to it, sir; and, I want to make it plain, I do not regard every act of this committee unfair, or anything of that kind. I am just pointing to certain things that have damaged me.

Senator SMITH. At the time you made your comments on the committee accepting Budenz' testimony, you didn't know about the existence of this evidence; did you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This comment in here, on Budenz' testimony?

Senator SMITH. No; in the record you just read from.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was in the press; that I read was in the press, and I knew about that when I wrote this statement here.

Senator SMITH. You don't like Mr. Budenz' testimony because he accused you of being a Communist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz might not like your testimony because—

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can't accuse him of being a Communist.

Senator SMITH. You accuse him of being a perjurer, and I imagine your counsel will tell you——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't accused him of perjury, because I don't know.

Senator SMITH. You said he lied; has not told the truth before this committee. That is perjury. And I am sure your counsel will advise you that there is no law against being a Communist, but it is a felony to be a perjurer. Therefore, what you have said about him, if you do indeed accuse him of being a perjurer, is far worse than what he said about you. You did not realize that; did you? I mean, in all fairness you did not realize it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think probably this is a good legal point, but could we bring in good common sense, too?

Senator FERGUSON. You want to throw the law out and bring in the common sense?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would, in this way.

Senator WATKINS. It happens that the law and common sense are in line on that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Liars are called liars all around the country, but it doesn't get them into the trouble it does if they are called Communists by ex-Communists who say they had a factual basis for knowing it. I say calling a man a Communist in 1950 or 1951 is a very serious thing, and calling him a liar is a run-of-the-mill thing. It happens all of the time in politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Even under oath.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, lying is an original sin.

Senator FERGUSON. Are we not trying to combat and fight perjury, too?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course. But this specific investigation is against communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but it does not want any perjured testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead. We will probably ask you some more questions further down the page.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know the record on what Mr. Budenz was asked that day. I have not seen it, and I do not think I was present. I would like to call him back, since you say that there is not any basis for that, and we will investigate a little further to see what his basis is.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it would be very good.

Senator WATKINS. I think he probably will be called, and we will go into it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Particularly if someone can suggest the questions of cross-examination.

Senator FERGUSON. I will make a suggestion to your counsel that he prepare a list of questions that he wants on that point.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It would be very useful.

Senator FERGUSON. We may all be surprised what Mr. Budenz knows.

Mr. FAIRBANK. While no one questions the sincerity of this committee in seeking to combat communism, I think some of its methods have been dangerously at fault. It has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian "guilt by association."

Senator SMITH. We better ask you a question on what you mean by that, "totalitarian 'guilt by association'." "Totalitarian" isn't any too sweet a word in American understanding now; is it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a frankly critical statement of the committee, and it is about the only one I have put in.

Senator SMITH. Let's see whether it is truthful or not. What is the basis on which you say that this committee has turned "our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association'?" Just what do you mean by those words?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let's take the case of IPR. I was told this morning that there were 11 persons who had refused to incriminate themselves. If you think this is off the track, we can stop it, but the IPR strikes me as an example.

Senator FERGUSON. I have seen this carried in the press; some of the press carried only your criticisms of the committee. There was none of the praise that you had for the committee in the beginning. Now, you explain that statement.

Senator SMITH. What is the meaning of your words "totalitarian 'guilt by association'," as referred to this committee? Can you tell us what you mean?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; it has to be done by examples. I propose to begin with an example of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Cannot you tell us in simple language, Mr. Fairbank? You are a man of great ability and educational experience. Cannot you tell us just what you mean by those words?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Or is that a fantastic statement of just a nebulous conclusion you reached without any foundation for it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; I think there is a foundation.

Senator SMITH. What is it that this committee has done that justifies that conclusion of yours in those words?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It has said that because Miss Bentley—I mean, the situation has developed where it appears to the public that because Miss Bentley—

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by "appears to the public"? What are the facts, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course, I can begin sentences here all afternoon and never finish them.

Mr. MORRIS. Please give us facts, Mr. Fairbank. You can justify any erroneous facts with the statement you just made, what "appears to the public."

Senator SMITH. What are the facts that justify you in using the language "totalitarian 'guilt by association,'" as applied to this committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, let's start at it this way: the word "totalitarian" I associate with the idea of "guilt by association." So, it is one thing. Let's decide on the idea there. The totalitarians—the Communists, the Nazis, and those people—have a tendency to go by the associations a person has rather than following the idea of freedom of contact. I think that is plain.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that is all that "totalitarian" means?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I am just trying to get one idea set up here: totalitarian "guilt by association." If you are unorthodox in a Com-

munist country, your head may go off; you may go into a concentration camp or anything.

Senator SMITH. We are familiar with that. But I want to find out what you can tell us.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can if I can finish the sentence. It may be a long sentence. Here we have the example of 11 persons—said this morning—having refused to incriminate themselves and who have been connected with IPR. This was put forward, as I got it, as a very serious charge against the IPR case, indicating that the IPR has had a really subversive influence—I got that impression; maybe I was wrong—because of these 11 persons. Who are these 11 persons: Field and Moore, and they have been pretty definitely connected with the IPR. That is two persons. Now, DeCaux, a man who was a trustee for a while and went to a conference. Mildred Price, a person who paid \$6 and was a member for a few years, without taking any active part.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she write any articles?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; she wrote no articles, as far as I know. And, then, Lawrence Rosinger, a research worker for 2 years, 1948 and 1950. And, then, two people named Keeney, who had no connection with the IPR, as far as I can find out. I just called Bill Holland at lunchtime, and he says he knows of no connection. Perhaps we are wrong there, but we would like to see it.

Now, Mandel wrote a book on the Soviet Union, which the IPR sponsored, but was not employed by the IPR. Then a man named Allen wrote one or two articles in Pacific Affairs; no other connection. Then a man named Deane wrote one article; no other connection. And, then, Kathleen Barnes, who was a junior employee in the early 1930's. Those are the 11 persons. They are associated with the IPR to some degree, and two of them, Field and Moore, obviously have associated with the American council of the IPR in an important way, and that is an important point, but the nine others were not in an important way, and in some cases no way that I know about. That is association. And guilt is alleged from that association, against the IPR, in general, as an organization. Now, look at that organization. There are 60 trustees, and, you know, very responsible people. General Marshall is still a trustee in spite of all these attacks. They are scattered all over the country. With 11 councils, now 10 councils, in countries all around the Pacific area. In England, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a very respectable conservative organization, is part of the IPR, but the IPR in the public mind, because of "guilt by association," stands condemned as a Communist front or some kind of thing—nobody knows exactly what—because of reiterated statements here.

That, I think, is real criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Field's connection with the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I have mentioned that.

Senator FERGUSON. He was practically one of the operators; was he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was in the American council of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Was he a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He became one. I didn't know of his becoming a Communist until after 1940. I just don't know Field.

Senator FERGUSON. When in 1940?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know Field; I have met him a few times.

Senator FERGUSON. When in 1940?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Maybe it was 1941—I don't know—about that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What makes you place that date 1940 or 1941, for Field's becoming a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I have read a great deal from these hearings, and people keep talking about this question "When did Field become a Communist?" I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard the testimony of Mr. Weyl, who was a Communist at the same time, who said he became one in 1936 or 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't heard that testimony; I am sorry.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, I still get back to see if you can give me an answer.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did try to give you an answer.

Senator SMITH. I do not think you have touched it remotely. You say, "It"—this committee—"has turned our traditional American freedom of contract into totalitarian 'guilt by association,'" and you think you have explained what you meant by those words.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have talked about "guilt by association."

Senator SMITH. I am not talking about your talking about "guilt by association." I am asking you if you think you have answered the question as to the basis of fact for your statement "It has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association.'"

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think I have answered it, and done quite well.

Senator SMITH. You think you have?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I do not think anybody else thinks so, because I cannot understand your talking about all of these other things when you said this committee "has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association.'"

Mr. FAIRBANK. It may well be not the intent of the committee to have done that, but it seems to me that is what has happened from these hearings.

Senator WATKINS. You know that the purpose of this investigation is to find out ultimately if it had any effect, and to see if it still has effect, as a matter of guarding the internal security of the United States. You know this investigation isn't finished yet. We are still working on it. Would you have us disregard completely the matter of association?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not at all.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not think it has a proper place as a part of the evidence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It should be taken into account.

Senator WATKINS. There is an old adage, isn't there, that you are judged by the company you keep? I think my mother taught me that when I was a small boy. "Remember, when you go out, the people you go with. You are going to be judged by that." That goes back in my memory, and I think it goes a few hundred years beyond that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But I am sure you will agree, that judging by the company you keep is not judging by the individual, and that in this country we are to judge by the individual, and that your mother would want you to judge not by somebody you might meet or somebody seen with, but by your own qualities and integrity and character, as an individual. That is not guilty-by-association, that is judgment on the person.

Senator WATKINS. I understand all of that. But this is only one item. You say we shouldn't regard it. I think we would be neglecting our duty if we did not consider it. If a man runs around, for instance—this is a hypothetical situation—if a man is found in the company of people who are notoriously known to be thieves, he probably wouldn't be accepted by a bank as a teller, or anything of that sort.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely, he might have been a detective.

Senator WATKINS. He might be a detective. It is possible but not likely he would be a detective and then go in and get a position in the bank. But, as a matter of fact, that is one of the elements in every case. Now, we are hearing that along with the rest of them. We have the direct and positive statements of witnesses with respect to you and others. That is only one element. So, what you in effect try to say there is that we have prejudged you, and we have made a judgment on it simply by association. I see that in the press, occasionally. That is all they think we have before us. That is only one element. That is only one piece of evidence. It may have some weight and it may not have any. But we certainly should not ignore it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But may I ask about the judgment that is going on here about the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator WATKINS. There has been no judgment yet. We cannot be responsible for what the editors and the columnists do as they go along. They do it to us as well as to you, incidentally. You are not the only one on the receiving end.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, do you subscribe to these two sentences from a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States:

One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps.

Do you subscribe to that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; reputation determined in part by the company you keep.

Senator SMITH. There is, of course, I think—and other witnesses have brought it up—statements made outside this committee about judgment.

The next sentence I want to inquire about—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would not like to leave that. I want to ask some questions.

Senator SMITH. This is in the case of *Adler v. Board of Education, New York*, Mr. Justice Minton writing the opinion, March 3, 1952.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask whether or not the witness does not think that Mr. Field's association with the IPR was more than just association, as used by your expression guilt-by-association.

Mr. FAIRBANK. To be sure it was with the IPR activities. My reference was to the persons, all of the persons, connected with the IPR.

Now, Field is associated with those persons in the IPR. The IPR is not a person, it is an operation. And people are associated in an organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get the idea that this committee was drawing the conclusion that anybody connected with the IPR as a trustee was a Communist? And, if so, where did you ever get that idea?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that would be going too far.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is that not what you are saying here, "It has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian guilt-by-association"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The committee has not attacked all the trustees of IPR. The witnesses before the committee have not attacked——

Senator FERGUSON. And the committee has not gotten a report out. The committee has not done anything yet, but asked questions.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I misspoke myself. The witnesses before the committee have not attacked all of the people of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Of course not. We know there are plenty of good names of people that were sucked into the IPR.

Senator WATKINS. But according to the conclusion, I think the argument is being made that they probably all would be open to attack because they were associated with the other people. Of course, that would be very, very small evidence to convict them on or to charge them with.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I just refer to your statement, Mr. Chairman, people sucked into the IPR? Now, that perhaps has a connotation.

Senator SMITH. Well, I had in mind things that have come out in the evidence about the efforts of Mr. Carter and others to get people to come into the IPR and pay the dues and put up money for it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. By being sucked in, you meant that they were brought into something undesirable, did you not?

Senator SMITH. I did not say that at all. You may be sucked into conversation with a very charming group of ladies, for instance, you may be brought into that. In fact, a lot of people have been sucked into this hearing here, because they are interested in what you are going to say.

Senator WATKINS. That has no evil connotation.

Senator FERGUSON. Your next sentence clearly indicates what you want to convey to the public, "The committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence." Where did you get that? Did you ever see a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations by this committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I did not believe that a senatorial committee would allow an ex-Communist, who has testified about a great many people, some correctly and some incorrectly, to make an accusation of a person like myself who is not an isolated individual working in the Institute of Pacific Relations where the institution's good will and good name was important, would allow a man to make an accusation like that against me, unless the committee was making some sort of presumption.

Senator SMITH. Do you not think we should have heard you today?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Definitely. I think you should have heard me last September.

Senator SMITH. You have been denominated by at least one as an ex-Communist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not ex, sir, that would be a great honor.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not seen any report by this committee or any conclusion, have you, on you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. I have been judging by the operation of the committee.

Senator SMITH. So you want to condemn the committee here and say that it has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. Now you cannot state one single fact to justify that, can you? And you have sworn to that. You realize that you have sworn to that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir, and I state the fact which I alleged just now that the committee through its operation of having an executive session and screening the whole thing and putting it out in public, which we all have discussed and agreed was the operation, allowed Budenz to make an accusation against me which apparently had no more basis than what was in the record here, which was damaging to me and which could only have been made, it seems to me, that decision to have him testify that way could only have been made by people who really were prejudging and saying, "This man we are attacking because he says he is a Red."

Senator SMITH. Do you not think turnabout is fair play, if we heard him we should hear you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that system is good. I think discretion needs to be used in the operation of any system.

Senator SMITH. You would like this committee when they run across your name in some of these documents to delete that and keep that in executive session? You do not mean that, do you, Mr. Fairbank? You do not think this committee ought to show any favoritism between you and Mr. Budenz when we have taken sworn testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not know about favoritism between me and Budenz. You are putting us on the same level as if I was coming before you to attack him when he had not attacked me. I am not doing that. I am not going around accusing people of being an ex-Communist.

Senator SMITH. Of course I do not know which one of you is right.

Senator WATKINS. I am interested in knowing the witness' view on this. Do you not know it to be a fact that there may be other evidence in the record, probably is, bearing on this question of whether you are or are not a Communist or you were or were not a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There may be.

Senator WATKINS. When we get through we can go through that mass of evidence. We take it over a long period of time, day after day. We cannot judge on every one of these accusations because the investigation is not completed. In the end we may be able to say positively there is not anything that reflects on this man, the evidence does not justify such a conclusion.

Inevitably in an investigation by a committee of Congress, if we are going to follow any of the established procedures, how can we avoid taking evidence as we go along? You agree we probably should have the right to do it, you agree in a measure with it. How can we avoid taking evidence as we go along?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do you, sir, have all the evidence in the open session which comes into the executive session? In that case, why do you have the executive session?

Senator WATKINS. I cannot answer entirely that question, whether all of it comes out or not. I do not know. I am not present. We have two or three different task groups in this committee investigating so many different fields that I could not answer.

I told you this morning in some cases if evidence presented or talk presented or rumors presented to the committee in executive session do not stand up, I do not think the committee would ever reveal it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wish that had been done in my case. I think you can understand my case.

Senator WATKINS. You had a man swearing positively that he knows you to be a Communist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But all evidence in executive session is under oath.

Senator WATKINS. Certainly, but it is a direct, positive charge. There is no wishy-washiness about the charge of Budenz. He just said, "I know him to be a Communist."

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, you understand my position, do you not?

Senator SMITH. I can understand your not liking what Budenz says. You know the saying, "No fellow who ever felt a halter draw had a good opinion of the law." You have heard that expression, I am sure. I bet your counsel has. I can understand how you do not like what Budenz said. I am not blaming you for disliking it, but I am talking about the unfairness of your statement here that we have, that this committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence, and we have done nothing of the sort.

I do not know where you get the basis for such an outrageous statement. It is just as bad against us as anything Mr. Budenz has made against you because you are swearing to this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not damaging you.

Senator SMITH. You cannot quote any instance that would justify that conclusion. I am pointing that out not for the purpose of argument but for the purpose of showing you that you have done the very same thing you have found fault with Budenz for doing, accusing somebody without foundation.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you can appreciate my situation. I do think I have a foundation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you think it is true if you have a foundation. You are swearing to it, are you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have a foundation for not approving what the committee has done.

Senator SMITH. I asked you what is the foundation for your statement that the committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have stated that. I have a foundation. It is that you have allowed Mr. Budenz to testify, as he did, after an executive session where presumably no more evidence was presented than was presented in the open session, namely, no evidence at all. That is my position.

Senator SMITH. You say that means that we made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. We have not said a word about you,

Mr. Fairbank, justifying a statement that we made a presumption against you at all.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But Budenz testified only in answer to the committee counsel, "Do you know?" and the committee therefore initiated the question and brought me into it. Budenz did not bring me into it except as the committee did.

Senator SMITH. You do not know whether we have a report to that effect or not.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is another question. As you have them, please bring them forth.

Senator SMITH. Do you want us to bring forth unsubstantiated reports?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If they are not substantiated, why do you use them?

Senator SMITH. If they are unsubstantiated we do not use them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then you are in a position of letting Budenz go ahead.

Senator SMITH. But he swore you were a Communist. You turn around and say he is a perjurer. Some instrumentality may have to decide who is telling the truth. I do not know, and I am not attempting to say.

Mr. MORRIS. On this point documents have been submitted to the witness as of yesterday in executive session. We had a paper, the probative value of which we could not determine, and what we did was let the witness have it overnight in order that he might look at it and very thoroughly come to a sound conclusion as to whether we should put any probative value on it. I would like the record to show that he has had it overnight, and it can be considered evidence, the probative value of which we cannot determine, but we have asked him to look at it.

So I think in that sense, to that extent, certainly Professor Fairbank has been unwarranted in some of the statements he has been making. He has had this document overnight.

Is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Would you like me to bring this up and report to you on it?

Senator FERGUSON. Professor Fairbank, is it not true that some other agency of Government has been considering this question as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are referring to the Department of the Army?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course their decision was taken on August 17, whereas the testimony against me here by Miss Bentley was on August 14. Now I don't know whether there was a casual connection or not.

Mr. MORRIS. This newspaper you had overnight is dated 1950, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. Let us examine this newspaper if you like. It is interesting.

Senator FERGUSON. You say here that we have already made up our minds as far as you are concerned. Is that correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, in a few words, I come here now 5 months after I was accused by Budenz to defend myself. I think you can say I am coming to defend myself, to defend my good name. Now that could only happen if I was accused, and I was accused 5 months ago. That is a situation which has grown up under the auspices of

this committee where I was presumably judged very questionable, dubious, or guilty, and it has to be cleared up now.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a college professor. You are familiar with court trials?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not awfully, but I can consult my counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. There are many times that a paper, an affidavit, or a bill of complaint or a declaration is filed in the court against a man, and he is only a witness, and his name is in it. He does not have a chance to answer at all. Now is that not what we are talking about here as far as you are concerned? You are having this time to answer.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is also the consideration of national interest sometimes as to override personal liberties and rights, that is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, should he finish that sentence or go into it?

Senator SMITH. Go ahead. He did not finish reading that paragraph, did he?

I believe you read down to "the result."

Mr. FAIRBANK. It has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. The result has been wholesale and indiscriminate attack on American China specialists, whose effective work must depend in part upon freedom of contact. In other words, we are attacked for doing the very thing we have to do to serve our country.

We must all fight Communist subversion. But to preserve our democratic freedoms, we must conduct the fight accurately—with sights and a rifle and not with a blunderbuss; with facts, not hearsay and suspicion; with faith, not fear.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask you a question there, Mr. Fairbank. You say the result has been wholesale and indiscriminate attack on American China specialists, whose effective work must depend in part upon freedom of contact. It is true, is it not, that before so many of these China specialists got to work on our situation in the Far East we had several million Chinese on our side?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And today we have none on our side practically?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I could go further than that, sir. I could say when I was in China, until 1946 China was still largely on our side, and shortly after that I left China, and China became Communist. Was that because I had been in China?

Senator SMITH. It was probably because somebody else went over there. There was a change in policy?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say that China went Communist mainly because of the Chinese situation. Perhaps we disagree on this, but my fundamental view on this is that the Americans couldn't make a terrific difference one way or the other in the China sense. We might have done better or worse, but whatever we did we were outsiders and that vast mass of people in a country as big as this and three times as numerous, it is a terrible thing to deal with on the other side. You could only deal with it by working inside through some kind of Chinese organization, the way the Russians are doing.

Senator SMITH. We did have a change in policy in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We had a policy of supporting the Nationalist Government. We gave them quite a lot of support.

Senator SMITH. Then we did change that policy, did we not, and try to amalgamate the Communists and Nationalists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are referring to the Marshall mediations?

Senator SMITH. Somebody tried to amalgamate them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. I was there at the time. We were trying to get the Chinese Communists not to fight a civil war but to lay down their arms, and Marshall's military arrangement would have brought their divisions bridged in with superior numbers of Nationalist divisions.

Senator SMITH. He tried to amalgamate them.

Mr. FAIRBANKS. If it had worked, they would have been immobilized, and they could not have taken over. The chances are that they couldn't have taken over, but it didn't work.

Senator SMITH. After that conditions in China began to deteriorate?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was deteriorating very steadily.

Senator SMITH. You do not think there is hope for us to accomplish anything worth while in China with any of our programs?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we have to have a program toward China. We have to make an effort. It has to be ideological. That is why I feel I am very important. That is why I don't want to be damaged by being accused as a Communist.

Senator SMITH. I believe if we had kept the professors away from there, the better we would have been in China. The more we send over there, the worse they get.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I read from page 6 of the witness' own statement:

The question before this committee, I submit, is not whether I should have had such broad contact with persons of all sorts connected with China, but whether I engaged in such contact as a loyal American or engaged in it subversively. The fact of my contact with all sorts of persons concerning China should be assumed as a matter of course, just as it is assumed for a press correspondent. The real question is whether I used this contact disloyally, or in the course of this contact was used by others with disloyal intent.

Certainly we have the right to make investigation and take testimony. In effect you admit you had a lot of these contacts. You admit it is a perfectly proper procedure to find out just what the nature of those contacts was, whether you were there as an investigator in the objective sense, or whether you were there as an associate of those folks. That is all there is to this statement, and I think that is why your own statement contradicts what we had a right to do.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear the expression of "guilt by association"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am afraid I just can't recall. It is a rather recent term that has been used more recently than before. It might have been written by some eighteenth century fellow. I just don't remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know when you first ran into that phrase?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear it used by the Communists in some of their writings?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear this expression "freedom of contact"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know. I sort of invented this to try to express my idea. I don't think it is a new term, but it does express my idea.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that is your own expression, "freedom of contact"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sure many people have said it many times before. I just don't know where.

Senator FERGUSON. You used the two expressions, "guilt by association" and then the counterremark of "freedom of contact," is that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Suppose you have a situation where people are in contact or in association in a sort of neutral way. One interpretation is that because we are associated the guilt of one is transmitted to another or presumed to be attached to another because he associates. According to freedom of contact, you do not go that far, and you say that these people may have contact, but you have to take them as individuals, by cases as persons, according to what they do and think, and judge them on their merits as persons.

I think that is more of the American tradition. I am sure you do.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you used this expression as if it is a crime because of your associates, the people look on it as a crime because you have associated with somebody. Is that not right? Is that not the way you have used that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. People impute guilt because of contact.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is guilt by association. I think I agree with you.

Senator FERGUSON. And you claim that the man has a right to that freedom of contact without public opinion feeling that there is some guilt by that association, by that contact?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think on the whole the individual should be given the benefit of doubt. This is a matter of degree between extremes. Particularly a press correspondent or a diplomat or a professor or researcher where they are working in a foreign country, they have to see people in that foreign country. If the country is going Communist they probably have to see some Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. It would apply to a lawyer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. If he was found associating with criminals, you do not think that ought to affect his reputation as a lawyer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It might be his business.

Senator FERGUSON. It might be, certainly, and it might not be.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think this is a matter of degree; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to get at here. You think the public has no right to say that association has anything to do with it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Isn't that an extreme statement, sir? Isn't that one end of the spectrum here?

Senator FERGUSON. You know what the Supreme Court said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It said in part by association.

Senator WATKINS. That is all we have said, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, but, you see, the thing that strikes me over and over again in connection with the IPR, the committee, it does not seem to me, has really dealt with this matter of the publications

of the IPR. Now there have been certain publications picked out and jumped on and some of them rightly so. Incidentally, Epstein's book we discussed this morning is not an IPR publication.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But the great bulk of IPR publications, which is the main thing it has done—it has worked year to year getting those available—most of those books are useful, good books and we couldn't get along without them.

Senator SMITH. We have not attacked them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. When you attack the organization you have made it more difficult for those books to come out. The IPR has to fold up, and somebody else has to do that job. IPR is a private agency trying to do this job in an honest, factual way.

Senator SMITH. Somebody else might have a different view.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In general, yes.

Senator SMITH. We have heard testimony about IPR. I expect we know a lot more about it than you do, even though you were a member.

Senator FERGUSON. You know they have given us most of the books they published, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. But they have not been read, I should imagine.

Senator SMITH. We could not sit here and read all those books. You do not think that, do you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would suggest that in so important a matter as this, with people involved and reputations and everything, that a research staff of one or two people, if you could find a budget to go through the IPR publications and read the whole works and line them up, it would be a proper service.

Senator SMITH. We have lined up some of them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Instead of just picking out the bad eggs you might find in the basket.

Senator SMITH. If they are bad, there is no reason to disturb the good eggs. You do not think we should involve the good because there may be some bad?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, if they have all the IPR label and the IPR label becomes a garbage word, it is all garbage. That is what I mean by guilt by association among books.

Senator WATKINS. The object of this committee is to protect the internal security of the United States. We are only looking for those things that may involve the security. You may find something just like it was in Japan with Sorge and Ozaki; there were only two of them apparently, and yet they did incalculable damage to the Germans and the Japanese, just those two fellows.

Now, you cannot go out after the whole group. Ninety-nine percent of them probably are all right, very fine people and good citizens, but these spies work in with people and ingratiate themselves and become very powerful people, and they are never suspected. They were not suspected until the very last thing, until they had done the damage.

Senator SMITH. I believe Mr. Fairbank had finished reading his statement. Mr. Morris, do you have any questions to ask of Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I would like to ask Professor Fairbank about a newspaper that was given to him last night. Professor Fairbank, you read Chinese, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the Central Daily News of September 3, 1950, which was given to you last night?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read one passage.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the passage which purported to be the confession of Mr. Li Peng?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read the passage in his confession which referred to me and others.

Mr. MORRIS. We had a translation made by the Library of Congress, and that translation reads:

Wittingly or unwittingly, they—

referring to you and two other State Department people—

leaked out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel.

Is that an accurate translation of that passage?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I see the transcript?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. This committee knows nothing about Chinese, Professor Fairbank. We are going to rely on you to translate it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do you have also the synopsis statement you showed me last night?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. You recall I was given this synopsis statement to look at as a basis for comparison with the Chinese text?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I made that comparison, and I have here a report on that comparison.

Senator SMITH. Could you answer his question?

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you not translate it for us, Professor?

Senator SMITH. He asked you about a translation. Can you not answer that question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am reading here from a special edition of the Central Daily News which contains a transcript, stated transcript, of a statement made by a Chinese named Li Peng. The passage which I was shown last night in English synopsis reads as follows. Shall I read this?

Mr. MORRIS. You see, we have two translations, the one I gave you and the one you were shown last night. The committee vouches for the authenticity of neither one. All we can do is send it to the Library of Congress for translation.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The one I see today is more accurate. I will read you the one given last night.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one we told you we would have the first thing in the morning.

Senator SMITH. You want him to read both of them?

Mr. MORRIS. I think the second one is the one we will address ourselves to. It is the one I brought up for the record.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And you want just the references to myself?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. I think it is just as well, Senator, although I do not know, there are two other names mentioned there. I think we should try to restrict this just as much as possible.

Senator SMITH. If that does not involve Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. It does involve Mr. Fairbank, but two other people in the State Department. I think it would be my preference, Senator, that we not mention the other two names at this time.

Senator SMITH. Is that all right with you, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will leave out the other names.

Mr. MORRIS. Unless Mr. Fairbank feels he has to mention them.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading) :

In addition, at the time the person in charge of information and intelligence in the American Embassy, the Director General of the United States Information Service, Fairbank—

and then certain other persons are named—

were all persons who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the Nationalist Government. Their prejudices frequently superseded their duties to maintain secrecy relating to the nation's concern. Wittingly or unwittingly they leaked out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel.

As I understand it, this translation was made at the Library of Congress, and I should say it is substantially accurate. It is more accurate than the one you showed me last night.

Mr. MORRIS. The one showed you last night, Professor, was shown to you with apologies because it was made up hurriedly and we told you we were having another one prepared.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is labeled "synopsis?"

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The part that I examined.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know from the reading of the transcript that that purports to be a confession of Li Peng who was executed by the Chinese Nationalists for being a Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. FAIRBANK. So I understand.

The part that I have examined I would confirm reads as follows:

Wittingly or unwittingly disclosed diplomatic secrets which then were transmitted by way of the embassies of third party countries to the blank intelligence officers' ears.

Now this is a peculiar thing here, but the Chinese character where I said "blank" and which in the interpretation, the translation, reads "Soviet," is missing from the Chinese text. I don't know why. The context would indicate that it should be Soviet at that point. But here is the place where that character should be, and it is missing in the text. There is just a blank spot there. I don't understand that.

Now I can go ahead with more description of this.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, when did you first hear that there might be some question about leaks to other embassies or through other embassies to the Soviet from China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have not heard of any charge against me of leaks.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not say of charges against you. I just say there was some question of leaks through our Embassy to other embassies or through them to the Soviets.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall hearing of any particular case, and I don't recall hearing, in other words, of leakage.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of it until you saw this paper last evening?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't think so. You see, for one thing I was not concerned in the Embassy in 1945 and 1946 with intelligence. The statement is incorrect. I was concerned with an information program which was under the auspices of the Embassy, but operationally separate, and which was entirely a clear output operation of information material, not an intelligence operation at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not indicate this morning that you did get some evidence of some intelligence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is when I was earlier in China in 1942 and 1943 under the Embassy more directly.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never heard that there might have been a leak or was a leak?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall any such story.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that there were leaks to the British and from the British to the Soviets?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have heard a story of a leak to a British paper, and I don't know what the details of it are. We discussed that last night.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you hear of that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Last autumn.

Senator FERGUSON. That was before this was printed? What is the date of this paper?

Mr. FAIRBANK. September 3, 1950, and the testimony is dated April 1950. I heard of this after this was printed. Whether it is the same thing I have no way of knowing.


Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 558" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 558

[Source: China Daily News, September 3, 1950]



NOTE.—In the smaller illustration the blank character discussed by Mr. Fairbank is in the third column from the right and would be the fifth character up from the bottom.

(The material below is a translation of the illustration)

It will be recalled that it was in 1945 that United States Ambassador to China (Patrick J.) Hurley personally went to Yen-an. In October, Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking, and came to an agreement in talks with the government

to solve internal political controversies by political means. At the end of December (George C.) Marshall arrived at the subsidiary capital (Chungking), bearing the title of Special Representative of the President of the United States. At the beginning of the next year, the government convened the Political Consultative Conference, composed of various parties and groups. This was followed by the issuance of the cease-fire orders, the reorganization of the units of the armed forces, the establishment of the Executive Headquarters after the return to the capital (Nanking), and Marshall's six successive trips to Lushan (Kuling). During this whole period, peace talks were being conducted like an endless string for a period of two years. During those two years, the conduct of the internal and foreign policies of our country can be said to be centered around relations with the United States. It is only natural that the intelligence collection work of the Soviet Union was also directed along these lines. But the interests of different countries were at variance, so that the degree of interest and the points of concentration were also dissimilar. By coincidence, during these few years, the two successive American Ambassadors to China were Hurley and (J. Leighton) Stuart. One of them conducted himself in the direct-line approach of a military man. The other was an educator endowed with broad sympathies toward worldly affairs. Both of them lacked the strict training of career diplomats in keeping secrets. In addition, at the time, the person in charge of information and intelligence in the American Embassy, the Director-General of the United States Information Service, (John K.) Fairbank, and his successor, as well as the person assisting Ambassador Stuart in the formulation of China policy, the Counselor with Ministerial rank, were all persons who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the National Government. Their prejudices frequently superseded their duties to maintain secrecy relating to the nations concerned. Wittingly or unwittingly, they leaked out diplomatic secrets, which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of the Soviet intelligence personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. Now in connection with the translation, Mr. Chairman, we have a problem. I would be inclined to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we accept Professor Fairbank's translation of that document, and then the staff can confirm through special sources the translation that he gives us here.

Senator SMITH. Do you have a copy of the photostat you are going to put in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It has some names in it that you want to keep out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I spot geographically for you the place where this blank occurs?

Senator FERGUSON. Why not put a circle there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would rather not mark this. It is a blank already. If somebody will look here, it is in the center of here on one side.

Mr. WAIT. Could it be stated that it is directly opposite the middle of the picture appearing on the mat sheet?

Senator FERGUSON. Read it the way it is and then read it the way you think it should be.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The way it is:

Wittingly or unwittingly disclosed leaks of foreign policy or diplomatic secrets, by way of—

Mr. MORRIS. Those are the aforesaid three people, one of whom mentioned is you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, and the other two are in the Embassy also.

* * * then by way of third party countries' embassies transmitted to blank—

that is pidgin-English, but that is where the blank comes—
intelligence officers' ears.

Senator FERGUSON. So the word "Soviet" is out of it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I don't know why because the context would make it perfectly plain it should be Soviet. That is what they are talking about.

Senator SMITH. What is the next question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I have some questions I would like to address to the witness.

Senator SMITH. All right, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Were you giving a literal translation or the substance?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was literal, sort of pidgin-English.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fairbank, have you ever carried messages or uncensored mail from Communists in China to Communists in the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever carry messages from Madame Sun Yat-sen to the China Aid Council?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I carried a message or a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever carry messages for Israel Epstein to persons in the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever receive messages from Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, the wife of Israel Epstein, to persons in the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Received from them for persons in the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. I received in Kweilin, and I have accepted the letter in your evidence as being substantially probably correct, I received from them reports or something to take to Chungking, and not only to Chungking—

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you took it from Kweilin to Chungking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. They were messages from Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I am willing to accept that although I do not recollect the details, the incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here reference to exhibit 112 in our public record which reads as follows, being a letter from Israel Epstein to W. L. Holland:

DEAR HOLLAND: I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday.

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

(Signed by I. EPSTEIN).

SEPTEMBER 6.

Will you identify H. and Elsie in that letter, please?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would assume that refers to the Chinese research man, Chan Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you concede that Chan Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley are Communists, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As of today I do not know. As of 1943, I did not consider them Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Fellow travelers?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Chan Han-seng was reputed to have been a Communist and to have broken away from them.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the lady?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did not have any impression of her politics. She was an English girl, escaped from Hong Kong. I did not, incidentally, have any ideas that what they were giving me was anything to do with Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but did you consider her a fellow traveler?

Mr. FAIRBANK. At that time in Kweilin I would not have said so. A fellow traveler being someone who promotes Communist interests?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. She was working for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, which was not a Communist project.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was not a Communist project?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the head of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Technically Dr. H. H. Kung, but the most famous man connected with it is a New Zealander, Rewi Alley.

Mr. MORRIS. He is still in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe he is today.

Mr. MORRIS. And the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives is also known as Indusco, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Indusco is an American cooperative which represents them here.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Now, you were associated with Indusco, were you not, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I was, and I secured evidence on that at your request.

Mr. MORRIS. You were connected with Indusco for what period of time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have reference here to one of those connections where I give my name to be on an advisory board. The date when I did that I have found no record of. Presumably it would be after I left Government service and returned to this country, presumably 1946 or 1947. However, I have secured from my secretary by telephone the following information as to my separation from Indusco, if you would like it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I would, Professor.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is in my files in Cambridge a form letter from Indusco, mimeographed, sent out to persons addressed "Dear Friend," dated November 1950, no day, just November 1950, and on the back I believe I and my wife are included in a list of the advisory board.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the one about the Bailie Memorial Technical Training School?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one I have here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The same letter, probably the same form or circular letter.

I wrote to Miss Ida Pruitt on January 8, 1951, and my letter included this statement:

Noting that Peter Townsend has written in China Weekly Review about CIC—
That means Chinese Industrial Cooperatives—

I wonder if it is still meant to be functioning. Naturally I think we would both want to disassociate ourselves from it in the present state of affairs in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Because you felt it was serving a Communist purpose?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the end of quotation.

I then have another of these form letters sent out by Miss Pruitt on Industrial stationery, dated April 6, 1951, in my files in Cambridge on the back of which is listed an advisory board which does not include my name or that of my wife.

Mr. MORRIS. That is at a time subsequent?

Mr. FAIRBANK. April 6, 1951, subsequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Peter Townsend the husband of Rose Yardumian?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And Rose Yardumian was secretary of the Washington office of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; she was about 1944, at some time during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. So you will concede that Indusco is an organization that is now serving Communist purposes?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You said so. That is no inference drawn from Miss Yardumian marrying Peter Townsend?

Mr. MORRIS. No. I mean over all. Based on your experience with Indusco and what you know about it and knowing that they are now operating in Communist China, you would concede they are an instrument of the Communist organization?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, you have the Christian Church still operating in China, but it is under difficulties, and I would assume that the Industrial Cooperatives either have been taken over or in great danger of being taken over or at least are being pushed around. I don't know the fact of that situation in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fairbank, will you identify that as a letterhead of the organization about which we have been talking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed. This is the letterhead of Indusco, Inc., American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, honorary chairman, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, office in New York.

Senator SMITH. Do you want that in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 559," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 559

Honorary Chairman: Admiral Harry E. Yarnell.

Honorary Vice Chairman: Frances Curtis, Marshall Field, Owen Lattimore.

INDUSCO INC.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE IN AID OF CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES

"Gung Ho"—Work Together

439 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

Telephone Murray Hill 3-3792

NOVEMBER 1950.

DEAR FRIEND: The weekly letters from the Bailie Memorial Technical Training School in Sandan tell of the progress in the projects which your gifts have helped to make possible. There is so much to be said for the remarkable job the school has done and continues to do.

There is the desert land that grows wheat, vegetables, and flax where nothing grew before. There are the numerous production centers that turn out cloth, chemicals, rugs, pottery, machines, glass, paper, and many other articles where nothing was produced before. Most important of all are the young people—future machinists, chemists, animal husbandry experts, cooperative specialists, scientific farmers and producers for the villages of China—who but a few years ago were poverty-stricken youngsters without a future or hope.

What a truly great gain for freedom from want.

What makes it meaningful to us is that Americans join with people from all over the world to help make the Sandan Bailie School a living center of international good will, where your friendship is a concrete and creative thing.

I want to urge you to continue to keep the Sandan Bailie School a splendid example of this friendship and help. The cost of running the school had decreased considerably because of the school's ability to supply many of the things it needs. But our help—and it is getting through to them and getting through in record time these days—is needed for teachers' salaries, for new teaching equipment, for replacement of worn equipment, for medical supplies in the school hospital, and for development of experimental projects.

We would like to be able to say to Sandan at Christmas—"your American friends are with you; we can promise the funds you need to carry you to the next year's harvest."

Won't you send us as generous a check as you can today?

Very sincerely,

[s] Ida Pruitt
IDA PRUITT.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: Maxwell S. Stewart, Chairman; Rev. Dwight J. Bradley, D. D., Vice Chairman; Ida Pruitt, Secretary; Charles S. Gardner, Treasurer; T. A. Bisson, Frances Curtis, Mrs. Frederick B. Fisher, Talitha Gerlach, Carl Goderez, Helen M. Harris, Mrs. Philip Jaffe, Olga Lang, Mrs. Owen Lattimore, Bishop S. Harrington Littell, Rev. William H. Melish, Walter Rautenstrauch, Alfred E. Sidwell, Nym Wales, Richard Watts, Jr., C. Martin Wilbur, Thomas Wright. Representative in China, Rewi Alley.

OFFICERS OF INDUSCO, INC.

President, Maxwell S. Stewart; Vice President, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot; Secretary, Mrs. Owen Lattimore; Treasurer, Charles S. Gardner.

ADVISORY BOARD

Mrs. Anne Archbold
 Mrs. Hugo Black
 Percy S. Brown
 J. Lossing Buck
 J. Henry Carpenter
 Y. G. Chen
 Evans Clark
 Harry G. Clement
 Dr. Alfred E. Cohn
 Mrs. John G. Coolidge
 Wayne Coy
 Mrs. Wayne Coy
 Errol Edgerton Crouter
 Mrs. Errol Edgerton Crouter
 Mrs. Lauchlin Currie
 Michael M. Davis
 J. W. Decker
 Hugh De Lacey
 Nicholson J. Eastman
 Thomas H. Eliot
 Gertrude Ely
 John K. Fairbank
 Mrs. John K. Fairbank
 Mrs. John H. Finley
 Margaret Forsythe
 Mrs. Manuel Fox
 Msgr. Paul Hanly Furfey
 John Garfield
 L. Carrington Goodrich

Mrs. Henry F. Grady
 Michael Greenberg
 Anne Guthrie
 William B. Hale
 Mrs. John H. Hammond
 Marion H. Hedges
 John R. Hersey
 Rt. Rev. H. W. Hobson, D. D.
 Richard W. Hogue
 Arthur N. Holcombe
 Arthur W. Hummel
 Mrs. Henry A. Ingraham
 Philip Jaffe
 Anthony Jenkinson
 Hon. Nelson T. Johnson
 Mrs. Nelson T. Johnson
 Mrs. Anne Hartwell
 Johnstone
 William C. Johnstone, Jr.
 Albert E. Kane
 Alice V. Keliher
 Mrs. Henry Goddard Leach
 Msgr. L. G. Ligutti
 Mrs. Goodhue Livingston
 Mrs. Frederick W.
 Longfellow
 W. C. Lowdermilk
 Dr. Lu Gwei-djen
 Mrs. Paul V. McNutt

Rufus G. Mather
 Mrs. Helen Hill Miller
 Homer L. Morris
 Philip Murray
 Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham,
 D. D.
 Nathaniel Peffer
 Mrs. Warren Lee Pierson
 Arthur Upham Pope
 Stephen Raushenbush
 Gerald Richardson
 Dr. G. Canby Robinson
 Daisy Fiske Rogers
 Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
 Mrs. Francis B. Sayre
 Mrs. George C. Shattuck
 Vincent Sheean
 Lewis S. C. Smythe
 Michael Straight
 Betty Gram Swing
 Deems Taylor
 Rose Terlin
 Mrs. Pherbia Thornburg
 Russel Tyson
 Roy Veatch
 Jerry Voorhis
 Mrs. John Paul Welling
 Mary Jane Willett
 Mrs. Quincy Wright

TECHNICAL CONSULTANTS

Karl T. Compton; Morris L. Cooke; Dana J. Demorest; Daniel S. Eppelsheimer; Ronald W. Gurney; Clark B. Millikan; Robert A. Millikan.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, there was read just now a letter about Kweilin and H. and Elsie and so on. Could I call your attention to a letter written by Mr. Holland at my request inasmuch as the letter just read refers to Mr. Holland? I mean I am just a third party in that letter. My name is just mentioned. Mr. Holland is a principal, and I have a letter from him which I have given a photostat of to Mr. Morris. Would it be useful in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Why don't you tell us of your conversation with Mr. Holland about that, and as to Mr. Holland's letter itself, why not allow that to go in the record when Mr. Holland is here. You can tell us what you like about Mr. Holland and the conversation.

If the witness wants to tell us about his conversation with Mr. Holland, I suggest that we accept that into the record but allow Mr. Holland's letter to go over until Mr. Holland is here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This will probably just delay you, and there is not much to say except that I phoned Mr. Holland and said, "Will you send me your comment on these four different letters you were connected with which incidentally referred to me, since you (Holland) were a principal and I was just connected?"—

Senator SMITH. He did that? You can refer that to us and we will have that to examine Mr. Holland when he comes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. He makes plain incidentally in that respect that these reports that I was bringing were those of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, in 1943 at the time when it was under the Nationalist Government of China.

There is also a letter from Graham Peck of which I gave you a photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir; I know him. I have met him several times.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mr. Rosinger was the editor of the last large publication of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was the editor of the State of Asia which was a symposium.

Mr. MORRIS. That was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, was it not, and it was an extensive project of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a thick book of some 500 pages because it is the putting together of chapters by a lot of people. I don't know how big a project I would call it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your practice to review manuscripts of Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I recall seeing one manuscript of his. I of course review perhaps 30 or 40 manuscripts every year. As a professor, they are sent to me and people from different parts of the country say, "Will you kindly read and give us your comments?" publishers, authors, and students and so on. I recall receiving this manuscript of Rosinger's which you have reference to.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I want to call your attention, Professor Fairbank, to our exhibit No. 128. This is already in the record, Mr. Chairman. It is addressed to John Fairbank, and it reads:

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Now will you relate to us the references in that letter? You did review the manuscript of Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I feel quite certain that I did because you have these letters in the record and I have a general, vague recollection. This manuscript of Rosinger was sent to me in Washington and I looked at it, at least at the latter part. Here is the book that resulted from the manuscript.

Mr. MORRIS. Did other people in the State Department contribute to this pamphlet? I mean that is the reference in there, "waiting for some comments from people in the State Department."

Mr. FAIRBANK. As to that, I don't know. I note you have in your record that reference to—will you check me on this? This is from memory. Don't you have a letter from Rosinger to Holland saying, "I am waiting for the comments of Hiss and Fairbank," dated December 30 or something, 1943?

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the letter to which you refer, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; this is the one I have seen in your testimony. I had no previous knowledge of it. I assume that refers also to this Rosinger manuscript. That is just my assumption.

This letter is from Holland to me. Would you like me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Holland says to me in a letter dated February 23, 1952, referring to page 482 of the committee's testimony:

Lawrence K. Rosinger, then on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, had at my invitation written a research report for the IPR on Chinese Wartime Politics, later published by the Princeton University Press. Following the regular practice of the IPR, I sent copies of the first draft to a number of qualified people for criticism. Among these were several Government officials, including John Carter Vincent, Alger Hiss, both of whom were then concerned with Chinese affairs, and yourself. From the dates it would seem that when Rosinger wrote, December 30, 1943, I actually had not yet sent you the manuscript because, as appears on page 479 of the hearings, it was not until February 21, 1944, that I sent it to you, apparently because other people had been slow sending in their comments.

Rosinger's study was a competent piece of scholarly work, did not propagate any Communist line, and was not based on classified reports. It was favorably reviewed in the press and learned journals.

That agrees substantially with my recollection. I have no recollection of Vincent or Hiss having seen this or I having been connected with their seeing it or having discussed it with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Maxwell Stewart made a contribution?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He wrote a pamphlet, Wartime China.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not the reference in this letter of Rosinger's to Holland say "Thanks for the comments from Stewart"? From that is it not apparent that Stewart himself made contributions to the Rosinger article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You were telling us about Stewart's pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. You have a letter in which I made reference to Stewart's pamphlet. It is in your testimony. I have here a copy of that pamphlet also. My connection with it is indicated in the letter that I wrote which is in your testimony. I don't know whether I have a copy of that letter here, but perhaps we could see that here somewhere.

At any rate, I criticized that pamphlet for being too outspokenly or undiplomatically critical.

Mr. MORRIS. This is exhibit No. 176, Mr. Chairman. May the witness read the first two paragraphs of this letter or the first three paragraphs?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. This is not actually about me at all, but it is a memorandum from Miss Miriam Farley to Mr. Holland dated February 4, 1944. You are interested in the second—

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would read the first three.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent, among others. Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

I am now editing the manuscript in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not very likely enough to satisfy him

completely. My position is that I am willing—in fact, anxious—to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, providing this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Those are the first three paragraphs. Would you like my comment on these?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I would like to have your point of view on it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have here a photostat of a letter from Miss Farley to me dated February 19, 1952, which gives her recollection of this transaction.

Mr. MORRIS. No; I would like to have your own recollection.

Mr. Chairman, that, you see, would be what Miss Farley thinks about this at some subsequent time.

Senator SMITH. You can leave that with the committee and we can go into that when, as, and if.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 559A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 559-A

FAR EASTERN SURVEY

OFFICE OF THE EDITOR

American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.

FEBRUARY 19, 1952.

Professor JOHN K. FAIRBANK,

127 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR JOHN: I doubt if this will be much help to you but here goes. I do remember discussing with you Max Stewart's pamphlet, "War-time China," although I recall few details, only the general impression. We had sent the manuscript for comment to you and several others. You then called me on the telephone—I think at my home, it must have been on a holiday, or perhaps in the evening—and we had quite a long conversation. So far as I now recall you did not raise any objection to the content of the pamphlet, i. e., on the ground that it was inaccurate or biased or otherwise not up to proper research standards, although you may have criticized at least some passages. Your principal contention as I recall it, which you put very forcefully, was that publication of this material at this time might be harmful to Chinese-American relations in general and to relations between the IPR and its China Council in particular. You feared that the pamphlet would arouse hostile reactions in China and might lead to the China Council's leaving the IPR. I disagreed with you on the main point; I felt that it was the IPR's duty to present to the American public a true picture, as nearly as humanly possible, of conditions in Nationalist China, giving the dark side as well as the bright, although I also felt that as China was our friend and ally the less pleasant features ought to be described and explained in a friendly and sympathetic, not in a hostile or critical manner. I felt that a sound relationship between China and America could not in the long run be based on concealment of facts from the American public, and that it was better for the American public to learn the facts from China's friends than from her enemies. ("China," of course, meant Nationalist China.) Also I did not believe that publication of the pamphlet would cause the China Council to leave the IPR.

As I recall it I did, partly as a result of your comments and partly on the basis of my own judgment, persuade Max Stewart to modify some passages in the original manuscript in order to make them as palatable as possible to Chinese opinion without actually suppressing or distorting important facts.

As I remember it my discussion with you was concerned chiefly if not entirely with Max Stewart's account of Nationalist China, not with the brief passage on the Chinese Communists which has been cited in McCarran committee hearings.

I do not recall the date of my conversation with you, in case that matters, but as the pamphlet was published in April 1944 it must have been two or three months before that.

You might be interested in the following extract from a letter, dated April 6, 1944, which Tyler Dennett wrote to Raymond Dennett, then secretary of the American IPR:

Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It ought to do some good even in Chungking. There may be enough new developments between now and the end of the year to require some additions or supplements to the text but I should suppose it would do for the documentation for the next conference. It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR.

(That's all he said about the pamphlet; the rest of the letter dealt with other subjects.) Raymond Dennett passed the letter on to Peggy Stewart and myself with the following note: "Tyler is not prone to make comments of this sort—I know, having been around him these many years. I think you are due a bow!" This is probably not relevant to your problem but might be of use in case anyone should ask you what you thought of the content of the pamphlet, as distinct from the advisability of publishing it in 1944, since it indicates that Tyler Dennett, who was hardly a Red, found nothing objectionable in it.

I purposely wrote the above before refreshing my memory by looking up the memorandum from me to Bill Holland quoted on page 629 of volume II of the hearings. As you see, the two accounts of my conversation with you are not inconsistent, although the one written in 1944 is naturally more specific.

If you wish, you may show this letter to anyone you like.

Warmest regards and good luck. I hope to see you at the Boston FEA meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Miriam
MIRIAM S. FARLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. One thing that did not appear in this pamphlet is the paragraph which reads in this fashion:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass-roots populist movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic processes."

Those views are contrary to the views which you have expressed before this committee, are they not? That is page 45. Would you care to read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are referring there to the opinion expressed by Maxwell Stewart in a pamphlet published in 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that not the same pamphlet that we are discussing in this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it is; yes. Maxwell Stewart makes this statement which you have quoted, and this statement is a rather broad one. I mean it does not say these Communists are mere agrarian reformers, which was the Communist line at one time in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. It says everything but that, Professor.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It quotes Raymond Gram Swing.

Mr. MORRIS. It does not express disapproval with Raymond Gram Swing on the subject.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say on the whole that this goes along with the idea of the Chinese Communists being different from the Russian Communists in a peculiarly Chinese way, and that idea was quite wide-

spread up to this period and even later among Americans and among observers in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hold that view?

Mr. FAIRBANK. At this time I think I would have subscribed to the statement that the Chinese Communists were in many ways like the Russian Communists and in many ways not like the Russian Communists. In other words, you had to describe them not by applying the clichés of Russia but looking at their activity on the Chinese scene. I have studied that since then, and we have a book coming out which goes into the whole history of Chinese Communist ideology and our analysis is that it has been remarkably Leninist in its form of organization. We don't know how close the tie-up has been with Russia at all times. Of course we know there is a tie-up today.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, you see Miss Farley writing to Holland in this letter says:

Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Doubtless he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course you have taken a quotation from that letter and sought to link it up with this paragraph on page 45 of this pamphlet, have you not?

Mr. MORRIS. I am talking about the whole pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Fine, I am glad to know that.

Mr. MORRIS. "The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others."

Obviously you read the whole pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I assume I read it through.

Mr. MORRIS. If we are looking at the pamphlet, we can address ourselves to particular items in that pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this not one of the important paragraphs in that manuscript?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not say it is the key paragraph. It is on page 45.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a pamphlet that represents the Chinese Communists to the American people as agrarian reformers. Would you not say that is an integral part of that pamphlet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I say you go too far in saying it represents them as agrarian reformers and nothing else.

Mr. MORRIS. It says "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. FAIRBANK. And quoting Swing above, you find it resembling Communist movements in other countries. In other words, Stewart was trying to do a balanced job. I think he is an honest man myself. I thought this pamphlet at the time was a realistic thing. As a matter of fact, in another connection I have made a list of the table of contents here of this pamphlet. I would like to leave that with you. It is just extracted here. It indicates the headings that Stewart put into this thing.

The main headings are "Wartime China," "China's wartime activities," "Obstacles to China's war effort," "Political divisions," and the Communists are just one of a dozen things there. This whole thing is an effort to explain China to the American people at a time when

the censorship of wartime prevented the American people from understanding the realities of the Chinese situation. This is something that lies behind our disaster in China, the fact that we did not really know what was going on, and we did not make the effort we could have made for reform programs in China before it was too late.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think if more people had read that pamphlet we would have been better off in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we would have been.

I do not think this one paragraph in here outweighs that pamphlet. There is praise in here of the Generalissimo and everything else. Given the amount of left-wing stuff that was flying around, it seems to me Stewart fell for very little of it at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. May the professor's notations on the pamphlet be put in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 560" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 560

WAR-TIME CHINA

(By Maxwell Stewart)

Wartime China:

China's New Strength
China Fights In Spite of Internal Difficulties
Wishful Thinking vs. Understanding China

China's wartime achievements:

Serious deficiency of Supplies.
Supply Routes
War-Time Economic Progress
Industrial Cooperatives
Birth of Political Unity
Age-Old Divisions Subordinated
Unity for National Liberation
Steps Toward Democracy
The People's Political Council
Criticism of Draft Constitution
Put Yourself in Chinese Boots

Obstacles to China's war effort:

Inflation
Poor Planning
Speculation
Farm Problems
Inflation Multiplies Difficulties
Graft, Abuse of Laws Cause Unrest
Military Weakness
Traditions To Be Overcome

Political divisions:

Business-Banking Group
Political Science Group
The CC Group
The Army
Three Important Generals
Secret Police
T. V. Soong
Chiang Kai-shek's Leadership Essential
The Communists
Agrarian and Political Policies
Military Efficiency
Kuomintang-Communist Relations
Threat of Civil War
Kuomintang Demands
Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties

Strengthening China's War Effort:

Supply Routes
Army Reorganization
"One For All, All For One"
Strong War Government Needed

China Plans for the Future:

Industrial Potentials
Goals
Need For Irrigation
Democracy's Future

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read T. A. Bisson's article in Far Eastern Survey in July 1943, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. That article came to China when I was there, and I must have read it. I remember very well it made quite a reaction from the Chinese Government.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the one that made reference to Communist China as a democratic China and Nationalist China as a feudal China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your view as to that particular pamphlet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As I recall, at that time in Chungking, the summer of 1943, with the circumstances of the war effort bogging down and all of those things that were going on that seemed disastrous for the future, those of us that were out there, including me and practically everybody I know, welcomed a pamphlet or a book, the things of Hanson Baldwin or Pearl Buck, which had a much wider distribution in the Reader's Digest and Life magazine, and also Bisson's article of which there were 300 copies or a thousand in Far Eastern Survey, welcomed criticism which was realistic.

The two terms "democratic" and "feudal" I think are cliché terms and not particularly realistic. That is not all of Bisson's pamphlet.

I do have a copy of Baldwin's article in Reader's Digest of August 1943 in which he says that China is not a nation in our sense of the word but a geographer's expression. Boy, did they hit the ceiling in Chungking. That was a terrible thing to say from the point of view of the Nationalist Government. Baldwin said that, trying to be realistic about the problem we faced in China. Bisson's was in that general category.

Now in retrospect I do not support his use of these terms, "democratic" and "feudal." Those are cliché terms. He may have picked them up from Communist inspiration or stimulus to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that not the change in the party line at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in China at that time and was in no position to judge whether it was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You say he may have picked them up from Communist inspiration?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They used the term "democratic" for many years before that about Communist China and "feudal" about Nationalist China. I think the change of line that has been suggested among the Communists in that period was something about attacking Chiang more vigorously, breaking up the united front.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever advocate giving the Communists Army material in 1945?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The question never came to me. I was not in that line of work. Now if it had come to me, I am not sure what I would have done. I recall that in that period a lot of people wanted to try to get more war effort in China; General Stilwell, as a matter of fact, General Donovan.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not a fact that Chiang Kai-shek had to keep part of his army engaged to try to keep the Communists from attacking him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was part of the civil war situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Then if you had given them arms you would have been making the job harder for him and making our own job harder.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If they had used them against the Japanese, it would have helped. That was the old Stilwell argument. I was not in this argument. I was there with the Embassy and not dealing with that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever advocate it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I never did because I was in no position to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you this letter, Professor Fairbank. I will ask Mr. Mandel to identify that letter.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 19, 1945, addressed "For T. A. Bisson," and it is signed by JKF with the typed signature of John K. Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that and see if you can recall having written that letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I don't recall writing it. I would like to read it though. The initials are not mine at the bottom definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not yours?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I would not recognize those as initials made by me. I don't make my initials that way. If you will allow me to read it a minute, I have not seen this before.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Now I have read that. I would say as to those initials that are not mine, that must be my secretary signing for me. I had a Chinese girl as secretary. She makes the type of initial which is the same general type that I would make with a bar for the top of a "J," probably signing for me. This sounds to me like a letter that I would have written.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received in the record?

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 561" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 561

(Chungking)
SEPTEMBER 19, 1943.

For T. A. Bisson.

DEAR TOM: I send herewith a Chinese translation of your recent article in Far Eastern Survey, which has been published together with the May 10 article by Pearl Buck. The publisher is doubtless a fake, and one naturally suspects that it was done by the opposition party. Many people, however, have distributed typed copies of the English versions of both articles, and this booklet was given me by a nonparty member.

I send this souvenir to indicate the great value of such critical expressions as an influence in the local political scene. No one here doubts that you have really helped to hold the situation together by indicating that American criticism would be very outspoken and direct if the KMT (Kuomintang) went through with the proposal for a liquidation of their opponents by force. Officials here are truly hypersensitive to American opinion, partly because American help is regarded as essential for postwar development. One good observer has suggested to me, however, that the recent decision of the CEC (Central Executive Committee) not to use force now was prompted in part by CKS' (Chiang Kai-shek) realization that many leaders in the provinces are restive and would seize any opportunity to shake off central government control; in other words, American opinion was perhaps not as influential as the fear to start any internal military operations here lest potential warlords or provincial separatists take advantage of the resulting commotion and deny or decrease central government authority. This tendency to break up is of course aggravated by the communications breakdown.

We are appalled and amused here by the American editorials praising the KMT (Kuomintang) for its decision to be democratic, as proved by postponing the constitution and end of tutelage to an indefinite future. I hope some Americans realize the situation and are using their praise as a weapon, but it is almost too much to hope for.

I am sorry I cannot write at length, but I thought I would give you some fan mail, at least.

Best regards,

JFK
(JOHN K. FAIRBANK).

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, will you read that, please?

Mr. FAIRBANK. "For T. A. Bisson." It is dated September 19, 1945.

DEAR TOM: I send herewith a Chinese translation of your recent article in Far Eastern Survey, which has been published together with the May 10 article by Pearl Buck. The publisher is doubtless a fake, and one naturally suspects that it was done by the opposition party. Many people however have distributed typed copies of the English versions of both articles, and this booklet was given me by a nonparty member.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall this particular Chinese translation of Bisson's article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Is your testimony you cannot recall that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall who gave you that particular booklet then? You say, "this booklet was given me by a nonparty member." Who was that, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't have a recollection. You asked me about such a translation yesterday. I didn't remember it. I don't today.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, "The publisher is doubtless a fake." Does that recall anything to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. With my knowledge of Chungking during that period—you see, this is evidently something published in Chinese and so a publisher's name is attached to it. My statement, "The publisher is doubtless a fake," would suggest it was probably a Communist source publishing this translation. That is what you would expect. All these things that were critical were immediately picked up by the Communists and spread around.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was given to you by a nonparty member.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That might have been almost anybody. You see, I was head of the American Publication Service of the American Embassy. I was buying Chinese books every day. Things were coming in and out of the office. I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you do not recall this episode at all, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. A letter like this which I am inclined to acknowledge I think I must have written, this helps me to reconstruct, but I have no more recollection than I had yesterday. In other words, I don't recall the incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time, I think the whole letter is in and the professor's opinions of the Chinese Government expressed in the letter speak for themselves unless you have something else.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it is important to indicate what I mean by this letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like to continue?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will continue reading the letter first.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

I send this souvenir to indicate the great value of such critical expressions as an influence in the local political scene. No one here doubts that you have really helped to hold the situation together by indicating that American criticism would be very outspoken and direct if the KMT (Kuomintang)—

I wonder why that is in—

went through with the proposal for a liquidation of their opponents by force. Officials here are truly hypersensitive to American opinion, possibly because American help is regarded as essential for postwar development. One good observer has suggested to me, however, that the recent decision of the CEC (Central Executive Committee) not to use force now was prompted in part by CKS' (Chiang Kai-shek) realization that many leaders in the province are restive and would seize any opportunity to shake off Central Government control; in other words, American opinion was perhaps not as influential as the fear to start any internal military operations here, lest potential war lords or potential separatists take advantage of the resulting commotion and deny or decrease Central Government authority. This tendency to break up is, of course, aggravated by the communications breakdown.

Would you like my comment on that?

MR. MORRIS. If you have something to add; yes.

MR. FAIRBANK. The point of that statement is—look, you have 1945 on this. You have the wrong date on this thing. I think the photo-stat is 1943.

MR. MORRIS. 1943 is right. The stencil is wrong. The Bisson article did appear in 1943.

MR. FAIRBANK. Yes. Let us get that straight. So this is wartime China, and the war effort is the object of the American people in China. In the summer of 1943, there were various very extensive rumors that the people in the Nationalist military organization, Hu Chung-han is the man mentioned, had a plan for attacking the Communists in Northwest China, which would have used the better part of their troops, those that were held down there, plus a lot more probably, with American equipment, starting a civil war at the time that the Japanese were by no means defeated in China or anywhere else, and when we were making every effort, by turning programs, by bringing stuff over the hump, by every possible means, to hold China in the war. Now the whole idea that they should start a civil war in the middle of 1943 would have been a disaster to the American cause in China and the American war effort against Japan. I am sure the policy of the Embassy was against that and my view was against that.

I am saying to Bisson here that I thought his article helped to oppose that idea in Free China at that time.

Now, you see the spot that Americans are in, in this kind of Chinese situation, because the article, Bisson's article, criticizes the Central Government. On the one hand, the Central Government is very sensitive, and on the other hand the Communists will pick it up and start beating the Central Government with it, spreading it all around and saying "Yah, yah, the Americans are criticizing the Nationalist Government."

Senator FERGUSON. Could that not be a reason for Bisson writing the article?

MR. FAIRBANK. That is the possible reason, but knowing Bisson, who was my student in 1940, I don't believe he would knowingly play the Communist game.

MR. MORRIS. You do know he joined the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, subsequently?

MR. FAIRBANK. I do; I would not do it myself. I still don't feel justified in calling him some name.

MR. MORRIS. Are you going to read the rest of that, Professor?

MR. FAIRBANK. I don't know whether you need it.

MR. MORRIS. It is in the record.

Did you use "care of Lauchlin Currie" in the White House, as your address during the war, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I used it on some occasions when I received mail which was sent to me at his office, because of the fact that I had been assigned officially to work by Dr. James Phinney Baxter, head of the Research and Analysis Branch of Strategic Services, in which I was the head of the China section.

Since Lauchlin Currie was the central coordinating person as Administrative Assistant to FDR, he was the logical person with whom should be attached as a liaison officer a person from the Coordinator of Information, and this was worked out in the fall of 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you use that address?

Mr. FAIRBANK. During the winter of 1941-42 in Washington I went repeatedly, sometimes every day I would drop in at Currie's office. Part of the time I was on assignment there to do a report, a recess report, which was done for the Coordinator of Information, and published, confidential classification, I think in January of 1942. It was on American aid to China, trying to give the whole story which Currie had the record of, of setting up General Chennault and the Flying Tigers, trying to give aid to Free China. The main burden was that the aid had been too little and too late. I was there for that purpose.

When I came back from China at the beginning of 1944 I was again under OSS, and this liaison arrangement was still in a sort of status quo ante.

I transferred in March of 1944 to the Office of War Information, and the man who brought me in there, George Taylor, urged that I continue this liaison relation with Currie, because Currie was in the White House, working on China. So I continued to drop in his office. He had an extra office. I did not do any work for him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Currie have access to your correspondence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not that I know of.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever prepare any material on the basis of your correspondence that you know of?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; during the war when I was in China I was under the American Embassy and I had really three jobs. First, I was collecting Japanese documents and sending them back for intelligence purposes. That was paid for by OSS, who sent me out.

The second job was that I was the representative in the Far East of the Library of Congress, and for that purpose collecting Chinese publications, which eventually were brought back to collections in this country.

The third job was that I was under the Embassy, working on some of their cultural-relations activities. Now, this cultural-relations activity of the Embassy was in connection with these other people, the same sort of people that I was dealing with on these publications, I mean intellectuals. That was my special line. I was getting publications from them; I was giving publications to them, I was dealing with cultural relations.

In that connection, in the Embassy I developed a number of projects which were for the purpose of helping Chinese intellectuals. I can give you a long list of these projects and cumber up the record. I don't want to bother you with all these activities, projects to help Chinese intellectuals.

There was one in particular on which I got Currie's help. I sent him letters occasionally. Every little while when I was writing to various people I would write to him, and one of these projects was arrangement in Kunming by which the American Army there that had a big base invited some Chinese professors to come and lecture to the American troops, trying to have good will and solve some of our public-relations problems in China.

Now, to indicate the nature of that kind of work I have here a letter of commendation from the State Department, from the Embassy, which may be of interest to you—I can show it to you.

Mr. MORRIS. We may save time, Professor. I have here a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a photostat of an original on the letterhead of the White House, dated May 22, 1943, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed by Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this obviously makes reference to the testimony being given by the witness. May it be received in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to, subsequently read in full in the record by Mr. Morris, was marked "Exhibit No. 562.")

Mr. MORRIS. It reads, Professor—

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 22, 1943.

DEAR CARTER: I am enclosing some material on the plight of the intellectuals in China, mainly from the personal correspondence of John Fairbank. I am afraid that I cannot let you have more official stuff, but I will be glad to show it to you if and when you come to the office. I know that you will use this material discreetly and protect John in such a way that his views cannot possibly be carried back to the Chinese.

I had a good letter from Graves, which made his position clear, but which, I am afraid, means that he is not available for this particular job—

Is that Mortimer Graves?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would assume so.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

I am therefore relying more than ever upon you. As time is pressing, I hope that you will have some good word for me shortly.

Sincerely,

LAUCHLIN C.

It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, the Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is certainly the type of project, and there were several of those projects. I considered them important. It was important to save these Chinese professors, keep them alive, and keep them coming our way, because you know how important they are in the Chinese scene. The Communists have them now, and that is one of the Communists' strengths. They have them under control.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Guenther Stein?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I met him in Chungking during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you express interest in his writings?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I know, of course, this letter in your record, and I think this is the only expression of interest that I can imagine.

Mr. MORRIS. You refer to Exhibit No. 84, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Volume II, page 378, it refers to Guenther Stein's stuff.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Will you read that for us, please?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a memorandum from Lockwood to Carter, and Holland, giving only their initials, but I assume that is pretty obvious, is it not?

JUNE 24, 1942.

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest.

I note, if I may call it to the attention of the committee, on page 378 committee counsel inserted the statement "Now, at that time, Mr. Fairbank was associated with the OWI."

Senator FERGUSON. Were you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was not, sir. I think it would be worth while to correct that error.

Senator SMITH. What were you connected with at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

Senator SMITH. That was OSS?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Which had been set up on June 13. I had been with that Research and Analysis Branch for the preceding year. That part of OWI which amalgamated in that branch was not in that branch. So I was not in the predecessor of OWI.

Mr. MORRIS. You subsequently did go to OWI?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did, after my return in 1943. Do you want these corrections for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. FAIRBANK. On page 378 the committee counsel says:

I would like to read this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as evidence of the fact that the Office of War Information at that time was expressing a great deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's—as Mr. Lockwood says—"stuff," in Washington.

On page 383, committee counsel says:

* * * Fairbank, who was then head of the China Section of OWI—

and then the statement is made:

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promulgating Guenther Stein's material—so it apparently served another function at that time, did it not, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would agree with you; yes.

And on page 399, committee counsel says:

John FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, was head of the China desk of OWI at that time.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say, as an interested bystander, that this letter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the techniques that they employ in recommending each other and disseminating their work.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean Communist work?

General WILLOUGHBY. People then ran from communism to fellow-traveling, befuddled liberals, and whatever that category has been described so often in the current press reports.

I think that testimony is based on this misconception.

Senator FERGUSON. That you were in OWI?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a secret-service branch; was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; that was not. That was the group which has now become part of the State Department. Of course, it was classified work, very definitely, and we were doing a wartime job.

Senator FERGUSON. It was even more classified than OWI; was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know how you have more or less. "Confidential" is "confidential," and "secret" is "secret" all over the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it all secret?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; in this Research and Analysis Branch we got large collections of printed matter from the public domain. We filed all kinds of newspaper clippings. We had a clipping service, got materials from abroad.

We did everything we could to bring up the record in one place of what was going on, in China, in this case. When Lockwood came to see us there was absolutely no idea of showing him classified material or trading classified material. You see, he says that we "might be asked to trade." Now, I have here his letter dated February 19, 1952, giving his recollection of this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not read this yet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will read that memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. The Research and Analysis Section of OSS was the agency, was it not, that supplied information to the people who were formulating war plans?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They were, among others, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The gravity of supplying Guenther Stein's stuff, as this memorandum says, to that agency is even more serious, is it not, than in the case of OWI?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say it is even more essential, because the people formulating war plans need to have every kind of material come in which they are well able to evaluate.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you gathering Guenther Stein's material as Communist material?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, we were gathering it as material coming out of China by a man who was a reporter, who had a status as a correspondent, and who was a reputable correspondent at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not label it as Communist material; did you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We had no occasion to.

You will see that Lockwood's memorandum describes how it was rather factual, not dealing with policy, nothing to do with the Communists, and so on. That is Lockwood's statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you acknowledge that Guenther Stein was a Communist agent?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read sections of the book by General Willoughby, where that is alleged, and a case is built up.

If you ask me: Would I feel happy in dealing with Guenther Stein now?—I would not. I would suspect him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you suspect him at this time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you send any caveat in the material that you sent in to the OSS at this time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The material was not sent in, as far as I know. It came to our files, and our files had all this kind of newspaper stuff. You see, this came out through the censorship of the Kuomintang by radio as a regular news dispatch to the IPR, instead of newspapers, and they paid for it. They were trying to get material out of China that would give them some factual information.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they trying to get Communist material?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not that I know of.

Senator SMITH. You had better read this letter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The memorandum says:

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it, and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the trade?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There was no trade that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the proposed trade?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This, of course is Lockwood's statement, not mine. I can only infer from this. I do not recollect this conversation. We had lots of people coming in. I can only infer from this that I may have said—this is supposition—that if the IPR is doing a research project and they are giving us unclassified material from the public domain which has come through the Kuomintang censorship by way of radio, from Stein, for example, then, as noblesse oblige, they could come and look at our open newspaper files, of which we had a big supply.

Senator FERGUSON. Would they not have had access to those newspaper files without any trade?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They could have, but perhaps not in so convenient a form. You see, we were trying to get material from all around.

I am not sure that I made that statement. That is Lockwood's declaration. I have here the letter, he being the material person connected with it.

Did I give you a copy of this letter?

Mr. MORRIS. No. Why don't you leave it, professor, and we will take it up with Holland.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think I gave you the letter from Lockwood last night.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you oppose bombing of Manchurian Red China, professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. In May 1951.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I went to the meeting of the Associated Harvard Clubs in Chicago in May 1951. I believe it was in May.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write in the Harvard Crimson that you opposed the bombing of Manchurian Red China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I did. I spoke at that meeting. It was published, and I gave my reasons at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the article you wrote at that time a fair expression of your views?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As of that time, certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is the Harvard Crimson of Wednesday, May 9, 1951, which contains an article by John K. Fairbank, class of 1929.

Is that the article you wrote, Professor Fairbank?

Senator SMITH. Do you want to put that in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. May it go in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes, we can put that in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 563" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 563

[From the Harvard Crimson, Wednesday, May 9, 1951]

FAIRBANK OPPOSES EXTENDING CONFLICT TO CHINA, SEES NO REAL ADVANTAGE IN BOMBING MANCHURIA—PROFESSOR SAYS AIRPLANE ATTACKS WOULD SPUR CHINESE ON, NOT DESTROY MILITARY POWER

(By JOHN K. FAIRBANK '29, Professor of History)

The furious debate as to how much further we should go in fighting China is rather skimpy in its analysis of the situation inside China. The leaders of American public life seem pretty vague about the actual state of things among the Chinese people.

It is safe to say that none of them, any more than the rest of us, have swung a hoe in a paddy field or experienced the hatred of landlords ("feudalism") and foreign invaders ("imperialism") which has been the lot of so many of the Chinese people. Although we are much handicapped by the Communist news barrier and propaganda blackout, there are at least a few major points which can be kept in mind.

In the first place, China, even more than Korea, provides a type of military terrain with which we have not had much experience. I refer not to the fact that the country is big nor to the fact that it is heavily populated, but to the remarkable density of the agrarian population in the countryside on the flood plains of the great rivers where the bulk of the Chinese populace live.

As the Japanese found to their cost over a decade, a densely populated countryside has some of the characteristics of a country-wide city in that the rural population are numerous and ubiquitous, and every peasant is a potential participant in military operations as an auxiliary for espionage, communication, transportation or other services.

The Japanese found that sending a military column through the densely populated Chinese countryside was a different proposition from sending one against an enemy in an unpopulated terrain. The chief result of this feature of the Chinese countryside is the tendency for invading spearheads to bog down, lose their communications and fight a war of rapier-against-haystack.

WHAT IS WORTH BOMBING?

Another military feature in China is the comparative lack of installations which are worth bombing. South and Central China where most of the people live is served by a network of waterways which make railroads largely unnecessary. The significant thing about the Canton-Hankow line is not that a single track connects these two major centers but that a single track is all they need between them in "normal" times.

Bombing canals is hard work compared to bombing railroad tracks since the bomb craters are just as likely to improve and deepen, as to injure, a river or canal system.

Similarly, the industrial production of China is incredibly small compared to the size of the country; and the age-old self-sufficiency of the farm economy is still great enough to make our experience in Germany and Japan no guide for China. The wartime bombing of Germany and Japan is said by many specialists to have been a much overrated operation in respect to its military effect. The

physical set-up in China would inevitably make bombing much less effective than in those cases.

ON TO GREATER EFFORT

The danger is therefore that the bombing campaign proposed by General MacArthur, instead of being a knock-out blow, would be a campaign of harassment and pin pricks which would spur the Chinese people on to an ever greater military effort against us without destroying their military potential as we might hope.

After all there is a great deal of land in China, much of it marked by towns and villages, but there are few major concentrations of industrial capacity. Outside of Manchuria, automotive engines are probably not yet produced anywhere in this whole great country, nor are we likely to find any petroleum cracking plants, much less roller bearing factories like those of Schweinfurt or centers of aircraft production.

The probable military ineffectiveness of our bombing campaign makes it something to think twice about since we can of course be sure of its psychological effectiveness, both in mobilizing the Chinese populace against us and also probably in losing us allies or admirers elsewhere in Asia.

GENERAL OVER-ALL FALLACY

This concept of somehow solving our problem in Korea by fighting elsewhere strikes me as part of a general over-all fallacy—namely, the tendency to expect that we can get desirable results in Asia by the application of greater force. There is no question about the need of punishing aggression by force and being constantly prepared to use force against Russian and other Communist expansion as a general proposition.

There is considerable question, however, whether the enlarged application of force in Asia by itself can solve any problems for us there. For example, the Chinese Communist regime has been reported by most observers to be a good deal more efficient and effective in handling some of China's problems than its predecessor.

The successful campaign to stop inflation and the efforts to increase production are examples of greater governmental efficiency, even though combined with some of the Communist methods of deceiving people by lying propaganda and controlling them by fear of the police.

Supposing that we were eventually able by force to destroy the present power of the Chinese Communist regime, what would take its place? I doubt if anyone but Chiang Kai-shek believes that he could form a government to take over and administer again the 400 millions of the Chinese subcontinent. The strength of the Chinese Communist regime, which is now being manifested against us, has not been built in a day but over a whole generation of activity in organizing the peasantry in the populous countryside.

It may bring China no happiness, even though the trains may run on time, but the fact remains that it has certain elements of strength and organization which have been acquired painstakingly and over a period of more than a decade. What would we put in its place? Where are the program and the personnel to take over?

No doubt, our best chance of finding them would be in Formosa, where many competent administrators and patriotic Chinese remain. But there is little sign that this island of 7 million with its quarter of a million Nanking Government refugees can provide the personnel and leadership now to run China.

If we were to have a program of bombing, we would need an equally important program of recruiting and training the young people and the civil servants who could establish a regime and meet the needs of the Chinese populace. The only alternative is chaos and the continued totalitarianism to which it conduces.

Thus, the advocates of force to suppress Communism in Asia, if they have their way, can no doubt destroy the Communist power holders in various places. But they give us no indication of what would come afterward. Are we to take over and run Asia with American personnel? Can we find competent puppets? Do we seek a new colonialism? Or do we expect western libertarian democracy to appear miraculously overnight?

The fact is that Asia has a background of political despotism and this tradition lends itself to the modern totalitarian developments. Our best chance of getting stability in the Far East, in addition to a balance of power system between China and Japan, lies in securing a situation in which revolutionary China is checked from being warlike abroad or toward us while left to work out her own destiny internally.

BEST FOR RUSSIA

It may be impossible for China to have any regime but a totalitarian one for some time to come, and we must assume that a purely totalitarian regime will be aggressive and militaristic toward us.

But this unhappy prospect does not seem to me to lead to the conclusion that an all-out war with China now would serve our interests. On the contrary, it might provide the best opportunity for Russia to take Western Europe and put us in a forked stick.

WILLIAM M. SIMMONS, *President*
 RUDOLPH KASS, *Managing Editor*
 DAVID L. RATNER, *Editorial Chairman*
 FRANK B. GILBERT, *Associate Managing Editor*

WILLIAM S. HOLBROOK III, *Business Manager*
 ROBERT L. WILEY, Jr., *Advertising Manager*
 MARLOWE A. SIGAL, *Photographic Chairman*
 EDWARD J. COUGHLIN, Jr., *Sports Editor*

THE HARVARD CRIMSON

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

(Full text enclosed with passages marked. For release: Thursday, May 10, 1951)

Bombing Manchuria would spur the Chinese on to a greater military effort against America and would not destroy their military potential, John K. Fairbank, noted far eastern expert, warned today.

Such a United States move would also probably lose allies and admirers elsewhere in Asia, Fairbank added. Fairbank outlines, instead, a different approach which he calls "our best chance."

While agreeing that aggression must be punished by force, Fairbank—a Harvard history professor—said, "There is considerable question, however, whether the enlarged application of force in Asia by itself can solve any problems for us there.

"For example, the Chinese Communist regime has been reported by most observers to be a good deal more efficient and effective in handling some of China's problems than its predecessor."

The statement—appearing in the Harvard Crimson, the university daily—continues, "Thus, the advocate of force to suppress communism in Asia, if they have their way, can no doubt destroy the Communist power holders in various places. But they give us no indication of what would come afterward. * * *

Do we expect western libertarian democracy to appear miraculously overnight?" Fairbanks says that "our best chance of getting stability in the Far East * * * lies in securing a situation in which revolutionary China is checked from being warlike abroad or toward us while left to work out her own destiny internally."

Although agreeing that China may continue to have an aggressive totalitarian government, Fairbank concludes "this unhappy prospect does not lead to the conclusion that all-out war with China now would serve our interests.

"On the contrary," he says, "it might provide the best opportunity for Russia to take Western Europe and put us in a forked stick."

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your article, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is an article for the Harvard Crimson. It is not the occasion that I speak of, over which President Conant was presiding, in Chicago.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write this article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sure. Nobody else would put this picture in but the Harvard Crimson, surely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Would you like me to comment on this?

Senator SMITH. Is that your picture?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is hard to identify, but that is it.

Senator SMITH. We will put that in.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you on a number of occasions asked recognition of Red China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have at certain times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the statement in 1950 that recognition of and veto power for Red China in the United Nations would not be detrimental to the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe that came up in a debate with Admiral Cook, possibly, or somewhere.

Mr. MORRIS. I am making reference to your article that appeared in the Reporter of January 3, 1950. I think you say here, Professor Fairbank:

In this context, diplomatic recognition is only the first step. Since Russian aid to Chinese Communists during the civil war has been relatively meager, we have little basis for applying the Stimson doctrine.

The change of government in China has followed a genuine civil war, and not military aggression from outside. Diplomatic relations, so necessary in our dealings with Communist Russia, are equally necessary, now that the cold war extends to Communist China.

Recognition is not moral approval, only realism. The Chinese veto in the United Nations can have only a little more nuisance value than the present Russian veto.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I see that?

I would be inclined to acknowledge that; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have several other quotations.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I add the comment, that was long before we were fighting the Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the Chinese Communists changed their nature between 1950 and the present date? It is the same Chinese organization; is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say they changed their relationship to us. They became more overtly armed, militarily aggressive enemies.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a matter of degree; is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Their intent, I would say, has remained very similar all along. The problem is: How do we deal with that intent? That is where the argument comes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the same article you wrote:

The hardest idea for us to accept about China today is the seeming paradox that the new Peking regime is both Communist and popular. It is definitely a Communist regime, and in the Russian camp. Yet it shows promise on its record thus far of being the best government that modern China has had.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I have the date of that? I am sure I said that.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same article; that is January 3, 1950.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; that is about the time when the British were recognizing it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this whole article go in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes; it may be inserted into the record. Do you want to read any more now?

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 564" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 564

[Source: The Reporter, January 3, 1950, pp. 23-25]

IN SEARCH OF A CHINA POLICY

When Mr. Acheson told the world last August, in the State Department's White Paper on China, that we look forward to a reassertion of "the democratic individualism of China," he was using our best political vocabulary. But his good phrase was unexpectedly seized upon by the propagandists of Communist Peking

and turned against us with devastating effect; for "individualism," translated into Chinese, has become a garbage word, meaning everyone-for-himself-and-devil-take-the-hindmost. The Chinese Communists neatly identified it with the disruptive antisocial selfishness that disgraced the last days of the Kuomintang.

The misunderstanding between Washington and Peking is more than verbal. The plain fact is that Asia is very different from America, socially, culturally, ideologically—in all the institutions and values of everyday life. We speak in different language systems, with only part of our vocabularies translatable with any accuracy. Our legal conceptions were so different a century ago that westerners demanded the right to be tried in China by western law under extraterritoriality, a system only recently ended. It is not surprising that neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek was ever able to put up a reasonable semblance of Anglo-Saxon parliamentary democracy.

So now that a new order has come to China, the American mind is ill-equipped to deal with it. As the world's oldest surviving revolutionaries and youngest defenders of the established order, we fail to appreciate the attitudes and feelings of revolutionary Asia. We assume that the American ideals of political freedom and economic development, having been good enough for us, are good enough for the Chinese, Indonesians, Japanese, and Filipinos. With our instinctive horror of the totalitarian police state and the evil deeds of Russian imperialism, we assume that no intelligent Asiatic could really desire Communism or, having been duped into it, could avoid eventual disenchantment.

If we approach Asia on these terms we will be defeated. This has just happened in China, where we backed a decadent régime in the effort to secure a "strong, united, and democratic" China, independent of Russia and friendly to ourselves. Had China been an industrialized democracy of western Europe, a revived Kuomintang might be in power today. But China is uniquely different and Asiatic, densely populated but thinly industrialized, intensely self-conscious but noncohesive, one of the oldest civilized states in the world, convulsed by the newest revolution.

In forming a new policy toward China we must face several very tough and unpleasant realities. If we want to maintain any contact with China at all we have to recognize the new Chinese Communist régime. Yet recognition will not necessarily preserve for our one thousand or more missionaries, our trading firms, our students, professors, and our journalists the position and influence which they have had in modern China heretofore. We have to fit our China policy into a larger over-all policy toward Asia. Yet our effort to put the Japanese economy on its feet (so as to take it off our necks) will continue to provoke the bitter enmity of patriotic Chinese.

In tackling all these problems, our freedom of choice is narrower than we may think. If we do not recognize the Chinese Communist government, Russia will have even greater influence in China. If we do not encourage Japanese trade with China, Japan will become an even greater financial burden and a more dangerous political powder keg. We are the losers and cannot expect to be the choosers as much as we were before. What we have to offer may interest Asia less than we expect. We must assess wherein our real contribution can be—mainly in material goods and technology, or in the realm of ideas and values.

Our first need is therefore to face the truth. No amount of bluster, nor the sending of marines (or even legionnaires) can keep the Chinese Communists from putting consuls like Angus Ward in jail if they choose to. We may feel certain there are Russian machinations behind the scenes, but we have to deal with China as though it were an independent foreign state. Chinese patriotic sentiment demands this with complete sincerity. If the Chinese people are in reality falling victim to police terror and the Russian squeeze, we have to let them find it out for themselves.

Meanwhile, as advisers and foreign friends, our influence is at a low ebb. It falls steadily lower as Nationalist planes, gifts of the United States, continue to drop American-made bombs on open Chinese cities. The American public forgets that since VJ-day our aid to Chiang has contributed to the killing and maiming of many thousands of Chinese civilians. More than a thousand bombing casualties have been reported from Shanghai since the Communist take-over—enough to blacken our name and strengthen the Communists' moral position.

The hardest idea for us to accept about China today is the seeming paradox that the new Peking régime is both Communist and popular: It is definitely a Communist régime and in the Russian camp, yet it shows promise, on its record thus far, of being the best government that modern China has had. This proposition is hard to take. In recent years some Americans have preferred to

think that the Chinese Communists were mere "agrarian reformers," do-gooders in the countryside, and not real Communists committed to the police state and allegiance to Moscow. Many Americans have chosen, on the other hand, to deny altogether the record of Chinese Communist good works and reforms for the peasant masses. Either of these beliefs—that the Communists weren't real Communists, or that they weren't real reformers—was a way out. But now we are up against it. Mao Tse-tung has taken over China with a minimum of slaughter and is making some initial progress in solving China's gigantic problems, while proclaiming his allegiance to Moscow.

Revolutionary Asia seems a paradox to us partly because we don't understand its degrees of social and economic difference from the West. The old order of personal government (landlord rule in the countryside and official corruption in the towns) is so far below our own modern standards that a party dictatorship, which seems a backward tyranny to us, may seem a forward step in Asia. The Chinese people are not yet accustomed to the protection of a legal system which is independent of the government in power, nor do they take the rights of free assembly and political self-expression as matters of course. The mere preservation of order, the lessened fear of arbitrary seizure by the police, have been a relief to Chinese intellectuals after their experiences under the Kuomintang. The fact that the new régime may at any time resort in its turn to arbitrary arrest and coercion makes it no worse than its predecessors. It will be judged by the Chinese masses according to their traditional touchstone—whether there is enough rice to eat.

Our ignorance of China leads to sad miscalculations. We overestimated the Nationalist armies' will to fight and oversupplied them with American arms. We sent them field-artillery pieces, key tools for capturing walled cities. But the Nationalists held the walled cities and the Communists remained dispersed in the countryside, where artillery could not reach them. When the besieged Nationalists grew demoralized, the artillery began to change hands, and soon the cities did too. Since our armament of Chiang outran his troops' desire to use it, the Communists today have the best-armed forces in Chinese history, American-equipped.

We can make similar mistakes in other parts of Asia. Suppose, for example, that our economic-development plans overlook the social effects of industrialization. Done our way, industrialization will create big cities in Asia, which will draw their cheap labor from the farms of the countryside. But this will disrupt the old family relationships, upset the traditional amenities of the individual's life within his community of kin and neighbors, and make him the more ready to give his allegiance to revolutionary causes. American-style industrialization in the crowded East may increase the material satisfactions of the Indonesian or the Indian, and yet also increase his psychological frustration and spiritual dissatisfaction. All these things are interrelated, and our technological aid cannot help having deep social repercussions. Our well-meant injections of technology into underdeveloped economies under Point Four can be misused to entrench backward régimes in power, and so lead us into a whole series of disasters like the one we have suffered in China.

These unhappy facts suggest that American policy can no longer afford to project American ideals into Asia unless they are translated into Asiatic terms. The freedom of the individual, the democratic process, the good life we seek to defend, seem to most Asiatics to be all right for Americans, but beyond their own reach. They must settle for what they can achieve in their own countries, with the meager resources at hand and the historical traditions they have inherited—through Communism, if no better means presents itself. Can America offer an alternative, not in New York or Washington, but in Batangas Province and the paddy fields outside Bangkok?

Our forebears, as traders, missionaries, and educators, began the revolutionary process in Asia. It is high time that we took a hand in helping it along. Containment of Communism, to keep it out of countries undergoing social metamorphosis, is like containing a forest fire. It is better to build a back-fire.

It is not beyond our capabilities to work closely with the native non-Communist leadership of Asia, once we acquire the will and the vision. Asia is still our farthest West, the final frontier to which our westward expansion has brought us. It is now also our strategic frontier, where American ways and ideals are on trial, a border area of cultural ferment and change where modern science can either remake the ancient East or else enslave it. We will bear some responsibility for the outcome.

Our policy must be cast in a new pattern of relations between the American people and peoples of Asia. Elements of this new pattern may be suggested as a series of operating principles.

First, American private citizens and private agencies must be enlisted and given opportunity to work in Asia—business corporations and private enterprisers, missionary and student workers, teachers and technicians of all kinds. They should not be dominated by government, but advised and helped. We must avoid our recent error in China, where we funneled enormous amounts of aid into the government channels of China and overloaded them. We should not place our bets on governments but on the long-term interests of peoples, and we should seek to work with the peoples of Asia at all possible levels of planning and technical development. Naturally, the governments of the new Asia will be largely "socialist" in their plans for the future, since *their countries generally lack a strong middle class*.

Second, our new contact with Asia, both private and governmental, must be on a basis of equality and reciprocity. First of all, Asia's independent sovereignty and freedom of action must be fully acknowledged. This means the full recognition of nationalist aspirations in Indonesia, Viet-Nam, and other areas, even when we know that the new leadership is weak and untried. Colonialism and the old Anglo-Dutch imperium in Southeast Asia are finished, and we cannot fill the vacuum with a new American imperialism of our own invention. Our only recourse, as a trading power at a great distance, is to nurture nationalist movements and try to treat them as independent even while they are weak.

Finally, insofar as we can plan our part of this relationship with the new nations of India and Southeast Asia, we must seek to keep it balanced and integrated within an over-all program, so that military armament does not outrun social reform, and industrial development does not overshadow the welfare of peasants. Trade among Far Eastern countries, for instance, is quite as necessary as trade with us.

If we regard China with these considerations in mind several principles emerge: First, we must help the various new nations of the Far East to work their way toward political independence and economic development, so that increasingly they form a local international community, a segment of the world order. Japan is an integral part of this community and must trade with it. Such a growth must inevitably attract Chinese participation. Yet China is not likely, in our lifetime, to be in a position, economically or strategically, to dominate this community.

Second, our interest is to maintain as best we can our contact with the Chinese people, rather than to push them behind a Russian-type iron curtain. Their new government, having ridden to power on a wave of nationalism, is in no mood to accept Russian dictation and police surveillance in its domestic affairs. It is by no means certain yet that the Chinese Communists want to subordinate themselves fundamentally to Russia, or that they wish to eliminate American contact, or that, if they do, they can succeed soon. No matter what the Chinese Communists want, China is still oriented toward the West in many ways. We should try to keep it so, neither by hostility nor by appeasement, but by standing on solid American principles: national independence, economic welfare, personal freedom. These are positive things we are for, not against, and in our relations with Communist China we should mainly talk about them, rather than about "anti-Communism."

In this context diplomatic recognition is only a first step. Since Russian aid to the Chinese Communists during the civil war has been relatively meager, we have little basis for applying the Stimson doctrine. The change of government in China has followed a genuine civil war, not military aggression from outside. Diplomatic relations, so necessary in our dealing with Communist Russia, are equally necessary now that the cold war extends to Communist China.

Recognition is not moral approval, only realism. A Chinese veto in the United Nations can have only a little more nuisance value than the present Russian veto. Meanwhile, persistent nonrecognition would constitute desertion of the century-old American interest in the Chinese people—a denial of American principles of humanitarianism, and friendship for the four hundred millions of China. Recognition is a necessary first step in our continuing competition with Russian influence in China. To withhold recognition beyond the time when the State Department can work out the details would be defeatist and essentially isolationist. It would be playing into Russia's hands. Our aim must be to follow a middle course, free of the illusory hopes and fears that have

dogged our China policy in the past, ready to deal with the Communists in China but under no compulsion to take their terms, without expecting either that their regime could be destroyed by our hostility or that it could be enticed out of the Russian orbit by appeasement.

—JOHN K. FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing you want to call our attention to in that article, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, it is difficult for the American public to understand the problems of government in China and how ineffective modern government there has been. It is because of the fact that the Communists are totalitarian and bring in a strict control, that in the honeymoon period, when they are first in there are certain apparent gains for the populace. They get a better food supply in the cities, they get peace and order and that sort of thing. That is the honeymoon period. And that has given way long since, of course, to the period when the Communists' squeeze begins to operate to get everybody in his spot under control, isolated, and being used by the Communist state.

But nevertheless you have, I think, if you are dealing with China, to recognize how the Chinese people are reacting to the Communists, and in that honeymoon period of 1950 they were reacting on the whole much more happily that we would have reacted, because we don't like Communists in this country, and they are in China.

Mr. MORRIS. In that same article you also advocated, did you not, that we should put pressure on Japan to trade with China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall. It may be that. "Pressure" I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, "urge Japan."

Mr. FAIRBANK. As a general proposition I would say today that Japan is going to explode or collapse on our hands if trade cannot be developed from Japan with other countries, and it is a real tough problem: how is Japan going to feed her people by trade without doing something or other with the Chinese mainland?

Mr. MORRIS. That is your opinion today, is it, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is, yes. We are really up against it.

Mr. MORRIS. That is substantially the same thing you said in this article.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. It is a continuing problem. It is a very, very tough one.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee what positions you have held in the Government in the past?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Beginning in August 1941, I went to Washington to join this Coordinator of Information Office. I remained in it until about August of 1942, when I was sent to China under OSS, but specifically under the interdepartmental committee for the acquisition of foreign publications, which was doing the job I described, in China.

Having reached China, I think in September 1942, I stayed there under the American Embassy, until the end of 1943, and came back in December, and was in Washington, home from the field, with that interdepartmental committee, in January and February of 1944, and I believe I moved into OWI, at Mr. Taylor's invitation, in March 1944.

I remained in OWI in Washington, or in China, until it became the Interim International Information Service after the war, and, in

turn, became the United States Information Service about 1946, or before then, perhaps. I remained with that until the summer, July or August, of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, if there are other writings of yours that we come across, may we verify that they are your writings by consulting your attorney?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed. Consult me directly, too.

Mr. MORRIS. I will not take any more time introducing articles at this time.

I have no more questions.

Senator SMITH. Are there any more questions?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything else you wish to say, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel that you have had a full hearing?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I do. We haven't covered everything. Of course, we could keep on forever.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have anything more that you want to add?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't want to be sentimental, but I feel we have here the democratic process in operation.

I regard the American Senate as one of the citadels of the democratic process and it is within that context that I have said anything critical that I may have said. But I have the greatest respect for the American Senate and for the Senators, in their efforts to deal with these problems.

I feel that I have had a full hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to confer with counsel as to whether or not he has any question?

Mr. WAIT. No; except to thank you very much.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, did you read Professor Lattimore's statement about his testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read a copy; yes.

Senator SMITH. When did you and he confer about your respective statements, if you did, indeed, confer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have not conferred about these statements. I sent him a copy yesterday. He had not seen it before—that is, my statement. His statement was sent to me when he was sending it out. I received a copy in Cambridge. I had not seen it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was?

Senator SMITH. Did you read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read it just a few days later.

Senator SMITH. Do you know when that was that you got a copy?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was well after the beginning of the hearings, about a week later. It came in the mail.

Senator SMITH. Now, you sent him a copy of your statement yesterday, I believe you said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Had you had any telephone conversation, or any correspondence with him during the time you prepared your statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. After I prepared my statement and sent it down, I sent it down here, you recall, on February 29, to be here in time for

March 3, which was the first date I was given. I actually came to Washington by error, not having been held by the telegram which went on Saturday. So I was here the week end before last, in Washington, at my house.

Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore stopped there as they came in to Washington from Baltimore. I saw them then. I saw him again here yesterday or the day before. He talked at that time about his hearing, and so on. I did not show him my statement.

Senator SMITH. Did he counsel you to make an attack on the committee, or suggest to you that you do that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I do not recall that he did.

Senator SMITH. Did he make some suggestions along that line?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall actual words, but I certainly have the impression that his advice to me, if I had asked him for it, would have been—at least I got the impression this is what I should do—that I should be vigorous and outspoken and not hesitate to state what I really thought. Now, I don't recall any counsel to me to make any attack on the committee.

I think it is quite plain that my approach to this whole thing has been a little bit different. At least I feel the response has been different, and I am gratified by that, because I feel we are on common ground here.

Senator SMITH. If you had followed what you thought, after talking with him, was his line of advice, you would have been much more critical than you were in your statement, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. My modifications of that statement were made after I had read it over several times, and I would not say it was as a result of Mr. Lattimore's suggestions, because he did not see the statement, and he had no opportunity to make those suggestions.

Senator SMITH. But the restraint which you may have shown in your statement was not provoked by any advice from Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. When he saw you at your home here in Washington, he had made the attack on the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. And he had been attacked in return for some time. It was after a whole week.

Senator FERGUSON. He had made the attack?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you had his copy at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I really don't recall. The copy that I received I left in Cambridge. It wasn't around when he was present. He was very tired and not much interested in discussing anything.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did discuss an attack on the committee? You stated that he said you should be vigorous.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why are you having trouble on this statement? It has just been recent.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a week ago. I am under oath here. I do not want to misrepresent a conversation which was very casual and brief. He was tired. He didn't want to say much of anything. He was on his way. He thought that I was going on the next day.

When I told him he was on the next day, then he felt even more tired, and sort of depressed, and pretty soon they left.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your statement completed at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was completed, mimeographed, and submitted to you.

Senator FERGUSON. It has not been changed since then?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Only the modifications that I sent, that I called to your attention in two or three sentences on the last page.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you change on the last page?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We can compare those modifications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you change the sentence: "It has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I merely made it an independent sentence. These changes were made for clarity and in a way they were mollified rather than sharpened.

If you would like to compare these two copies——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that sentence with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I did not discuss my statement with him at all in any way. That is very definite. That was a policy on my part. I did not want to.

Senator FERGUSON. When you wrote that paragraph on page 17, next to the last paragraph, did you have a copy of his statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I may have—I don't know, but his statement did not influence my statement. I will make that as a flat assertion.

Mr. WAIT. Perhaps I could refresh his recollection on that.

Senator SMITH. That is all right with me, counsel.

Mr. WAIT. That was written in my office, and we discussed it at considerable length. It was discussed with Mr. Fairbank and me and my partner, who thought he was coming down. It was at least a week before March 3 that we arrived—there may have been some slight revision, but it was mimeographed in my office. I have never seen that one.

Senator SMITH. You understand that the chairman is trying to compliment Mr. Fairbank on being more restrained?

Senator FERGUSON. But you know that Mr. Lattimore had attacked the committee for bad faith, in his statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall those words, but it certainly was an all-out—well, a lot of things were said.

Senator SMITH. Several words.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Several words; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you intending by that paragraph to attack the good faith of the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. I say very definitely in both these: "No one questions the sincerity of this committee," and that means good faith.

Mr. WAIT. The conference that we had at which this was drafted was on February 25. I remember Mr. Fairbank calling me on Saturday, the 23d. I had just gotten back from a skiing holiday.

We then got word it was to be set for the 3d, which I could not attend because I was moderating at the time in Harvard.

We got together on Monday, which was the 25th, and apparently Lattimore had not gotten the statement out at that time.

Senator SMITH. At that time Professor Lattimore had communicated with you, though. You had had some sort of communication with him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. When I wrote this statement?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall any talk about statements, or anything of that sort.

Senator SMITH. How long had you known Professor Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I knew him quite well. I stopped and saw him at Christmas time, as we were coming through Baltimore. He had been up in Cambridge. His son is going to college there. And we have seen each other back and forth.

In supporting Mr. Lattimore, as I have, ever since he was attacked, 2 years ago—and I have the documents here somewhere—I have consistently inserted a clause that I do not agree with everything he has said by any means. I make that plain.

I merely say I think he is an honest man, and it is all right for him to be heard.

Mr. MORRIS. You will supply, will you not, the translation of that transcription that appeared in the Chinese newspaper?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I have it here.

Mr. MORRIS. That is our only copy, Professor.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have typed out—

Mr. MORRIS. You have the translation already?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; we have copies, and can distribute it, if you want.

Senator SMITH. Are there any other questions?

Mr. WAIT. I am to get, I understand, documentations that Professor Fairbank was at Harvard the academic year 1937 and 1938 and we are also to get the date in 1935, to find out whether Lattimore was in Peiping at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have Mr. Lattimore here again. I think the latter we can ask him about.

Mr. WAIT. Then I will simply get the material with reference to his being in Cambridge during the academic year 1937 and 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything else?

Is there anything else you have to say, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, thank you.

Senator SMITH. Will you let us know if anything occurs to you and you want to come back and give it to us?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Up to now, then, do you think the committee has been perfectly fair with you in this hearing today?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think this hearing today has allowed me an opportunity to express myself; it certainly has. I think the intent of this committee hearing was certainly very fair.

I am afraid I can't go all the way of saying what really would be inconsistent with what I have said here, which is a really considered opinion, about the committee in general.

Senator SMITH. Have you anything else you want to say now, today?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. You have had a full chance to have your say?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly; on the things we have covered.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything else you want to cover?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I do not think there is. I appreciate the attitude that you gentleman have had.

Senator SMITH. You have not gotten the impression that was the attitude we had toward Mr. Lattimore from what he had said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. From the press reports, too, I must agree; yes.

Senator SMITH. If you want to fuss with the press, you can pick out whichever one of those men you want to go after and take him on.

All right. If there is nothing further, the hearing will adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m. the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, O'Connor, and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator EASTLAND. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. MATUSOW, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary is the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MATUSOW. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HARVEY M. MATUSOW, DAYTON, OHIO

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Matusow, will you give your full name and address to the reporter, please.

Mr. MATUSOW. Harvey M. Matusow, 1308 Grand Avenue, Dayton, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. MATUSOW. I am a staff member of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission. It is a joint committee of the Ohio State Assembly.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long have you held that position?

Mr. MATUSOW. Since my release from the Air Force, in December.

Mr. MORRIS. December 9—

Mr. MATUSOW. 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Matusow, did you serve in World War II?

Mr. MATUSOW. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What service were you with?

Mr. MATUSOW. United States Army, the Infantry, in Europe.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the American Youth for Democracy?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the American Youth for Democracy a Communist organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was. It is no longer in existence.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances surrounding your joining the American Youth for Democracy?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was just a kid out of the armed services and looking for something. I was just psychologically right for being recruited into the American Youth for Democracy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you subsequently join the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, in October 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Who recruited you into the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. A few of the club members of the AYD, one Julie Sheik.

Mr. MORRIS. And who else?

Mr. MATUSOW. One Lee Scharf.

Mr. MORRIS. How long had you been a member of the American Youth for Democracy before you joined the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. About 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you in the course of your activities with the Communist Party, become disillusioned with the principles of that organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do at that time?

Mr. MATUSOW. I contacted the FBI in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us approximately when that was?

Mr. MATUSOW. Early February 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. When you contacted the FBI in New York, did they show interest in the information that you possessed at the time?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; they did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they urge you to stay in the Communist Party and report to them?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; they did.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you so report to the FBI the activities and the information that you discovered in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. I did, until January 1951, when I was expelled from the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you expelled from the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. The charge was that I was suspected of being an OSS agent.

Senator FERGUSON. What is OSS?

Mr. MATUSOW. Office of Strategic Services.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the FBI?

Mr. MATUSOW. Not the FBI.

Senator FERGUSON. They had not caught on to the FBI?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir. It was a matter of circumstances, and witch hunting in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there an OSS in existence at that time, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; there was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they start their own loyalty program within the party to find out whether there were any subversives in the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir. As they called them, "enemy agents."

Senator FERGUSON. But they started their own loyalty program.

Mr. MATUSOW. During my whole time in the Communist Party, they adhered to witch hunting and purges.

Senator FERGUSON. But they had their own loyalty program, finding out if they had disloyal people in the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. They had a former New York City police conducting interrogations.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was he?

Mr. MATUSOW. I didn't get the name, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Matusow, did you work at a Communist Party book shop while in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I worked at three different book shops.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what they were?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Jefferson School Book Shop; that is, at the Jefferson School of Social Science, 565 Sixth Avenue, in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us what the Jefferson School is.

Mr. MATUSOW. It is the Communist Party educational institution in New York. They state that they are a school which studies Marxism and Leninism. They are run by the Communist Party educational department, national educational department.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that from your own experience?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, when I worked at the school.

Mr. MORRIS. That is one of the three Communist Party book shops that you were associated with?

Mr. MATUSOW. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the other two?

Mr. MATUSOW. The other was the Workers Book Shop, at 48 East Thirteenth Street. At the time it was located in the national headquarters of the Communist Party, and was a part of the Communist Party literature-distribution set-up.

Mr. MORRIS. That is openly affiliated with the Communist Party; is it not?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the third?

Mr. MATUSOW. The third was the Camp Unity Book Shop, at a summer camp in New York State. At that time I was on the payroll of the Communist Party State literature department, and receiving my checks from them.

Senator FERGUSON. How much were you getting?

Mr. MATUSOW. It varied, sir. The maximum was \$45 a week at any one time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you working at other jobs?

Mr. MATUSOW. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever stay at Camp Unity?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I managed the book shop there in the summer of 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist Party camp?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was run by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Completely by the Communist Party. It isn't an infiltrated group; is it?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; it was set up originally by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; set up by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. In meetings with James Nesi, a teacher at the Jefferson School and a lecturer at their camp.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by the camp?

Mr. MATUSOW. That was in 1948, Camp Sherwood, in Monticello, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a Communist camp?

Mr. MATUSOW. A Jefferson School camp, and in that relation Communist Party-dominated. Mr. Nesi is an instructor at the Jefferson School, and one of the lecturers of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. I was very friendly with Mr. Nesi, and we used to discuss the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. On more than one occasion. I had visited in the office of the committee at 799 Broadway and picked up certain material, such as China Digest, which was published in Hong Kong, and I believe later became People's China, published in Peking, distributed through the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. Also distributed there was a publication turned out monthly or every 2 or 3 months, whenever they got their material, called Letters From China, which were letters from Chinese Communists who at the time were behind the lines when Chiang Kai-shek was still on the mainland. It was part of the propaganda set-up in the United States. They mimeographed this letter-sheet.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they trying to do with this literature in the United States?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1948 they set up a program of what they called—I will quote from this, if I may——

Mr. MORRIS. What is that you are quoting from?

Mr. MATUSOW. This is a study outline prepared and issued by the New York State education department of the Communist Party, 35 East Twelfth Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get that, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was given to me when I was in the party to help prepare an educational program for the Communist Party club that I was in.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember who gave it to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was handed down through the county educational department. At that time I believe the county educational director was Ted Bassett.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this a pamphlet or a booklet that was circulated to everybody, non-Communist as well as Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir; this was circulated to leaders of the Communist Party only.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was advisory to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. As a Communist.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. It is entitled "The Great Victories in China, and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention. Club Discussion Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events in China, and the Tasks of All of the Clubs."

On page 5, paragraph 3, underlined, "Support the greetings to the liberation fighters of China," issued by the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. At that time their address was 111 West Forty-second Street.

Senator FERGUSON. Am I right in saying, then, that the purpose was to try and keep America out of the Far East as far as it would harm the Communists taking over of all of China?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And this literature was to go out among Chinese in New York, or all of them?

Mr. MATSOW. I might cite the example of this greeting to the liberation fighters in China, and the future greeting was a scroll. It said, "Recognition of the People's Republic of China." At one rally the Progressive Party had at the Yankee Stadium in September 1948, where I believe some 65,000 people were in attendance, the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, in conjunction with party workers, had circulated those petitions and gotten a great number of signatures. They used that to collect money. They put out little buttons that looked like the Red Cross buttons with a red flag crossed with an American flag, and urged you to wear that, too. And also published a magazine called Far East Spotlight.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the name of the book that you want to show?

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead, Mr. Matsusow.

Mr. MATSOW. I believe I was saying that they published the magazine called Far East Spotlight, which was set up by the party, the Communist Party, distributed through the Communist Party literature set-up. I differentiate between something that was not published by the Communist Party or recommended by them, in that it might have just been sold in the book shop, and material that was actually distributed through the party organization, in the clubs.

Senator FERGUSON. The party book shop, was this book shop a Communist book shop?

Mr. MATSOW. That is right, operated by the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Operated by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATSOW. There were three of them in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that they sold all kinds of books, non-Communist as well as Communist, as a front?

Mr. MATSOW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They only sold Communist or pro-Communist books?

Mr. MATSOW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And they had to be orthodox Communist books, did they not, Mr. Matsusow?

Mr. MATSOW. That is correct. No deviation from the party line. I would like to cite the example of a book that was published in 1949, entitled "Tomorrow's China," by Anna Louise Strong. That book was published by the party in New York, as well as a pamphlet on Korea, by Miss Strong. Three or four weeks after publication date, the Soviet Union expelled Anna Louise Strong as being a spy, and 2 days after that expulsion became known the Communist Party took all of the books off the shelves, and they haven't been sold since.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the store at that time?

Mr. MATSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You were working for the party as a member?

Mr. MATSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you explain how that got to the book store; what the pipeline is?

Mr. MATSOW. On Miss Strong's book?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; why it was taken out in 2 days. I want to try to get the pipeline from Moscow, whether she was expelled, to your book store, to take the books off the shelf, what the party line would be, and how the line was conducted.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, the announcement was made in the press—New York Times, Herald Tribune, et cetera, and in other papers—saying Miss Strong had been expelled from the Soviet Union. The party did not act on that yet, because they did not have the party's fact. If they just acted on the basis of a story in the New York Times, for instance, there would be dissension in the ranks of the party. They waited until a correspondent for, maybe Tass, or one of the Communist newspapers here in the United States, for instance, had gotten copy on it for distribution, or a Daily Worker correspondent.

For instance, Joseph Starobin was in Europe. I don't know if he was there at that time. But there has usually been a Daily Worker correspondent in Europe.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this actually what happened or is this your speculation?

Mr. MATUSOW. This is not speculation.

Senator FERGUSON. He is giving me how this chain of command comes from Moscow over here to stop this sale in the book shop.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. When either the correspondent or somebody in the position of leadership or know-how, I don't know who the person was—

Senator FERGUSON. You can't name the person, but you are giving me the *modus operandi*.

Mr. MATUSOW. The information would be received in New York. It might also have been received at the time through its Cominform Journal, a newspaper called For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy. At that time the New York State or the national committee of the Communist Party would hold a meeting and decide "We will not support or sell the book Tomorrow's China by Anna Louise Strong, and it will be taken off the bookshelves." The State literature director, one Bordofsky, at that time issued an order to the bookshop to just take the books off the shelf.

Senator O'CONOR. You mentioned before that there were three such stores in New York under direct control of the Communists. Do you happen to know whether simultaneous action was taken at all three at about the same time?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct; just a phone call was all that was necessary.

Senator O'CONOR. But regardless of the type or the manner in which the word was communicated, what was the result as to their action, whether it was uniform and taken at the same time or not.

Mr. MATUSOW. Taken at the same time. Within a 5-minute period you could not find a copy of the book.

Senator O'CONOR. In any one of the three stores?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. You say that the only books that were carried in those three bookstores were official Communist publications, is that right?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir; I did not state that. I stated that anti-Communist books, for instance, a book by Whittaker Chambers, would not be carried in the Communist Party bookshop, nor would a book on economics that did not teach Marxist economics be carried, but books of other publishers that were written by Marxist or Leninist writers were carried.

Senator EASTLAND. They were Communist publications?

Mr. MATUSOW. Written by Communists but not by a Communist Party publishing house. There is a difference.

Senator EASTLAND. The difference was that books that were not published by an official Communist publishing house were carried provided the book was promoting Communist policy, is that right?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, did you carry books by Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MATUSOW. We did, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1948, as I think this document will show, the Communist Party literature set-up had not caught up with the fast-moving events in China; that is, the war in China and the setting up of the Chinese Communist Government. The only material they had published by the Communist Party, either International Publishers or New Century Publishers, were a pamphlet by Mao Tse-tung, the Turning Point in China, and China's New Democracy. Two pamphlets, nothing else. Well, the party had to get the line disseminated. People were asking "What is the line on China?" And we had instructions in the bookshop that came down from the New York State educational department of the Communist Party, to refer the members of the party to the following books: The Unfinished Revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, and Mr. Epstein was a member of the Communist Party and an instructor at the Jefferson School.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir; I did. Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, was used in the Communist book shop at the Jefferson School and the workers' book shop. It was required or recommended reading for students at the school. The book, Red Star Over China, by Edgar Snow, was also recommended reading. The book—I am trying to think of the name of it—by Harrison Forman, the title slips my mind at this point, was another one of the books that was recommended reading. Those books I just outlined were basically the books that the party stated carried out party line on China.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, you said that the party stated that these books carried the party line on China. Now, you were a Communist, were you not?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you consider those authors Communists?

Mr. MATUSOW. On the basis of the reading? You mean in actual dues-paying Communist Party members?

Senator EASTLAND. Well, you draw a distinction now. Did you consider those authors Communists?

Mr. MATUSOW. My own opinion at the time; yes; I did.

Senator EASTLAND. You considered Lattimore a Communist, you considered Snow a Communist, and you considered Epstein a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. Epstein I knew was a Communist on the basis of his work at the school.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not necessarily mean that everybody that wrote a book that was sold in that book shop was really a member of the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever carry a card?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did you stop carrying a card?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1949. The party no longer issued cards.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had a card up to 1949?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you said that your mental reaction of the three people that wrote the books, Epstein, Lattimore, and Snow, was that they were Communists. Will you give us a definition of what you meant by the term "Communist" when you said they were Communists?

Mr. MATUSOW. In thinking, their political ideology, on the basis of their books, to use the party's terms, I felt that they agreed with and adhered to the principles of dialectical materialism, or Marxist philosophy, and perpetrated the line through their books.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand those were the only kind of books that were sold in those book shops, that if it was not party literature it was not sold?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. It did not make any difference whether the person consciously or unconsciously followed the line?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But if the line was actually in the book, do I understand then it was sold in the bookshop?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And if they consciously carried it, then you would consider that person a Communist. Now, unconsciously, would he only be a fellow traveler?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. I would like to point out an example of the book which does not deal with the subject of China, of an example of somebody who wrote a book and was not a Communist, and the book carried the party line. There was a book called, I believe, American Freedom and Catholic Power, by Paul Blanshard, which was published while I was still at the bookshop. That book adhered to the Communist line in relation to the Catholic Church. It was a good text as far as it went. They would not recommend the book because in the book Mr. Blanshard stated he was opposed to communism. Though he carried the party line through in his book, it was not considered recommended reading for Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Because of that one sentence, or that one line, and not meaning the party line, but the fact that he had mentioned that he personally was opposed to communism, they felt that that was enough deviation from the line that they would not sell that book in their bookshop?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many such bookshops were in the United States?

Mr. MATUSOW. I stated the three in New York. There was a bookshop in Boston, there was one in Washington, D. C., Chicago, Cleveland, Ohio.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there one in Detroit?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; there was one in Detroit.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the name of it?

Mr. MATUSOW. Most of the bookshops were called Progressive Bookshops. I don't remember the names of all of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Some catch phrase?

Mr. MATUSOW. Usually dealing with the word "progressive" or "world" bookshop.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you could get us the names of all these bookshops in the various cities? Do you know any way you can get them?

Mr. MATUSOW. I might be able to. I am going to New York tonight, and in New York I might be able to get the list of them. I might say that most of them are out of business now, except the one in California, the California Labor School Bookshop, and one in Los Angeles that is still operating that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why they are out of business?

Mr. MATUSOW. A certain amount of publicity in certain cities had been given to the bookshops, and they were highlighted and therefore couldn't operate.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to tell me that only Communists bought in these bookshops, or were they open to the world?

Mr. MATUSOW. They were open to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. The name "Communist" did not appear in any way with it?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. He has gone further than that, though. He said that the books that he mentioned, that Communist Party members were advised that those books represented the Communist Party China policy. Is that correct?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. That was Lattimore's book.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am getting a general idea, rather than just Lattimore's book, that if I came in to that bookshop to buy a book, I wouldn't know anything about it being a party-line book.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But suppose I come in as a Communist. Did you ever have anybody come in the bookshop and say, "I am a Communist, and I want such a book"?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, in my position in the bookshop, I knew by sight probably 10,000 Party members in New York. I had seen them at various mass meetings or they knew me to be a Communist. We will put it that way. On that basis, many people would come in to me and say, "We are holding a club educational at this meeting," at so and so club tonight, and "we have to prepare for the subject of China." They might not have had this outline or had the outline and wanted to expand on it. "What book is recommended to supplement the outline or recommended reading for the club?" That happened on many occasions. On the question of China, I was told to recommend Red Star Over China by Snow; and Solution in Asia by Lattimore. I left out one before—and that was Agnes Smedley's books—in that other group. Israel Epstein's book and Harrison Forman's book Report From Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. On the China group?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Could I ask one question: You stated that you were instructed to recommend. By whom, just what method was followed to give you the authority or the word that that was to be the book or books recommended?

Mr. MATUSOW. That came down from the New York State educational department of the Communist Party, through the State literature director who was a member of that commission.

Senator O'CONNOR. Did it last over any considerable period? I mean, was there any revocation of it or any change in that regard?

Mr. MATUSOW. It lasted over the period of my employment in the bookshops, and that was 1948, and through December 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you handle through the Communist Party bookshops the IPR pamphlet, *Job in the Pacific*?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; we did.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything in particular that you recall about that particular pamphlet?

Mr. MATUSOW. *Job in the Pacific*, I believe, was written by Henry Wallace, put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was used in the same light as the books we have just mentioned, in that we supplemented Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet, the title there "*China Today*," or rather "*New Democracy in China*," or "*Turning Point in China*," with the pamphlet by Henry Wallace put out by the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the publication *New China Daily News*?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the *New China Daily News*?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was told by Mr. Jim Nesi, one of the lecturers for the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, that the *New China Daily News* was the Chinese language version of the *Daily Worker* in New York, and that its editor, a Mr. Chu Tong, I believe, was a member of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Chu Tong ever lecture at the Jefferson School?

Mr. MATUSOW. He did. I was present when Mr. Tong lectured at the Jefferson School.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it not be possible for Chu Tong to lecture at that school, if he was not a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, it would not, not in that period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that because of a rule that that school was actually teaching Communist line and Communist principles?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. I will state, though, when the school was originally set up, they did have non-Communists lecturing and teaching but in 1948, or after the indictment of the Communist Party leaders, in 1948, the policy of the school was no lecturer or instructor at the school—I mean, nobody can lecture or teach at the school, unless they are a member of the party.

Senator FERGUSON. You being in the educational line of the Communist Party would know something about this school first-hand, is that it?

Mr. MATUSOW. I worked at the school.

Senator FERGUSON. You worked at the school.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. In what capacity?

Mr. MATUSOW. I worked in the bookshop at the school.

Senator FERGUSON. The bookshop at the school.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That, I assume, was a Communist bookshop.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The same as these other bookshops.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the name of the one here in Washington?

Mr. MATUSOW. I just don't remember the name of it offhand. It closed about a year ago.

Senator FERGUSON. There was once a cooperative bookshop. What was the name of it? The Washington Bookshop. Was that it? You are going to try to get those names. Did you know a man by the name of Chi?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You know something personally about this newspaper that you were talking about, the Communist newspaper?

Mr. MORRIS. The New China Daily News.

Mr. MATUSOW. As I stated, members of the Communist Party who I discussed that with at the time of Mr. Chu Tong's lecture at the Jefferson School stated that it was a Chinese Party newspaper, controlled by the party.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you sell newspapers in your bookshops?

Mr. MATUSOW. We did not have any call for the China Daily News.

Mr. MORRIS. That was a Chinese language paper, was it not?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that newspaper, the New China Daily News, was a Chinese sheet?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I stated it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You are sure of that?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you also knew, as a matter of fact, that Chu Tong was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not only your deduction from the fact that he was a lecturer at the Jefferson School?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, at that time just to make doubly sure that we did not offend people when they lectured at the Jefferson School, in my position at the bookshop, I had to cover the lectures in that on any given subject I had to prepare certain literature for sale and distribution to the audience. And before anybody lectured, I usually made doubly sure by checking with the director of the school as to whether that person is a member of the Communist Party or whether it be known that they are a member of the Communist Party, and how far can we go on distribution of literature. In other words, can we sell Communist Party literature, material published by the party.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the name and label.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. In the question of this one lecturer, I was told, "Yes, Mr. Tong is a member of the Communist Party, and you can sell Communist Party literature at the affair."

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to tell us then some people were Communists but the Communist Party did not want it known that they were actually members of the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And some were known and it did not make any difference whether they were held out to the world by the Communists themselves as Communist members?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; at times.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would allow you to sell books, actually published under the label or the name of the Communist Party, if they were to be known as Communists.

Mr. MATUSOW. Right. Or if they had not so much been known as Communists or whether or not they would be personally offended at times, or certain members of the audience who they would attract. I mean, you use a certain name to get a group of people to a lecture, and if you feel that you are going to offend or alienate your audience by openly saying so and so is a Communist or the material here is being published by the Communist Party. If we know we would alienate those people, we didn't at the time distribute Communist Party literature.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, the information I had about it was in relation to the China Daily News and information gotten from the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. And I recall the day, I believe, the official announcement that, I believe they called it, the New People's Republic of China was established, the Red flag of China was run up over the building of the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Mr. MATUSOW. That came down from the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Israel Epstein to be a Communist Party member?

Mr. MATUSOW. I stated, "Yes"; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. And you also knew that he was a lecturer at the Jefferson School?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know he was a member?

Mr. MATUSOW. They stated, on the question of employment at the Jefferson School, a prerequisite in 1948 and '49, that you had to be a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have occasion to visit Frederick V. Field's library?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Mr. MATUSOW. The address, I believe, is 26 West Twenty-sixth Street. And prior to a trip that I had taken to Puerto Rico in 1949, under the auspices of the Communist Party, I was told to go to the Frederick V. Field Library on Twenty-sixth Street and there I would be able to find all the reference material that I would need to prepare myself for the trip to Puerto Rico.

Mr. MORRIS. And you did go to the library?

Mr. MATUSOW. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you leave that, did you meet Field?

Mr. MATUSOW. I have seen him at other occasions, not at the library.

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the library.

Mr. MATUSOW. You see, he turned this house over to a number of groups, the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the Civil Rights Congress, the Council on African Affairs, and a few other groups that used his house that he turned over to the party.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get into the library to use it? Could anyone go in and use it?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was open to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. It was open to the public.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, that is, the party public. You can call up and make an appointment and go up there. They had two librarians on duty.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to tell us that it was his library at that time, or had he disassociated himself from the library?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, it had his name on it, the Frederick V. Field Library.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was it located?

Mr. MATUSOW. 26 West Twenty-sixth Street. I might be wrong on the 26. It might be 26 or 25.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a library was it?

Mr. MATUSOW. One of the largest I had seen of a private nature.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it have Communist books in it published by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, the Political Affairs, Daily Worker, Masses in Main Stream, New Masses, Main Stream, every publication that the party put out was in the library, Communist Party pamphlets and books.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any non-Communist books in it?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, they had that, as I say, for reference.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know William Mandel?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was William Mandel a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; he is.

In 1949, when I was working at the Jefferson School Camp, and managing the book shop there, my duties were to handle the distribution of the literature for its lecturers that appeared at the camp during the summer. Mr. Mandel was one of the lecturers. There again I had to find out in advance whether someone was a member of the party, for the purpose of literature distribution. Mr. Mandel at the time lectured on his book, I believe it was called Handbook to the Soviet Union or Handbook to Russia. I met him and we talked at length about the question of the Soviet Union and the party. I mean, I spent a number of hours with him at that visit, and the year before at the Jefferson School Camp, the same situation existed.

Senator FERGUSON. From your conversation, then, you are telling us that he was a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. More than my conversation. Officials of the New York State Communist Party notified me that he was a Communist. In my conversation with him, we discussed questions of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with Evans Carlson?

Mr. MATUSOW. Not directly; just the question of, first, the American Youth for Democracy publication, Youth, in two specific issues there were articles or references made to Evans F. Carlson. One was an article which he coauthored with Paul Robeson, on the question of—I don't believe I remember the title. The other one was a photograph or a reproduction of a letter that he had written to the national office of the American Youth for Democracy. This one club in New York, had written him a letter asking if they could use his name for the club, the Evans Carlson Club, and he wrote a letter back stating he was proud to be associated with the American Youth for Democ-

racy, and that they could go ahead and use his name. It was reproduced and used in the magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. When a book, a biography of Evans F. Carlson, came out, called *The Big Yankee*, it came out in 1948, it was first distributed by the Communist Party Book Club, the Liberty Book Club, in New York. I had a number of discussions in relation to the book, with, again, this Jim Nesi of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. And Nesi stated that in the 1930's, when Carlson had been to China, he was very close to Mao Tse-tung and helped train remnants of the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army for the Chinese Communists. That was before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the publication *China Today*?

Mr. MATUSOW. I know of the publication *China Today* and have seen back issues of it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is no longer published, is it, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. It is not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, from your Communist experience, if that was a Communist publication?

Mr. MATUSOW. If I may quote from this outline here.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this whole outline into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; we will admit it.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 565" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 565

[Stamped:] Library of HARVEY M. MATUSOW

THE GREAT VICTORIES IN CHINA AND THE NEW DANGERS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION

CLUB DISCUSSION OUTLINE ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT EVENTS IN
CHINA AND THE TASKS OF ALL CLUBS

(Issued by: New York State Education Dept., Communist Party, 35 East 12
Street, New York City, November 20, 1948)

CHINA DISCUSSION OUTLINE

1. VICTORIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN CHINA

The victories of the Chinese Red Armies over the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship now embrace Manchuria and Northern China, an area embodying 200 million people.

1. Chinese People's Liberation Armies move steadily forward from victory to victory.

Manchuria is completely in hands of the People's Liberation Army. The Liberation Armies have moved into North China and are moving on Peiping and Nanking.

An area comprising some 200 million people of China is in the hands of the People's liberation forces.

Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, speaking of the shift of the Chinese liberation forces from the defensive to the offensive, said in a speech on December 25, 1947: "This is a great event. * * * *Once it has taken place, it will of necessity move toward nation-wide victory.*"

It is moving toward nation-wide victory. On Nov. 10, 1948, Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Armies, said: "The complete liberation of China is near."

2. Demoralization, defeatism, disintegration, pessimism and economic chaos permeates the Kuomintang areas.

3. The coalition of democratic forces in China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, has steadily broadened its base and influence among the people while that of Chiang Kai-shek narrows and he becomes daily more isolated.

II. THE MAGNITUDE AND MEANING OF THE VICTORIES OF THE CHINESE LIBERATION FORCES

1. Mao Tse-tung, in his speech "The Turning Point", delivered December 25, 1947, said:

"This is a turning point in history. * * * This is a great event. This event is great because it occurs in a country of 450 million people. Once it has taken place it will of necessity move toward nation-wide victory. *This event, furthermore, is great because it occurs in the eastern part of the world where there is a population totalling more than one billion (half the population of mankind)*" suffering from the oppression of imperialism. The turn of the Chinese people's war of liberation from the defensive to the offensive *cannot but bring jubilation and encouragement to the oppressed nations. At the same time, it is also a form of aid to the oppressed peoples now struggling in various countries of Europe and the Americas.*"

2. American imperialism, center of world reaction, main prop of the colonial system, is severely weakened by the disastrous defeat it is suffering in China. This aids the struggle of the progressive, anti-imperialist people within the United States as well as all other peoples who are fighting American imperialist exploitation.

3. China is a "preview" of the futility of the Marshall Plan program. In China it has now been fully demonstrated that no amount of American dollars poured in to support an oppressive, reactionary government can bring either recovery or stabilization nor can it destroy the people's movement for greater democracy and independence.

Henry Wallace's statement is completely borne out: "More and more it becomes certain that the Chinese fiasco will be the first to drive home to the American people the complete bankruptcy of our foreign policy."

Hence the struggle in China powerfully aids the democratic people's struggle for world peace and is of immeasurable aid to change our foreign policy.

4. *Leadership and contribution of the Chinese Communist Party, especially of Mao Tse-tung.*

These victories have been won under the leadership of the Communist Party, which is the acknowledged leader of a *broad coalition of all democratic forces*. The Party, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, was able to apply the universal science of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete situation in China, especially in respect to: (a) agrarian revolution; (b) the nature of the new democracy in China; (c) the role and building of the Communist Party.

III. ON THE NATURE OF THE WAR

The war in China is a liberation war for independence.

"The war launched by him (Chiang Kai-shek) is a counter revolutionary war directed by American imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation and the liberation of the Chinese people. * * *"

—Mao Tse-tung in Turning Point, P. 4.

That is why all progressive forces in America sympathize with and support this war of the Chinese people as a just war for national liberation.

It must be underscored that *American imperialism has emerged in the postwar period as the chief bulwark of the decaying colonial system.*

American imperialism has buttressed, aided, and armed British, French, and Dutch imperialism in the struggle against the liberation movements of Asia, such as the French against Viet Nam, the Dutch against Indonesia, British in Malaya and Burma. Its own role in Philippines and Korea.

No place in the world has American imperialism, in its own right, intervened on so vast a scale and in so many ways as in the most decisive of all Far Eastern countries—China.

A. Nature of American Intervention in China

1. Total cost to American taxpayer—6-10 billion dollars (breakdown attached) in the form of—

Direct military intervention by U. S. Army, Navy, Marines, Air Corps.

Vast military program to train and equip Chiang Kai-shek's armies under the name MAGIC (U. S. Military Assistance Group in China).

Similar program for Chinese Navy based on American built and operated naval base at Tsingtao.

Transfer of Chiang's armies to civil war fronts by American planes and vessels.

American troops have guarded Chinese lines of communications.

Enormous American munition dumps have been turned over to Chiang's forces.

Under illegally extended lend-lease hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment transferred to Chiang from Okinawa and other Pacific Islands.

B. Purpose of U. S. Policy of Intervention

1. To stop the march of the Chinese people toward democracy and independence under the slogan of "containing Communism."

2. To gain military control over China and extend military bases against the U. S. S. R.

3. To stem the upsurge of colonial liberation movements in whole Far East, which is profoundly affected by what happens in China, thereby endangering the rich monopoly holdings of Western European nations and America in the Far East.

IV. FUTURE AMERICAN ROLE IN CHINA

Further intervention by Truman Administration, unless balked by the action of the people, may take any of the following forms:

1. Direct military intervention—landing of American Marines (Vice Adm. Badger, C. O. American Naval forces in China declared on Nov. 5, that he is considering landing of marines in Shanghai and sending American naval vessels up the Yangtse to protect American lives and property. U. S. may provide bombers, airplanes, for onslaught against industrial cities (Manchuria) in hands of Communists. Also American military personnel to direct operations, as in Greece.

Chiang, it is reported, may declare Shanghai an open city and invite American troops in to protect it from advancing Communist forces.

2. Truman Administration finding Chiang useless to it may give direct support to a number of local war lords in an effort to stave off nation-wide victory for the Communists.

3. Pour more funds into China in an attempt to bribe wavering elements in the Chinese democratic front and split their ranks, causing disunity and chaos, prolong the civil war, perpetrate killing of Chinese people, delay consolidation of victory.

Although all these forms of intervention must fail in long run—they mean throwing away more of the American workers' money, accelerating inflation at home and further blackening the name of the U. S. in the eyes of the Chinese people whose suffering would be prolonged.

Our own struggle against U. S. imperialism would receive setback if U. S. imperialism were able to win even limited objectives in China. Hence, activity to halt intensified intervention is urgent. Wall Street's policy in the Far East is based on rebuilding and strengthening Japan as a war base and the Japanese as gunmen for the Wall Street gangsters.

Program of Action

1. Demand a reversal of present disastrous Truman policy, complete withdrawal of American military forces in China and cessation of all forms of intervention. Connect this with the fight for world peace, for withdrawal of armed forces from Greece, Turkey, etc., and for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Plan an effective program of action for your club against intervention against the Chinese people. These actions should be based on the type of work the club is engaged in, such as—

Distribute agitation folder on China in your shop, community, etc.

2. Bring the Chinese issue to the American people through forums, meetings, literature.

3. Tie China issue with our inflation at home. Make the point that Truman cannot fulfill his pledges for progressive legislation on the domestic front while carrying out an imperialist, reactionary war-making foreign policy. Show the oneness of domestic and foreign policy.

4. Enlist the speakers and the help of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in preparing educational material for the broad masses of people.

Support the actions initiated by the Committee Against American Intervention in China.

5. Read and sell subscriptions to the Committee's publication "Spotlight on the Far East," for the most authoritative and progressive approach on all Far Eastern questions.

Support the campaign of "Greetings to the Liberation Fighters of China."

Issued by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, 111 West 42d St. *Role of the American Progressive Movement in Aiding the Struggle of the Chinese Liberation Movement Against American Imperialism and Chinese Semi-Feudalism.*

"The victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the formation and the consolidation of the United Revolutionary Front.

"The formation of a United Revolutionary Front is impossible unless the proletariat of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of 'their own country'."

—Stalin: Foundations of Leninism.

1. The American progressive movement has a long and honorable record of support to the Chinese people's movement in the past.

a. 1934—American Friends of the Chinese People, and its magazine "China Today" mobilized support for the struggles of the Chinese people.

b. 1938—Boycott against Japanese goods.

c. 1938—Longshoremen on West Coast stopped shipments of scrap to Japan.

d. 1945—Newly constituted C. P. USA resolution on China and subsequent Times Square demonstration against Hurley mission.

e. GI demonstration in Pacific theatre.

2. 1946—At present we must self-critically admit there has been a serious lack of education, discussion and action in support of the world-shaking struggle of the Chinese people against "our own imperialism," American imperialism.

Bibliography

Mao Tse-tung—Turning Point in China—China's New Democracy.

A. A. Zhdanov—International Situation.

Supplementary for Speakers

Mao Tse-tung—New Democracies in China. New China (pamphlet).

uopwa/16.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that, Mr. Matusow.

Mr. MATUSOW. Issued by the New York State Educational Department, Communist Party, 35 East Twelfth Street, New York, November 20, 1948; title "The Great Victories in China and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention. Club discussion outline on the significance of the recent events in China and the tasks of all clubs."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you receive that from your official position in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, as a club leader in one of the Communist Party clubs. On page 5, paragraph 1, I would like to quote this in relation to the tasks of the Communist Party, its context here:

The American progressive movement has a long and honorable record of support to the Chinese people's movement in the past: A. 1934. American friends of the Chinese people and the magazine China Today mobilized support for the struggles of the Chinese people.

Relating to the Chinese Communists, we were told to use this in our discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if you had any research to be done, and if you went to China Today, you could accept China Today as an orthodox source of information; is that right?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right, carrying the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us when you were working in the bookshops as to whether or not there was a large or small sale of Solution in Asia?

Mr. MATUSOW. I wouldn't like to give you an exact figure.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is the reason I use the word large or small.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, it wasn't a large sale. All of the books I have mentioned on China had a large sale in that period. We sold a number of Solution in Asia and the Agnes Smedley books, and the Edgar Snow book, Red Star Over China, and——

Senator FERGUSON. What about the Epstein book?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Epstein book had the largest sale because it was the newest book at the time. Solution in Asia, I believe, was published in 1945. The Epstein book came out in late 1947 or early 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say now that the Solution in Asia book did not have a large sale?

Mr. MATUSOW. It has a smaller sale than the Unfinished Revolution in China.

Senator EASTLAND. Because it was an earlier book?

Mr. MATUSOW. Correct.

Senator EASTLAND. But you also say that the Chinese organization in the State of New York had instructed you that the book, Solution in Asia, represented official Communist policy?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. And therefore you would have promoted the sale?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like if you think it is within the scope of the inquiry to ask the witness some questions on the Book and Magazine Guild. The Book and Magazine Guild was a local of the United Office and Professional Workers Association. It had a contract with the IPR to cover the employment of the employees of the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the United Office and Professional Workers of America?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Book and Magazine Guild?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; local 18.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were a member of that union?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you, from your own experience, testify that the Book and Magazine Guild was controlled by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I can.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. All of the locals, local 16, 18, and a few of the other numbers, were located in a building on Twenty-ninth Street, at the office of the United Office and Professional Workers of America. The leaders of that union I knew to be party members because I attended the Communist Party meetings with them. The head of the local 16, Norman Aronson, some of the business agents, one was Jack

Greenspan, a former head of the AYD; Winifred Norma; the Communist Party author, Aaron Kramer, and the head of the placement bureau or union hiring hall, Ethel Beech. I had had a number of meetings with these people in relation to concentration in certain shops or places of employment that were under contract to the UOPWA, and the Book and Magazine Guild. The policy of the Communist Party that was set up by the State Union Committee in New York, disseminated to the union and carried forward, was that all organizations such as trade-unions that had contracts with UOPWA, all political organizations, such as the American Labor Party, the Communist Party, et cetera—

Senator FERGUSON. What others?

Mr. MATUSOW. The American Labor Party, the Progressive Party, the Communist Party; all fraternal organizations or nonprofit organizations, which IPR fitted in that category and was one of the shops or places that were mentioned. They included some direct Communist Party fronts, like the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, People's Songs, Inc., Civil Rights Congress, Council on African Affairs, Institute of Pacific Relations, et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you deal with the Institute of Pacific Relations as a front?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; what I am stating here, I didn't refer to all of these organizations as fronts. I am stating that all organizations that fit into the category of nonprofit organizations or had dealt in any way with anything of a political nature, that the party felt would be a place to infiltrate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the Lawyers Guild?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; I had no contact with them. Well, as I say, the policy here was that when a vacancy existed in any of these shops, that in the 10-day interim period they had to supply somebody to fill the vacancy—

Mr. MORRIS. That is when the employer had the opportunity to fill the vacancy.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, the contract, I believe, all of the contracts with these organizations had stated that if the union cannot furnish suitable personnel within 10 days, the employer could seek out personnel elsewhere. But the party concentration policy was that within that 10-day period "We shall furnish a Communist Party member to that organization."

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to say that the union would come to you during that 10 days to supply a Communist Party member?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, they wouldn't directly come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but the Communist Party.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. They would, through certain members in the union, who were in the various youth clubs, for instance, or community clubs. Word would be sent down that there was a vacancy in a shop, and somebody was needed, and always somebody is unemployed to do clerical work, and they would send that person up to get employment.

Senator FERGUSON. So that a Communist would get the job.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, and they high-lighted these organizations that I just mentioned. There were others, but I don't recall all of the names of all of the organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were endeavoring to get as many Communist Party members into organizations, charitable and otherwise, that were dealing in political questions, like the IPR.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the more Communist members you could get into the staff and into the employees, the better off the Communist Party would be.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And IPR was one of those unions that you know that the Communist Party recommended members to?

Mr. MATUSOW. One of the organizations that the union, through the Communist Party, would send party members up to get employment.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Paul Robeson a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't know whether he was directly. I did belong to a club with his son, but not with him directly.

Senator EASTLAND. His son was a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the son's name?

Mr. MATUSOW. Paul Robeson, Jr.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the publishing firm Little, Brown and Co.?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I am.

Mr. MORRIS. They published Solution in Asia.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anybody in that organization who is a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I belonged to a Communist Party club with Harry McIntyre, the son of the former President of Little, Brown. I believe Mr. McIntyre died a few years ago, and Harry McIntyre was one of the main beneficiaries in the will.

Mr. MORRIS. It was the son of Harry McIntyre?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, we called him Harry McIntyre. He was recruited at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. But the son is the one who was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. I belonged to a club with the son.

Mr. MORRIS. A Communist club?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; a Communist Party youth club on the lower East Side of New York.

Senator FERGUSON. If it does not take too long, will you tell us how they recruited at the university?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1945, a fellow named Art Saha, with a few other fellows, set up a Marxist study group, not called a Communist Party club. That is, using the principles of academic freedom to attract students who are interested in learning all sides of the subject. They get a number of people in the Marxist study group, and on the basis of their appearances there, they would attempt to recruit, and were successful in many cases.

Senator FERGUSON. When they recruited you, did they recruit you directly as an invitation to join the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1947; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1947?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So they used this Marxist club as a kind of a front to tell who was interested before they would approach them?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were recruited directly into the party——

Mr. MATUSOW. Not through the Marxist club, but through the AYD, on the same principle.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the same principle. Do you know how many members there were in New York?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, I know the NYC student section of the Communist Party, and I got this from a 1948 convention report of the Communist Party, New York County, stated 900 students on the campuses of New York City schools are members of the party. The total city membership was approximately 25,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the publication Science and Society?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist publication?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. Science and Society was a publication that was required reading for members of the Communist Party and distributed through the party organization rather than solely through the party book shops.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what role James S. Allen had in the Communist Party? Tell us, based upon your own experience in the Party.

Mr. MATSOW. James S. Allen was, and still is, I believe, one of the leading theoreticians on the question of minority groups and the colonial question. In 1935 or 1936 he wrote a book called Negro Question in the United States, which, when I left the party, was being revised as a basic text for Negro people. He also wrote a book on the reconstruction period, called Reconstruction. He wrote one called, I believe, War Minority and Capital.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those books all party-line books?

Mr. MATUSOW. Published by the party, not by any publisher but by the party itself. I believe he had a total of eight or nine books published by the Communists over a period of 1935 to the present day.

Mr. MORRIS. He was also the foreign editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. And his affiliation with the Communist Party was as well known to the members of the party and people close to the party as that of, for instance, Earl Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think, from your experience in the Communist Party, Mr. Matusow, that a man like Fred Field could be active in the Communist organization, interested in an organization for 10 years, without expressing and advocating Communist principles?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; he could not. He would have to, sometime in that 10 years, advocate Communist principles. In the magazine China Today, he did.

Senator FERGUSON. China Today you sold in the book shops.

Mr. MATUSOW. No; we didn't. It was mostly for reference material. I had seen and read copies of the book at the Jefferson School library. According to this, in 1934, and I believe Mr. Field was one of the editors of China Today in 1934——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you testifying now to Frederick Vanderbilt Field being a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. When I worked at Communist headquarters at 35 East Twelfth Street I got that information. I was a full-time employee of the Communist Party at one time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that when you people worked for the Communist Party, in the positions that you were, that when you got that information you relied on it?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, if it came down from a State or a functionary of the party, somebody in a position to know, you had to take it on its merit. You presumed that a full-time employee or a State officer of the Communist Party is not lying about something. If a man says to me John Doe is a member of the Communist Party, and he is an organizer and has access to membership roles, and so forth, I am not going to think he is lying.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are not going to question it?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How did they catch on that you were giving information outside of the party line?

Mr. MATUSOW. They never did. It seemed that in 1948 and 1949, I had sold 326 subscriptions to the Sunday Worker in about a 9-week period, and they didn't believe it was possible for anybody to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not think that a good Communist could be disloyal to the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, they thought I was just too active, and they felt that anybody who is too active in the party, doing too much work, must have an ulterior motive. It was strictly a matter of witch hunting and circumstantial evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. You know, they talk a lot about witch hunting outside. They talk about witch hunts here in Washington, of trying to discover or disclose who are Communists in the United States Government. They use that expression, do they not?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you Communists use it in your own organization.

Mr. MATUSOW. No; they never did. I am using it because that is actually what it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did they try to ferret out disloyal members to the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; they did. But in most cases, when they booted somebody out of the party, they very seldom had anything to base it on.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you said in the beginning they were always trying to ferret out disloyal members.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And trying to ascertain whether or not they may be spies in their own organization.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what method did they have to discover spies?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, they took a quote from one of Lenin's documents where it says that anybody who is too active or works very hard,

you know, over and above that of the normal party members, is somebody who you might suspect because usually he is the agent provocateur.

Senator FERGUSON. That is how they found you. That is, they got suspicious of you.

Mr. MATUSOW. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you did something over and above the line of duty, did they not?

Mr. MATUSOW. They called it that; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And they thought that because you had sold—how many?

Mr. MATUSOW. 326, in 9 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. 326 subscriptions, that you came, probably you did come, within the definition of a saboteur.

Mr. MATUSOW. Or somebody who would be looked upon with suspicion.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and that is how they really discovered and got you out?

Mr. MATUSOW. One of the things. They also found in my library some issues of the Communist Party organ Political Affairs that I had purchased in a second-hand bookshop, that had the stamp of the Office of Strategic Services on the front cover. There were six covers. In fact, I was working in Communist Party headquarters at the time, and picked them up in a second-hand bookshop, next door to Communist Party headquarters. That was in 1948, and I brought them up to party headquarters, and showed them to a few people and we had a good laugh about it. But in 1951, somebody brought that up to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And said that because you had them, they discounted the fact that you actually bought them in a second-hand bookshop and thought you had them from the OSS?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. Then they claimed that I was getting a disability compensation from the Government for injuries sustained in the last war, which I was. But they didn't believe that. They thought I was getting income from somebody else.

Senator FERGUSON. Rather than from the Government?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So they have a means of checking on the loyalty of their members.

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, and they maintain dossiers on most of the membership.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they find these in your library? Had they gone into your library?

Mr. MATUSOW. I had brought them up to party headquarters when I bought them, and I imagine somebody up there made a note of it, and put it on file, and 2 years later it was brought out on charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is quite a bit of suspicion among members of the Communist Party as to whether or not there is disloyalty in the party itself.

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir; and there was another charge, and they stated that I committed an act of white chauvinism and the charge was that I was working for a Negro newspaper, Amsterdam News in New York, and because I was working for a Negro group, I was

keeping a Negro out of a job, for a short period of time, and that I was not contributing to the working class or to the class struggle, because I worked for this anti-Negro newspaper.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a Negro newspaper.

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was the Amsterdam News and because I worked for that newspaper that was opposed to the struggles and the fights of the Negro people.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was still a Negro newspaper?

Mr. MATUSOW. And I recall the person who made that charge, and I said, "What did he do?" and he said he sewed mink coats in the garment district of New York.

Senator FERGUSON. When they suspended you, did they give you a trial?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, a good kangaroo court.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us something about the trial, how did they try you?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was called up to Communist Party headquarters and sat in the back room on the twelfth floor, at 35 West Twelfth Street. This former New York policeman and Communist Party member conducted the interrogation along the lines that I just mentioned, "Were you an OSS agent, where do you get your money, how much money does your father have, how much money does your mother have. Did you sell so many subscription to the Daily Worker, how come you were able to do that?" At the end of the meeting, I said, "What are the specific charges?" They said, "There are none." I said, "What are they?" and they said they can't say. "You tell us."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a lawyer?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, it doesn't exist in the party.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it an open hearing?

Mr. MATUSOW. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people were at the trial?

Mr. MATUSOW. Two.

Senator FERGUSON. The two you mentioned?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And anybody else present?

Mr. MATUSOW. Nobody.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the three of you?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And at the end, what happened?

Mr. MATUSOW. They told me if I know what is good for me, I better stay away from Communist meetings and Communist groups or I might get into some trouble, and at that point I picked up my hat and stole away.

Senator FERGUSON. They announced the verdict right there.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The policeman and the other man?

Mr. MATUSOW. Just one of them, Joe Bucholt.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his connection with the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. He was a State organizer of the Labor Youth League and a State chairman of the Communist Youth movement in New York State.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he announce the verdict?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, he did. And then it was announced in the Daily Worker about 5 days later.

Senator FERGUSON. What did it say in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MATUSOW. That I was expelled from the Communist Party for being an "enemy agent." I had engaged in irregularities in the subscription drive in 1949. I had just come back from the Southwest. They gave a description of me, and that was all.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you call an official ouster?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. On the basis of that, I was thrown out of a few meetings since.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to get back into some meetings?

Mr. MATUSOW. I attended a few. I attended one 2 months ago, in Ohio.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to you there?

Mr. MATUSOW. I got away with it until I testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and they found out who I was and were very unhappy about it. I tried covering the founding convention of the National Negro Labor Council, for the Dayton News; tried to cover that meeting. As soon as I arrived, I was informed that since I was expelled from the Communist Party, I could not cover the meeting of the National Negro Labor Council, which is supposedly a non-Communist group.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have to have any particular method of getting into these Communist meetings?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, if you walk in and know their terminology and when to laugh and when to be mad, you can get away with it, if they don't know your face.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have to know the party line to sit in there?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have been able to use the right smile or the right anger and so forth, to stay in some of the meetings?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this will help you with the Communists, this meeting here this morning? It is public.

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't think it will hurt me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may have a hard time getting in their meetings; is that it?

Mr. MATUSOW. I doubt it.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you can still get in some?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You appreciate that you are under oath here.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that what you are saying here about certain people is under oath.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that what you say about their work is under oath.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you want to leave the record stand now just as it is?

Mr. MATUSOW. Right again, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. No further questions.

Senator EASTLAND. Thank you, sir.

We will recess.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m. the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, will you be sworn.

Senator WATKINS. Stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GREENE. I do.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JEROME D. GREENE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1929-33, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that Mr. Greene has been called here today at the suggestion of the institute as a person who has known the institute for many years and who, according to the institute, is in a position to testify before this inquiry today.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a statement that you would like to put in the record?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, and I would like to read it.

Mr. MORRIS. You would like to read it?

Mr. GREENE. I would like to read it, yes. It will take about 6 minutes, I suppose.

Senator WATKINS. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. That is perfectly all right. You go ahead, Mr. Greene.

Mr. GREENE. The heading of my statement states the offices I have held in the Institute of Pacific Relations which is my main competence to speak. Some of my experience in various positions I have held in the meantime have a bearing on it, and I wonder if you would like

me to go into my previous experience at all and the positions I have held or not.

Senator WATKINS. As background, Mr. Greene, I think if you want to give us a brief outline. We don't want to spend too much time on it.

Mr. GREENE. My interest in the Far East is primarily due to the fact that I was born there. My father was a Christian missionary in Japan. I lived there in my boyhood. I came home to go to school and college. After a considerable period at Harvard in administrative posts I became manager of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. Later I was the chief executive and organized the Rockefeller Foundation. I was in there for 4 years. Then I went into the banking business for 15 years, during which I made four trips to the Far East and had a considerable acquaintance with people out there. I might say in particular that I had dealings with five members of the Japanese Cabinet, three of whom were Prime Ministers, one was Minister of Finance, all assassinated because they stood in the way of militarist demands which culminated at Pearl Harbor.

On returning after 15 years, in 1932, to my great surprise I was invited to serve as professor of international politics at the University College of Wales in England, a position for which I felt no qualification because I had not had the discipline and training of a scholar, but I was told they didn't want a pundit, they wanted somebody who was familiar as a businessman with political conditions, which have to be considered in connection with national credits.

Senator WATKINS. You are an American, are you not?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. A natural-born citizen?

Mr. GREENE. I vote for President. Many people think the Constitution says that you have to be a native citizen. It doesn't. It says you have to be a natural-born citizen. I am a natural-born citizen.

Senator WATKINS. Anyway, you are a citizen and did not come in by naturalization.

Mr. GREENE. No; I did not.

Senator WATKINS. I just asked that because when you suggested they asked you over to Wales to be a professor over there that was something rather extraordinary; was it not?

Mr. GREENE. Well, as a matter of fact, I think they were very anxious to have an American. The chair that I held was founded by a rich Welshman, Lord Davis, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson, and he called the chair the Woodrow Wilson Professorship of International Politics, so there was perhaps a certain propriety in my being there.

I then came back and I have been in various trusteeships in Boston, which have kept me busy, but I consider myself retired.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would you like to read your statement?

Mr. GREENE. I would like to; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, by all means.

Mr. GREENE. I think I can be most helpful to the subcommittee in its inquiry into the conduct of the Institute of Pacific Relations by a statement of the origin, purposes, and activities of the institute, as to which my testimony as one of its founders may be considered competent. As a matter of fact, I wrote the constitution in 1927. My most active connection with the institute was limited to the period

from 1927 to 1933. In 1932 I went to Great Britain for 2 years, except for a brief return to the United States to attend the institute's conference in 1933 at Banff. On returning to this country in 1934 I moved my residence from New York to Cambridge. I continued as a trustee and a member of the executive committee and attended meetings until 1939. After that it became impossible for me to attend meetings regularly and I therefore resigned. I continued, however, to keep fairly well informed about the institute's activities and publications. In a general way, not in a detailed way.

A group of public-spirited persons in Honolulu and the Pacific coast, alarmed by the bitterness of nationalistic feeling and the apparent conflict of national interests in the countries bordering the Pacific, felt that something should be done to promote international understanding and thus avert a crisis that might lead to war. Let us put an end, they said, to making faces at each other and exchanging verbal recriminations from opposite sides of the Pacific, and instead organize periodic conferences at which unofficial but competent people from different countries can sit round a table and try to reconcile their divergent interests by frank discussion leading to mutual enlightenment, if not agreement.

The decision to try such an experiment in the promotion of mutual understanding and good will was made at a preliminary conference held in Honolulu in 1925, which I did not attend, with members from the American mainland, Hawaii, China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The meeting demonstrated so well the advantages of such a conference that it was decided to form a national group in each country and at a second conference, 2 years later, to form a federation of such groups in an international body. The national groups were duly formed in advance of the 1927 conference, with the addition of a group from Great Britain, and each came prepared with papers on matters of timely importance (121 in all) which were circulated to all members of the conference and furnished reference material for the discussions. Observers attended from the League of Nations and the International Labor Office.

While national antagonisms were not without some emotional expression, particularly by the Japanese and Chinese, the discussions were held under admirable restraint and exhibited a degree of mutual forbearance and good will that fully realized the hopes of the members. The greatest importance was attached to research and publication both by the national groups and under the auspices of an international research committee. Not the least important byproduct of the conference was the formation of acquaintances and friendships among the participants.

Thus a pattern was set for future conferences, and before adjournment a constitution was adopted providing for the establishment of a Pacific Council consisting of one member from each national group and having charge of the institute's affairs between conferences, to call conferences, and to secure the funds needed for the conferences and for the international research committee. I had the honor of presiding over the Pacific Council from 1929 to 1931, having succeeded Dr. Wilbur and being in turn succeeded by Newton D. Baker. With the foregoing statements as my background, I shall give the result of my experience and observation as regards the integrity of the

institute in adhering to its exclusive aims of competent, disinterested research, of fact-finding in the areas of possible conflict, and of conference in which divergent views could be frankly expressed and efforts made to reconcile them.

To guard against any temptation for the institute as such to espouse one side of an international dispute, whether as between nations or as between political, economic, or social theories, the rule was established from the beginning and strictly adhered to that no resolutions should ever be passed concerning such matters. Neither the institute nor anyone purporting to speak for it could advocate one international or domestic policy or another. It merely sought to make available to the public in the several countries the facts bearing on a dispute, including such national or individual divergences of opinion or interest as a dispassionate judgment would take into account.

The record of research, publication, and conference during the past 25 years reveals many differences of opinion, not only between national groups but also between individuals in the same group. In the publications of the institute the sole responsibility for opinions expressed and facts presented has rested in the authors. This wise policy has also been adopted by other private research organizations and is admirably expressed in every issue of that distinguished quarterly, *Foreign Affairs*, as follows:

The articles in *Foreign Affairs* do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that by keeping clear of mere vagaries, *Foreign Affairs* can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can be identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.

Similar disclaimers are applied to all publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

As a citizen I would deplore any evidence that the Institute of Pacific Relations or any other organization either purposely or as a tool of a foreign power attempted to influence or control the policy of our Government. As one of the founders of the institute I would be shocked and humiliated by any evidence that it had thus betrayed its fundamental ideals. The hundreds of members of the institute in all parts of this country, representing every variety of political and economic views, and united only in their confidence in its spirit and methods, would not tolerate such a betrayal if they had grounds for suspecting it. I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been impaired.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you a question at that point, Mr. Greene. "I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been impaired." In other words, if that means what it seems to mean, you have examined all the evidence and you have given the institute a complete clearance and acquittal of any accusations of any kind.

Mr. GREENE. I can't say that I have made an examination of everything that has been published and written, but I have kept fairly close track of the adherence to the general policy that I have mentioned. I may say that yesterday I went through the minutes during the years when I was less in contact with the institute, and time and

again the caution was insisted upon that the institute as such took no position on any question whatever, political or economic.

Senator WATKINS. When you say "I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been impaired"—

Mr. GREENE. I mean by that if they had done what has been alleged, there would have been any number of members, including myself, who would have made the most violent protest.

Senator WATKINS. If you had known it, I do not think there is any doubt about it. If you had known that some things were going on, for instance, which have been called to the attention of this committee, you probably would have protested.

Mr. GREENE. I don't know whether I would have protested or not. It depends on what it was.

Senator WATKINS. Have you read the evidence before this committee?

Mr. GREENE. I have read some of it. I don't know whether I would have protested or not because I think some of the things which may have been objected to in this committee are things which represent a legitimate or at least a frank divergence of opinion. That is one thing which the institute stands for all the time, the freedom to express their opinions.

Senator WATKINS. Some of the evidence may have been of that character, but I have listened to a great deal of it and I am trying to catch up on the reading of this evidence, and it seems to me that there is something there which certainly requires explanation.

Mr. GREENE. I think I perhaps cover that a little bit by what I say further.

Senator WATKINS. When you said "I have seen no evidence," I wondered just how far you had gone, if you had read the complete hearings.

Mr. GREENE. There would have been a very general protest by the membership at a departure from what they all recognize as fundamental principles. That does not mean that the institute controls the utterances of every individual ever connected with it. It didn't mean that. But it meant that the institute as an institute was very careful to protect the integrity of its fundamental principles as I have outlined them.

Senator WATKINS. Just how close were you to the operations of the Institute of Pacific Relations after you were president? Were you a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. GREENE. I was a member of the board of trustees I think until 1940. Up to that time, up to 1939, I attended with some regularity. After that I found that I could not, and I resigned for that reason.

Senator WATKINS. How often did you meet?

Mr. GREENE. I think the executive committee met, I think, once a month.

Senator WATKINS. Did you meet with them once a month?

Mr. GREENE. I met with them occasionally but not regularly.

Senator WATKINS. Where did they meet?

Mr. GREENE. They met in New York.

Senator WATKINS. Could you tell us about how much of the time—because this has something to do with what you have said there and probably what you will say. I would like to get the background in

the record of just how close to the operation of this association you were during this period of years.

Mr. GREENE. I was living in Boston. I wasn't living in New York. I wasn't dropping into the office all the time. I didn't pretend to have that kind of familiarity. But at the meetings that I did attend I learned what decisions were before them and what publications were in prospect or had been completed. There was no shred of evidence that there was anything there inconsistent with what we were aiming to do.

I confess an element in my confidence was my confidence in some of my colleagues. I mention that later here.

Senator WATKINS. Just which ones?

Mr. GREENE. I place it first in Mr. Holland. I think that the committee has got to weigh, as I have said later here, the perfectly patent integrity of people who are testifying before it as against allegations and insinuations by some of your witnesses—

Senator WATKINS. There have been of course witnesses here—

Mr. GREENE. Who have nothing like the record and reputation that these people have.

Senator WATKINS. That may be true, but at the same time if you are investigating a matter of this kind that has to do with the security of the United States, you know that you can't for instance get people who are operating in an apparatus like the Communists have had here who probably have the best reputation. They wouldn't have. The only way you can get any evidence of what was going on is by some of the men themselves telling you about it.

Mr. GREENE. I deal with one instance of that later on in my paper, if you will allow me.

Senator WATKINS. I want to find out just how much contact you had with the actual operations of this group. I would like to ask you this: Is it not a fact that the principal activities of the association were turned over, that is, the carrying out of the policies was turned over to the executive secretary?

Mr. GREENE. Naturally, yes; any executive is supposed—

Senator WATKINS. He was given rather wide latitude, rather wide powers to go ahead and carry out the policies as he interpreted them.

Mr. GREENE. So long as he had the confidence of his employers.

Senator WATKINS. During the time that you were president who was the executive secretary?

Mr. GREENE. In 1931 Mr. Edward Carter became secretary general. I can't remember when his term expired or when his tenure expired.

Senator WATKINS. Then who followed him during the time you had direct contact with the association?

Mr. GREENE. I think Mr. Lockwood was secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barnes became secretary up until 1934.

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And then Mr. Field was secretary.

Mr. GREENE. Yes, I can't remember those dates. I knew Barnes pretty well.

Senator WATKINS. During each of these secretaries you were in close touch, attending these executive meetings that you have spoken of?

Mr. GREENE. I saw them occasionally; yes.

Senator WATKINS. Occasionally. How often?

Mr. GREENE. I don't want to overstress my familiarity with it. The main point of my paper is to bring out the fact that nothing ever happened to my knowledge to change the policy of the responsible people who were the trustees. I am dealing later in this statement with what may have been done by people who had some connection with the institute which didn't in the least affect that general policy of the trustees.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not concede that it would be possible for a subversive movement to infiltrate if they tried, an organization of this kind which was left largely to one or two men to operate?

Mr. GREENE. I can imagine their trying it, yes; and I can also imagine their being very much disappointed in the results.

Senator WATKINS. We will see as you go on. I thought maybe in support of this statement you made you could outline how——

Mr. GREENE. I have seen no evidence of it.

Senator WATKINS. You probably haven't, and maybe a good many other people haven't, because they were not in contact with it.

Mr. GREENE. I wish most emphatically to place on the record with this committee my conviction that the institute has not departed from its declared principles. No evidence that it has can be construed from the extreme views or misconduct of individuals, or from that "Broad hospitality to divergent ideas" which is not only accepted, but stoutly defended. On the other hand, no one whose conduct or writing is open to a serious question of subservience to a foreign power or of advocating the overthrow of our Government by violence has the slightest claim to immunity because of a connection with the IPR or any other organization. That is individual responsibility and deserves the strictest scrutiny by law enforcement agencies.

As regards American policy toward China, it is not easy to say, even with the advantage of hindsight, just what it should have been. An overconfident judgment on that point betrays ignorance rather than political insight. For the problem has been a baffling one at every stage, and still is. The problem of mutual understanding between cultures, manners, and methods of thought and action as far apart as those of China and the United States is a formidable one. That is one of the many problems that the Institute of Pacific Relations set itself to study; but what remains to be learned and to penetrate popular understanding is vast compared with the little that has been learned. But of one thing we can be sure; the technique of independent research and conference is right.

Your committee has been concerned about the possibility of Communist infiltration in the staff or among writers of IPR publications. This raises two questions; first, has there been any such infiltration; and second, if so is there any evidence that has compromised the institute's fundamental policy of abstaining from expressing, or even formulating, corporate judgments or actions in favor of or against governmental action?

As for infiltration I do not exclude the possibility that it has been attempted. Its results must have been disappointing to any who made the attempt. For I know no evidence that the institute has ever succumbed to any such insidious influence that may secretly have been brought to bear on it.

At this point I should like to interpolate some observations bearing on the much-discussed question of guilt by association. During the

period following our recognition of the Soviet Government, when the iron curtain was less tightly drawn than it is today, many Americans, and especially so-called young liberals, cherished the vain hope that by promoting friendly contacts between the American people and the Russian people and by making an open-minded study of the workings of the Communist system, national antagonisms might be softened. Some went so far as to make the Soviet Government regard them as friends in a political sense and thus as possible tools of Soviet policy.

The Stalin-Hitler alliance destroyed the illusions of most of these young people, but the record of their Russian contacts remained to plague them. The question of their guilt by association can be justly considered only in the light of their subsequent behavior when the sinister implications of fellow traveling along the Communist line gained a clearer significance. These young people and some of their elders may have been suckers for Soviet propaganda, but they were no more fooled than were the Russians who had counted on them as tools of Soviet intrigue. Yet their credibility as loyal Americans today seems often to have been less accepted than that of Communist turn-coats whose guilt by association was that of admitted traitors.

If I may, I would like to say I am tempted to adopt a verse of Scripture by saying there seems to be more joy in the heaven of Washington investigation authorities over one avowed American Communist or foreign spy, who has professed conversion to democratic ideals than over 90 and 9, whether once taken in by Soviet deception or not, who always were and still are loyal Americans.

Communists love confessions, whether it be to justify the punishment of their political victims or to save their own skins.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not part of your statement.

Mr. GREENE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Are you adopting that? Did somebody else say that?

Mr. GREENE. No, sir; I thought of that after I had finished my speech.

Senator WATKINS. So you want to make that part of your statement?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

So far as the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned, I do not believe that in the staff or among the members there were any individuals, whatever their relations with Russians or with subversive organizations may have been alleged to be, who succeeded, if they tried, in deflecting the institute by a hair's breadth from its principles as I have stated them. Even in the case of Frederick V. Field, who ceased to be employed by the IPR in 1940 and was requested in 1947 to resign from the board of trustees, when his commitment to the Communist line became manifest, long before the present investigation, his earlier excellent services in administration and research showed nothing but complete fidelity to the corporate policies of the institute. He was the author of an economic handbook of the Pacific, an objective, scholarly, and authoritative work. During the period of my most frequent association with Field, especially in connection with three IPR conferences, I admired his industry, ability, and liked him personally. I was subsequently pained and shocked by his defection, almost as a father would feel whose son had betrayed his confidence.

I have spoken above of the young so-called liberals who were beguiled into interest in, or sympathy with, communism. Their radicalism contained two elements. The first, and I think the dominant one, was a revolt against reactionary attitudes and against being expected to accept ready-made economic and social doctrines. They were determined to be critical and to think for themselves. It was often a rather callow and juvenile attitude deserving a tolerant sympathy rather than contempt. Nothink did more to goad and confirm it than the intolerance and stand-patism of some of their elders. The manifestation of the latter qualities, in my opinion, tends to produce more pinks and reds than all Moscow's efforts in that direction, which the common sense of the American people can be trusted to reject. Most of us are prone to take the radicalism of young people too seriously. It is something like measles, from which most of them recover.

The second element in youthful radicalism is youthful idealism. This is its saving grace, and a failure to recognize it tends rather to confirm than to cure the radicalism.

The inclusion of Russia, having obviously large territorial interests in the Pacific area, in the international body of the Institute of Pacific Relations at a time when she had diplomatic relations with all the other countries concerned, was a matter of elementary fairness and common sense. An organization for the study of international relations in the Pacific that left out of account Russia could not pretend to be making a comprehensive or realistic study of the area. The Russians had to be offered membership. In 1929, on my way to the IPR conference in Kyoto, Japan, I went by way of Moscow for the express purpose of asking the Soviet authorities to permit an unofficial group of Russians to attend the Kyoto conference. I went first to the head of the official Society for Cultural Relations and was referred by him to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinoff. He was civil, not not too cordial. "My colleagues," he said, "do not like going to international conferences only to be treated like pariahs." But quickly he added, "though personally I find it stimulating." He finally consented to allow two Soviet newspaper correspondents in Japan to attend the conference as observers. At the same time, however, an official Soviet newspaper denounced the institute as a tool of Wall Street imperialists.

Before the following conference held in Shanghai in 1931 the formation of a Soviet unit of the institute was authorized but no delegates were sent to that conference. It was hardly surprising that Russian participation in the institute amounted to little and was abandoned in 1939. The pattern of unofficial representation was hardly to be appreciated by a country whose citizens were not free to express their own opinions. Free discussion violated the most sacred of Soviet principles.

In conclusion allow me to express the hope that in weighing the testimony heard in this investigation so far as it relates to the integrity of the Institute of Pacific Relations, your honorable committee will give due weight to the matter of the integrity of its most responsible leaders, with whom I have felt it an honor to be associated—Ray Lyman Wilbur, Newton D. Baker, Cary L. Alsberg, Philip C. Jessup, and Robert G. Sproul. Not one of them would have tolerated the

slightest departure from those principles for which the institute has always stood and without which it could have made no claim on their interest and support. Integrity and loyalty, after all, are factors in the light of which irresponsible charges and malicious innuendoes have little weight in unprejudiced minds.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, how much of the proceedings before this committee have you read?

Mr. GREENE. I have glanced through I think a couple of volumes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. GREENE. I don't pretend to be familiar with them at all.

Mr. MORRIS. You served on the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the year 1941, did you not, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. Probably; if that says so.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the last time you served?

Mr. GREENE. I think so; yes. It must have been.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to offer you this, which is a list of staff members and the make-up of the nominating committee in 1941, Mr. Greene.

The nominating committee in 1941 was made up of Miss Harriet Moore, chairman; Frederick V. Field; and you, Jerome D. Greene. We also have ex officio Edward C. Carter and Ray Lyman Wilbur. Can you recall that particular meeting, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. No; I certainly cannot. I must have been very dependent on my colleagues to suggest names of people that I didn't know. Some of them I did know.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the function of the nominating committee to your recollection?

Mr. GREENE. It was to prepare a list of nominations for action by the trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this not indicate that Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and yourself made up a list of officers to serve?

Mr. GREENE. I think so; yes. I don't know how far Mr. Carter and Mr. Wilbur made suggestions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the ex officio members actually present, do you know?

Mr. GREENE. I suppose so; but I don't know that Dr. Wilbur was. I suppose Carter must have been; I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall this particular meeting?

Mr. GREENE. I don't recall it particularly; no. These things are pretty formal things. A list of names is gotten together. Somebody draws up a list. Then somebody makes suggestions of additions or omissions. Then we agree, and the thing is done. That was 11 years ago. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, we have had testimony from several witnesses that both Miss Moore and Mr. Field were Communists. We brought both Miss Moore and Mr. Field down to answer the charges, and both of them elected to refuse to answer the question whether or not they had been Communists, on the grounds that their answer would incriminate them.

Mr. GREENE. I am ashamed of them for doing so.

Mr. MORRIS. Then as we look at this nominating committee in 1941, which is made up of Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and yourself, with the two ex officio members, do you think it is possible that they in the light

of that evidence which I have just mentioned could have exercised some Communist influence on the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. GREENE. I think the best judgment as to that would be formed by somebody who is familiar with the persons nominated.

Mr. MORRIS. You were present, though, Mr. Greene, at this meeting of the nominating committee.

Mr. GREENE. I can't pretend that I knew everybody on the list.

Mr. MORRIS. I am just talking about the nominating committee there. According to this list, Miss Harriet Moore, chairman, Frederick V. Field, Jerome D. Greene, Edward C. Carter, ex officio, Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio.

Mr. GREENE. Now, the question is, Whom did they nominate?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We have the list here.

Mr. GREENE. I would have to be shown that list to refresh my memory.

Mr. MARKS. We have a list here, Mr. Morris, of people they nominated.

Mr. GREENE. The chairman was Ray Lyman Wilbur, the vice chairman Miss Ada L. Comstock, then William R. Herod, Philip C. Jessup, Benjamin H. Kizer, Philo W. Parker, Robert Gordon Sproul, acting secretary Edward C. Carter, assistant secretary Miss Katrine R. C. Greene, treasurer Francis S. Harmon, Mrs. Rose W. Landres. I can't read any infiltration into that list.

Mr. MORRIS. The question, though, Mr. Greene, is do you think in view of the testimony we have had about Miss Moore and Mr. Field who were your associates on this nominating committee, that it is possible in view of that evidence that they may have caused some Communist influence to have been brought into the institute?

Mr. GREENE. No. Quite the contrary. I think it is a manifestation of the fact that whatever leanings they may have had in that direction, which I suppose would develop progressively during that general period, had no visible effect in the direction of infiltration or affecting the make-up of the slate of officers. To me it is a very gratifying evidence. I will admit that from your point of view it looks mighty suspicious. Miss Moore refused to answer, Mr. Field refused to answer. But as a matter of fact those people were perfectly capable of understanding the limitations of qualities for membership in the institute and observed those limitations.

Mr. MORRIS. I draw your attention to the secretariat at that time, Mr. Greene. I made a list of that on that same page. Did you know Mr. Chen Han-seng in the secretariat of that year?

Mr. GREENE. No. Would you like me to tell you who I did know?

Mr. MORRIS. No. This is the secretariat now. Do you know what the function of the secretariat was in the IPR?

Mr. GREENE. It was a staff to which the general secretary assigned various jobs of publication, research, and various administrative things. They were the staff, the method by which the general secretary carried out his work.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Marks, do you have a question?

Mr. MARKS. The secretary to which you are referring is the Pacific council, the international council. I believe Mr. Greene's associations were with the American council, is that correct, Mr. Greene? So we wouldn't—

Mr. GREENE. Yes; the American council.

Senator WATKINS. Cannot the witness explain? Does he understand?

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, I was just going to suggest that it is 11 years ago and he might not recall—

Senator WATKINS. He can say so.

Mr. MARKS. All right.

Senator WATKINS. In court or anywhere else the witness does his own testifying.

Mr. MORRIS. Your point, Mr. Marks, is that this is the international secretariat.

Mr. MARKS. I think that is right. You can ask him the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was the international secretariat lodged, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. At that time in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you have any experience with the people mentioned on this list of the secretariat?

Mr. GREENE. This list that you gave me?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; the secretariat list. That was in the same year these people served on the secretariat and, as Mr. Marks pointed out, it is of the international council.

Mr. GREENE. I remember Miss Austern, Ruth Carter, P. E. Corbett—is that the Corbett, of Portland, Ore.?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The point is, Mr. Greene, if you feel any of those people were Communists at the time.

Mr. GREENE. I certainly did not; no. Nobody had any anxieties on that point at that time, I can assure you.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that four of those people are now in Red China?

Mr. GREENE. No; I don't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Several of them are officials of the Red Chinese Government.

Mr. GREENE. I will depend on you for that information.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all in our hearings here, Mr. Greene. I don't like to supply information. I should only ask you questions.

Did you know, for instance, that Y. Y. Hsu, Chen Han-seng, and Ch'ao-ting Chi are now three officials of the Chinese Communist government? Shouldn't that give us reason to believe that perhaps these people were exercising a Communist influence on the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. GREENE. I can see no sign of it. Even in the case of Field, as long as he was there, there is not the slightest evidence that he was working in that direction. His final defection, as I recall it, came as a shock and a grief to everybody.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not closely supervise the work of these people, though?

Mr. GREENE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, for instance, that Michael Greenberg has been identified as a Communist here. As I said, Harriet Moore. And Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is now over in Red China.

Mr. GREENE. By identified, you mean proved to be?

Mr. MORRIS. People who were in the Communist movement together with them and who have abandoned the Communist movement have so testified.

Mr. GREENE. Yes. The testimony I suppose is unequivocally accurate?

Mr. MORRIS. We don't know.

Mr. GREENE. The strong presumption is against the character of the witnesses affecting the work that the IPR carried on under these auspices.

Senator WATKINS. I will say to you that some of these witnesses have testified in the courts of the United States and they have been believed by juries and they have been used by the prosecuting arm of the Government as genuine witnesses who were telling the truth. So when you say that the presumption is against them, I think that may be in your mind, but the fact of the matter is that the Government has taken an entirely different position.

Mr. GREENE. I am not passing upon the guilt or innocence of those people. I am talking about the effect upon the policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. You were characterizing these people, and I am just calling your attention to the fact that the presumption is not against them. The presumption has been that they were telling the truth, because the Government has taken them and used them as witnesses.

Mr. GREENE. I have not said there was a presumption in their favor. I am saying there is no presumption in favor of the charge that they affected the institute. It is perfectly possible for some of these people who were extremely leftist to be competent secretaries and clerks and researchers. It is perfectly possible that they could give good services, and if the service they rendered turned out to have a Communist slant, it would have been rejected.

Senator WATKINS. If it had been known. I take it for granted, Mr. Greene, no one is thinking for a moment that you would knowingly have taken a Communist in and put him in any of these positions.

Mr. GREENE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Because as we understand communism it is part of their doctrine to overthrow this Government by force and violence.

Mr. GREENE. Therefore—

Senator WATKINS. I take it many of these men—in fact I think the large majority of them are men of very high character and would not for a moment have stood for anything of that nature had they known it, but that isn't our problem. We know that many organizations in this country have been infiltrated by Communists because they could not have accomplished the things they have accomplished unless they had done that. They have done it in other nations and there is no reason why we shouldn't look at it. It is our job to find out whether it is true or not true.

Mr. GREENE. The best evidence as to whether the infiltration, if it took place, was successful is to how it was effected in the utterances, in the publications of the institute. So I think a search of the very voluminous records of the IPR is your source for any indication that the responsible activities of the institute had that leaning.

Senator WATKINS. That is one source.

Mr. GREENE. I feel almost like challenging you to produce any evidence that the publications of the institute show that tendency on the part of the institute. There has to be a wide hospitality to divergent views. As a matter of fact, apart from the question of totali-

tarianism, which identifies the Nazis and the Soviet people pretty closely, apart from that you can't prevent having people thinking of the philosophical merits of Marxism. Even Tolstoy was a philosophical anarchist. Those differences of theoretical opinion have got to be recognized, and there is no way of controlling individual beliefs or expressions as far as that goes. But so far as disloyalty to the Government goes, the evidence has got to be apparent in the only way in which the Institute of Pacific Relations expresses itself, which is through its publications and conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Do I take it, then, Mr. Greene, that the summation on these two items of your testimony on this score is that even if Harriet Moore and Frederick V. Field served with you on this committee, and were Communists at that time, in your opinion they did not give expression to any Communist ideas or Communist purposes?

Mr. GREENE. Involving the Institute of Pacific Relations, certainly. I say that positively.

Mr. MORRIS. If there were Communists on this list of the secretariat, you feel that their expressions and their writings did not reflect their Communist connections—

Mr. GREENE. I wouldn't say that at all.

Mr. MORRIS. In the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. GREENE. As far as the responsibility of the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned, they did not affect it.

Mr. MORRIS. Then at the same time you did not know the individual work of these people on the secretariat?

Mr. GREENE. I became acquainted with Miss Harriet Moore I think for the first time at Banff in 1933. I knew of her as an extremely able, I believe summa cum laude, graduate of Bryn Mawr College.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. I have none.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. GREENE. Do you excuse me, then?

Senator WATKINS. Yes; and thank you for your testimony.

Call your next witness, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Lockwood, will you stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give in the matter pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N. J., ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL**

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a statement, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like that to go into the record or would you like to read it?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would like your permission to read it if I may.

Senator WATKINS. I would rather he read it because then he is

under oath. Otherwise, there is a question whether it is sworn to or not.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee as a witness and to place at its disposal such information as I have concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations.

For many years I have been closely associated with the American Council of the Institute as a staff member, a trustee, and an American citizen professionally concerned with research and teaching in the far-eastern field. From 1935 to 1940 I was on the American council's research staff, and was its secretary from 1941 to 1943. Since 1946 I have been a member of the board of trustees of the American IPR, and have had occasion to use the institute's publications extensively in following far-eastern affairs. For 15 years or more, therefore, I have had a fairly close knowledge of its activities; particularly I should say those of the American council.

First let me say I fully share the aversion of members of this committee to communism and all its works. I believe that totalitarianism in any form is a threat to every ideal we cherish in American life, and every hope of betterment in the rest of the world.

It is for this very reason that I was first attracted to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and have long cooperated in its activities. For the preservation of free institutions depends upon knowledge and its wide dissemination. And knowledge depends upon free inquiry, such as the institute was organized to encourage in our relations with the vast, turbulent, and little-understood continent of Asia. No one would be more indignant than I to discover that the IPR had become, wittingly or unwittingly, the tool of Communist conspiracy or of Soviet designs upon the free world.

The truth is, in my opinion, that the Institute of Pacific Relations has never been subverted to Communist ends. From fairly extensive knowledge of its operations I believe it has remained true to its principles of nonpartisan investigation and free discussion. If the Communists tried to use it to further their designs, then on the record they failed. One need not endorse every single publication or action associated with the institute to affirm this conviction. It rests on an appraisal of the full record.

The outstanding fact about the institute is the tremendous contribution it has made to knowledge of the Pacific area. For this the whole free world is in its debt. It has striven to provide the first requirement of an intelligent and successful approach to Asia: an understanding of its basic facts and problems, arrived at by free inquiry. This is hardly a Communist objective, nor one which the Communists welcome. They themselves view everything from the premise of a rigid and infallible dogma, prescribed for everyone. They can succeed in Asia only as the democratic world fails to understand and deal intelligently with the forces at work. The best guaranty of this is dispassionate study, and an open market for free ideas where we may search for the truth.

Now free inquiry means controversy, of course, in a situation as explosive as that of Asia. For a decade the Far East has been an arena of war and revolution. Facts were often scanty; interpretations differed; feelings often ran high. Anyone with a knowledge of the problems of operating the Institute of Pacific Relations in this tense

atmosphere can testify to the difficulties. Especially with the advantage of hindsight it is not difficult to point out certain errors of judgment.

Nevertheless, it is striking fact that the great body of scholars and close observers of far-eastern affairs in all countries outside Communist control will testify to the good faith of the institute's leaders, and its large measure of success in maintaining high standards of objectivity.

Senator WATKINS. Do you take in all of its leaders in that broad generalization?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. The great body of scholars and close observers of far-eastern affairs, Mr. Chairman. I don't exclude the possibility, in other words, that an individual here and there may take a critical view, and I think almost all persons with knowledge of the institute's activities would find a good many points here and there which they would feel was subject to criticism.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you do not mean by that that these people would approve men like Field and some others who have refused to answer the question—the \$64 question as we put it—whether or not they have ever been Communists or are now Communists. When they refuse to answer that you don't mean that these people would approve those individuals. Some of them have been active in the institute.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I can't really generalize about the opinions of a great many people here on any specific issue of that sort.

Senator WATKINS. I think you are taking in a lot of territory when you say all of these people will testify unless you have contacted them to find out whether they will or won't.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I think my phraseology was that the great body of scholars and close observers. This does not mean 100 percent but means an overwhelming majority, and that is my impression based on considerable acquaintance with, particularly of course, the American scholars and other people especially interested in the Far East.

Senator WATKINS. You go so far as to say that they will testify, and I assume that that is an opinion, although you don't say so.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, on that point just to support the point, I call attention to a great many letters, copies of which I have seen, letters written in recent months reaffirming the confidence of these people who know the institute in its integrity and its great contribution to knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know whether any of them have ever read the record that is being made in this matter before the committee?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I can't generalize, again, about that except to say that I have seen, that Mr. Holland has shown me just now, a number of copies of letters received within the last 2, 3, or 4 weeks—

Senator WATKINS. That is hardly an answer to my question. Do you know whether or not any of these close observers and scholars have ever seen the record of the hearings or have read the testimony that has been presented here in this matter.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I can't say of course how many such people have read the record of the hearings.

Senator WATKINS. Have you read it?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have read considerable parts, not all.

Senator WATKINS. Newspaper accounts or the actual record?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have followed the newspaper accounts generally and have read a considerable part of the record insofar as it has appeared to date in print.

Senator WATKINS. You mean you have had the volumes of testimony?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes; especially those parts bearing directly on the institute.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I should like to make three points more explicitly concerning the record of the Institute of Pacific Relations. These are fundamental to the committee's investigation, as I understand its purpose.

The first is the wide and diversified character of the institute's associations, necessary to the conduct of its work.

The second is the support and participation it has enjoyed generally from scholars and men of affairs in all Pacific countries, except those behind the iron curtain.

The third concerns the actual character of its publications and its conferences which, far more than associations alone, provide the real criterion by which it should be judged.

On the first point—associations—the most casual inspection of the institute files will show (a) how diverse have been its contacts in the United States and other IPR countries; and (b) how overwhelmingly non-Communist those associations have been.

Only by the narrowest and most partisan selection of facts can it be made to appear that the participation of Communists or Communist sympathizers bulks significantly in the record. To conjure up this picture it is necessary to ignore the vast majority of people who have dominated the institute program and who cannot be labeled Communist in any way, shape, or form. It would be necessary, for example, to pass over most of American Council's 50 trustees and 1,000 to 2,000 members, not to mention their counterparts in the United Kingdom, the Pacific Dominions, China, or Japan. It would be necessary to ignore almost all of the 300 or more books published by the institute, as well as the contents of Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey over 25 years. It would be necessary to disregard hundreds of leading citizens of the United States and other countries who have made up the IPR conferences held periodically since 1925 to discuss the problems of the Pacific. These facts are a matter of public record, easily verifiable.

If association alone is the test, indeed, it would be easier to conjure up a picture of the institute as Wall Street, rather than Communist, controlled. Some of the most influential policy makers in the institute have been distinguished representatives of American business. Prominent American corporations have also been among its leading financial supporters. It is hard to believe that this group, along with some of our greatest foundations and large numbers of individual members, could have been duped to finance Communist subversion through the institute.

The charge of "Wall Street control" is exactly the one that the Communists make, of course. The institute is denounced in Russia

as the tool of American capitalism. Apparently the Soviet authorities never viewed the IPR with anything but deep suspicion. The best evidence of their attitude, I suggest, is their refusal to let Soviet scientists take any significant part in institute research or conferences. On the occasion of the latest conference, held at Lucknow, India, in 1950, the institute was bitterly assailed in the Soviet press as "one of the unofficial channels by which American imperialism exercises influence over the Asian countries."

Both pictures are false, I submit. In fact, the IPR has provided a forum and coordinating center for cooperative study of Pacific problems on the widest possible platform. For this it has required and invited the participation of all sorts of people. Its corresponding obligation, of course, was to see that it did not allow itself to fall under the domination of any particular group with any particular ax to grind. I believe it has succeeded in doing this about as well as humanly could be expected. Certainly its associations, so far as they are the test, have been—to repeat—overwhelmingly non-Communist in character.

My second point about the institute is its reputation for integrity among people professionally concerned with the study of the Far East. Few Americans acquainted with its work take seriously the charge that it has been Communist-controlled, or that it has sought improperly to influence American policy.

This can be readily ascertained by questioning any number of university presidents, professors, newspaper editors, foundation officials, business people or other men of affairs who actually know the institute. Many of them have publicly defended it since these hearings began, though their views receive far less publicity than those of irresponsible critics. They are the people most familiar with its books and periodicals, its round-table conference, and its various services to the world of scientific research. They should know whether the institute has perverted its ideals, and specifically whether it has lent itself to Communist purposes.

From such informed persons, both here and abroad, you can get criticism on many details and phases of the IPR program. For 25 years nevertheless they have given it their confidence and loyal support. When we speak of the institute we speak mainly of these people, for they are the writers and members and contributors who have carried on its work. To indict the IPR is virtually to indict a whole generation of study of the international problems of the Pacific in the United States and other institute countries.

Finally, and most important, the real test of the Institute of Pacific Relations is its actual record of achievement—its output.

Here the record is easy to judge in one respect, and difficult in another. It is easy in that the institute's chief activity from its inception has been the collection and publication of information and ideas about the Pacific area. Its hundreds of books and thousands of periodical issues are on the shelves of libraries all over the world. There is nothing mysterious about them; they speak for themselves.

For example, the IPR inquiry series on the Sino-Japanese conflict exists in the form of 30-odd volumes published between 1938 and 1945. It is unnecessary to search through office correspondence for clues as to its character. These books are readily accessible to anyone who cares to examine them. For the most part they are factual studies

of the course of wartime developments in China and Japan, and the policies of the Western Powers toward the conflict.

The difficulty in appraising IPR publications is that, while they are a matter of open record, they are also very voluminous. It is difficult for anyone to give a summary judgment who has not worked with them for a long time. And the hostile critic can easily select individual items, still more particular sentences or passages, to "prove" almost any kind of bias. Without going into details, I should like briefly to offer two observations. They are based on acquaintance with a large part, though not all, of the IPR literature.

First, the great bulk of institute research and publication has consisted of nonpolitical studies of Pacific countries—resources, trade and investment, agriculture, industrialization, living standards, press and public opinion, treaty relations, and so forth. Totalling tens of thousands of pages, they cover an enormous area of subject matter. They include basic researches which all scholars use, for example, J. Lossing Buck's monumental work on Chinese agriculture, G. C. Allen's and T. Uyeda's studies of Japanese industry, or the volumes of J. S. Furnivall, the English authority on southeast Asia. To evaluate the influence of the institute it is necessary first and foremost to appraise this extensive research program.

Second, a much smaller share of institute publications, and particularly its periodicals, deal with political problems of a more controversial nature. It is to the institute's credit, I believe, that it never shied away from controversial issues. This would have been the safe and easy thing to do. But equally the institute would not have served the purpose for which it was formed. For example, in 1938 the Japanese objected vehemently to IPR studies of the war in China. When the institute went ahead anyway, they withdrew on this issue. I have already referred to the general distrust of the IPR by the Russians, and their refusal to take any effective part in its work. At various times the institute also aroused the ire of groups in Britain, in Holland, in China and the United States, because of the way certain problems were handled in the IPR forum of publications and conference discussions.

This is what you must expect of course, if you are going to face the real issues of the day. The alternative is to retreat to some ivory tower—if any remains. Actually the IPR constituency always insisted on frank discussion of conflicts in the Pacific, without the exclusion of any view entitled to consideration, and without the organization itself becoming identified with any single view. How well the institute succeeded can only be judged in terms of the record as a whole, and by people who take the trouble to find out the real content of its publications and related activities.

I am myself convinced that no consistent IPR line has ever existed, except for an underlying faith in the ideals of democracy, nonaggression, and human betterment.

It is true that institute publications and discussions have inevitably reflected the general range of information, interest and opinion current among scholars and writers in the Far Eastern field. This is necessarily so, since few IPR books or articles are staff-written. A program of this scope could only be carried on through the voluntary cooperation of hundreds of experts and laymen in the United States

and other IPR countries. If it has been inadequate—say, in the foretelling the course of events in China—it has reflected in the main the limitation of insight and prophecy under which all such people have worked. The remedy for these shortcomings is a greater and better-equipped effort, for there is no other way a democracy can proceed.

These are very general remarks, I realize. To people familiar with the Institute of Pacific Relations they will even seem commonplace: the diverse character of its associations, its reputation for integrity, its substantial record of research. They can readily be verified by anyone who will inquire into the facts.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, do you believe that a person can be a Communist for a long period of years and yet not give expressed to thoughts and ideas that are Communist thoughts and views?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am by no means an expert on communism, but I should think it would be difficult for a person to be a Communist in the full sense of the word—that is, subscribing to the basic philosophy of Marxism-Leninism—and submitting to the discipline or the organization without giving expression sooner or later certainly to the line, the views that that implies.

Mr. MORRIS. And purposes, too.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You heard the testimony of Mr. Greene in connection with his attending this nominating committee meeting of 1941. There we had the arrangement by which Miss Moore was the chairman, Mr. Field was a member of the nominating committee and Mr. Green was the third member. As you know, Miss Moore and Mr. Field have been identified by witnesses before this committee as Communists, so we brought them in and asked them whether or not they had been, and they refused to answer on the grounds it would incriminate them. Do you think that we can draw any probative conclusions from the fact that Moore, Field, and Greene served together on a nominating committee to select officers for the Institute of Pacific Relations? Do you think that it is fair to assume that there was some Communist influence ipso facto from that fact?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I think the best evidence as to whether there was or not is represented in the list of nominations which it was the responsibility of that committee to present. If I may, I would like to identify the persons whose names Mr. Greene read off. As he pointed out, I believe, Ray Lyman Wilbur was, I think, then still president of Stanford University and, of course, at one time a Cabinet member under President Hoover.

Miss Comstock was president of Radcliffe College; William R. Herod was at the time either vice president or president of the International General Electric Co.; Philip C. Jessup, professor at Columbia University; Benjamin Kizer, an attorney of Spokane, Wash.; Philo W. Parker, president of Standard Vacuum Oil Co.; Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California. Those five people were named as vice chairmen; Edward C. Carter as acting secretary, and Mrs. Katrine Greene as assistant secretary. Both of them, of course, were staff members. Francis S. Harmon was an executive of—I am not sure I have the exact title—the Motion Picture Producers

Association. And Mrs. Rose Landres, assistant treasurer, a staff member.

Mr. MORRIS. You were secretary of IPR for a while; were you not, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes. I was secretary from about, I think, November 1941 to early summer of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. As secretary, you would have dealings with this secretariat—would you not?—that we have been discussing this morning.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes; I would have dealings of various kinds with them in connection, of course, with the fairly close working relationships which existed in certain phases of the IPR program between the American council and the international secretariat.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear complaints at any time that any of these people listed on the secretariat at that time were Communists?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Did I hear complaints at this time?

Mr. MORRIS. 1941. You have a list of these; have you not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I do not recall any complaints or allegations at the time that any of these people were Communists. I am relying here, of course, on memory.

Mr. MORRIS. For instance, do you recall Roger S. Greene complaining about the Communist nature of the secretariat?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have no recollection of that. May I add a further supplementary remark: that it would not surprise me if people had expressed criticism of views expressed by one person or another on this list. It is rather a long list, and it is difficult for me to recall exactly correspondence and comment going on at this time 10 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, the members of the secretariat are the people who actually did the work around the IPR office; were they not?—under supervision, of course.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. They were people who did the office work. Actually, an overwhelming majority of the books, the contents of the periodicals, were written by outside people all over the world. The conferences were made up largely of nonstaff people. These people were—I am testifying now, Mr. Chairman, about a staff with which I was not directly connected, but they were in various capacities—they include, for example, Professor Corbett, a distinguished expert from McGill and now at Princeton, who was there engaged in a specific study of the postwar plans. They ranged from Professor Corbett, on the one hand, to people whose functions and responsibilities were, I think, entirely clerical or administrative.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. These are letters, carbon copies of letters, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first one is a letter dated January 20, 1942, addressed to Mr. Roger S. Greene from William W. Lockwood, secretary. The second one is a letter addressed to Mr. W. W. Lockwood, dated January 23, 1942, signed "Roger S. Greene." And the third, which really should precede the others, is a letter dated January 16, 1942, addressed to William W. Lockwood, signed "Roger S. Greene".

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify that exchange of correspondence, Mr. Lockwood? [Documents handed to Mr. Lockwood.]

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify those as having been written by you and to you, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. They appear to be carbon copies of correspondence exchanged between Mr. Greene and me on the dates indicated.

Senator WATKINS. You don't doubt their accuracy; do you? You do not doubt the fact that they are copies of the actual correspondence?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received into the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The three letters referred to were received and marked, respectively, "Exhibits No. 568, No. 569, and No. 570" and are read in full below).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, will you read the letters, please. Read them aloud, please.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. The first is the letter dated January 16, 1942, signed by Mr. Roger S. Greene, 348 Lincoln Street, Worcester, Mass.:

EXHIBIT No. 568

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Before the next annual meeting that is, the 1943 meeting—will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the board of trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal character, his judgment during the past 2 years has been so strange that it seemed to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be nominated, surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic, and social subjects on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual freedom.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER S. GREENE.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Roger S. Greene, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I was acquainted with Mr. Greene at this time and over a period of several years, not closely but through occasional contact, and I cannot identify him specifically as to his institutional connections. I believe that at one time he was connected with the Peking Union Medical College in Peking, China, and was undoubtedly a member of the American council at this time, as indicated.

Senator WATKINS. You think he was an official in the American council?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure whether I can verify that from——

Mr. MORRIS. Perhaps Mr. Holland can help us on that.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Greene, from my recollection, was a member. I have no recollection that he was ever a trustee or officer. He is a brother of Mr. Jerome Greene, and it is true he had been an official of the Peking Union Medical College in China. He returned from China, I think, somewhere around 1941; and, as I recall it, was fairly active in this country in organizing the committee to boycott trade in war materials with Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a member of the American delegation to the seventh conference.

Wouldn't it appear on the basis of this letter, Mr. Lockwood, that Mr. Greene was registering a complaint about the political orientation and political complexion of the secretariat and staff that we have been talking about?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No'. If I understand the letter, Mr. Morris, that is not the nature of his complaint.

Mr. MORRIS. He says there [reading]:

When Chinese, of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to more cautious.

There is a flat assertion on Mr. Greene's part at that time.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes, but the purpose of Mr. Greene's letter, as I read it, is to comment on the manner of electing trustees to the board of American council. In that connection he makes this comment on Mr. Field. From memory, I am unable to establish the link here between these two paragraphs and exactly what his meaning is. Perhaps my reply will indicate something. May I refresh my memory?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. This is a letter to Mr. Roger S. Greene, dated January 20, 1942, and signed by me in my capacity as secretary of the American council:

EXHIBIT No. 569

DEAR MR. GREENE: Thank you very much for your note on the procedure followed in submitting nominations to the American council's board of trustees. I agree with you that the present method is not very satisfactory. Some people feel as you do: that it looks too much like a perfunctory "railroading" job. Others—for example, one of our most interested members, whom I saw yesterday—would prefer that we make the board self-perpetuating in some fashion and not bother them with a ballot at all. Some time this year I hope to be able to give the matter careful consideration and work out a more suitable plan. Frankly, since taking office late in 1941, I have been so preoccupied with immediate questions of wartime program that I have not been able to give this matter the attention it deserves.

I also am completely unable to understand and justify Fred Field's political reasoning during the past 2 years. At the same time, his long experience with the IPR and his high technical competence in the field make him, in my opinion, an exceedingly valuable trustee. As for the present staff, it is hard for me to see how anyone could believe that it merits the criticism you cite. Actually, the staff represents a wide range of political opinion, and in this respect it is quite representative of American public opinion at large. This is as it should be; don't you think?

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

Mr. Chairman, I would conclude from my own letter that the question at issue here is the nomination of Mr. Field to membership on the board of trustees; and Mr. Greene's feeling, for the reasons he indicates, is that Mr. Field is an inappropriate nominee.

Do you wish to comment briefly on this question of nominations and elections to the board?

Mr. MORRIS. I was going to get to that, Mr. Lockwood. Perhaps you had better read the third letter, too, and then we can discuss the whole thing.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Right. A letter to Mr. Lockwood dated January 23, 1942, and signed by Roger S. Greene.

Mr. MARKS. I note that the date is marked in pencil on this copy, January 23, 1942. It is not typed in. I don't think that is very significant.

EXHIBIT No. 570

Mr. LOCKWOOD (reading):

MY DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Thanks for your letter of January 20. Perhaps I took too seriously some of the criticisms that I have heard of the alleged leftist tendencies of many of the IPR staff. I may say that, except in Field's case, they never gave me any direct concern, though at times I thought I detected a kind of sentimental attitude toward Soviet Russia that seemed to me somewhat amateurish. I quite agree that a variety of opinion should be represented. My contention was not that Field should necessarily be excluded but that one should not be compelled to vote for him.

With regard to election of trustees, I should myself have no objection to a self-perpetuating system. That might actually produce more thorough consideration of candidates than the present plan.

The War Department public-relations office has asked me to join a panel of speakers to go to Army camps. I have, of course, consented, though the new kind of audience to be faced causes me some anxiety. As I understand that you suggested my name, I may later be asking you for suggestions. In the meantime I expect to have additional information from Washington that will answer some of the questions that have arisen in my mind on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

ROGER S. GREENE.

May I say in elaboration that the question of Mr. Field raised by Mr. Greene here is not a question of membership on the staff of the American council or of the international secretariat, but the nomination of Mr. Field to the board of trustees. May I say, if my memory is correct, Mr. Field did serve as trustee for several years after the war. The dates I don't recall, but evidently it included 1942.

(Senator Eastland took the chair.)

Mr. MORRIS. There are two issues I would like to ask you about, Mr. Lockwood. One is the complaint on the part of Mr. Greene that members of the staff were, as he said, too much under Russian Soviet influence. Then he distinguished here. He says [reading]:

I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic, and social subjects on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with the party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual freedom.

I say isn't that at least evidence that at that time Mr. Roger Greene, the brother of Jerome Greene, who testified here today, was complaining to you about the nature of the staff that we have been discussing? I presume it is the same staff a copy of which you have in front of you.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Morris, I believe that Mr. Greene's statement is that certain Chinese were saying that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence; and, while you may think he implies some degree of agreement with that, that is not his own statement as given in the letter.

In the second place, I would interpret the latter part of his paragraph, which you just read, to refer to Mr. Field, though it is a little ambiguous, I grant, as it is stated.

Mr. MORRIS. It talks about the staff there. It talks in the plural. He says "too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence."

Mr. LOCKWOOD. This is his quotation of the opinion of certain Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. He doesn't say that; does he?

Mr. LOCKWOOD (reading):

When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Then he goes on to make his independent statement.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes. With the exception of that sentence in the middle of the paragraph, all of the other sentences in the paragraph refer to Mr. Field and the question of his nomination to the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the part that I read doesn't refer to Mr. Field. Anyhow, Mr. Lockwood, you yourself have complained in the past, have you not, to individual members of the institute that there were too many pro-Communists on the staff?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Morris, I don't recall any such complaint.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you think that?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. That there were too many?

Mr. MORRIS. That there were many pro-Communists on the staff.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. You are speaking now of the American council staff?

Mr. MORRIS. It doesn't make any difference, either the secretariat staff or the American council staff.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Morris, I knew the American council staff fairly well, and, and I do not believe now and I do not recall ever believing that there were, as you say, too many pro-Russian Communists on the staff.

Senator EASTLAND. Russian Communist. Any kind of Communist. American Communists.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it your opinion that there were any Communists on the staff?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Of the American council?

Senator EASTLAND. Or the secretariat.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am aware of course of the allegations that have been made before this committee. So far as my own personal knowledge is concerned, I do not know of any Communists on the staff of it.

Senator EASTLAND. He said pro-Communists.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Pro-Communists?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARKS. May I ask—

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir. I want an answer to that question. Is he the attorney?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. I want an answer to the question.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I was just trying to interpret the word "pro-Communist" in naming my answer. Let me put it this way. If by "pro-Communist" you mean someone who subscribes to the basic philosophy of communism and systematically followed the gyrations of the

Communist Party line in international affairs, then I am not aware that there were any Communists by that definition of the term on the staff of the American council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever tell, for instance, Mr. Dennett that you thought there were any pro-Communists on the staff? Raymond Dennett was your successor, was he not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. After an interlude he followed me. I do not recall telling Mr. Dennett that there were pro-Communists on the staff.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Mr. Frederick V. Field a member of the staff?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Field was a member of the staff from, I think, 1934 to 1940; perhaps earlier than that. At any rate, his staff connection was terminated in 1940. Of course, I am well aware of the activities and expressions of opinion of Mr. Field in recent years which would certainly create a strong presumption that in this period at any rate if not an active party member, he is at least thoroughly pro-Communist in his outlook. So far as the period when I knew him on the staff of the American council is concerned, I did not know then and do not know now of any Communist associations, and in his IPR activities and the handling of his IPR responsibility I saw no evidence whatsoever that he was attempting to intrude partisan views or displaying a lack of objectivity and so on. As has already been pointed out, I think his chief writings for the institute consisted of two books; the first was a study of American participation in the Chinese consortium which was to my recollection a thoroughly objective study. The second was an economic handbook of the area, a very dry and full but useful collection of economic statistics, with a foreword by Mr. Newton D. Baker. In his writings therefore, as well as in his conduct of American council affairs I did not find the evidence which one would presume to be there if he had been at the time a genuine Communist. I don't attempt to say whether he was or was not. If he was, then I am puzzled to explain the lack of evidence of this in his activity.

Mr. MORRIS. How about some of the other members of the secretariat? Do you know of the work of Chen Han-seng?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am generally familiar with one or two books which he has written on economic studies of Chinese agriculture, yes, and I have had some activity with him informally over a period of time in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say now, in view of all the evidence before this committee and as you have experienced yourself, that Chen Han-seng was at that time a pro-Communist?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would not exclude that possibility certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Ch'ao-ting Chi?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would not exclude the possibility there, though in Mr. Chi's case his record is difficult to interpret. After the time when he left the IPR or subsequently he became, as you recall, a high-ranking and evidently trusted official of H. H. Kung, the Minister of Finance in Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. All this time he was active in the Communist-controlled publication, China Today; was he not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. That I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. My recollection is that she was on the staff of the national secretariat in a secretarial capacity. I had casual personal acquaintance with her, and from that would not have had any basis for supposing that she was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that she and her husband are now in Communist China?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have heard that; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that change your opinion of her?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Is my opinion now different from what it was 10 years ago?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would say that so far—I am not at all familiar really with her activities in recent years, but so far as I have heard about them they would indicate to me certainly a very friendly attitude toward the Chinese Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact——

Mr. LOCKWOOD. One which I did not see displayed, however, at the time she was on the staff.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand; but you have now changed your opinion?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. If I may I would like to leave it as I stated it.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to answer the question “yes” or “no” and then explain it. Have you now changed your opinion? You said you know they are in Communist China. Have you changed your opinion?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes; I would have certainly much more, some reason now to take a different view than I did at the time.

Senator EASTLAND. You have changed your opinion of Mr. Frederick V. Field, too, have you not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Andrew Grajdanzev? Did you consider him to be pro-Communist at that time? Were there not frequent complaints at the office about Mr. Grajdanzev's writings?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am trying to recall whether I have enough information on it to answer the question. Mr. Grajdanzev wrote, I recall, a book on Formosa, which was mainly a compilation of factual material. I remember him as having strong views on the need for land reform, for example, in Japan and along the line of General MacArthur's subsequent program.

Mr. MORRIS. How about his pro-Communist expressions?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't recall, Mr. Morris, pro-Communist expressions which would lead me to make a general statement.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Michael Greenberg? In view of the testimony that has been brought out about Michael Greenberg, would you revise your opinion of him now?

Senator EASTLAND. Ask him if he knows about the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know about the testimony concerning Michael Greenberg?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I recall it has been alleged—by whom I don't remember—that he was or is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Prof. Karl August Wittfogel and Elizabeth Bentley have both testified that he was a Communist to their own personal knowledge.

Senator EASTLAND. Does that change your opinion of him?

Mr. MARKS. What is the question? The opinion of whether he is now——

Senator EASTLAND. The opinion which he, the witness, expressed.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. In other words, what was my opinion at the time?

Mr. MORRIS. You expressed the opinion, did you not, Mr. Lockwood, that none of these people at that time were pro-Communist in their activity or in their expressions.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I think my statement referred to the American council staff, and this is the international secretariat staff, which I knew much more casually and concerning many of whom I really lack the knowledge to express an opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe——

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I wish to be responsive to the question, but——

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe that at that time these people were pro-Communists in their writings and in their activities?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Recognizing the allegations that have been made here, I have not personally knowledge which would lead me to conclude that they were in a general sense. May I say there in elaboration that particularly when it comes to the Far East over this period, over the period from 1937 to 1945, it is especially difficult to apply the test in terms of whether views expressed did or did not parallel the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no difficulty coming to a conclusion in reading your statement, Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. May I continue?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. From 1937 on of course there was one issue in the Far East, namely the Japanese invasion of China. On this issue the Russian opinion, the opinion expressed in the Russian press and so on was very anti-Japanese. At the same time there were a great many Americans non-Communist in their general philosophy who also were anti-Japanese. Therefore, there was a parallelism of outlook which ranges all the way from extreme Communists on the one hand and Mr. Henry L. Stimson on the other, who headed the boycott movement against the Japanese.

Similarly, in China, in the internal conflict within China, the Communists were of course bitterly anti-Chiang Kai-shek through most of this period, but so were many others heavily critical. This makes it difficult, I think, to judge the presence or absence of communism in a person's outlook by the particular things they happened to say about Japanese aggression or Chinese policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; but knowing what you now know, will you concede that there was reason to believe that at that time some of these people were at least pro-Communist in their activities and in their writings?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I certainly would not exclude that possibility.

Senator EASTLAND. You would not exclude that possibility.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Y. Y. Hsu, on this list?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he is now an official of the Chinese Communist Government?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. So I have heard.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider now that any of his activities or writings were pro-Communist?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Many of the opinions that Mr. Lattimore expressed of course have coincided in one way or another with the Communist line. Many of the opinions he has expressed to my recollection have not. I find it difficult, therefore—I find it impossible, in fact, from my knowledge of his writings to believe that he has been consistently a fellow traveler or a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. We will recess until 2 o'clock. I want you back at 2, please, sir.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m. the committee was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N. J., ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the nominating committee, how did that operate, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. During the time that I was secretary of the council, as I recall, and in later years when I have been a member of the nominating committee, my recollection is about as follows: There would be sometimes preliminary discussion or correspondence considering various possibilities. The amount of actual personal meetings which the nominating committee would have would depend on the possibility of getting all the people together and what issues were to be considered. In advance of the date when the nominations were to be put forward the committee would come to some agreement on the slate to be proposed to the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the nominating committee would come out with one slate, would it not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the membership would vote on the administration slate?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. During the time that you were secretary was there any effort made to destroy the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am aware of only one incident, which has been brought to my attention within the last few months, indicated in a memorandum to Mr. Field and from me, a memorandum which I can't quote exactly but of which I think I can give the substance, if you wish.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do, yes.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. It makes reference to certain correspondence which had come in from our San Francisco office, from the secretary of our San Francisco division—

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. John Oakie, O-a-k-i-e, if my memory is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the letter you refer to? "Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast * * *?"

Mr. LOCKWOOD. May I see it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Would you look at that, please. Will you read that aloud? Do you recall writing that letter?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not. Will you read it aloud, please.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 571

FVF from WWL:

Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast, but with all the investigations which have been carried on or are likely to be undertaken in Washington, I am a little nervous about any documents coming to rest in our files which suggest any questionable dealings between the American council and private corporations, especially as regards the relations of those corporations with the Government. There are one or two passages in this file of correspondence which for a person who is out to get us might suggest something improper.

If you agree, I suggest destroying the compromising parts of Oakie's letters of February 14 (first paragraph) and January 23 (third paragraph, first sentence). In addition, Sherlock Holmes suggests that you throw this note in the wastebasket and direct Oakie to destroy the carbons of these two letters together with your letter of instruction to him.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the writing in longhand? Do you recognize that handwriting?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I think that is presumably from Field's writing. It is signed with the initial "F."

P. S.—We have a lot worse already filed—just remember where the bad stuff is for der Tag.

Signed "F."

Mr. MORRIS. Now do you recall having written that memorandum?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't recall having written it; but I presume it is a photostat of a memorandum which I did write.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Senator EASTLAND. It came from the files.

Mr. MARKS. There is one word in handwriting. The word "questionable" is in Mr. Lockwood's handwriting. Maybe that would help him identify it. Did you notice that word in handwriting?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that first, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 23, 1939, headed "FVF from WWL," with some penciled notes and the initial "KS," Lockwood's name at the upper right-hand corner, and the penciled note—"I have no idea what this means." Clayton Lane, June 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Whose initial is after the penciled note?

Mr. MANDEL. "F."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It is admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 571" and was read in full:)

Mr. MARKS. You don't know whether that is your handwriting?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Marks calls attention to the word written in pencil here and I cannot identify the writing.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this memorandum recall any episode to you, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, Mr. Morris, it does not. It does recall a problem of a general character which was always in my mind at the time, and if you wish I will explain that.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like to have your testimony on this particular episode.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have no recollection of this episode except for what is contained in this memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any questions on that?

Senator EASTLAND. No questions.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. May I make one comment?

Mr. MORRIS. Surely, Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I recall that at this time the American council was engaged in a number of research studies relating to American trade and investment and other particularly economic subjects, that is, trade, investment, et cetera, in the Far East, and of course at the same time we were receiving contributions for the support of the council's general program from a number of prominent American corporations, including certain corporations on the Pacific coast like the American President Lines, Crockett National Bank, and so on. For this reason we were always acutely conscious of the problem of preserving not only the substance of the integrity and independence in our research work with respect to the sources of financial donations, but also avoiding even the appearance of bias or control or influence of improper character. My inference, therefore, which I think is supported by the substance of this memorandum, is that certain passages in this correspondence seemed to suggest or might be taken by some outsider to suggest an improper relationship with certain American business concerns. This was evidently the reason why I was uneasy about its going in the files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those letters, please.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 4, 1942, addressed to American People's Fund, 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City, from William W. Lockwood, secretary.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. How many letters have you there, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Seven.

Mr. MORRIS. Were all those seven letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; they were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, may I show you these eight letters and ask you if you can recall having written those?

(Witness examining documents.)

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, do you recognize those letters as copies of the letters having been written by you?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Those appear, all of them, to be letters or memoranda written by me. Some of them deal with subjects which I recall, and others quite beyond my present memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received in the record.

Senator EASTLAND. That has already been ordered.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 572 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 572-A

SEPTEMBER 4, 1942.

AMERICAN PEOPLE'S FUND,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

DEAR SIRS: The purpose of this letter is to make application for a grant of \$2,500 from the American People's Fund toward the educational and research program of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

The reasons for this request, and the purposes to which the requested sum would be devoted, are sketched in the following paragraphs:

I. CURRENT PROGRAM OF THE IPR

War in the Pacific has created an unprecedented demand for authoritative information on the peoples and problems of the Far East. This has doubled and redoubled the demands on the Institute of Pacific Relations, the sole private agency wholly devoted to objective study of the Pacific area.

There have been urgent requests from many quarters for I. P. R. studies—published, in proof, or in manuscript. Institute research volumes will be found on scores of Government desks in Washington, London, Canberra, New Delhi, and Chungking. Far eastern experts trained by the IPR are in a dozen war agencies of the United States. American council members now in key positions in the Pacific world include J. C. Grew, former Ambassador to Tokyo; W. H. Standley, Ambassador to Moscow; Henry F. Grady, who recently headed the special economic mission to India, and Owen Lattimore, personal political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Large numbers of American council pamphlets have been purchased by the Army and Navy for use in training camps and on shipboard. Few educational tasks are more important today than that of meeting this need on the part of the armed forces.

Editors, radio commentators, business firms, teachers and students likewise call on the institute daily for library and information services. United China Relief has relied heavily on the IPR staff in planning aid to China. The American Council on Education has asked its help in a new effort to improve teaching on the Far East in secondary schools. Other agencies have requested assistance in radio and motion-picture projects.

So far the institute has managed to meet these and many similar demands which have flooded into its offices since Pearl Harbor. It is greatly in need of additional staff and financial resources, however, to cope with the wholly new situation created by the war.

Twenty-one IPR books and reports have been rushed to completion since the outbreak of hostilities. Together with earlier studies, particularly the IPR Inquiry Series on the far eastern conflict, they provide information vitally needed for the war effort, as well as for postwar settlement and reconstruction in the Pacific.

This basic IPR research is in turn the foundation for various educational services to the American public:

Popular pamphlets like *China—America's Ally*; *Meet the Anzacs*; *Asia's Captive Colonies: Our Far Eastern Record*.

A weekly radio program, *Spotlight on Asia*.

School texts and teaching materials. A new series of five cheap textbooks on the peoples of the Far East will be published in September.

A biweekly bulletin of reliable information on the Pacific area, the *Far Eastern Survey*—widely used by editors, college students, and adult-education groups.

Conferences by American citizens on wartime and peacetime cooperation among the United Nations—for example, recent week-end conferences in Princeton, Cleveland, and Seattle, and teacher meetings in Houston, Chicago, Des Moines, and San Francisco.

Advice to Government agencies on far eastern personnel and research materials.

The knowledge, contacts and educational experience necessary for this diversified program could not be improvised overnight. They are the product of many years of preparation.

Founded in 1925, the institute consists of a series of national councils in 10 countries of the Pacific. Together they cooperate in international research and conferences. One of these councils is the American council, a nonprofit membership corporation under the direction of an elected board of trustees now headed by President Robert G. Sproul, of the University of California. The council's 1942 budget of \$80,000 is provided in part by foundation grants, and in part must be secured through contributions from members and friends.

The IPR has been responsible for the bulk of the pioneering study of the past 15 years on economic, political, and social developments in the Far East. It has sought to mobilize the best scholarly resources of a dozen countries for this common purpose. Among the institute's most active leaders have been outstanding scholars and men of affairs like Newton Baker, Ray Lyman Wilbur, and Philip C. Jessup of the United States; John W. Dufoe of Canada; Hu Shih and W. W. Yen, of China; R. H. Tawney, of Great Britain; Walter Nash, of New Zealand; H. J. van Mook, of the Netherlands Indies, and V. Motylev of the U. S. S. R.

One of the products of its work has been the training of a whole new generation of young scholars equipped with the scientific and linguistic tools for far eastern study. This training program now urgently requires expansion in the United States. Present and future needs for trained experts far exceed the available supply; this is a serious bottleneck in Government agencies and in American education.

II. NEW NEEDS AND PLANS

The opportunities of the IPR today arise directly from the critical war situation in the Pacific. The next 5 years will be the most fateful in a century in the relations of America with the Orient. Together with her United Nations partners, America must reverse the tides of military defeat and in the victory over Japan and her Axis partners. In so doing she must also create a basis of mutual confidence between the western democracies and their allies in Asia—one which will survive the strain of victory and place the future relations of East and West on a new footing of equality and interdependence.

A vital role can be played in this by the IPR. Its international task, first of all, is to mobilize all its resources among the United Nations for cooperative study of the issues of a future peace settlement, and, most important, of their implications for war time policy and attitudes.

This international program is shared by all the IPR councils—especially the British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Chinese, Soviet, Dutch, and American. The first stage is being planned around an international study meeting on wartime and postwar cooperation in the Pacific, to be held next December in this country. This conference will be one in the regular series of IPR conferences: Virginia Beach, 1939; Yosemite, 1936; Banff, 1933; Shanghai, 1931, etc.

In preparation for this meeting, a series of studies are in progress, participated in by leading scholars and men of affairs, members of the IPR from the countries of the United Nations fighting in the Pacific. Out of this conference study will grow a continuing program of research and discussion. The special IPR research series on the far eastern war, now numbering 20 volumes, provides the indispensable foundation for this evolving inquiry.

The American council naturally is being called upon to play a leading role in this international process. It hopes to draw on the best intellectual resources available in this country, and to give the widest possible dissemination of results. In the critical period of the next 6 months it needs special funds to accomplish this purpose.

No less important than the above research and international conference program is the whole field of popular education on the Far East. The war has opened up an unprecedented opportunity, with the public now awakened at last to the importance of the Pacific half of the world, and eager for knowledge. The IPR has an immense store of information packed in its scores of research publications. This now needs to be disseminated in simplified forms to a wide audience.

Fortunately the American council has a tested program and staff in this field. Its staff is already overburdened, however, and seriously needs expansion. The past 8 months show that there is a new opportunity at almost every turn, if the personnel and funds can be secured to capitalize on the situation.

For example:

1. There is a great demand for popular pamphlets and teaching materials on the peoples of the Far East and the problems of war and postwar settlement

in this area. American schools and colleges are deplorably lacking in authentic materials on Asia; today for the first time teachers realize this and are seeking to remedy the situation. Experience shows that sales returns will now cover publication costs on new pamphlet materials, but not the staff and overhead expenses incidental to the program.

2. During the past year the IPR has experimented successfully with its own radio program on the Far East, and with documentary films. Both of these new channels of education should now be exploited on a large scale.

The newly completed IPR motion picture, *Know Your Enemy—Japan*, is expected to find a wide audience through defense councils, the Army and Navy, schools, adult-education groups, etc. It should be followed this year with a series of additional educational films on modern India, China, the colonial areas of southeast Asia, etc. Similarly, the success of the council's weekly CBS program, *Spotlight on Asia*, argues for a more ambitious radio effort presented in more dramatic terms and with still more effective techniques. Both projects call for a staff person with the special competence required and with a full-time assignment to develop a program.

3. The education of the American worker in international affairs is something scarcely touched yet by adult-education groups. A new opportunity now presents itself, particularly in war industries. To capitalize on it requires a special approach taking into account the interests, vocabulary and outlook of the worker. The council would like to recruit for its staff a young person directly from the field of labor organization and education, and to provide him with modest funds for travel, conference, and publication. With this might be linked certain work with editors and writers of cheap fiction magazines having a mass appeal; there are indications that they might welcome assistance in presenting more objective information and attitudes on the peoples and problems of the Far East. A successful demonstration of the possibilities here might revolutionize traditional programs in popular education on international affairs.

For some time the council has been working at least experimentally in all the above fields. It has a membership of 1,300 citizens scattered from Maine to Hawaii, a number of regional offices, long-established contacts with many educational groups, valuable library collections, and a nucleus of highly trained staff. It has two other assets especially important in this war period: a long-standing reputation for objective, nonpropagandist study, and membership in a working international community of scholars and educators from many countries.

To push ahead rapidly and vigorously along these new lines of wartime education, however, it is in great need of added staff and working funds. The opportunity unquestionably is there: the problem is only to find the resources to realize it. If this can be done, the IPR will be in a position to make a fundamental contribution toward a new understanding of the Far East at a decisive turning point in the history of our relations with the billion people of Asia.

The council will greatly appreciate a contribution to its 1942 budget in furtherance of the objectives outlined above. If any further information is desired, we shall be glad to supply it.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary*.

P. S.—For your records, I am forwarding a copy of the council's latest annual report, 1940–41. The 1941–42 report will be published shortly and will be mailed to you when it becomes available.

EXHIBIT No. 572-B

NOVEMBER 18, 1936.

Mr. ROY VEATCH,
1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR ROY: I am sorry to have delayed so long in answering your request for suggestions as to possible candidates for the new Philippine office. I have been away from the office several days and this has held up the matter.

Fred and Carter and I have all discussed the question and have picked out several possibilities. On a number of them our information is rather incomplete, and, consequently, it is difficult to arrange them in a very definite order of priority. Obviously the appointment is of great importance, however, and we are anxious to see a thoroughly first-rate man in the position.

From what we know of him, Kenneth Colegrove is a promising person. His little pamphlet on "Militarism in Japan" seems to be a first-rate job, and Fred got a very favorable impression of him personally in a recent interview. Our personal contact with him, however, has not gone beyond this brief meeting. Possibly he suffers the handicap of having worked largely in the field of government rather than economics, but I should imagine that you would be primarily concerned in getting a man of first-rate ability with a broad understanding of far eastern affairs rather than a technician in the field of trade, etc.

There come to mind the names of a number of people whom you must know better than we. There is Bill Stone, for example, who should be able to do a corking good job. What about Hayden, former vice governor, or Arthur Young, formerly of the State Department and recently with the Chinese Ministry of Finance? Both of them should have a thorough understanding of the Far East, combined with a good deal of administrative experience. Is either one available, and does either have the qualifications you are looking for?

One of the very best men you could have in that position is Phil Jessup, professor of international law at Columbia. Whether you would be able to secure him is a question, but he is a person of great promise. I have heard him mentioned as a successor to Butler at Columbia. Another possibility is Bisson. As you know, he is a first-rate research man with a liberal social philosophy. I am somewhat doubtful as to whether he has the right personal qualifications for the office, and perhaps his greatest contribution can be made right where he is. It may also be true that his known views would disqualify him, but we would put him well up on the list of possibilities.

In addition, there are several other people, largely from the academic field, who might be worth your consideration. These include Nicholas J. Spykman, professor of international relations at Yale, Joseph Barnes, formerly secretary of the American council and now with the Herald Tribune. Charles E. Martin, professor of international law at the University of Washington, and Rupert Emerson of Harvard. Spykman we do not know very well, and perhaps his Dutch origin would disqualify him. Joe Barnes would probably do well if he could be lured away from journalism. Martin is perhaps the most available of these three, but the least imaginative. He is greatly interested in the Far East, and was an active participant in the Yosemite conference, though his approach is primarily that of the international lawyer. Rupert Emerson occurs to us as a possibility, largely because of his studies of colonial government in British Malaya under the auspices of the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research.

It is apparent that there is a dearth of people with some special knowledge of the Philippines or of economic tendencies in the Far East. I am wondering whether you do not know someone of the Princeton group like Fetter or Whittlesey who might merit consideration. I wonder too whether Dr. Ernest Gruening might not be able to propose a likely candidate. Of course, I personally do not think you could do better than to kidnap Fred Field. He could do a superb job, but his departure from here would leave our organization completely flattened out. The papers report that Tugwell is out of a job. Now there is your man.

I hope these suggestions may be of some use to you. They do not exhaust the possibilities by any means, but the list may include one or two names that you have overlooked. We shall be greatly interested in the choice that is made.

If you are still expecting a visit from Fred and me, how would Tuesday, December 1, suit your convenience? We might come down that day if you can assemble your group.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, JR.

WWL:AA

EXHIBIT No. 572-C

NOVEMBER 15, 1937.

MR. MAXWELL M. HAMILTON,

Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. HAMILTON: At Mr. Frederick Field's suggestion, I am sending you herewith a manuscript of a pamphlet on American policy in the Far East which we are shortly to publish.

We should be very grateful if you or someone in the Far Eastern Division would consent to look over this manuscript and send along any criticisms or suggestions which you might care to make. It often happens that outsiders writing upon these subjects make errors of factual statement or interpretation which can readily be pointed out by those to whom these matters are of direct and official concern. Before issuing this pamphlet to the public we would welcome suggestions and comments from someone who speaks with authority in this field. I should add that this pamphlet is not intended to be a review of details of American policy nor an argument for any particular line of policy, but a simple presentation of the general background and of the major issues today.

I shall greatly appreciate any suggestions which you will care to make.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 30, 1937.

Confidential

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 15, 1937, with which you enclosed a manuscript entitled "America and the Far Eastern War, World in Arms," with the request that I or someone in the Far Eastern Division look over the manuscript and send along any criticisms or suggestions which we might care to make. In accordance with that request the manuscript has been studied in the Division and certain comments thereon as to statements of fact are set forth in a memorandum attached to this letter. You will realize, of course, that neither the Division of Far Eastern Affairs nor the Department of State should be cited as the source of these comments.

Sincerely yours,

[s] MAXWELL M. HAMILTON.

Enclosures:

Memorandum.

Secretary Hull's statement of July 16, 1937.

Manuscript.

(Penciled note:) Envelope double-sealed in wax.

EXHIBIT No. 572-D

JANUARY 4, 1938.

IPR REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON

BL from WWL:

If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representative has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as to the functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important to have rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully do before laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and energetic person would naturally create his own job to a large extent.

As for Washington "society," I never made much use of the black or white tie in Washington, and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless there are potential contributors there, but I see little reason to suppose that we should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more than the social set of any other city.

Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local educational program. Outside of the comparative small circle of government people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much public affairs as its daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unresponsive to lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc.

The really important contacts in Washington are as follows:

- (1) administrative officials and legislators.
- (2) newsmen.

(3) private educational agencies (League of Women Voters, National Council; FPA, WIL, etc.

(4) embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation.

(5) universities.

It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give to our national program, and second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of himself to them in a variety of ways.

Given our present program and set-up, it should be recognized, I think, that the value of a Washington office would be somewhat limited. It would become invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold: First, as long as our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little practical use for the political information for which Washington is the preeminent source, both its official and its newsmen. If we did get the hot dope from the State Department, what would we do with it?

Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East, Washington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the embassies—and this is a doubtful exception—I doubt if one can get in Washington a great deal of news from the Far East which is not available here. Its preeminence is as a source of information on what is going on in the United States, and the value of an IPR agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to concern ourselves with American shipping, investments, education, public opinion, etc.

Third, our value to the people in Washington and the welcome we would receive depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events, publications, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our contacts through our international set-up enable us to offer anything of distinctive value. At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far East so haphazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the continuous personal relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people there already have access to most of our sources of information and more besides. We can offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research program such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and support of persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however, an IPR man starting out in Washington today, would find himself in the position of going hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing something the people there are eager to get.

There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are as follows:

(1) The Washington bureaus--agriculture, commerce, tariff, maritime, etc., are stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the data and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say that roughly, a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern topics and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere else. One obvious function of an IPR agency, then--although not the most important one--would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for the execution of certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked up in Washington through this broadened contact might help to shape our whole program more realistically.

(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time drifting around among officials, Congressmen, and newsmen, developing personal contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an issue of Pacific relations and policy arose (Bill Stone has done this rather successfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy). The importance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their dispatches. Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since their offices are practically all in one building, and since Washington is a comparatively small place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.

As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no circumstances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, however, a relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up informally. It is not difficult to imagine that under the circumstances of the last six months this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said of relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior group who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the job ought to be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the end it would be helpful all around.

The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan to go into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington would be just as indispensable for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want to go very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels for effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If we should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways.

(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and there is no use looking to them for a lot of good research in our field (Brookings stands in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good deal of educational effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of specialised training for government work. Our man might be able to associate himself with these activities through doing some teaching, taking part in discussion groups, etc., but this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal in its value to the IPR.

(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer relationship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named above, with the embassies, and with such offices as the ILO, etc. This need not be rated very high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from New York, but it would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot.

(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around.

Thus the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work both to secure and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start, but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially important—in fact, it is essential—if we are to move further and further away from a strict research program appealing only to the academic world. It goes without saying that the individual chosen for the job would have to know his onions and be able to make his way as a person; otherwise he can do us a lot of damage.

Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR representative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in Washington.

EXHIBIT No. 572-E

JANUARY 28, 1941.

MISS RUTH CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR RUTH: In answer to your Father's note I do not think I had better accept this radio engagement. Some time in the near future I shall probably be taking a jump across the country. If I sign up for March 5th in New York, I'm likely to find that this is just when I want to be in, say, Sun Valley. I think, therefore, that I had better be counted out although I regret to turn down the suggestion because right now people ought to be as helpful on this sort of thing as possible.

As soon as I can dig up my copy of Corbett's manuscript I will send it along as requested by your Father. I have it at home with the intention of preparing a critical note but perhaps someone else can put it to better use.

Stevens of the R. F. told me Friday that an urgent request had come from some Government department for an emergency training course in the Japanese language. Someone in Washington wants 30 or 40 competent language people overnight. A special course may be organized this spring, possibly at Harvard. Stevens mentioned this in passing and I didn't have a chance to get details. My information may not be quite accurate but further dope could doubtless be had

from him. Your Father may be interested in knowing about this. It's ironical that the country neglects a matter of this kind over a long period of time despite the obvious need and then suddenly someone wakes up and wants a whole generation of trained linguists at 9 a. m. on Monday morning.

Alger Hiss of the State Department was surprised to learn from me last week that Fred had resigned from the American council. I mention this because I rather inferred from what he said that some people in Washington may have associated Fred's views as expressed in the October AMERASIA as the present "line" of the American council.

If and when the American council has another discussion conference on far-eastern policy I wish that Alger Hiss could be invited. Unless he felt too much muzzled I think that he could make a valuable contribution.

One of the men in the State Department showed me two letters—or was it three—from Bill Elliott of Harvard more or less apologizing for the pro-Japanese slant of Mrs. Schumpeter's book and emphatically dissociating himself and the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau from this point of view. This same State Department economist told me that he had concluded Mrs. Schumpeter's book was useless as source material because of its uncritical acceptance of Japanese sources.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

WWL:JB

EXHIBIT No. 572-F

Copies to ECC and WLH

DECEMBER 23, 1942.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
*Room 228, State Department Building,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR LAUCH: Enclosed herewith is a staff memorandum on the high points of the Mont Tremblant Conference. You may feel free to use the memorandum confidentially in any way you wish.

Brief summaries of this sort never succeed in conveying the color and vitality of the round-table process, but I hope you may nevertheless find this of some value.

The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this postwar discussion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contacts with Governor Lehman's office—both to insure that full use is made of whatever value there may be in the conference documentation and discussion, and also to see what further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Lehman's program. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with you.

In a few days I will send you under separate cover a new set of IPR schoolbooks on the countries of Asia. They are just out and are already getting an enthusiastic reception. One wishes that the State Department's Cultural Relations Division and the Office of Education could see their way to assisting substantially in developing work of this type. The Rockefeller Foundation has now decided not to go extensively into this field, thus leaving pretty flat for the moment the ambitious plans of the IPR and American Council on Education for capitalizing on the new interest in the Far East among school authorities.

One other matter—Wilma Fairbank has just written to say that she does not feel that she can accept our offer to her of the Washington IPR secretaryship. If you happen to think of anyone who might be a candidate, we would welcome nominations.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 572-G

Copies to: ECC
MSF
RL
HM
TGS

APRIL 9, 1943.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
*American Peoples Fund, Inc.,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City*

DEAR FRED: This is to express the thanks and appreciation of the American council for the action of the board of the American Peoples Fund, Inc., in voting a grant of \$2,500 to the American council for the year 1943.

I hope to see you shortly to discuss the questions raised in your letter of the seventh. At the moment Harriet Moore is out of the office with German measles, so perhaps we had better wait her return.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

AMERICAN PEOPLES FUND, INC.,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City, April 7, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: Your application for a grant from the American Peoples Fund was considered at a meeting of the board of directors on April 2. The board voted a grant of \$2,500 to be paid in one sum or installments at the discretion of the officers during the calendar year 1943, with the added reservation that before an initial payment is made projects of mutual interest to the IPR and the fund shall be worked out in greater detail with the directors of the fund.

The IPR memorandum on a labor program for the American council, received the day of our board meeting, seems to indicate in general the kind of education and research on Pacific affairs which the fund's directors would like to see launched in cooperation with labor groups. I look forward to an opportunity to discuss more fully the possibilities of this program.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 572-H

MAY 18, 1943.

To: ECC.
From: WWL.

Thank you for the invitation to the May 27 meeting on collective security. It now looks as though I would not be in Washington on that date, but off somewhere writing the final report on Lehman Study. If I am there, however, I would like very much to attend.

A day or two after the last meeting, Alger Hiss spoke to me and said he felt that the purpose of the series was not clear, either from the selection of people attending or the agenda.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Frederick Field was the head of the American People's Fund?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall having written to the American People's Fund asking them for a grant?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I recall that the American People's Fund did make a contribution to the American council and I presumably had correspondence with them in that connection.

I would like to point out if it is appropriate——

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. There are two points I would like to make. One is that the total contribution from this source was, as I remember, \$2,000, \$3,000, or \$3,500 perhaps in a year, in relation to a total budget of anywhere from \$70,000 to \$100,000. Second, that to my knowledge no conditions of any kind were attached to the contribution, nor was understood to be present by the council.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that the contributions from this source, American People's Fund, was \$3,500?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Two to three.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't remember the amount; two or three thousand or \$3,500. The record of course will show.

Senator EASTLAND. Has Mr. Holland been sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. No; he has not been sworn yet.

Senator EASTLAND. Hold up your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give the Internal Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you remember what that contribution was?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my recollection, Senator, it is \$3,500.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. For what year was that? Is that for one year, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I can't quite recall. I think we do have a record of it in one of the annual reports or financial statements.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you get that information, please, and put it in the record? Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of Mr. Lockwood. Have you anything else, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, sir; I think not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland.

**TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIR-
MAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOM-
PANIED BY STUART MARKS, COUNSEL**

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do you have a statement with you?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement here which I would like the permission of the committee to read.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you give me a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. This is your second statement, is it not, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator EASTLAND. I am going to order the statement printed in the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that you do not wish me to read it, then? I am just asking for information. I am not aware of the significance of your remark.

Mr. MORRIS. The problem, Mr. Holland, is that Senator Eastland is pressed for time.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. The point is, everything in this statement is true, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. It is going to be put into the record in its entirety. Will you make available copies of all of this to the press?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will be glad to do so.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, he has already done so.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. So would any additional advantage accrue to you if you read the statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been here before, have you not, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. You have made a statement.

Senator EASTLAND. If you want to read it, I will let you read it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate your courtesy, sir. I think in that case if I might I would like simply to mention rather briefly four or five of the main points so as not to take up your time.

Mr. MARKS. There is one small point on this. There are two appendixes.

Mr. MORRIS. We haven't come to that yet.

Mr. MARKS. They are referred to in the statement. It is just a question of what is going to be in the record. I didn't understand that the Senator said what would happen to these, Mr. Morris. He mentioned that he would order that statement into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. MARKS. But I wondered whether the Senator had ruled upon the appendixes.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, there is a question about the appendixes. I suggest, Mr. Holland, that you submit them to the Chair for consideration.

Mr. HOLLAND. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. You have noticed, Mr. Chairman, that the appendixes are not sworn statements.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Mr. MORRIS. At the same time many of the statements in appendix I go back as far as 1947, I believe. In fact, the last man who gave testimony is now dead.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have now removed those from this particular collection, Mr. Morris. These include testimonials covering the years 1950 or later.

Senator EASTLAND. I will take that under advisement.

Mr. MORRIS. There are two of those.

Senator EASTLAND. I say I will take them under advisement.

You may file them for consideration of the committee.

(Mr. Holland's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY AT HIS SECOND PUBLIC HEARING ON MARCH 19, 1952

I am presenting this statement partly in order to supplement the prepared statement which I submitted in my previous hearing on October 10, 1951, and partly to clarify a number of points which have emerged from subsequent hearings of the subcommittee. I respectfully ask permission to read it, as other witnesses have been given this privilege and I was not give the opportunity to read my previous statement of October 10.

I

I believe such a statement is now needed because the subcommittee's hearings have gone on so long and ramified so far beyond the organization and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations that it is increasingly difficult for the ordinary person to know precisely what the subcommittee is really trying to investigate or to establish. At times it has appeared as if the subcommittee were conducting a general inquiry into American Far Eastern policy. At other times the subcommittee seems to have been investigating the private opinions and writings of certain individuals. Again, at other times, the subject of inquiry seems to have been the opinions, policies, hopes, and programs of the Communist Party.

A considerable part of the hearings has been devoted to matters which have no clear and direct relationship to the aims and work of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Supposedly the institute is the object of investigation, and the printed record of the hearings carries the words "Institute of Pacific Relations" in prominent type on the top of the front page. Yet large sections of some volumes concern questions which have nothing whatever to do with the institute, or contain views of persons who have exerted no influence whatever in the policies or program of the institute.

The subcommittee has the power to frame its own rules of procedure and to enlarge the scope of its inquiry as it pleases. But I feel it would be only fair that the subcommittee should make a more consistent effort than it has done hitherto to point out to the press and the public when it is really investigating the institute and when it is concerning itself with other problems, persons, or organizations which have little or nothing to do with the institute.

On the assumption that the subcommittee wishes to observe the "high standard of evidence and truly objective approach" to which Senator McCarran referred at the opening session last July, I venture to point out a few ways in which the subcommittee has thus far failed to take certain obvious steps which would seem essential to any impartial inquiry into an organization.

In the first place, the subcommittee has thus far given no public indication of having made any careful analysis and appraisal of the hundreds of books, pamphlets, conference papers, and articles which have been issued under IPR auspices during the past quarter century and by which it is mainly known to the scholarly world and to the general public. The IPR officers and most reasonable people maintain that its publications are by far the most important evidence of the institute's value as a nonpartisan research organization and are the true measure of its influence in advancing knowledge about far eastern and Pacific countries.

On March 1 and again on August 13, 1951, after the subcommittee's counsel had assured me of his desire to study any materials which the institute's officers wished to submit, I sent several hundred representative publications of the institute covering a wide range of countries, topics, and periods of time. However, many weeks later at the time of my own hearing on October 10, I observed the packages in which these publications had been sent lying still unopened outside his office. There is still no evidence in the subcommittee's record to indicate that the institute's publications have been analyzed.

I recognize that the Senators with their many other duties may not feel that they have the time to read and appraise a substantial portion of the institute's published output. It may also be that the subcommittee's staff lacked the time or expert knowledge to analyze some of the numerous specialized or technical publications of the IPR. Nevertheless, it would seem only reasonable to expect that after these many months during which they have found time to make the most minute examination of old and often inconsequential IPR correspondence files, they would have been able to insert into the public record a general description and analysis of the content of at least a representative sample of the institute's publications.

If the subcommittee is unable to take this necessary step, then I suggest that the time has come for it to seek the independent opinion of outside Far Eastern scholars who are familiar with the IPR's research activities and publications and can readily supply a professional appraisal of them. There are many eminently qualified persons who are available and have played no significant part in the formulation or execution of IPR programs. I have in mind such people as current or past presidents of the Far Eastern Association (which is the principal learned society of far eastern specialists).

The IPR, like other voluntary private research organizations in the field of international affairs, can exist and continue to maintain its reputation and

financial support only to the extent that it preserves proper standards of scholarship, accuracy, balance, and comprehensive coverage. Its success or failure in doing this must be measured by the professional judgment of qualified scholars and experts in the field. This statement remains true even though there are bound to be cases where the experts will differ among themselves on particular issues or publications.

From my own long and intimate acquaintance with the institute's conferences, research projects and publications, I am confident that any dispassionate examination of the approximately 1,190 titles (containing about 114,460 pages) and the 18,480 pages of periodical articles which the IPR has issued or sponsored will show that only a tiny fraction deal with communism. Of this fraction, only a very small portion could be described even by the most hostile critic as Communist propaganda. There were, of course, a few documents which were clearly labeled as Communist and which were presented for informational purposes. As I pointed out in my statement of October 10, 1951, no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

I stress the importance of such an independent appraisal of IPR publications because we are here concerned with the great principle of freedom of expression and freedom of scholarly publication generally. In the course of the subcommittee hearings, a very small number of articles, pamphlets, or books (or frequently isolated or unrepresentative passages from them) have been cited as examples of IPR publications which someone has alleged to contain Communist propaganda. Yet, because of the subcommittee's failure to describe the character of the overwhelming majority of the IPR publications, the general public, reading about the investigation in the newspapers, is likely to get the idea that much of the material published or sponsored by the IPR is somehow tainted with communism. The fact is, however, that no one has made any such allegation either before the subcommittee or elsewhere.

That is why I think the subcommittee should make it clear to the public that not even the most biased witness called has alleged that anything more than an infinitesimal proportion of the institute's total output could be called communistic.

Having said that, let me now make it plain that I do not think the value and integrity of the institute should be judged by the very negative test of how little pro-Communist material it has published. It should be judged far more by the test of its positive contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge and public understanding of Far Eastern and Pacific area problems. I would note that such contributions to knowledge in the present state of affairs in the Far East certainly ought to include descriptive and unemotional accounts of Communist policies and practices in such areas as China and southeast Asia. There would indeed be something seriously wrong with the IPR if, for fear of attack by partisan critics, whether Communist or anti-Communist, it became so timid as to refrain from publishing articles or books which described what important Communist governments or groups are saying or doing in the Far East.

II

Let me turn now to the allegation that the Communists secretly got control of the IPR in past years and exerted, through it, a sinister influence on the policies of the Government. Much of the evidence so far produced on this point before the subcommittee is flimsy and not even plausible. Some of the assertions made by witnesses are, I believe, demonstrably untrue, while others are vague or irrelevant. A good many documents from the IPR's own files have been introduced, often out of context, and with the most farfetched interpretation put on them.

I believe that the American press and public are intelligent and fair-minded enough to make their own interpretation. Visits to Moscow, conversations with Russian Communists, and the like, can be interpreted only by a violent distortion of meaning as evidence of some secret Communist conspiracy. It is incredible that if IPR people were really engaged in a secret conspiracy they would have left such voluminous, frank, and detailed written records and have allowed the FBI to examine them. The same facts can, however, be interpreted much more reasonably as part of the normal operations of a nonpartisan international organization engaged in work in or concerning many countries, including Russia.

Now just suppose that the second interpretation is correct, that the IPR is what its officers and members claim it is, a private research organization trying to advance public knowledge of Asia. That would account for the fact that various IPR people who have been questioned by the subcommittee about things that happened or were written 10 or 15 years ago have often had to reply that they don't remember, or that their memory was inaccurate. Only if you start out with the idea that these people were conspirators would such answers seem evasive. If you start with the idea that these people were perfectly innocent, then their conduct appears quite normal. It would be extraordinary to find someone who could give, offhand, a full, precise account of a letter that he wrote a decade ago or a casual conversation that he had with a colleague, which was part of his normal routine of work and didn't seem unusual or important at the time.

What, then, can be said of allegations that Communists "infiltrated" the IPR? First of all it should be noted that the word "infiltrate" in this context is a very nebulous term, with many different meanings for different people. To some people, however, the testimony before the subcommittee may suggest that a good many years ago some Communists hoped or tried to use the IPR to spread disguised Communist propaganda. It does not show that they succeeded in this aim. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that if such an attempt was made, it failed ignominiously.

The clearest proof of this lies in the IPR's publications, which are its principal activity, and which have not followed a particular line but have represented many different and often conflicting schools of thought.

Why did the Communists fail to make any appreciable headway in the IPR? Very few people in the 1930s and early 1940s in the IPR or elsewhere believed there was any serious danger of Communist infiltration. Investigation of the political beliefs or affiliations of its employees or members or writers to keep out anyone who might be a Communist sympathizer was alien to the traditions of American scholarly research.

The reason why the Communists could not get control of the institute was simply because the IPR has operated on the democratic principles of free inquiry and open discussion, and Communist propaganda cannot succeed in such an atmosphere.

Anybody who is an American citizen can join the American IPR, whatever his political beliefs or affiliations. Hence the membership of the American IPR is a pretty good cross section of American opinion, and if there are any Communist members they are swamped in the mass, as they are in America as a whole.

To do its research the IPR has always sought the services of the best-qualified scholars it can find. It does not inquire into their political affiliations, only into their scholarly competence, but actually very few of the persons who have written for the IPR have even been alleged to be Communists. If any Communist author ever got his work published by the IPR by passing himself off as a non-Communist, it was only because in that piece of writing he had confined himself to accurate, factual reporting or had watered down his Communist views to the point of invisibility.

There is a moral in all this which all Americans today might do well to remember. It is that in the long run we cannot fight communism merely by looking under the bed for Communists. We have to be working for something, not merely against something. In the IPR's case it has been working for the advancement of knowledge through free, rational, scientific study and democratic discussion. If any disguised Communist got into the organization, he could not do any harm in an atmosphere of open discussion. He was not able to infect a healthy organism.

Being strongly opposed to communism myself, I think it right to combat Communist propaganda and expose Communist activities. But I think we ought always to remember that if, in our zeal for combatting communism, we jettison our American ideas of fair play, free inquiry and free speech, then we are really laying ourselves wide open to communism itself.

III

May I now call attention also to an indirect result of the subcommittee's activities which not only affects the IPR itself but may have very serious results for innocent people? There are thousands of loyal and respectable people who have had some connection with the IPR in its 27 years of existence—as members, or employees, or delegates to conferences, or members of study

groups, or contributors to its publications, or publishers of its books—and against whom witnesses before the subcommittee have made no charges whatever. If, as the result of headlines inspired by the subcommittee's hearings, the IPR comes to be associated in the public mind with the idea of a Communist conspiracy, or espionage or subversive activities, any of these people may, in the present climate of American opinion, suffer serious injury, even though no one has ever suggested that they had anything to do with communism or espionage.

It therefore seems to me urgently necessary that the subcommittee should in fairness make it very clear in a public way, and repeatedly, that the many loyal citizens who have worked or been associated with the IPR are not suspect on that account.

Moreover, the allegations mostly refer to things that are said to have happened many years ago. So far as I know, no one has seriously made the claim that the IPR today is under Communist control. (Of course, I am certain that it was never under Communist control—and I have been with the organization since 1929.)

But even the most biased witnesses before the subcommittee would probably agree that there is no reason to impugn the reputation of the IPR as it exists today—an organization which is doing a much-needed job of advancing American knowledge of the Far East.

IV

I now come to another example of how the subcommittee has thus far neglected to take an obvious step to bring out the truth about the institute's claim to be a nonpartisan organization. I refer to the question of whether the IPR or its officers have attempted to influence the policy of the State Department in a pro-Communist direction. Surely one of the best ways to find out the truth on this question would be to seek information from the men who were responsible officers of the Department concerned with Far Eastern affairs during the period when the alleged attempts took place, and could thus speak with knowledge. I therefore urge the subcommittee to call on such present or former senior officials as Stanley K. Hornbeck, Joseph C. Grew, Maxwell Hamilton, Eugene Dooman, Abbot Low Moffatt, Joseph W. Ballantine, Walter Butterworth, and John Allison and ask them whether they, or other Department officials to their knowledge, ever received or sought advice in United States foreign policy from the IPR or its officers. Mr. Ballantine has already written the IPR that he knows of no such cases of IPR advice being offered or requested.

At least one of these officials, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, has already been questioned by the subcommittee in executive session, and part of his testimony has been made part of the public record. If Dr. Hornbeck was asked in executive session the question suggested above, neither the question nor the reply has been made public. Mr. Eugene Dooman also testified at an earlier public session but not on the institute, and there is no indication whether he was asked the above question. I think the public, the IPR officers, and the members of the subcommittee have a right to know how the above-mentioned officials would answer such a question. It is my firm belief that their replies would show that the State Department in fact never allowed its formulation or execution of United States foreign policy to be shaped by advice from the IPR.

The subcommittee's counsel has made a labored effort to imply that the presence of some present or former American IPR employees or trustees at the State Department's conference on Far Eastern problems in October 1949 is an indication of IPR "influence." This contention will not hold water. It was made perfectly clear that the persons present (from banks, universities, and research institutions) were not speaking for the organizations to which they were attached, but only for themselves. Indeed, it is noteworthy that neither of the institute's two executive officers (Mr. Clayton Lane and myself) was invited to the conference. Moreover, it was plain that among those persons attending, who happened to have some present or past connection with the IPR, there was no identity of views.

V

The subcommittee has made much of the fact that several people, alleged to be connected with the IPR, have refused to state under oath whether they are or were Communists. Most of these, as the subcommittee must have known, never

had any significant connection with the institute. Only four of them were ever IPR officers or employees. Only two (including Mr. Frederick V. Field) had ever held executive positions and neither, while holding these positions, ever gave any sign of departing from the institute's tradition of nonpartisan research or of allowing it to be used for Communist propaganda purposes.

Personally, I regret and deeply deplore the action of the persons who refused to answer. I know that their refusal creates a suspicion in the minds of some people that they really were Communists at one time. Nevertheless, suspicion is not proof of guilt, and one can envisage circumstances in which a person, especially if already accused by others of having been a Communist or "considered" as a Communist, would decline to answer even though knowing the accusation to be untrue. Moreover, the refusal of the four above-mentioned persons certainly does not prove that they were Communists when they were IPR employees. I can only reaffirm that their writing and other work for the IPR was good, and in their conduct as IPR employees there was no ground for criticism.

I stress this particularly in the case of Mr. L. K. Rosinger, since it was I who engaged him in 1948 to prepare a survey since published as "The State of Asia." Rosinger already had an excellent reputation as a writer and lecturer on the Far East and had been for several years the Far Eastern specialist of the Foreign Policy Association. In his work for the IPR, I found him completely candid and honorable and a scrupulously careful researcher who sought and gladly accepted criticism of his manuscripts and meticulously respected the institute's tradition of scholarly work. Many other Far Eastern scholars who know him and his writings could testify in the same way about him. I recognize that many will now feel doubtful about his past affiliations. Personally I feel certain that he was not a Communist when he worked for the IPR. Even though I have sometimes disagreed with him on specific points, I do not believe that his writings and lectures were those of a Communist.

In a memorandum dated October 8, 1951, to me, Mr. Rosinger made the following remarks which I still believe to be sincere and truthful:

"I have worked at the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of three years: from September 1939 through August 1940, and again from September 1948 to mid-October 1950. Neither in these years nor at any other time have I seen even the slightest evidence of the existence of any 'cell,' Communist or otherwise, within the IPR or in connection with it. In reading IPR publications over the years, I have not observed in them an adherence to any particular approach to Far Eastern questions, but rather a variety of viewpoints. As far as my own work is concerned, my sole guide in everything I have written has been my independent judgment of the facts, based on painstaking study, without adherence to any line, Communist or otherwise. In accordance with standard IPR procedure and my own desire, the books I have written for the IPR have been submitted before publication to specialists of widely different viewpoints in an effort to insure balance and accuracy. It has been my practice to take such outside comments into account in revising my manuscripts for publication."

VI

The subcommittee has made repeated references to T. A. Bisson's article, "China's Part in a Coalition War" in the Far Eastern Survey for July 14, 1943. This point deserves special attention because it concerns one of the serious and specific charges made against Mr. Bisson and the IPR, namely that this article was written and "planted" in the magazine on instructions from American Communist leaders as part of a plan to attack the Chinese Nationalist Government and play up the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers. It seems extraordinary therefore that the subcommittee has not yet taken the obvious step of asking the author for a statement on the matter.

As a matter of elementary fairness to Mr. Bisson and the IPR, I maintain that the subcommittee should take note of his memorandum of September 15, 1951, to me in which he states: "In my experience with the institute I saw not the slightest evidence that the organization was part of a 'Soviet espionage network' or that it contained a 'Communist cell' that was influencing its policies. I am not and have not been a Communist and I deny most emphatically that any of the numerous articles appearing under my name in institute publications was written at the behest or under the influence of the Communist Party." (In the appendix to this statement I present the full text of Mr. Bisson's memorandum with an accompanying letter of commendation from Gen. Courtney Whitney, his former chief in SCAP Headquarters, Tokyo.)

I request the subcommittee to make these documents part of the printed record and also to insert as exhibits in the record the whole text of Mr. Bisson's article, "China's Part in a Coalition War" together with Dr. C. L. Hsia's reply to it and Mr. Bisson's further comment in the August 11, 1943, issue of the Far Eastern Survey.

VII

For the same reasons of fairness I ask the subcommittee to insert as exhibits in the record the other documents in the appendix, consisting of letters or statements which the institute has received from several other persons who have been accused by witnesses before the committee and have not yet had an opportunity or have not been able to appear publicly before the subcommittee. (Joseph Barnes, Benjamin Kizer, Laurence E. Salisbury, and Marguerite A. Stewart), together with memoranda, prepared by me and my staff, correcting misleading impressions which have appeared in the subcommittee's hearings concerning the content of three IPR publications: Land of the Soviets, Wartime China, and Our Job in the Pacific.

VIII

In a recent letter to the institute's legal counsel, the chairman of the subcommittee has indicated that he may be prepared to consider the possibility of allowing me to present a number of testimonials and other statements from Far Eastern specialists and other persons well qualified to speak of the value of the institute's work. Accordingly, I submit herewith, as appendix II, a preliminary collection of such statements with the request that they be made part of the subcommittee's printed record. I also respectfully request the permission of the subcommittee to present, before the subcommittee completes its work, additional statements of this kind which the IPR may receive from qualified persons in this country and abroad.

IX

As an institute officer, with some natural pride in its purposes and achievements, I would be less than human if I did not feel some resentment at the way in which the subcommittee has sometimes operated. By the one-sided character of its earlier proceedings, I feel that it has permitted the good name of the IPR to be blackened in the eyes of the public and its work to be misrepresented by witnesses who are utterly ignorant of its aims and methods and clearly unqualified to express opinions on it. Nevertheless I have made, and am still eager to make, an earnest effort to aid the subcommittee in completing its inquiry in a more orderly and impartial manner. The institute officers did not and do not object to a fair and comprehensive investigation of its past or present work and will not be afraid to acknowledge current or former mistakes if these are clearly demonstrated on the basis of an impartial appraisal of all the evidence.

The institute officers will not hesitate to admit, if the evidence justifies it, that Communists or ex-Communists may have been employed on the IPR staff or have written for its publications. The possibility of this, and the possibility of Communist attempts to influence the character of the institute's publications, has always been recognized. This is a risk which the IPR has shared with dozens of other organizations.

But on the kind of evidence thus far produced by the subcommittee I cannot see that any fair-minded person would agree that the institute was either controlled by the Communists or successfully infiltrated and "taken over by Communist design and made a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning of American thinking and American policy with regard to the Far East." These were the words used by Senator McCarran in an interview given to U. S. News and World Report on November 16, 1951. Even more emphatically do I reject and deny the slanderous insinuations which have emerged from some of the subcommittee hearings that the institute has been an espionage organization.

Similarly I reject the repeated but unsubstantiated suggestions of some subcommittee members that the institute officers or staff were engaged in a conspiracy to advance Communist or Russian aims and I protest, as legally and morally unwarranted, the continued assumption of an unproved conspiracy (which I am certain did not exist) as the excuse for the admission of flimsy and untested hearsay testimony. I do not question the right of the subcommittee to listen to hearsay testimony, but I do challenge the use of spurious arguments which would give such hearsay a wholly unjustified legal validity.

Because I believe that there is still time for the subcommittee to conclude its work in an impartial manner and thus perform a valuable public service as well

as render justice to the IPR and to the many loyal citizens who are connected with it, I earnestly appeal to the subcommittee to accede now to the reasonable requests which the American IPR chairman, Mr. Gerard Swope, and the institute's legal counsel made last year and which have not yet been answered. Those requests included the following: that the institute officers be given access to its files which the subcommittee illegally seized over a year ago; and that the institute officers be granted adequate opportunity (with due notice and sufficient time for preparation) to reply to charges against it.

My main purpose in making this statement has been to appeal, in a spirit of reasonableness, to the basic American instinct of fair play. The uncovering of subversive forces is, of course, a serious business and one which must continue to engage the full energies of such highly competent professional agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice. The IPR officers have cooperated loyally and gladly with those agencies ever since the institute invited the FBI to examine its files in 1950, and are still cooperating actively. I suggest, in no flippant sense, that the excessive concentration of attention which the subcommittee is giving to the IPR is undeservedly flattering to this small and unexciting organization. I have sometimes rubbed my eyes in wonderment that this institute, with its tiny staff of only 4 senior members and 11 junior and clerical workers, can be the object of so much valuable senatorial time and expenditure of public funds.

I have tried, but vainly, to adjust my mind to the idea that all those dull IPR publications on my shelves, most of them so specialized and uninteresting that it is a constant struggle to find publishers for them, can somehow have been an instrument of Communist subversion or espionage. I have tried to imagine that the hundreds of informal letters and interoffice memoranda, some thoughtful, some dull, some silly, jocular, and inconsequential, which were casually stored in never-locked office files, can now by some psychological change of political climate be transformed into sinister evidence of infiltration and diabolical undermining of United States Far Eastern policy planners. I have asked myself: Can it be possible that this institute, which for decades had the warm and active cooperation of conservative Chinese scholars and businessmen and prominent men in the Chinese Nationalist Government, which received financial support from such groups right up to 1949 when the Communists took over the country, could have worked to bring about the Communist victory in China?

I have tried hard to imagine these things, but my imagination balks at such leaps into the world of fantasy. And so, in all earnestness, I urge the subcommittee members to ask themselves: May we not have been given a wrong steer? Might it not be wise instead to look into the real motives of those who induced the subcommittee to launch this investigation by illegally seizing the IPR files and who obviously wish to thwart free scholarly inquiry and discussion on the vitally important problems of the Far East?

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, are there any parts of this prepared statement that you would like to have emphasized?

MR. HOLLAND. Yes, I think I can do it quite briefly if you will permit me.

MR. MORRIS. By all means.

MR. HOLLAND. On page 2, I stress and earnestly bring to the attention of the subcommittee the fact that we believe that a much more detailed and serious attempt should be made by the subcommittee staff before it concludes its work to analyze the content and balance and general scholarly standing and validity of the very large quantity of publications which the institute has put out, and a large selection of which I sent many months ago to the subcommittee. For reasons that the two previous witnesses today have given, we feel that these publications constitute the major test and measurement of the value of the institute's work.

SENATOR EASTLAND. What about your present files? I think the staff will have to have access to them.

MR. HOLLAND. To our present files, sir?

SENATOR EASTLAND. Certainly.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, the situation as I understand it at the moment is that the staff of the committee has complete access to any and all files of the institute whether here or in New York, and Mr. Morris and Mr. Mandel have in fact been through our files there and made a number of selections.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. HOLLAND. That remains the case, I think. Those are open at all times.

Mr. MORRIS. The committee is exploring the possibility of making these available to you for a period of the next few weeks, Mr. Holland. I think you have asked for a period of 1 month.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is one of the other points in my statement here.

Mr. MORRIS. If you would be willing to have someone work here in the Senate building, most of the files would be accessible to you upstairs. If you have someone there, they would be working under the same conditions that our people work under, not the most agreeable conditions, but at any time you want to do that, the committee wants you to have full access to all those files.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to express the thanks for this. I take it that this is the formal answer to the request which our counsel have addressed to the committee which up to now has not been answered.

Mr. MORRIS. You can appreciate that it would be impossible for us to turn them back to you again because many of them are still being used. At the same time you require for your side of this maybe something in here that supplements some of the evidence that we have.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I might say in passing that I think this is a substantial evidence of what I could call fairness on the committee's part and I would like that to be noted.

The other point which I want to stress in my statement is the fact that, as we think, the most conclusive evidence of the failure of any possible attempts at Communist infiltration in the Institute of Pacific Relations in the past years is to be found in the character of its conferences and publications, that had there been a successful infiltration this must have shown itself in the bias of the publication.

Senator EASTLAND. Would all these Communists be swarming around you if they didn't penetrate your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Senator Eastland, I think you asked me that question last time I was here, and I felt obliged to answer as I do now, that I do not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists, as you put it.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists in your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I find evidence of a small number of people who are alleged to have been Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were they? How many Communists were in your organization there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I can tell you the name of only one whom I feel positive was a Communist at the time that he either worked for IPR or is—

Senator EASTLAND. That is Field, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; it is not.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think Frederick V. Field is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I indicated in my last testimony that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler but at the time he worked for the

institute I did not so feel and even now I am not convinced that he was a Communist at that time. In his recent activities as I indicated I regard him as a decided pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You think he is a pro-Communist but not a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no evidence, sir, that he was a party member, but his actions were such that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler.

Senator EASTLAND. How many pro-Communists did you have swarming around your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I cannot accept your word "swarming" or even the implication that there are a large number. If you want my candid opinion, I would emphasize based on testimony which has come out before this committee, I would say there are possibly three or four people whom I can think of whose subsequent actions suggest to me that they may have been Communists, but whom I cannot feel there is certainty. I am quite willing to name those. I would say that in his subsequent activities there is a likelihood that Mr. Chi was a Communist. I have not seen evidence which convinces me that he was a Communist when he worked for the IPR. On the contrary, the evidence is the other way, that he was—

Senator EASTLAND. Come, now. Who else was pro-Communist? Name the others.

Mr. HOLLAND. The only other ones it seems to me there is a reasonable possibility that they may have been—I can't say more than that—are Mr. Y. Y. Hsu—

Senator EASTLAND. Is that all?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said three or four, Mr. Chairman. The other one that I want to mention here is Mr. Israel Epstein, and I judge him simply by his actions in the last 2 or 3 years.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. Here is testimony that is undisputed that one of the big shots in the institute wrote a book, and that book was laid down by the Communist Party—not a front organization but by the Communist Party—as party doctrine in this country. The students of communism, Communist Party members—the testimony is undisputed—were instructed to read that book to get the official Communist policy for Asia. That does not arouse any suspicion—no question mark—in your mind that that man was a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I will have to ask you to whom you are referring.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. HOLLAND. If it is Mr. Lattimore's book, *Solution in Asia*, or *Situation in Asia*, then I have to point out to you, sir, that these were not IPR books and Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the institute at that time and had not been for many years.

Senator EASTLAND. He molded your policies. You know that.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; I deny that categorically, sir. These books had nothing to do with the institute. They were written many years after Mr. Lattimore ceased to be and he was not even in a position where he could influence the policy of the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. It is very strange, then, to me that these people were all wool and a yard wide when they worked for IPR, when their actions to any reasonable mind would tend to show that they were, to say the very least, fellow travelers and under discipline. Then later

when it gets out and they openly affiliate with Communists, you say they might have been years later, but they were all right when they were with us. How do you know that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I have indicated I do not know for sure.

Senator EASTLAND. Then why do you make the statement that they were not Communists when they were with your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because there is no conclusive evidence that they were, sir, and I believe that a committee like this should base its findings, as I should, on conclusive evidence. I do not think—

Senator EASTLAND. You think we should be reasonable men.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not rule out the possibility, sir, that these people may secretly have been Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course.

Mr. HOLLAND. The only ones that I feel there is a reasonable possibility on that, are these ones that I have just now mentioned. I felt I should do that in frankness.

Senator EASTLAND. Is there anything else that you want to point out there, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I want just to point out that in this statement I suggest one or two courses of action which it would seem to me, if taken by the committee, would insure a more fair-minded appraisal at the end of the committee's work of the true nature of the institute. One of those is that one of the best ways of testing the quality of the institute's public work is to seek the opinion of qualified professional people in the far-eastern field. I know I have no power to tell the committee how to conduct its work, but I do suggest—

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute. That is a question that the committee will go into.

Mr. HOLLAND. I recognize that, Mr. Chairman, but I do mention this is one of the points in my statement.

The next one is that a great deal has been made out of the fact that the institute has in undesirable or improper ways influenced the policy of this country, particularly the far-eastern policy. I suggest that one of the crucial ways in which to test the truth or the falsity of that allegation is very simply to ask the responsible officers who were connected with the Far Eastern Division of the State Department over those years, and I therefore venture to suggest here that the committee ask this question of such people as Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Grew, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Eugene Dooman, Mr. Abbot Low Moffatt, Mr. Joseph Ballantine, Mr. Walton Butterworth, and Mr. John Allison.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you read Mr. Dooman's testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; and I remember very clearly that Mr. Dooman spoke to me immediately afterward in this room and said that he had made a point of not discussing the affairs of the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. That testimony stands for itself.

Mr. HOLLAND. But it was not concerned about the IPR, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. I think it was. I think it very definitely was.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will have to register my disagreement on that, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish also to register this fact—and I do this again because I think I should be frank with the committee—that I per-

sonally very much regret and deplore the action of the persons here who have refused to answer the question of whether they were or were not Communists. I know that their refusal to do this creates a suspicion in the minds of some people that really were at some time——

Senator EASTLAND. That suspicion is reasonable, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have indicated that I recognize it does create a suspicion in the minds of some people.

Senator EASTLAND. It is a reasonable suspicion, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to state what I have——

Senator EASTLAND. No; I want you to answer my question.

Mr. HOLLAND. My answer, sir, is that in some of these cases it seems to be a reasonable suspicion and in some it does not. In particular I want to emphasize that suspicion is not proof of guilt, and at least in some cases I am myself certain that these people were not Communists when they worked for the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. Wouldn't you think that man who is accused of treason to his country—that is what a Communist is—who is accused of being the very vilest and lowest creature that there is, when he is asked the question whether he is guilty or not, would be most anxious if he wasn't guilty to say he was not guilty?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the way I myself would react, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Why, of course.

Mr. HOLLAND. But I do know that there are circumstances in which a person to whom it has been indicated that there are three or four witnesses who are prepared to testify against him to this fact, would decline to answer even though he himself felt that the accusation was untrue, simply because he would feel that in the event of a perjury suit his word would not stand up against the words of four or five other witnesses.

Senator EASTLAND. Any man would be most anxious to answer such a question, and you know that, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I cannot alter my testimony on this point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had difficulty trying to subpoena as witnesses 19 people whose correspondence and whose association with the Institute of Pacific Relations have arisen in connection with this investigation. We have asked Mr. Holland if he would aid us in locating these people, and Mr. Holland has written us a letter, together with various comments to the whereabouts of these 19 people. I would like Mr. Holland's letter with his qualifications and with his answer to go into the record.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you write such a letter, sir?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did, sir. I am glad to have it go in the record.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be placed in evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Holland has ventured to give us where these 19 people are now.

Senator EASTLAND. That is fine.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 573," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 573

JOHN W. DAVIS
ALLEN WARDWELL
WILLIAM C. CANNON
HALL PARK McCULLOUGH
J. HOWLAND AUCHINCLOSS
EDWIN S. S. SUNDERLAND
THEODORE KIENDL
MONTGOMERY B. ANGELL
GEORGE A. BROWNELL
WALTER D. FLETCHER

CARROLL H. BREWSTER
LEIGHTON H. COLEMAN
EDGAR G. CROSSMAN
RALPH M. CARSON
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ
MARION N. FISHER
PORTER R. CHANDLER
EWEN CAMERON MACVEAGH
THOMAS O'G. FITZGIBBON
EDWARD R. WARDWELL

S. HAZARD GILLESPIE, Jr.
D. NELSON ADAMS
ANDREW Y. ROGERS
TAGGART WHIPPLE
CHARLES H. WILLARD
FRANK L. POLK
MORTON FEAREY
JOHN C. HOVER

DAVIS, POLK, WARDWELL, SUNDERLAND & KIENDL

15 Broad Street

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Cable Address: Stetson

MARCH 4, 1952.

Re Institute of Pacific Relations.

Hon. PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws,
Room 424-C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR: We acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 26, 1952, relating to our letter of November 13, 1951.

With reference to Mr. Holland's next appearance before the subcommittee, we again request that because of the press of business Mr. Holland not be called before March 19. Your cooperation in this respect will be much appreciated.

As to Mr. Jerome D. Greene, Prof. John K. Fairbank; and Mr. Herbert S. Little we believe that the subcommittee ought to call those gentlemen if it is interested in obtaining a fair picture of IPR activities. We think, too, that you ought to call Prof. William W. Lockwood, to whom we referred in our letter of October 16, 1951. If you desire to hear them, we suggest that you communicate with them directly and make arrangements with them concerning their traveling expenses and fix dates convenient to them. In order to facilitate your communication with them, we are enclosing their addresses.

We object to your including within the term "Institute of Pacific Relations people" persons on your list whose relation with IPR is and was, as you know from testimony already received by your subcommittee, insignificant or of short duration in the fairly remote past. We likewise object to the unfair implication in your last two sentences that the IPR ought to know the present whereabouts of such persons, or that the IPR has any "good offices" for bringing them before your subcommittee. The subcommittee itself is aware from documents and other testimony received by it in earlier hearings that several of the persons named in your list are not in the country, and are not now connected with the IPR. In order to assist the subcommittee, however, Mr. Holland has prepared the enclosed list setting out all the information available to him concerning the whereabouts of the persons named.

We wish to repeat once again the request made in our letter of October 16, 1951, that you return to us the IPR records you seized, illegally, at Lee, Mass. In letters to Mr. Morris dated October 9, 1951, and December 4, 1951, Mr. Marks requested the return of papers which the IPR turned over to you on the understanding that you would complete your examination of them and return them to the IPR within a short time after receipt. Some of these papers have now been in your hands 11 months. Will you please let us know when you intend to return them. As we indicated in our letter of October 16, your continued retention of these papers and the papers seized at Lee is one of the factors making it impossible for us currently to prepare a defense of our client. We therefore assume that in accordance with the request set forth in our letter of October 16, 1951, we will be allowed at least a month after your counsel has finished introducing evidence to study the whole record with a view to suggesting further evidence or to providing a statement for consideration of the Senators, or both.

Very truly yours,

[S] DAVIS, POLK, WARDWELL, SUNDERLAND & KIENDL.

Mr. Jerome D. Greene, 54-A Garden Street, Cambridge, Mass.
 Mr. Herbert S. Little, 1510 Hoge Building, Seattle, Wash.
 Prof. John K. Fairbank, 127 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.
 Prof. William W. Lockwood, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.

THE FOLLOWING HAVE NEVER BEEN EMPLOYED ON THE IPR STAFF

Solomon Adler (now working at the Economic Research Institute at Cambridge University, England. Never an IPR member).
 Anthony Jenkinson (last address, 133 West Forty-fourth Street. Might be located through Allied Labor News, 401 Broadway, New York. Canceled IPR membership June 1947).
 Anna Louise Strong (according to some reports is living in California. Could probably be reached through her last publishers, Doubleday Doran, New York. Never an IPR member).
 Victor Yakhontoff (listed in New York telephone directory. Never an IPR member).
 Ella Winter (address unknown. Subcommittee has files. Never an IPR member).
 Israel Epstein (reported in earlier hearings of subcommittee as having left this country in 1951 with his wife, who was formerly Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. Later reported as having left England for Hong Kong or China).
 Fred W. Poland (address unknown but possibly in Canada. Never an IPR member but attended 1945 IPR conference. Might be located through Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. Is Canadian citizen).
 Andrew Roth (now in London, England, as correspondent for The Nation, New York. Could probably be reached through The Nation. Canceled IPR membership June 1947).
 Guenther Stein (exact address unknown but has been reported as working as newspaper correspondent for Hindustan Times in Geneva, Switzerland. Canceled IPR membership March 1946. Was temporary IPR correspondent in Chungking in 1943).
 Michael Lindsay (now lecturer, National University of Australia, Canberra, Australia. Never an IPR member but attended 1947 IPR conference).
 Abraham Chapman (last address, 76-23 Commonwealth Boulevard, Bellrose, Long Island, N. Y. IPR membership lapsed May 1947).
 Andrew Steiger (last address, 49 Claremont Avenue, New York. Canceled IPR membership April 1947).

THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN IPR EMPLOYEES IN PAST YEARS

Y. Y. Hsu (last heard of in Shanghai, China, March 1947. Employed as translator and research assistance by IPR international secretariat, New York, 1941-45).
 Michael Greenberg (last address, Trinity College, Cambridge University, England. Now reported working in a business firm in Switzerland. Employed by IPR international secretariat, 1941-42).
 Chi Ch'ao-ting (last address, Research Department, Central Bank of China (1949). Reported in newspapers as Chinese Communist government's nominee for United Nations Economic and Social Council. Employed as research associate by IPR international secretariat, May 1938-January 1941).
 Chen Han-seng (last address, Care of Asia Institute, New York. Now reported to be in China. Employed as research associate by IPR international secretariat, 1935-39. Later employed at University of Washington, University of Pennsylvania, and Johns Hopkins University).
 Rose Yardumian (now married to an Englishman, Peter Townsend, and living in London, England. Latest address: 34 Lyndale Avenue, London NW 2. Employed by IPR 1942-45. IPR membership lapsed May 1948).
 Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley (last address, 235 Rutledge Street, Brooklyn, N. Y. Reported by subcommittee as having left the United States in 1951 with her husband, Israel Epstein. Was employed as secretary by IPR international secretariat, 1935-39).
 Ellen Atkinson (last address, 3447 South Wakefield Street, Arlington, Va. IPR

*Canceled IPR membership April 1947.

membership lapsed 1951. Employed as junior research associate by American IPR, February 1940–August 1941).

Mr. HOLLAND. May I continue briefly for a moment?

I also have pointed out in my statement that one of the most serious allegations made against the institute has been the fact, according to some witnesses, that an article called China's Part in a Coalition War, published in our magazine the Far Eastern Survey in 1943, was written by the author, Mr. T. A. Bisson, on instructions of the American Communist Party as part of a plan to discredit the Chinese Nationalist Government and to play up the Chinese Communists as democrats and agrarian reformers. I feel in justice to Mr. Bisson that the committee should either call him to get his own sworn statement on that or if that is not possible because he is in California, just as a matter of fairness to him the committee should take note of his memorandum to me, which is one of the documents in that green volume there, in which he said specifically:

In my experience with the institute I saw not the slightest evidence that the organization was part of a "Soviet espionage network"——

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am quoting from his memoranda.

Senator EASTLAND. It is just a self-serving memorandum in which we are denied the right of cross-examination. You are smarter than that. That is propaganda that you are trying to get in this record.

Mr. MARKS. I object to that.

Senator EASTLAND. I do not care what you object to now. I am running this hearing. I want all of that stricken, and we are going to subpoena Mr. Bisson and take his testimony under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is far more satisfactory, I agree, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Not some self-serving propaganda.

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I point this out simply because after this long delay when the accusation has been on the record Mr. Bisson has not had a chance to answer it. If you will recall——

Senator EASTLAND. We are taking these people as fast as we can get to them and we do not need to be lectured, Mr. Holland, by you or anybody else as to procedure. You have just stated that we have conducted the hearing fairly.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Bisson will be given a chance to testify on this point. That is all I ask for.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection you see there have been some 60 people named as Communists, Mr. Holland, and it is a very difficult thing to bring all of them in, particularly inasmuch as we are having such a great deal of difficulty in locating most of them. As you yourself admitted, 5 of them are in Red China now, and there are at least 10 or 15 others who are in Europe somewhere. So I think Mr. Bisson is one of the few people we haven't called. He is out on the west coast. We were hoping that he might be East some time before we do it.

Mr. Chairman, there is one affidavit in here by Mr. Kizer that we were going to introduce into the record during the course of events. May I say that in that case will an exception be made inasmuch as it is a sworn statement, and will Mr. Kizer's statement go into the record at this time?

Senator EASTLAND. I will have to read it. Where is it?

Mr. HOLLAND. In the blue one. I might say there is another sworn statement by Mrs. Marguerite A. Stewart, which is there, too.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I will admit that into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Stewart is on the east coast here.

Mr. HOLLAND. She is in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. It may be that we will be able to bring her down without too much difficulty. It would be a clear imposition to bring Kizer all the way over just to affirm that.

(The Kizer affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 574" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 574

KIZER

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

County of Spokane:

Benjamin H. Kizer, being first duly sworn, on his oath, says: My attention has been called to the testimony of Louis Budenz, on August 22d, 1951, before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee, in which he testified that I am a member of the Communist Party. This affidavit is made in reply to that charge.

This testimony is wholly false. I am not now, nor was I ever at any time a member of the Communist Party, nor have I ever been a communist, nor have I ever been in sympathy with communist doctrine.

Budenz further testified that he knew of my membership "through official information given me by Jack Stachel, and also by the district leader of the Party in Washington, Henry Huff."

This is likewise wholly false. I never even knew Jack Stachel or Henry Huff or either of them, and I have never had any dealings with them or either of them. I do not remember ever to have heard of the names of either of these men, until I read them in the testimony of Budenz. Nor have I ever known or met Louis Budenz.

I have never even contemplated any kind of association or connection with the Communist Party, or with any organization avowing communist principles, which I have always held, and to which I remain devoted. Communism's totalitarianism is exactly as contrary to my democratic outlook.

I have lived a happy and contented life in this little city of Spokane ever since I was twelve years old. I have never aspired to hold political office of any kind, and have been content with my life as a lawyer and private citizen.

I have always been deeply grateful for the privilege of being an American citizen, living under our federal and state constitutions, to whose basic principles I am attached, and have tried to express my gratitude for these inestimable privileges by serving my community and my state in a considerable number of civic and state uncompensated tasks.

I do not hesitate to avow my membership in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, later known as the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I became a member of the Institute in 1933, became a trustee in 1935, and have served as such trustee ever since save for the year of 1946. I have also served as one of its vice chairmen in 1936-1939. My experience with the Institute is that it is a research and conference-holding organization of the highest repute and integrity, engaged in collecting and publishing scholarly studies prepared by leading specialists and students of the Pacific Area and the Far East. Of its many publications that I have read in the last 18 years, I have never discovered any that were communistic in tenor, or that tended toward communism. If I had ever detected communist influence in the Institute, I would have resigned at once. Since I have not done so, I propose to continue my membership in it.

[s] BENJAMIN H. KIZER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of September 1951.

[SEAL]

[s] (signed) ELIA HOPE,

Notary Public in and for the State of Washington, residing at Spokane, Wash.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you anything else, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. The only other thing I request is indicated in my statement, that in accordance with the earlier letter from Senator

McCarran indicating that the committee might be prepared to admit into its record a number of testimonial letters written by qualified far eastern specialists, I now request that those be admitted, and this includes the earlier ones which were sent to the committee some months ago. I am willing to exclude those older ones prior to 1950, but I would like to have added the very recent ones included in this yellow volume here which have come in quite recently. I think that is all I need to say, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. That is a matter for the whole committee. We will let him file it for consideration of the committee.

Do you have further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I have.

Mr. Holland, did you employ the pseudonym of Sinicus?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what publications you wrote for under that name?

Mr. HOLLAND. Only one. I wrote one article in what is called the International Journal, the publication of our Canadian affiliate, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. I am willing to give you the reason why I did so because I have very rarely done this.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write under the name of Sinicus for any other publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write for the publication China Today under the name of Sinicus?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I didn't know there was such.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know there was a Sinicus?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I didn't know that.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you get the name?

Mr. HOLLAND. I invented it, Mr. Chairman. The reason for my doing this, I wrote this article on the present economic situation in China just before our international conference in England in 1947. It was suggested to me by some of our Canadian friends that since we were going to have this conference at which some Chinese would be present, it would be unfortunate if I gave the impression of expressing opinions on a current very controversial situation in China, and therefore I adopted this device of using a pseudonym.

Senator EASTLAND. No one suggested the name?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. It was my own. I chose it partly because it was a mixture of something to do with China and also sounded like as if it had something to do with "cynical."

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, did you know Miss Lucy Knox?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I did. She was a stenographer in the very early days of the institute in Honolulu in 1929, and I think worked partly for the China branch of the institute in 1931. Subsequently after she left the institute in 1932 I think she did some work for the Lytton Commission in the Manchurian incident and then went to Moscow. I think for some years there she worked in some capacity, I don't exactly what, on the Moscow Daily News.

Mr. MORRIS. Her mailing address is the Moscow Daily News?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I wrote her a letter there myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would you refer to her as "my dear comrade Lucy"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I was not aware I had done so, but I know one of the letters I wrote her was in a flippant vein in which I kidded her and said she was in the wrong country if she wanted to study revolutions because she ought to be back here—this was in the early days of the New Deal—and see a real social revolution going on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter and the carbon comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 27, 1934, addressed, "Miss Lucy Knox, Moscow Daily News," with the typed signature of W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having written that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't precisely recall it, but I am sure it is one that I have written, Mr. Morris. I note that in the letter I describe myself as a capitalist. I don't know why. But I see I refer to myself as "which my capitalist eye." I was apparently asking Miss Knox to try and get an article from B and I think B was the well-known Soviet figure, Borodin, who had played an important part in the Chinese Nationalist revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 576" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 576

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 27, 1934.

Miss LUCY KNOX,

Moscow Daily News, Petrovski Per. 8,

Moscow, Russia.

MY DEAR COMRADE LUCY: Your letter about Uzbeks and things in Russia excited the office enormously. I showed it to Lasker, Barnes, and Lattimore before sending it on to the Keesings (whose address, by the way, is 14 Northwick Mews, St. John's Wood, London, N. W. 8, England). There was much discussion as to whether we should not print most of the letter as it stands, but we finally decided to ask you to expand it without abandoning its slightly evangelical style, and let us have it for an article in the June issue of Pacific Affairs. This is not a request, but a peremptory demand, so you had better start getting to work. Quite seriously, we want the article to be as vivid and enthusiastic as the letter itself. At the same time, I hope you will find occasion, here and there, to expand one or two of the slight criticisms which my capitalist eye seems to see lying hidden in your letter. I have no desire at all to prove that the Soviet policy toward minority peoples is all blah or all wrong, but we should really like to know, in as objective a fashion as possible, just how much of the existing cultures are being preserved or are worth preserving and how far the Russification which you speak about is inevitable in spite of all official protests to the contrary.

We are really counting on the article from B., and I hope you will keep prodding him, if you are on sufficiently good terms to do that sort of thing.

I hope you safely received the \$50 which I sent along with my Christmas card to you. Doreen and I leave New York about March 1st, travelling in the general direction of Japan. I shall have a fortnight in Honolulu and then go on to Tokyo, leaving Doreen with her mother for about a month in Hawaii before she rejoins me. It is going to be great fun looking for a house in Tokyo. We hope to get comfortably installed just in time for the Japanese agrarian revolution or the war with either Russia or the United States. Everybody in this country has quite decided that the war is coming very soon, but there is a little doubt as to whom Japan is going to fight. The only thing in this country which distracts attention from the war and keeps young men from rushing to enlist are the controversies in every household about how much the dollar is really worth, and whether the workers of the country are all going to rebel when the Civil Works Administration stops doling out its millions to all the unemployed. We

are having great fun in the New York office of the Institute just now, with hundreds of waiters and bellboys picketing the Waldorf Astoria.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter, the carbon being taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 8, 1934, addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, and the typed signature of W. L. Holland, research secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I ask you if you recall having written that letter.

Can you recall having written that letter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Again I do not recall it precisely, but I feel quite certain that it is a letter from me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last paragraph, please?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The last paragraph, addressed to Miss Moore, who was apparently then in England:

I quite envy you your job and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay forever in Russia, but will at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality problems of the natives. Here's to the day.

The Doreen mentioned in here is my wife.

Senator EASTLAND. What did you mean "here's to the day"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot honestly remember, Mr. Chairman. I think in all honesty I ought to say it seems an extraordinarily silly and flippant thing to me now to have said at any time, but in the previous paragraphs I notice that I was suggesting that Miss Moore, who was about to undertake a study of Asian peoples, the Asian sections of the Soviet Union, I was suggesting that she ought to treat them as some of our other studies had been treated; namely, as problems of the government of dependent territories.

Senator EASTLAND. That statement in there was a letter to a lady in Moscow, "Dear Comrade"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, this is not the one. This is a different one.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand that, but there is another letter which went in here, addressed "Dear Comrade" that was a flippant statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly.

Senator EASTLAND. How many of those flippant statements——

Mr. HOLLAND. I think there are very few in my total record.

Senator EASTLAND. How many?

Mr. HOLLAND. Probably half a dozen. I don't know since I have not seen them.

Senator EASTLAND. Those things are cumulative; are they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are.

Senator EASTLAND. That is a circumstance. Wouldn't you consider it so, sir?

Mr. HOLLAND. It shows that at that time I was being much too casual and flippant about matters which I ought not to have been.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 577" and is as follows:.)

EXHIBIT No. 577

NOVEMBER 8, 1934.

MISS HARRIET MOORE,

*Care of Mr. E. C. Carter, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square,
London, S. W. 1.*

DEAR HARRIET: I was greatly pleased to learn from Carter and from your letter of September 25 to him that you will be able to work for the Institute for 6 months in Russia. As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Carter, I strongly approve your first choice of study, namely, Nationality Problems and the Soviet Union. I believe that you should give practically all your time to this work and that you should only take up the question of standards of living, if the Moscow group agrees to appoint you as an assistant on a standards of living study to be carried out under their auspices. I suggest this simply because I believe we should encourage the new Soviet group to participate directly in the international research program and not because I have any doubt whatever about your own ability to do a good piece of research in the question of standards of living. As a matter of fact I think that you and Mr. Carter should try by all means possible to arrange things so that you will at least be kept closely in touch with all stages of any standards of living study which the Moscow group carries out. This again is not because I question the capacity of the research workers whom the Soviet group may choose, but simply because you will be able to point out to them many points which will be very interesting to foreign readers, but which they themselves might be apt to take for granted or to neglect.

As regards the study of nationality problems I know too little about the question to presume to advise you. My only suggestion is, however, that you should tackle the work on the understanding that it will form an integral part of our studies in cultural relations. This means that it should be linked up in some way with the study which Owen Lattimore is going to make of cultural relations on the northern and western frontier in China, particularly since the same people of Mongolia and Turkestan are now being brought into intimate contact with a totally different kind of cultural influence from Russia. In this work I presume you will want to study how far the Soviet policy of encouraging autonomy in matters of language, custom and art is actually working out in practice or how far the process of Russification is going on in spite of the official wishes of Moscow.

A second part of your work, it seems to me, should be an attempt to treat the problem as a question of the government of dependencies and minority peoples. In this work you might proceed somewhat along the lines suggested in Kessing's two books on Samoa and Philippines and his earlier syllabus on dependencies and native peoples prepared for the 1931 conference. In this you will presumably discuss questions of political autonomy, economic policy, social and educational policy looking at the question from the point of view of observing whether the impact of a socialist modern civilization brings about the same kind of cultural disintegration among traditional civilizations, as has been the case in other parts of the world under capitalist imperialism.

I am asking both Kessing and Lattimore to let you know as soon as possible what other points they think might be brought up in your study. The only other point I should like to make is that your work should be confined as far as possible to the eastern part of Russian Central Asia and to Siberia and the Far East. That is to say, I think you should exclude the problems of southeastern Russia and the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan.

I am writing separately to Mr. Carter suggesting one or two specific points which he should ask the Moscow group to study, when they decide to go ahead with a research program on the question of standards of living.

I quite envy you your job and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay for ever in Russia, but will at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality problems of the natives. Here's to the day.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND, *Research Secretary.*

WHL: MI.

Copies to Mr. Field.

Mr. Loomis.

Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 6, 1942, addressed to Miss Agnes Smedley, with the typed signature of W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having written that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I feel certain this is a genuine letter which I wrote. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph?

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute. Did I understand you to say you feel certain this is not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, no, that it is a genuine letter. I don't happen to recall writing it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will it be admitted into evidence?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I will admit it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 578" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 578

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,

February 6, 1942.

MISS AGNES SMEDLEY,

R. R. 2, Box 57, Ojai, Calif.

DEAR MISS SMEDLEY: This is to acknowledge your letter of January 31 about Mr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. The Chens are old and very close friends of mine and I am as eager as you are to do everything possible to assist them. Mr. Carter and I will make inquiries about the possibility of having them put on some exchange list of war prisoners. I think you will realize, however, that we have to move very cautiously since it is at the moment very unlikely that any Chinese will be included in lists of prisoners handled by the American Red Cross. It might even be highly dangerous for the Chens if their names were included in a list that eventually came to the attention of the Japanese authorities.

There is always the chance that Han-seng and his wife have been able to conceal themselves among the million or more other Chinese in Hong Kong and that they may succeed in escaping in disguise via Kowloon or Masao (?). We have had reports that several thousand people have already escaped in this way. From what I know of Han-seng's previous experience in China he would be pretty resourceful in escaping if the Japanese were not able to discover him as soon as they occupied Hong Kong. I realize, of course, that because of his wife's illness he may have decided to stay, but even so he may be in hiding and planning to escape.

I know it seems absurd, but I think that nationality is going to play a large part in the question of compiling lists of prisoners. However, we shall certainly make discreet inquiries without revealing Chen's name and will do everything we can to find out whether the Chens are actually still in Hong Kong, and if so, to get them released.

We have heard that several other members of our Institute are also in Hong Kong including Dr. Franklin L. He and Mr. W. L. Lin, as well as the wife and family of our Chinese secretary, Mr. Liu-Yu-wan.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Senator EASTLAND. Read it, please.

Mr. HOLLAND. All right, sir.

DEAR MISS SMEDLEY: This is to acknowledge your letter of January 31 about Mr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. The Chens are old and very close friends of mine and I am as eager as you are to do everything possible to assist them. Mr. Carter and I will make inquiries about the possibility of having them put on some exchange list of war prisoners * * *

The Chens at this time were at Hong Kong—

* * * I think you realize he will have to move very cautiously since it is at the moment very unlikely that any Chinese will be included in list of prisoners handled by the American Red Cross.

Senator EASTLAND. Chen was a Communist; was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. At this time to my knowledge and belief he was not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Since then?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have not even now seen any evidence that he is, but the fact is that in the last year he went back to Communist China and is taking part in a publication there.

Senator EASTLAND. A Communist publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. A Communist publication.

Senator EASTLAND. In Communist China. And you do not think he is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. It seems to me much more likely that, like other Chinese, he changed his mind and decided to throw his lot with the present Chinese Government.

Senator EASTLAND. I see. There is always an excuse.

Mr. HOLLAND. Not always, sir, but in this case I feel sure——

Senator EASTLAND. O. K. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, the institute was instrumental in bringing Chen over here, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Some years later.

Mr. MORRIS. When was he brought over here?

Mr. HOLLAND. In the first place he was brought over here before the war, about 1938, I would guess, and he was brought back again after the war around 1943 or 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Chen Han-seng was also associated with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. In recent years he was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know under what name he wrote for the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure. I know that he wrote some things under the pseudonym of Raymond Brooke, but whether he did for this particular organization or not I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that a Communist-front organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I regard it so, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. But you do not regard him as a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said specifically just a moment ago, sir, that in recent years I think there were indications.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead and read the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would rather not have Mr. Holland read the letter. I would like to find out to what extent the institute was instrumental in having Chen Hen-sang come to this country.

Mr. HOLLAND. In the first place before the war. I can't recall the exact details, but it is probably true that the institute invited him to come here as a research worker to undertake the study of some aspect of Chinese agricultural problems. I think it has to do with something in the problems of the southernmost province of China. At that time he was a well-known and very reputable authority on Chinese agricultural problems. He was a member of one of the most distinguished——

Senator EASTLAND. What year are you speaking of?

Mr. HOLLAND. When he was brought here either 1937 or 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you attempted to get him exchanged as a war prisoner?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure whether we did attempt, Mr. Chairman. The point is Miss Smedley had written us a letter earnestly begging us to try to help him escape from Hong Kong. In fact he and one or two others did escape, but not with our help.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Miss Smedley a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no means of knowing. I have been told that she was never a Communist member, that she tried very hard to be made a member of the Chinese Communist Party but was never in fact accepted by the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. She is dead now; is she not?

Mr. HOLLAND. She is dead. I have always regarded her as a very decided pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is she buried?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You know she is buried in Communist China?

Mr. HOLLAND. Miss Smedley?

Mr. MORRIS. Weren't her ashes scattered over Communist China?

Mr. HOLLAND. The only thing I know about her is she bequeathed her estate, whatever it was, to a Chinese Communist general.

Senator EASTLAND. That is right.

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't remember her being buried in China. I don't believe she is.

Senator EASTLAND. At her request, at the request of this lady who willed her property——

Mr. HOLLAND. Ten years later.

Senator EASTLAND. To a Communist general and whose ashes are scattered over Communist China, at her request, you attempted, your organization attempted, your non-Communist organization attempted, to get a Communist writer exchanged as a war prisoner, and there is no communism involved at all? That is your testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to dispute your statement, Senator, because at this time we knew this man, we had no knowledge that he was a Communist when he was interned in Hong Kong in 1941. We did know that he had had an excellent reputation as a Chinese scholar. He was widely known throughout the world.

Senator EASTLAND. There are just dozens of cases——

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot feel any apology for having helped the Chinese escape from the Japanese.

Senator EASTLAND. I am asking a question, based on your sworn testimony. There are dozens of these cases where a man is not a Communist when he affiliates with you, so you say, and then several years later you say he is a Communist now.

Mr. HOLLAND. This is simply a fact, sir. Many people are changed. There are hundreds and hundreds of well-known Chinese intellectuals and officials who changed their minds in the last few years.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it not a fact that those people when they were in this country around the Institute of Pacific Relations, attempting to mold the policy of this Government, were hiding the fact that they were Communists?

Mr. HOLLAND. I dispute every part of your statement, Senator. They were not attempting to mold policy. There is no evidence that they were Communists at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. All right. We will submit that on the record. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, photostat of a memo, dated January 3, 1941, marked ECC from WLH.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having whitten that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe that I wrote this letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. HOLLAND. There is a letter to Mr. Edward C. Carter, who was then my chief:

Thank you for your memorandum of December 28 about Chi's future work. I agree that is probably wise in accepting a job with Universal—

Universal was Universal Trading Corp.—

and you are right in thinking that I would prefer him to finish his IPR assignment in the next 6 months. Accordingly, I enclose a note to Chi approving his plan of hiring Mr. Y. Y. Hsu for an initial period of 2 months beginning as soon as possible on a date suitable to Chi and Hsu, the arrangement to be subject to renewal or revision after I have conferred further with you and Chi about it—

There seems to be a word missing—

early next month. This will enable Chi to make a start on the project and at the same time will not commit us indefinitely if we find the arrangement is not working out well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. He has read it already in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. He has read the first paragraph.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, I will admit all of it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 579" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 579

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., January 3, 1941.

ECC from WLH:

Thank you for your memorandum of December 28 about Chi's future work. I agree that he is probably wise in accepting the job with Universal, and you are right in thinking that I would prefer him to finish his IPR assignment in the next six months. Accordingly, I enclose a note to Chi approving his plan of hiring Mr. Y. Y. Hsu for an initial period of two months, beginning as soon as possible on a date suitable to Chi and Hsu, the arrangement to be subject to renewal or revision after I have conferred further with you and Chi about the early next month. This will enable Chi to make a start on the project and at the same time will not commit us indefinitely if we find that the arrangement is not working out well.

From your knowledge of Chi's financial situation and his obligations to Universal, do you personally think that the proposed division of funds is a reasonable one? The grant we have made to Chi was \$1,250, this being intended to represent five months salary at \$250 monthly. In addition we agreed to pay up to \$600 for incidental expenses involved in the collection of materials in China and have already paid \$100 for this purpose.

Enclosed: Letter to Chi and copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 28, 1940, headed WLH from ECC.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having received that letter?

Obviously it is from Mr. Carter to you, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to ask you to read the first two paragraphs.

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall it, but it seems to be the preceding letter to what I have just read.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, will that be admitted into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. The whole letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 580," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 580

DECEMBER 28, 1940.

WLH From ECC:

Chi is at last recovered though he still looks rather pulled down by his succession of three illnesses.

His contract with K. P. Chen expires early in January. Since his return, however, the Universal people here in New York have given him a formal invitation to join permanently their research and administrative staff in a very important relationship. Chi feels that he has no alternative but to accept for the following reasons: (1) It appears to be a patriotic duty; (2) it will give him access to materials that would not otherwise be available but which will be essential for his completing the assignment that the IPR has given him; (3) it enables him to provide for the support of his wife and children and makes it unnecessary for him to live the uncertain life of depending on lecture engagements which so interfere with an orderly scholarly life.

He asked me whether in view of this new job he should take a couple of years to finish the assignment you gave him at Berkeley, or whether you and I would prefer to have him finish it in the next six months. I told him provisionally that I thought you would prefer the latter course and I knew I would. The latter course he could adopt, provided with the grant you have made him you would approve of his hiring a research assistant who can read the Chinese periodicals and make the first draft of the report under Chi's direction. The assistant he has in mind is Y. Y. Hsu, a graduate in economics of Stanford. Hsu has been working for Chi's father, knows Chi's outlook and method of work, and according to Chi, is first-class. Chi would employ Hsu at \$125 a month, paying this out of the grant you have made, and would use the balance for his own time in supervising Hsu's work and in writing the final report.

At the moment I haven't by me the details of your commitment to Chi, and Chi's commitment to you, so I cannot say how Chi's proposal will strike you. Please write me frankly as to your wishes. Hsu if employed, would have a desk in the IPR office and would keep up our Chinese files. Chi will have to keep office hours every day at Universal, but as the office is at 5th Avenue and 52nd Street, he will always be in easy reach.

Now that Chi's future is assured, I am hoping that we can get a higher and more regular rate of production out of him than when his life was disordered by uncertainty. Let us hope that our wishes in this matter will be realized.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like you to read the first two paragraphs, Mr. Holland, as I have several questions to ask you.

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

Chi has at last recovered, though he still looks rather pulled down by his succession of three illnesses.

His contract with K. P. Chen expires early in January. Since his return, however, the Universal people here in New York have given him a formal invitation to join permanently their research and administrative staff in a very important relationship. Chi feels that he has no alternative but to accept for the following reasons: (1) it appears to be a patriotic duty; (2) it will give him access to materials that would not otherwise be available but which will be essential for his completing the assignment that the IPR has given him; (3) it enables him to provide for the support of his wife and children and makes it unnecessary for him to live the uncertain life of depending on lecture engagements which so interfere with an orderly scholarly life.

Mr. MORRIS. The next paragraph?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes [reading] :

He asked me whether in view of this new job he should take a couple of years to finish the assignment you gave him at Berkeley, or whether you and I would prefer to have him finish it in the next 6 months. I told him provisionally that I thought you would prefer the latter source and I knew I would. The latter course he could adopt, provided with the grant you have made him you would approve of his hiring a research assistant who can read the Chinese periodicals and make the first draft of the report under Chi's direction. The assistant he has in mind is Y. Y. Hsu, a graduate in economics of Stanford. Hsu has been working for Chi's father, knows Chi's outlook and method of work, and according to Chi, is first-class.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you pause at this point. What was meant by he "knows Chi's outlook"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't be sure. This is Mr. Carter's letter to me. I myself would interpret it that he knew Dr. Chi's analysis of Chinese society. Chi was the author of a well-known book on the key economic areas in Chinese civilization. And the assignment which we were giving him was a report on wartime economic developments in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you aware of the Communist record of Y. Y. Hsu which has been introduced into our record?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think I read in the press or in the transcript some allegations but I don't recall the details that you have in mind.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Y. Y. Hsu's first contact with the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as I know, yes; but I can't be sure about that.

Mr. MORRIS. It would seem from that, would it not, Mr. Holland, that Chi brought Hsu into the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. This would suggest that he recommended him in the first place as an assistant for himself.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall any experience with Hsu before that?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 25, 1940, marked "confidential," addressed to W. L. Holland from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having received that letter from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe this is a letter which I received from Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 581" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 581

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam	London	Manila	Moscow	New York	Paris	Shanghai
	Sydney	Tokyo	Toronto	Wellington		

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

25TH APRIL, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL (hand written)

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
*Care Giannini Foundation, University of California,
 Berkeley, Calif.*

DEAR BILL: K. P. Chen is asking Chi to go to China with him, sailing on May 15 to act as his personal research secretary. Chi is to keep his files, draw up memoranda, and carry forward such studies as will reinforce Mr. K. P. Chen's highly responsible work. It will not be a government position, so Chi will be much more free than would be the case if he was on the government payroll. Chen will, I think pay Mrs. Chi here in New York \$250 monthly and in addition will take care of all of Chi's expenses out to China, in China, and back from China. Chi will travel with Chen, stay with Chen, eat with Chen, travel all over the new highways and investigate various economic and other projects.

I am keen to have Chi accept this offer, both because it will give Chi invaluable contacts and materials for his later research "The Principle of Economic Reconstruction in China" and also because it enables him to render an immediate direct service to his country as a patriotic Chinese at a very crucial period in Chinese history.

Incidentally, it overcomes the difficulty of which you have just written with reference to a grant from the International Research Fund for Chi's project now that the Rockefeller Foundation has failed us in the matter of a fellowship for Chi.

As I understand it you have felt that the International Research Committee could not make a grant of say \$2,500 or even \$2,000 for Chi to make a study to be undertaken in New York and Berkeley. If, however, it were possible for Chi to get out to China and possibly get two or three first class Chinese working under his direction in Chungking and Kunming, I surmise that you think you could get a grant not to exceed \$2,500 for a study somewhat like that which Chi has proposed, but under a slightly different title.

I agree with you that a great deal of the work for such a study can only be done effectively in China by someone in touch with the actual work of reconstruction. It is certainly true that even so well-informed a person as Chi in an attempt to lay down principles of reconstruction from America can hardly fail to be academic.

I know that he feels this just as strongly as you do. This is one of the reasons for his feeling obligated to accept Mr. K. P. Chen's invitation. It gives him a grass roots opportunity such as that which you feel is so fundamental.

In the development of the Chi study, it is desirable for you to tell Chi that you will have to coordinate his study with that of Chen Han-seng on Agrarian Problems in Southwest China and W. Y. Lin's Migration of Capital into Southwest China. I understand that you recognize the need of integrating all of these studies with the China Council's effort to complete the study of industrialization of Southwest China originally assigned to D. K. Lieu.

I am sending off this news about Chi before it becomes public in the hope that you can send me by air mail your reaction and thus put me in a position to take it up with Chi immediately in a preliminary way preparatory to his having a conference with you en route to China.

I will write later about the P. T. Chen project and also about Miss Mitchell's views. I am returning your copy of Chi's tentative outline.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter.
 EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Adam Von Trott?

Mr. HOLLAND. Von Trott I didn't know very well, but as I recall it, he was a German, a Prussian, of rather aristocratic background in Germany, who chose to start at the wrong end, who was implicated in the coup against Hitler and was one of those who was executed. At that time or just before he had risen to a high position, I think he was chancellor or something in the German Foreign Office in the middle of the war. Before the war, I think about 1939, or thereabouts, he had been a Rhodes scholar. He has been educated in England and knew Lord Lothian, the then British Ambassador here, very well. I think partly through Mr. Carter he was suggested as a person who ought to spend the third year of his Rhodes scholarship in the Far East before he went back to Germany. He, therefore, came to this country for a few months and actually attended our conference at Virginia Beach in 1939 and then went on across the country and visited Japan and China and went back through Russia to Germany. I believe while he was here he contacted a number of German scholars, most of them exiles, whom he had known previously, but what the purpose of that was I was not informed. I do know that he had some contact with the former German chancellor who was at Harvard University, Brüning, but that part of his work I don't know. I saw relatively little of him, and I must confess I was quite startled when I heard that he had taken part in the coup against Hitler, because I was extremely suspicious of him myself. He seemed to me much more like a Nazi who was trying to ingratiate himself with Americans, and I was very dubious indeed whether he was really on the level in trying to pretend that he was critical of the Nazi regime. I don't know even now whether he was playing a double game.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he work with the Soviet forces in that 1944 uprising?

Mr. HOLLAND. I had not known this but I think in one of our executive sessions you mentioned that, but that was news to me.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know anything further on that from your own experience?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated January 17, 1940, headed WLH from ECC, and attached thereto is another memorandum dated January 16, 1940, a memorandum to ECC from FVF.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I wonder if you can recall that particular memorandum?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall it, but the note on the bottom of the reply is in my handwriting, and I undoubtedly received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 582," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 582

JANUARY 17, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

With reference to the enclosed from Fred, I shall reply that Mangahas is no longer on the Secretariat, that von Trott continues, that Chi continues, and also Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. Is Fred right that Wittfogel is still working on the book for the I. R. C.?

(pencilled note:) Yes, but that is no reason for regarding him as a research associate. I doubt if the book will be ready for two years and it will have practically no bearing on our current program even though it may be a monument of scholarship.

WLH

JANUARY 16, 1940.

Memorandum to: ECC.

From: FVF.

Continuing our correspondence regarding the important question of who, if anyone, is to list Wittfogel on his staff, I shall be very glad indeed to recommend to you whichever move you wish to make. If you think it is advisable to drop Wittfogel from your current listing, it can probably be done on the ground that Wittfogel is no longer spending the major portion of his time on Pacific Council work. If it is done, however, it is quite clear that Mangahas and von Trott would also have to be dropped from the category of "Fellows" in the PACIFIC AFFAIRS listing. I suppose Chi would have to be dropped from the Secretariat, to be consistent. Or is he still working for you? I am not entirely clear as to the status of Chen Han-seng or Elsie Fairfax-Chomeleg. I had thought that she, if not Chen, had been loaned to the China IPR in which case I should not think that she would be listed as a member of the Secretariat.

I mention these other names because I feel that it is important to be consistent in this matter, particularly in view of the fact that, if I am not mistaken, Wittfogel is still writing a book for the I. R. C., representing the first volume of his interpretation of Chinese economic history.

I shall be very glad, if you drop Wittfogel, to write him a letter telling him that he can henceforth, for some time, regard himself as a research fellow of the American Council. But in return for this I am afraid he will have nothing but such a letter in his files.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what position Dolly Eltenton had in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe I can answer completely. The only part I know is relatively recent. In 1947 when we held our conference in England she was already there. She is a Britisher. I asked her to serve temporarily as a secretary on the conference staff at that meeting in Stratford, England. I know that previously—I have forgotten the circumstances and dates—she had worked either part time or for a period in the San Francisco branch of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 29, 1942, addressed to "Dear Bill" signed "Phil."

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that letter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall it, Mr. Chairman, but it is undoubtedly from my colleague, Mr. Philip Lilienthal, the present editor of Pacific Affairs.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 583," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 583

Lilienthal
WWL
ED
KRCG
RET
WLH

15 MACONDRAY LANE,
San Francisco, November 29, 1942.

DEAR BILL: Thanks for your note of the 14th, with its enclosure of the letter from Hinder which I was extremely interested to read. Will you please pass on to her the enclosed note, or send it to her if she isn't at the Conference? Did her latter-day Shanghai experiences take any of the starch out of her? Somehow I imagine that nothing short of the apocalypse could do that.

I suppose that you'll be in Canada when this reaches you. I hope that it's going to be a very interesting and almost enjoyable meeting, and that the weather will be decent. If you think of it, will you send me a list of those in attendance; I'd like to know who's going to sleep with whom. Dolly Eltenton left for the east last night. It's a good thing that she's going, and I think that you'll find her a nice gal to have around. She's very wide awake and enterprising, and very amusing, too. I'm sure that you won't need to be reminded that she is still a bit new to the IPR, its names and customs, and that it would doubtless make the Conference more valuable to her if someone were to keep a friendly eye on her for the first day or two until she's had a chance to get her bearings. Will Doreen and the Graces be going along to Canada with you, or have you detailed them to polish the keys of your piano in your absence? I think that you finally showed sense in getting the piano, and I'm sure that it will give you and the family a great deal of pleasure. The thought of your being able to play a piano under your own roof, after so much time, gives me a lot of the afore-mentioned pleasure.

You've surely heard of the little discussion group which met in the local IPR office a couple of times 2 weeks ago to hash over the Japanese problem. I was able to attend one of the meetings and thought it good enough to warrant more groups of the kind. What made this particular meeting interesting to me was the presence of several persons of some influence in the community who were frankly anti-Japanese to the extent of wishing to disenfranchise the Japanese-American citizens after the war. The IPR simply has got to take greater cognizance of this sort of attitude than I think it has done in the recent past. In fact, the deliberations of your present meeting won't have much validity unless the enlightened intellectuals are compelled to descend occasionally from the realm of pure theory and dirty their hands with dealing with the great unwashed. I hope that you and Dolly Eltenton will be able to formulate some sort of program whereby the IPR, at least in the city, will be able to enlist the support of conservative groups which are not in the habit of letting their thoughts cross national boundaries. But before this can be done, the IPR will have to secure considerable factual information on, let's say, the record of the Japanese in America, and then have it presented by men who are known to be hard-headed. Much as I like Galen and admire the work that he is doing, it seems to me that anything that he touches nowadays is at once suspect because he himself, by virtue of his record in this Japanese business, is suspect. None of this, however, implies that I think the IPR, in any of its manifestations in this country, should engage in anti-Japanese activities. I most certainly do not think so.

News of myself is not especially electrifying. I'm still messing about on the Oakland docks, not accomplishing a great deal but managing to keep fairly calm through the device of telling myself, every hour on the hour, that I might be in the army instead of a free agent and thus mustn't complain. Nevertheless, sometimes I think that I could load the ships singlehanded more quickly than actually they are loaded. In the past months, while riding to and fro on the Key trains, I've been learning to read Italian and have now got to the point where I can read the local rag, *L'Italia*, without too much cheating. It's a pleasant language, I think, and I'm having fun with it in a harmless sort of way. I believe that I must be the first person ever to have learned to read Italian without the express purpose of reading Dante.

A few days ago I moved from the hotel to a little flat on Macondray Lane, on Russian Hill and not far from Telegraph Hill. It's a nice neighborhood, with more grass and trees than paving. Really my dump is a house rather than a flat, and the occupants of the other half of the house are not here now, so I'm a landholder. It's an attractive and extremely unusual sort of place (a flagged walk before the house, a good view of the Bay and Alcatraz, no auto traffic nearby, monk's cloth on the walls, a fireplace, lots of books left by the previous tenant whom I know of old, and the sort of neighborhood which is not unlike Greenwich Village in its informality but is far, far more attractive in its physical aspects. There are disadvantages in the present set-up, but on the whole they're not too serious. Only I do wish that the ceiling would leak a little less, or at least that the carpet would dry more quickly.

Mother wrote at length on the subject of the lecture which she heard you give some weeks ago on China, at the Women's University Club in New York. She said that you were perfectly marvelous. Later she wrote that a talk by Sir George Sansome had been rescued from utter failure by remarks which you made at its close. Isabel tells me that you're giving a course at the New School, and I wonder if you're enjoying it.

Well, I've written a far longer letter than you deserve. Don't forget to send me a list of the Conference personnel if you have an extra one, along with whatever scandalous matter you may have on tap. Please give my fondest greetings to the gals. All the best to you.

Yours,

[s] PHIL.

(Penciled :) If George Glazebrook shows up at the Conference, please give my best.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, are you acquainted with the testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in connection with Charles and Dolly Eltenton?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I am not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall a meeting of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1947, where a vote was taken on whether or not Mr. Field should be continued as a member of the executive committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I cannot remember this occasion. I have heard about it of course because it was a momentous occasion, but I don't believe I was present and I was not myself at this time a member of the American IPR. So I have only heard about it afterward.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you hear about it, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. That there was a great deal of discussion as to whether it was proper for Mr. Field because of his activities and writing for Communist magazines, such as New Masses, to remain on the board of trustees. I know that the upshot of it was that Mr. Carter wrote a letter to Field saying that he thought under the circumstances he should offer his resignation and that Field wrote back rather resentfully, implying he didn't think it was very fair, but nevertheless submitting his resignation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at this time from the minutes of the board of trustees of March 18, 1947, which has been made part of the public record on page 483 of the hearings held by the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, the following notations from the minutes:

With regard to Mr. Field, President Sproul had been of the frank opinion that the best way out might be for Mr. Field to agree to withdraw from the executive committee. During the course of the discussion, Mr. Dean and Mr. Gilchrist had pointed out that Mr. Field was one of the most valuable and objective members of the executive committee and that they had never known him to show any political bias whatever as far as the IPR had been concerned. They also argued that if Mr. Field were removed from the committee, it would be welcomed by Mr. Kohlberg, who would then concentrate his efforts on getting rid of other members who participate actively in the IPR. They had further pointed out that Mr. Field had been reelected to the board with a majority—that, in fact, he had received a majority of the votes of the California members. It was noted in this connection that the nominating committee in preparing the ballots for the new board of trustees informed the entire membership that Mr. Field was a member of the editorial board of the New Masses.

Then later on, on page 485:

Mr. Dean then called for a vote on the question of whether Mr. Field should be included in the executive committee for 1947. Fourteen trustees voted in favor of Mr. Field's serving on the executive committee for 1947 and one voted against.

Does that square with your recollection of the episode as you heard it?

MR. HOLLAND. No; I must say that this is news to me. I knew there was a vote and there was disagreement, but it implies to me that after this, despite the vote, there must have been private conversations of people who frankly told Mr. Carter that they didn't see how they could continue to raise money for the IPR. It was as a result of this that Mr. Carter finally wrote the letter to Mr. Field asking him to resign. I am afraid I don't remember the dates of that, and I am speaking here only from what other people have told me, including Mr. Carter. But I was not in the meeting and I am afraid I had not read that particular thing or known that the vote was so strongly in favor of Mr. Field.

MR. MARKS. What was the date of that meeting, Mr. Morris, please?

MR. MORRIS. March 18, 1947.

MR. MANDEL, will you identify this letter, please?

MR. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 13, 1940, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, care of the Giannini Foundation, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

MR. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that letter, Mr. Holland?

MR. HOLLAND. I don't recall receiving it, but it seems to me to be an authentic letter.

MR. MORRIS. Would you read the second and third paragraphs, Mr. Holland?

MR. HOLLAND. This letter says I am enclosing a series of letters Hanwell from Block, Block from Hanwell, Field to Block, and Hanwell from Block [reading]:

As I remember it, you are ultimately to be the doctor on the Hanwell manuscript. To what extent do you wish to give avuncular advice to Hanwell now before it is too late. Please return all of this correspondence ultimately unless you wish to have Mrs. Ward make copies for your files.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted in the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 584," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 584

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, June 13, 1940.

MR. W. L. HOLLAND,
c/o Giannini Foundation,
University of California, Berkley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: For your private information I enclose a docket containing the following:

Letter to Norman Hanwell from Kurt Bloch dated March 27, 1940.

Letter to Kurt Bloch from Norman Hanwell dated April 25, 1940.

Memorandum from Fred Field to Kurt Bloch dated June 4, 1940.

Letter to Norman Hanwell from Kurt Bloch dated June 4, 1940.

It is an exciting melange of different points of view with a grand climax in which Fred Field assumes a gorgeous sound and fatherly role.

As I remember it, you are ultimately to be the doctor on the Hanwell manuscript. To what extent do you wish to give avuncular advice to Hanwell now before it is too late. Please return all of this correspondence ultimately unless you wish to have Mrs. Ward make copies for your files.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the original of a memo from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 4, 1940, headed, "WLH" from "ECC."

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted into the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 584-A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 584-A

JUNE 4, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

Your letter of May 27, asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I shall share with him and my colleagues of the Secretariat.

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been giving a great deal of thought to the very questions you raise.

The attitude of Alexander, Corbett, and Shepherd has been to question the Chatham House action in placing itself at the disposal of the British Government. I have no idea what Field's attitude to that or to a similar proposal on behalf of the American Council would be.

My own feeling is that principal tasks for the International Secretariat should include the following:

(1) Accelerating and deepening our work on the Inquiry. This should include the kind of correlative study which Corbett is making of the relations of the Asiatic and European wars and of international organization after the wars are over. Here the IPR is doing something which may be more fundamental than the work of any other society anywhere in the world. It won't be fully accomplished if we do not think out new ways of going to Corbett's aid.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the second paragraph of that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been giving a great deal of thought to the very questions you raise.

Mr. MORRIS. What is meant there by "Field alone can speak for the American Council," Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will have to read the whole letter.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Mr. HOLLAND. This memorandum from Mr. Carter to me in June 1940 begins:

Your letter of May 27, asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I shall share with him and my colleagues of the Secretariat.

Then the second paragraph says:

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been giving a great deal of thought to the very question you raise.

I assume from this that I had written a letter asking both Mr. Carter and Mr. Field what their views were, and since Mr. Carter at that time was the Secretary of the international IPR, not of the American Council, he is here dissociating himself and making it clear that Field is the one who will have to give the answer so far as the American IPR is concerned, and then he goes on to make some comments relating to the international.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 26, 1940, headed WLH from ECC.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that memorandum from Mr. Carter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall receiving it and I don't know what the allusion is, but as far as I can tell it seems like an authentic memorandum from the IPR files.

Mr. MORRIS. This makes reference to Abend's dispatch. Does that recall any episode to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I am afraid it doesn't.

Mr. MORRIS. It ends up saying:

Fred has received an avalanche of congratulations, among others from Jessup, Shotwell, Bruce, Bliven, Goodrich, Hu Shih, Mrs. Jessup, and a great many others.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't recall the incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced?

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). Yes; it will be received.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit 585," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 585

APRIL 26, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

It is perfectly all right to show Rowell and Oakie Abend's dispatch and poster that appeared in the Times on April 22 and Field's letter which appeared the next day, but I don't think there is any point in showing them my letter, as my activities in this matter might be misunderstood in certain quarters.

Fred has received an avalanche of congratulations, among others from Jessup, Shotwell, Bruce, Bliven, Goodrich, Hu Shih, Onmansky, Mrs. Jessup, and a great many others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall the circumstances of Michael Greenberg's coming into the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't recall them exactly, Mr. Chairman. I do know that somewhere about 1938—I am afraid I can't even remember the year correctly, but it was somewhere in that period just before or just after the Second World War began in Europe that Mr. Greenberg, who I think at that time had been on a fellowship at Harvard, making a study of early British trade with China, was invited, I think by Mr. Carter to come on as a research assistant or editorial assistant to the International Secretariat of the IPR. Then later after Mr. Lattimore ceased to be editor of Pacific Affairs in 1941, Mr. Greenberg I think was given the title of managing editor. Mr. Carter and I at that time being the actual editors, but Mr. Greenberg was responsible for the production job and most of the donkey work.

Mr. MORRIS. Who sponsored him in the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I don't recall, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 6, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland, with the typed signature of E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do you recall having received that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. As before, I don't recall it but it seems to me to be an authentic letter from Mr. Carter, telling me that Mr. Greenberg apparently wants to work for the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 586," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 586

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y., May 6, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
*Giannini Foundation, University of California,
 Berkeley, Calif.*

DEAR BILL: Michael Greenberg visited us last week. He seems to be more eager than ever to have the advantage of study and collaboration as a member of the International Secretariat. He would like to spend a year studying the effect of the European war on the Far East.

I wonder whether, if he does this well, this should not be a good Inquiry study. Or would it be more appropriate in the International Research Series or as an unclassified Secretariat paper?

I have told him that the Secretariat is long on ideas but short on money. He is going to try to get the authorities at Harvard to make his Choate Fellowship next year applicable to work in the New York office even though it is supposed to be awarded for study at Harvard. If the Secretariat can carry on its activities at the University of California and Johns Hopkins, I can see no reason why Harvard shouldn't conversely carry on its activity at Fifty-second Street.

Please write me frankly.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Toledano, a Mexican?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have never had the pleasure of meeting him. I have heard of him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in the Institute of Pacific Relations' affairs?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 12, 1949, headed "WLH" from "ECC."

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that particular document, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. This is a note from Mr. Carter to me saying would there be any point in our considering inviting Lombardo Toledano as an observer to the Mont Tremblant conference.

I have never met him but Greenberg speaks enthusiastically about him.

Then in my handwriting underneath I have put:

Might it be a good scheme. Better see him first.

Then, "Lunch," with a query. Underneath I put:

Greenberg suggests Sr. Rosas of the Mexican Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider Toledano to be a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't say. I have certainly heard him described in press reports as being a very strong Communist sympathizer, but I am afraid I haven't followed his career enough to know whether he is considered a party member or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Ordinarily would Greenberg's recommendation for a conference like Mont Tremblant conference be enough to warrant a recommendation?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it was rather exceptional because normally since we don't have a Mexican council, it would only be guests or observers who would come from those countries. I would say Greenberg's recommendation would be given very low priority in any such case, not because of Greenberg but because he was just a junior staff member.

Mr. MORRIS. What further factor caused you to think that was a good idea?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't recall, Mr. Morris, and I can only assume that I thought that it would be a good idea to have a Mexican; but that is only a supposition. I can't recall the exact reasoning.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 587" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 587

OCTOBER 12, 1942.

(Penciled:) ECC.

WLH from ECC:

Would there be any point in our considering inviting Lombardo Toledano of Mexico City as an observer to Mont Tremblant?

I have never met him, but Greenberg speaks enthusiastically about him.

(Penciled:) Might be a good scheme. Better see him first. Lunch? WLH. Greenberg suggests Sr. Rosas of the Mexican Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a group of documents. One is a carbon copy of a memorandum dated April 16, 1940, headed "WLH" from "ECC." Attached thereto is an original memorandum dated April 16, 1940, headed "HA, KM" from ECC and signed with the handwriting signature of "Kate".

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Tsuru active in the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge. In the last 2 years he is now in Japan and as an important professor in Japan. He contributed one document to our last conference in Lucknow in 1950. I think he is a member of the present Japanese IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he related to Saionji, who was the secretary of your Japanese Council?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

I wonder if you recall having received that document from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't remember the incident, but this is a note from Mr. Carter:

Tsuru came to see us last week and the following day at my suggestion he brought in Mrs. Tsuru for a visit. She is studying music and is exceptionally bright and attractive. She is some kind of relative of Saionji's.

Tsuru would like Yasuo's job on the secretariat, though I think that if Harvard, offered him an appointment that would be his first love.

Mayeda spoke to me in the highest terms of Tsuru and said that he thought he would be an admirable successor to Yasuo and that I could quote Mayeda to this effect in a cable to Tokyo. I have taken no action in this matter for two reasons: (1) I wished to consult you and get your final judgment on Tsuru; (2) I learned from a young Foreign Office fellow named Matsumoto who is on his way to the Japanese Embassy in London, that he feels it is of the utmost importance that either Ushiba or Saionji succeed Yasuo. Matsumoto has told them that they are wasting their time mixing in internal politics in Japan, and that it is high time they got out of the Tokyo atmosphere and got the kind of view that they can best get in New York.

Of course, if there is a chance of either Ushiba or Saionji coming, it might be a mistake to put forward Tsuru's name. What is your advice? Of course, Yasuo's ideal successor would be Yasuo.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the actual termination of that episode? Yasuo became associated?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to the best of my recollection, because in fact we did get another man from Tokyo whose name was Matsuo. Neither Ushiba nor Saionji was able to come, but we did finally get another

er man to succeed Yasuo. Neither of these people. Tsuru as far as I know never was appointed in the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the letter be received?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 588" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 588

APRIL 16, 1940.

(Penciled:) HA and KM ret ECC.

WLH from ECC:

Tsuru came to see us last week and the following day at my suggestion he brought in Mrs. Tsuru for a visit. She is studying music and is exceptionally bright and attractive. She is some kind of relative of Saionji's.

Tsuru would like Yasuo's job on the secretariat, though I think that if Harvard offered him an appointment that would be his first love.

Mayeda spoke to me in the highest terms of Tsuru and said that he thought he would be an admirable successor to Yasuo and that I could quote Mayeda to this effect in a cable to Tokyo. I have taken no action in this matter for two reasons: (1) I wished to consult you and get your final judgment on Tsuru; (2) I learned from a young foreign office fellow named Matsumoto who is on his way to the Japanese Embassy in London, that he feels it is of the utmost importance that either Ushiba or Saionji succeed Yasuo. Matsumoto has told them that they are wasting their time mixing up in internal politics in Japan, and that it is high time they got out of the Tokyo atmosphere and got the kind of view that they can best get in New York.

Of course, if there is a chance of either Ushiba or Saionji coming, it might be a mistake to put forward Tsuru's name. What is your advice? Of course, Yasuo's ideal successor would be Yasuo.

APRIL 16, 1940.

(Penciled:) HA
KM

From ECC:

You will, I think, be interested in the attached copy of my letter to Holland regarding an eventual successor to Yasuo. Have you any comments?

(Penciled:) From the point of view of contacts with the Japanese Council, it would certainly be better to get someone who knows the IPR ropes in Tokyo. However, if that proves impossible, I should say Tsuru would be excellent for general research and translation work, as well as providing an intelligent Japanese point of view on the Far Eastern situation. I know Norman regards him very highly.

KATE.

Mr. HOLLAND. This other memorandum seems to be from Kate Mitchell, also saying it would be better to get somebody from Tokyo.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Kate Mitchell's salary was in the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I am sorry, Senator Ferguson, I don't recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was she considered a minor or a major employee?

Mr. HOLLAND. In two different stages. She began in a very minor capacity as a sort of secretarial assistant. I would say in the last few years of her work there she was promoted to be a research assistant because by that time she had written a rather serious book on the industrialization of eastern Asia. I am afraid I don't recall what salary she was getting.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

MR. MANDEL. This is an original document dated November 22, 1934, on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to W. L. Holland, 306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, and it is signed by Edward C. Carter.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do you recall having received that document from Mr. Carter?

MR. HOLLAND. This seems to me to be an authentic letter which Mr. Carter sent me. I don't recall receiving it, but there is no doubt that I did.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this be received into the record.

SENATOR FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 589" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 589

(Penciled) SU
Carter

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HONOLULU, HAWAII

Chatham House, 10, St. James' Square, London, S. W. 1

November 22, 1934.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
306 Osaka Building, Tokyo.

DEAR BILL: Here are copies of Kantorovitch's letters to me of October 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st, and also of my replies. Would you, on my behalf, take up with Urumatsu the question of sending all of the Japanese IPR publications to Kantorovitch. Of course, the list is not large, but it is symbolical as well as actual, and it is of great importance that, at the earliest convenient date, everything that has been published in Japanese since the beginning of the Japanese IPR be sent to Moscow.

In my letter to Kantorovich, you will see the reasons that I have given for choosing New York instead of Honolulu as the depository for the Soviet publications. Ultimately I hope that there will be a Russian speaking member on the staff of both the Chinese and Japanese Councils, so that the fullest use can be made of materials in the Russian language.

I am counting on you, of course, also to explore with Urumatsu the question of whether the Japanese Council will want to have some Soviet publications sent to them. (Penciled.) We don't want to ask for any until we are sure they will be used.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward Carter.
EDWARD C. CARTER.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, this is Carter writing to you:

Here are copies of Kantorovitch's letters to me of October 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st and also of my replies. Would you on my behalf take up with Urumatsu the question of sending all of the Japanese IPR publications to Kantorovitch. Of course, the list is of great importance that, at the earliest convenient date, everything that has been published in Japanese since the beginning of the Japanese IPR be sent to Moscow.

Was it a practice of the institute to send all the records and files at the request of the Soviet council?

MR. HOLLAND. No; it was not the records and files, Mr. Morris. The practice was to exchange the publications. In other words, all of the national councils usually made a practice of sending complimentary copies of their publications to all of the other national councils. Kantorovitch as I recall it at this time, was the secretary of the Soviet

council which had only just recently been started. Mr. Carter apparently had been visiting there and was stirring me up to see that the Japanese IPR sent this new council their own publications; in other words, the back numbers, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. It was only the actual publications, nothing to do with the files.

Mr. HOLLAND. Nothing to do with the files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon of a two-page letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 23, 1934, addressed to A. J. Kantorovitch, 20 Basin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R. There is no signature. In the upper left-hand corner it says, "WLH for your information, ECC."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular document?

Mr. HOLLAND. Again I don't recall it; but it seems to me to be an authentic letter and is, I should judge, following up the practice which I just described a moment ago. In other words, Mr. Carter is here suggesting that this exchange process be continued and that the books received from the Soviet council be kept in the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you see the paragraph there, Mr. Holland, that begins, "New York has a great advantage over Honolulu"?

Mr. HOLLAND. Do you wish to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; would you please read that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes [reading]:

* * * As what may be a temporary depository, New York has a great advantage over Honolulu in that, in addition to a considerable Russian-speaking American population in New York, there are always a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested. The Pacific Council's Library can supplement the Russian collection—

and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent was that true, Mr. Holland, with respect to employees of the Amtorg?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't speak with any knowledge at all, Mr. Morris. I had nothing to do with these Soviet publications nor any contact myself with the Soviet consulate or Amtorg at that time. My assumption from that letter is that the assistance he refers to is assistance in the matter of translation, but I can't be sure. You would have to ask Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 590" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 590

W. L. H. For your information. E. C. C.

CHATHAM HOUSE,
10, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
London, S. W. 1., November 23, 1934.

A. J. KANTOROVICH,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MR. KANTOROVICH: This is in reply to your letter of October 20th, proposing a most interesting and useful exchange of publications between the Soviet group and the Pacific Council. Immediately I received your letter, I discussed the matter with several of my colleagues, including Frederick V. Field, the newly

elected secretary of the American Council, and Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, who serves jointly on the staff of the American and Pacific Councils.

In view of the fact that, at present, we have no Russian-speaking member on our staff in Honolulu, I have decided for the next two years to establish at New York the Pacific Council's depository for all Soviet and Russian language publications. Mr. Field has offered housing and free library service for the Pacific Council's Russian collection, so that during this two-year experimental period, I wish to have all of the Soviet publications that you are able to send, addressed *not* to Honolulu, but to: *Pacific Council's Library, 129, East 52nd Street, New York.*

Mrs. Barnes, who, as you know, has a good command of the Russian language, and has studied in the Soviet Union, will be in charge of the Russian collection, which you are aiding us to establish. As what may be a temporary depository, New York has a great advantage over Honolulu in that, in addition to a considerable Russian-speaking American population in New York, there are always a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested. The Pacific Council's Library can supplement the Russian collection in the New York Public Library and Library of the California University.

In recognition of the Pacific Council's making the American Council its depository for the Soviet publications which you described in your letter of October 20th, Mr. Field has undertaken to supply the Soviet IPR with copies of all the English language IPR publications and a small but very carefully selected number of English language books on the Pacific Area not published under the auspices of the IPR be also sent to you. I am hoping that if Mr. Field's first shipment of books from New York has not yet reached you, it will, nevertheless, be in Moscow well in advance of my arrival on December 23rd.

With reference to the rather extensive shelf of books in the general field of international affairs published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs here in London, I wish to report that I made a special appeal to the IPR Committee of the Royal Institute at its meeting on November 20th, immediately following my arrival in London. The Committee listened most sympathetically to my appeal, but, while favouring the recommendation in principle, they could not give an immediate affirmative answer because the matter has to be acted on both by the Finance Committees will probably be reached before I arrive in Moscow. I feel quite certain that some of their most important publications will be made available, though it may not be possible for them to donate their entire shelf. I ought to add that the secretary of the IPR Committee informed me that all the publications of the Royal Institute are sent automatically to the Library of the Communist Academy.

Copies of a few of the very recent books of the IPR were, I think, presented to your office by Miss Moore on her arrival in Moscow.

I am writing to the secretaries of the Japanese and Chinese Councils with reference to IPR literature in the Japanese and Chinese languages, but it may be that it will take a little time to work out a satisfactory basis of interchange with Shanghai and Tokyo because of the fear which a number of the police officials in some of the Far Eastern cities still have of Soviet scientific publications. It may pay to leave the final consummation of the arrangements till I am able to explore all aspects of the matter with my colleagues Liu in Shanghai and Urumatsu in Tokyo.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here four letters from Mr. Carter and one letter to Mr. Holland, which Mr. Mandel will identify and Mr. Holland will look at them, and may they be admitted into the record without comment, unless Mr. Holland may want to comment.

Will you identify those documents as documents having been taken from the files of the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. First we have a photostat of a document dated April 18, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland, signed Edward C. Carter. Second is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 5, 1937, addressed to Mr. Wm. L. Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. Then next

is an original letter on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations marked "urgent" dated February 8, 1937, addressed to Mr. William L. Holland, and signed by Edward C. Carter. Then we have a letter here dated January 9, 1935, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed A. J. Kantorovitch. Attached thereto is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dealing with a visit of the secretary general. It is headed "The Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R. (Soviet Council of the IPR)."

Finally, there is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 22, 1941, addressed to Mrs. Martha Czarnowska, with no signature, but the title here is research secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I wonder if you would identify those documents for the record, please.

Mr. HOLLAND. The first letter of April 18 from Mr. Carter appears to me to be an authentic letter which I received.

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. The second letter, the 5th of March, Mr. Carter to me, apparently referring to a copy of the proceedings of the trials of the Soviet generals, I don't recall but it seems to me to be an authentic letter.

The letter of February 8 from Mr. Carter to me, apparently suggesting a number of changes in a manuscript which Miss Moore seems to have had something to do, also seems to me to be an authentic letter.

The letter from Kantorovitch to me, addressed to me in Tokyo, January 9, 1935, the material sent along, a report on the activities of the Soviet council to be put in our house bulletin, IPR notes. That seems to be an authentic copy.

Finally, the letter of April 22, 1941, addressed by the research secretary to Mrs. Martha Czarnowska—

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who she is, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't—Oh, yes; I do now. I couldn't remember at first. This is the married name of the daughter of Dr. Ludwig Rajchman and she had prepared a book of maps on the Far East for us. These are my comments on the first draft of the maps, pointing out errors. I think undoubtedly the letter is mine.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Rajchman's connection with the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. Rajchman so far as I know had no connection, but I believe he may have attended one conference as an observer, possibly in 1931 when he was working for the Chinese Nationalist Government on behalf of the League of Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen the testimony in our record about the recommendation that he attend the Mont Tremblant conference?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You know of no other activity of his?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I met him once or twice in New York on casual visits when he had great pride in his daughter and spoke to me a number of times about how pleased he was at the book, these maps that she had done.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now with the Polish Soviet delegation, is he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't know that. I thought he was connected with the International Children's Emergency Fund.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he with the Polish delegation now?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. He could be in that capacity, but he could be representing Poland?

Mr. HOLLAND. He could be in both, surely.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 591-A, 591-B, 591-C, 591-D, 591-E" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 591-A

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam	London	Manila	Moscow	New York	Paris	Shanghai
	Sydney	Tokyo	Toronto	Wellington		

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

APRIL 18, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,

Care of Giannini Foundation, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: It is difficult to condense all that Cripps said, for I think I must have heard him speak a total of five hours.

In general his analysis is similar to that of Holland, Field, and Carter.

I did not hear his talk on India, but learned from Shridharani and Margaret Taylor that he seemed to have a pretty rounded understanding of Indian problems and a high regard for Nehru and Gandhi. He is reported to fear that the premature launching of civil disobedience might lead to a prolonged and bloody civil war.

With reference to the United Front he feels that in the present period it is growing stronger and that the Generalissimo is disciplining the rightists. He is agnostic as to the continuation of Kuomintang-Communists cooperation after Japanese pressure is withdrawn.

He gave a vivid picture of Sinkiang and its two-fisted ruler. Trade for geographical reasons is primarily with the U. S. S. R. There are Russian experts, but as far as he could discover no Russians in administrative positions. The relations between Sinkiang and Chungking are formal, correct, and cooperative, but the ruler in Sinkiang has pretty nearly full independence. He is keener on Sinkiang for the Sinkiangese than he is for either Russia or China, but he accepts the Generalissimo as his chief.

Cripps gave an inside picture of the reasons for the breakdown of the Anglo-French negotiations in Moscow before the war. He feels that the British could have come to terms with Russia if they had treated the Russians as equals instead of inferiors. Just before the Finnish-Russian war began Cripps was trying to bring London and Moscow together. But the efforts of the British Embassy in Stockholm to dissuade the Finns from coming to terms with Moscow prevented his being, I gather, a mediator between Maisky and Halifax.

In Chungking he talked to the Soviet Ambassador who personally approved of Cripps going on to Moscow from Sinkiang. This was presumably approved by Halifax. Cripps had long talks with Molotov and on his return to Chungking with, I assume, the approval of Clark Kerr, sent a lengthy cable to London urging in the strongest terms renewed effort on the part of London to establish some relations with Moscow.

I imagine that supplementing his cable will be one of the principal aims of Cripps on his return to London. He and Geoffrey Wilson sailed last Saturday on the *Rea*. I assume that he will get home before Italy comes off the fence.

Cripps spoke in high terms of CIC and of the educational possibilities of the CIC if properly staffed as a method of adult education in democracy.

Cripps had talks with Arita, Grew, Craigie, and others in Tokyo and, I think, felt that Grew and Craigie in their two speeches had the same objectives but that Grew had done it in the right way and Craigie in the wrong way.

After Tokyo, Cripps visited Formosa. And he has seen a great many people in Washington, Baltimore, and New York. To a large and predominantly right-

wing dinner at Council House he made a very able talk principally on the Far East, and all of the capitalist members with whom I talked afterward were full of admiration for the balance, vividness, and accuracy of his analysis. No one in the room seemed to share the bitter view of Cripps that some English tory and some English labor leaders take.

I myself am worried at the continued hostility to the U. S. S. R. on the part of the Washington and London governments. I am afraid that if the British do not take a different line in their relations with Moscow they will suffer.

It seems to me that it would be a great mistake for the Allies to go to war with the U. S. S. R., even though some of them may think that the Allied cause would more quickly gain American support if the Allies were fighting both Russia and Germany instead of Germany alone.

Mrs. Kittredge has just had a letter from her husband who was in Oslo the week before the invasion and left Oslo as the Germans came in. During that week end he saw the head of the university, the Foreign Minister, the Trustees of the Nobel Fund, and many similar people. They were all feeling a new strength, a new sense of Scandinavian solidarity. They felt that Scandinavia had now once more found its soul as a result of the Soviet invasion of Finland and the German sinking of Scandinavian ships, and now Norway was going to gird itself so as to make certain that there should be no further German aggression. Apparently not a single Norwegian of all those that Kittredge saw had the slightest suspicion during that week end of what was to befall them on Tuesday.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—Unless you get the information from other sources, please do not report to others what I have said regarding Cripps' negotiations with Maisky and Molotov.

EXHIBIT No. 591-B

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 5, 1937.

MR. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
*Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, California.*

DEAR BILL: You will, think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collgium of the Supreme Court. January 23-January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.

I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires will want to read it also.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the Library of the I. P. R. in San Francisco.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 591-C

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam	Honolulu	London	Manila	Moscow	New York	Paris
	Sydney	Tokyo	Toronto	Wellington		

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 8, 1937.

Air Mail.
(Penned:) Urgent.

DEAR BILL: Enclosed is a copy of Motylev's letter to me of the 15th of January regarding the manuscript for the Soviet chapter of Problems of the Pacific. As a result of a conversation with Harriet I have just wired you as follows:

Air mail me copy all you have written in problems regarding Takayanagi-Motylev discussion.

When you read Motylev's letter you will realize that Harriet and I are helpless in dealing with Motylev's paragraph 4 without seeing how you have treated this incident.

Now we will deal with Motylev's points as far as is necessary seriatim.

Harriet is mildly upset that after we had all voted in favor of eliminating her first paragraph the manuscript was sent to Motylev with this still intact. It is easy, therefore, for Harriet to accept Motylev's strong plea for eliminating this. She desired that it be eliminated and thought it had.

(1) Harriet feels that we should put Motylev's reply to Takayanagi in direct quotes (unless you have done it in your chapter) but that we should not yield to Motylev with reference to direct quotes of his other statements for two reasons; first, we have used direct quotes for a good many of his statements; second, where we have not done so his English was so involved that Harriet feels indirect speech more successfully expresses his ideas.

(2) Harriet is willing out of deference to Motylev to give the spokesman in her chapter greater authority by building them up in the manner proposed by Motylev, especially in relation to the German-Japanese discussion. You can use your own judgment about adopting a similar procedure in your own chapter.

(3) Harriet feels that we can include Yoshizawa's reply to Mr. Sarraut as proposed by Motylev.

(4) If you have quoted Takayanagi in full in your chapter, Harriet's proposal is that she quote Motylev's reply in full in her chapter and cross-reference it to the quotation of your chapter. This would end the Soviet chapter. Does such a proposal meet with your approval?

(5) Motylev's suggest accepted.

(6) 1st paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

2nd paragraph—Instead of putting paragraphs from the Constitution into the body of the text, my proposal is that they be quoted in a footnote. Harriet would recommend that we merely make a footnote to these clauses instead of quoting them *if* you would prefer to save space, (Penned) otherwise Harriet accepts my proposal.

(7) 1st paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

2nd paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

3rd paragraph—Harriet proposes to change the sentence regarding "dumping" from a statement of fact to a point raised by members of the Conference. In its new form it will read "Some members asserted that in the past certain markets have been affected by so-called Soviet dumping."

4th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

5th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

6th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

7th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted by omitting.

8th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted (His original manuscript used both terms indiscriminately).

9th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

10th paragraph—We assume that Motylev's suggestion is carried out in substance in the various chapters and that, therefore, there is no need of an appendix of Chairmen's statements. Before writing Motylev, However, we would like from you a clarification of this point.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

Enclosure.

(Penned :) Please reply by air at the earliest moment.

(EXHIBIT No. 591-D)

JANUARY 9, 1935.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
I. P. R. Notes, Editorial and Publication Office,
306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, Japan.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I enclose herewith the quarterly report of the Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R. to I. P. R. NOTES, which was promised in our letter of December 20, and about which Mr. E. C. Carter cabled you from London.

I hope it will reach you in due time to appear in the next issue of the I. P. R. NOTES.

Sincerely yours,

[s] A. J. KANTOROVICH.

THE PACIFIC INSTITUTE OF U. S. S. R. (SOVIET COUNCIL OF I. P. R.)

VISIT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

At the end of December 1934, the Soviet Council was visited by Mr. E. C. Carter, Secretary General of the IPR, who stayed in Moscow from December 20, till the 31st. The Secretary General's party included the following members:

Miss Kate Mitchell, permanent private secretary.

Mr. Stephanus V. C. Morris of Lenox, Mass.

Mr. Simon Wingfield Digby of Sherborne Castel, Dorset, England.

The party of the Secretary General was joined by Miss Harriet Moore, a member of the IPR staff, who is at the present time a resident in Moscow where she is doing research work on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

On December 29, the Secretary General was received by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov.

During his visit the Secretary General had two conferences with the Praesidium of the Soviet Council (Mr. V. E. Motylev, President; Mr. G. N. Voitinsky, Vice President; Mr. A. J. Kantorovich, Secretary General of the Council), and was in daily intercourse with Mr. Kantorovich.

The Secretary General availed himself of the opportunity to renew his contact with different scientific institutions of the U. S. S. R. partly connected with the Soviet Council of the IPR. Mr. E. C. Carter and his party have had interviews with The Chamber of Commerce, The Institute of World Economics and World Politics of the Communist Academy, The Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage, The All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, The Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas, The Institute of Oceanography, The Institute of Soviet Construction and Law, two Agrarian Institutes. Some of these institutions the Secretary General visited in person, while some sent representatives who took part in conferences arranged at the office of the Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R.

During the Secretary General's stay in Moscow the Praesidium of the Soviet Council had the opportunity of discussing and adjusting several questions pertaining to the current work of the Soviet Section and its plans for the future.

CONFERENCE PREPARATION

During the Secretary General's visit the question of the agenda of the next IPR Conference and of the data papers to be prepared for this Conference has been discussed in Moscow.

The Praesidium of the Soviet Council informed the Secretary General that it has no objections to the agenda as stated in the circular letter of the Secretary General dated Amsterdam, December 18.

However, the Soviet Group does not agree with the proposal of the American Council to shift the question of International Status of Manchoukuo to item "C" of the agenda (Soviet Far East). The Soviet Council's suggestion is to leave this question as originally proposed by the Secretary General's circular or to transfer it to items "D" and "A".

EXCHANGE OF PUBLICATIONS

With the assistance of the Secretary General, an agreement has been tentatively established between the American Council and the Soviet Unit for exchange of publications along the following lines:

1. Exchange of all publications issued by the respective Councils.
2. Exchange of all important books published in both countries dealing with the Far East.
3. (Subject to further adjustment.) Exchange of a collection of standard books of a general character on the Soviet Union and U. S. A., respectively.

* * * * * *

PUBLICATIONS

The following monographs are in the course of preparation by the Soviet Council, as part of the documentation for the 1936 conference:

1. Economic Struggle on the Pacific Ocean, by Professor V. E. Motylev, President of the Soviet Council.
2. The National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Soviet Far East, by Mr. S. M. Dimantshtein, Head of the Institute of Minor Nationalities.
3. Results and Prospective Plans of Socialist Construction in the Soviet Far East, by the research staff of the State Planning Commission in the Soviet Far East.

It is expected that these monographs will be ready in Russian towards the end of August or the beginning of September of the current year. Later on they will be translated into English and published in this language.

At the same time the Soviet Council has decided to proceed with the publication of a symposium of articles on a number of important questions pertaining to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.

The preliminary outline of contents is as follows:

Relations between Japan and China during the World War.

Reasons of the Denunciation of the Washington Treaty and the Situation in the Far East.

Problem of Unification of China.

Social and Economic Consequences of the War and the Crisis in Japan.

Anglo-Japanese Struggle for the World Markets.

The Silver Problem and the Colonial Countries in the Far East.

Ideological War Preparation in Japan.

Economic, Social and Political Development of the Soviet Far East during the First and Second Five Year Plans.

National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the Northern Regions of Siberia.

Establishment of the Autonomous Jewish District in Birobidjan.

Significance of the Great Northern Sea Passage.

The symposium will be published in English and will probably consist of about three or four hundred pages. It is expected that the manuscript will be ready at about the middle of the current year.

* * * * * *

MISCELLANEOUS

The Secretary General of the Soviet Council started to collect a library of Russian and Foreign books on the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.

A complete catalogue has been prepared of all literature published in Russian in the Soviet Union beginning with 1922 on questions pertaining to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, including those on the Soviet Far East.

* * * * * *

On invitation from the Secretary General of the IPR the Soviet Council decided to undertake the preparation of a report on the subject of the Legal Status of Aliens in the U. S. S. R. to be incorporated into an international handbook on the subject to be published by the IPR.

Similarly on the suggestion of the Secretary General the Soviet Council will submit as a contribution to the international study on this subject a report on communications in the Soviet Far East.

Both reports are expected to be ready around March 15th.

* * * * *

The Soviet Group suggested that all National Councils prepare a brief bibliographical survey of the literature on subjects which are of interest for the IPR published in their respective countries, which surveys could be circulated every three months or so.

EXHIBIT No. 591-E

Copy to ED

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., April 22, 1941.

Mrs. MARTA CZARNOWSKA,
*The Lodge, 8080 Rockville Pike,
Bethesda, Md.*

DEAR MRS. CZARNOWSKA: Thank you very much for your letter of April 16 and for the five maps. I have now had an opportunity to examine these with some care, and as a result have decided to send them back to you instead of sending them to our New York office as I had originally intended.

I am doing this because, as you will see from the pencilled annotations on the maps, there are a number of errors which ought to be corrected. In addition to the points I have marked, I am sorry to note that there are also a number of puzzling inconsistencies between one map and another, e. g., your location of principal Australian railways differs somewhat as between maps 3 and 4. In map 5, although you show the principal Malayan and Thailand railways you omit the coastal line of Indo-China and also the important east-west line running east from Chuchow almost to Hangchow and Ningpo in eastern China. Moreover, you show the railways across northern Manchuria, but not the important south Manchurian and Korean lines. Incidentally in this map I should prefer you to include the principal lines in the Japanese occupied regions. In maps 3 and 4, you show a line running from Bangkok into southern Indo-China, whereas the line actually stops at the frontier. You also show a railway running south from the Trans-Siberian to Ulanbator, but I doubt very much whether this railway has been constructed.

In map 1, you show the Chinese east-west railway from Chuchow to Hangchow, as if it were uninterrupted, whereas actually several miles of it are under Japanese control at Nangchang. On this map you also use the French "Baie de Cam Ranh" instead of the English, Cam Ranh Bay. I am also puzzled to know what the word "Hungsuhi" just below Kunming refers to and also why you have used abbreviations for towns like Changsha, Kweilin, etc., when there seems to be plenty of room to print them in full.

On Map 2, I wonder why you have given the names of tin mines in Burma and the Netherlands Indies but not in the other countries, and similarly why you have not indicated the location of oil wells in Burma. It will be necessary to add an explanatory note to map 2, indicating that you have included India, south China and Australia as part of southeast Asia. Most definitions of southeast Asia exclude those areas.

I note that you mostly use the word "Thai" instead of the more correct English form Thailand, even in cases where there is room to print the full name. In map 4, it would be desirable to substitute the word "Auckland" for "Devonport" in New Zealand, as the latter is simply a suburb of Auckland. For the French island Uvea northeast of Fiji you should either use the native names Uvea and Futuna, or the English names Wallis and Horne. The southern part of the Solomon group is British and the northern half is part of the Australian mandated territory. Western Samoa should be called New Zealand mandate and not British. You should also include the important phosphate island Nauru on the equator west of the Gilberts.

These errors and inconsistencies are so numerous that I feel it is essential for you to correct them before I send them to our New York office, as otherwise they may create a rather bad impression on our editorial staff. I am somewhat surprised that you did not give me the opportunity to examine the preliminary sketches of the maps so that I could have pointed out these matters in advance

and thus saved you the trouble of making corrections in the finished drawings. I hope it will be possible for you to make these corrections promptly and return the maps to me for further examination before I send them to New York. In the meantime, I am authorising our treasurer to send you a preliminary payment of \$75 and will instruct her to send the balance on receipt of the corrected drawings. Until these corrections are made, I think we had better postpone definite plans for doing additional maps, although I think it is probably that we shall want you to do at least two more of the whole Pacific area, showing principal lines of communication and transport.

I am sorry to say that it has not yet been possible for us to make satisfactory arrangements for the text to accompany these maps. However, we have now secured a competent person and hope to be able to persuade him to do work so that the text and the maps together could be issued as a pamphlet late this summer.

While I agree with you that it would have been preferable to have a new and up to date edition of the Atlas of Far Eastern Politics, it was financially impossible for us to arrange this, and accordingly we adopted the second best procedure of importing the 375 remaining copies of the English edition. We shall probably include an explanatory note in these, stating that a supplementary pamphlet will be issued later this year. I am afraid there would be no use in our asking Hudson to write the additional text as he is so busy with war work that he had to abandon another piece of writing that he had begun for the IPR. The copies of the English edition are probably on the way, and I am desperately hoping that they will not be torpedoed. Since there is no question of an American edition (as Distinct from the English edition which we have purchased outright from Faber and Faber) it will not be necessary for you to send me a copy of your contract.

I am not sure when I shall be returning to New York, but there is a possibility that I may make a short visit toward the end of the summer. I shall, of course, let you know when I am coming. In the meantime, please do not hesitate to call at our New York office if you want further information or books. Miss Downing, Miss Greene, Miss Farley, Miss Porter, Mr. Greenberg, Mr. Grajdanzev, and Mr. Matsue will all be willing to help you on specific points. In the meantime, however, the important thing is to complete the corrections on the present maps.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

— — — — —, *Research Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Marks, I have here a score of other documents. It would save the time of everybody if we could work out a stipulation in connection with letters to be introduced into the record. I think Senator Ferguson has some questions to ask possibly in connection with your statement.

Mr. MARKS. If Mr. Holland wants to make a comment on any of these letters, will there be a way we can do that?

Mr. MORRIS. Surely.

Senator, we are going to stipulate as to the introduction of other documents, but I thought you perhaps would like to ask Mr. Holland some questions now on the basis of the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I have gone over the statement but I don't care to ask any questions at this time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Might I inquire, Mr. Morris, perhaps to facilitate our work, in the case of letters originating with Mr. Carter, if we are going to do it by the stipulation method, would it not be just as easy to ask his to identify his own letter? I have no objection to this, but usually it would seem to be better if the sender of the letter can identify it. That is of course for you to decide.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you see Mr. Carter in the near future?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one letter that he is very anxious to have, and we have now found the letter. You can take with you a copy if you like.

Mr. HOLLAND. Very good.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the July 10, 1938, letter that has been disturbing him. I will give you one and send one to him, both.

Mr. HOLLAND. All right, thank you.

May I inquire as a matter of time-saving, Mr. Chairman, if I should wish to make comment on any of these letters that we go over together, may I also make comments on any other letters affecting me which have been previously introduced into the testimony and about which I have not been questioned?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be understood if you send it in and it is in writing, it is considered as part of the testimony and under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I will be glad to do that, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. That it is sworn testimony.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Fairbank was on the stand here he introduced a memorandum in connection with an explanation on your part of episodes that had taken place involving him. At the time he tried to have that introduced into the record, it was pointed out to him that the testimony was that of Mr. Holland and it wasn't sworn testimony and should be deferred until you were here. Are you acquainted with that document?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am. I have a carbon copy of it here.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you swear that the answers given in those—are there four?

Mr. HOLLAND. Four; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are those four points true to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received in the record at this time?

Senator FERGUSON. Under those circumstances it may be received as sworn testimony.

Mr. HOLLAND. Do you have Mr. Fairbank's original copy?

Mr. MORRIS. We have the original copy.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 592," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 592

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

FEBRUARY 23, 1952.

Professor JOHN K. FAIRBANK,

41 Winthrop St., Cambridge 38, Mass.

DEAR JOHN: Here are my explanations or comments on the references to you which appear on pages 436, 482, 651, and 652 of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Page 436: Israel Epstein's letter to me refers to you as having come in from Kweilin and of his having received something, through you, from "H. and Elsie." Epstein wrote this note to me in Chungking when I was visiting there in September 1943 with Mr. E. C. Carter at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. Epstein was then an accredited foreign correspondent in Chungking (he wrote some articles for the New York Times, I recall) and I had asked him and some Chinese colleagues, including Dr. Ta Chen, the well-known sociologist, to collect material for an I. P. R. study of wartime labor problems in China. Epstein was

also doing some work for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives in China and he gave me some of their field reports to bring back to their New York office. His reference to "H. and Elsie" means Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, both of which were then working in Kweilin for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. I assume that you brought back some of the field reports from Kweilin to Epstein in Chungking and that these were among the reports which he gave me to bring back to New York.

Page 482: Lawrence K. Rosinger, then on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, had at my invitation written a research report for the I. P. R. on China's Wartime Politics (later published by the Princeton University Press). Following the regular practice of the I. P. R. I sent copies of the first draft to a number of qualified people for criticism. Among these were several Government officials, including John Carter Vincent, Alger Hiss (both of whom were then concerned with Chinese affairs), and yourself. From the dates, it would seem that when Rosinger wrote (Dec. 30, 1943), I actually had not yet sent you the MS, because (as appears on page 479 of the Hearings) it was not until Feb. 21, 1944, that I sent it to you, apparently because other people had been slow sending in their comments. Rosinger's study was a competent piece of scholarly work, did not propagate any communist line, and was not based on classified reports. It was favorably reviewed in the press and learned journals.

Page 651: I was writing Prof. Chien T'uan-sheng, the well-known Chinese Political Scientist, then teaching at the Southwest Associated University in Kunming about his research report for the IPR on Chinese Government and Politics (later published by the Harvard University Press). Because of the great uncertainties and delays in sending bulky manuscripts by ordinary mail from China at that time (April 1944), I suggested as a precaution that the author might try to have it sent by the diplomatic bag to you in Washington. This would have involved Chien's getting someone in the U. S. Consulate or in one of the government agencies in Kunming to forward the MS. Because of the abnormal state of the mails, such favors were sometimes extended to prominent scholars in China. Whether a draft of (initialled: WLH) the MS was actually sent in this way I do not recall, but I think it very unlikely, as I remember that the completion of the study was delayed for several years and you will recall that Chien himself finished the final draft in Cambridge about 1947. I certainly have no record or recollection that any draft of his MS was received by the IPR office via the diplomatic bag or via you. As you know, Chien was a highly respected person in Kuomintang circles and there was nothing in his report of a pro-communist nature, nor was any of it based on classified materials. This seems to be a case of my having suggested a possible course of action which in fact was not adopted because of the author's delay in finishing his study.

Page 652: Here I apparently sent you a letter addressed to Liu Yu-wan, then Secretary of the China Institute of Pacific Relations and asked you to inquire whether it could be taken by hand or sent via the APO to Liu in Chungking. What the letter to Liu was about I don't recall, as he was the person with whom I normally corresponded about all IPR business in China. Whether you did in fact send it to him by hand or via APO I also don't know. I note that I gave you an opportunity to decline my request. Liu was not and is not a communist sympathizer. In fact he later became the Nationalist Chinese Minister in Korea and is now on the Nationalist Chinese delegation at the United Nations. My reason for asking you to forward the letter to him was, of course, to avoid the very long delays of the ordinary mails (sometimes over three months).

Sincerely,

[s] Bill

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary General*.

P. S.—I would remind you that during the period covered by the above letters I was research secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations and that the China Institute of Pacific Relations was one of the most important national councils of the organization. My colleagues and I were making special efforts at this time to keep the China Council alive and participating actively in the over-all IPR research program. The China IPR was never pro-communist. On the contrary it was largely supported by Dr. H. H. Kung and Dr. T. V. Soong.

[s] WLH.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else, Mr. Holland, that you would like to request the committee to do at this time? The files will be available. The bulk of the files will be available to you starting

today. I think if you get in touch with Mr. Hasser here, he will try to make the working conditions as agreeable as possible. I assure you that they are not agreeable at any time. In that way you can show us things that should go into the record in order to correct a wrong impression given by any letter, if that is the case.

Mr. MARKS. Do you know whether you now have plans to call any more people concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. MARKS. Counsel would like time after the close of your receipt of testimony about the institute to prepare a statement or to advise our client.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Marks, it is assumed, however, at all times that while this thing has been going on you have been taking cognizance of the matter and making preparations.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, but until today of course we haven't had the advantage of being able to examine our files and to examine what is going on in the light of what the files show.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, at the same time it is understood by the committee that while these hearings are going on you are taking cognizance and preparing whatever answers you consider appropriate.

Mr. MARKS. We are doing our best under the circumstances. There is the question of getting hold of transcripts, and so forth. There are apparently only five printed parts. Again I must say that it is going to take us a while, just as it has taken you quite a while, to go over those files.

Senator FERGUSON. How long does counsel think it will take?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know what they look like, Senator Ferguson. I have never seen them. I imagine they are pretty voluminous. I would like to hear Mr. Morris give an estimate of how long it would take to go over the files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland requested a month in his letter. That is what the committee has agreed upon.

Mr. MARKS. I wonder whether Mr. Holland was referring to the month that we requested to prepare something in the nature of a defense after the testimony had been closed.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will have to refer back to the phraseology of the letter. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. The month referred to by the committee, Mr. Marks, is that as of today the files are available, and they will be available for 30 days. That doesn't mean that is all it is, but that is the way it stands.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way it stands at the present time.

Mr. MARKS. I understand. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one letter that Mr. Carter had particular reference to. A copy of that may be picked up today.

Mr. MARKS. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. I can't think of anything else.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to have it go on record that while in the past I have registered some objections to procedure, I feel that what Mr. Morris has just proposed is very fair and satisfactory, and not only that, but Senator Watkins' actions this morning in permitting the two previous witnesses to read their statements is very much appreciated by us.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to read anything now into the record?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have already done that as far as I think it was necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sorry my work today has been such that I could not be here except now.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that it is well that the record shows, Mr. Chairman, that if you do care to have the privilege of reading it, the statement has been given out to the press, it does go into the record with the full force as if it had been read into the record, and I think that very little would be gained if you did read it. Senator Eastland was pressed for time.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I say, if you want to read it now—

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate your offer. I don't believe it is necessary, sir. The only point I would put forward as a request—I know the committee will have to pass on it—is that in line with the earlier letter from Senator McCarran the committee do give favorable consideration to the idea of introducing the testimonial letters we have received and also those letters and the replies there which concern people whom you are not going to call to give direct testimony. In other words, where people have been accused and are not in a position to come and testify for themselves, if they can submit a statement, even though technically it may seem hearsay, I feel it is only fair that it should be taken into account. But that is for the committee to decide.

Mr. MORRIS. The only one we haven't settled on in that category is Mr. Bisson and Mr. Barnes.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; in that particular group.

Mr. MORRIS. Barnes has not been connected with the institute since when?

Mr. HOLLAND. 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. He has been a member of the board of trustees since then.

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I think not.

The other three documents, there are three memoranda prepared by me analyzing three IPR pamphlets in an attempt to show that earlier descriptions of them in the testimony were not, in my opinion, balanced. If necessary, I would like to have the privilege of swearing to those three documents at the back of that green book.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you swear to those?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will receive them as part of the evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Those three publications.

Mr. HOLLAND. They are all memoranda on the three publications. (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 593A, No. 593B, No. 593C," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 593-A

MEMORANDUM ON "LAND OF THE SOVIETS" BY MARGUERITE A. STEWART

During testimony by Louis Budenz before the McCarran Subcommittee, August 22, 1951 (Hearings, Vol. 10, p. 1101 et seq.), the Subcommittee's research director, Benjamin Mandel, read aloud three excerpts from "Land of the So-

viets" by Marguerite A. Stewart, and published in 1942 by the Webster Publishing Co., for the American IPR. These were taken from a larger collection of such excerpts which was filed for the record as Exhibit No. 142. Budenz was asked to comment on the excerpts and said they represented "thoroughly a Communist point of view."

Mrs. Stewart denies this emphatically, stating that "Land of the Soviets" represented no viewpoint but her own. Both Mr. and Mrs. Stewart affirm that they have never been Communists or Communist sympathizers. In their association with the IPR, they have given no evidence of Communist sympathies. Budenz's comment was made on the basis of three short passages taken out of context and quoted by Mandel. There is nothing to indicate that Budenz had ever read the book which he branded as "Communist."

During the testimony of Raymond Dennett (Hearings, Vol. 17, pp. 1786-92), further excerpts from "Land of the Soviets" were read into the record by Mandel. The excerpts cited by Mandel in Exhibit No. 142 are obviously selected as being favorable to the Soviet Union. Mandel failed to mention that the book also contained many passages giving the darker side of the Russian picture. Examples are given on the attached sheets.

In her introductory chapter (p. 2), Mrs. Stewart stated:

"Americans * * * want the facts, both bad and good, about the Russian people and the system under which they live. Most people have become confused, at one time or another, by conflicting descriptions of life in the Soviet Union. Some returning visitors have pictured it as a land of perfection, and others have described it in the blackest possible terms. As a matter of fact, neither is correct. Like other countries, Russia has brilliant successes as well as dark failures in its record."

This impartial approach is not that of a Communist. But since Mrs. Stewart sought to give both sides of a complex picture, it is obviously possible to go through her book and pick out isolated passages showing Russia in either a favorable or an unfavorable light.

Another important fact about the book which Mandel did not mention is that it was published in 1942. Since 1942 many things have happened which have changed the climate of American opinion about Russia. If Mrs. Stewart were to write, and the IPR to publish, a book about Russia in 1951, its content and tone would be different from those of a book published nine years ago.

In 1942 the United States was fighting a war and the Soviet Union was its ally. At that time government officials, leaders of all parties, businessmen, and military men, including Winston Churchill and General MacArthur, were warmly praising the Soviet war effort. Our American ambassador to Russia was lavish in his praise of the Soviets and their achievements. Whatever their private opinions of the Soviet system, patriotic Americans were refraining from hostile statements which might disrupt the inter-Allied cooperation that was vitally necessary to win the war. This book sought to give a sympathetic picture of life in the Soviet Union, although not an uncritical one. At that time, many American business and political leaders were praising Russia in much more unqualified terms than did Mrs. Stewart in this book.

During the war many Americans hoped that peaceful cooperation between Russia and the democratic countries would be possible in the postwar period. This hope was doomed to disappointment by the aggressive policies pursued by Russia. The virtual conquest by Russia of Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, the provocative actions of Russia in Eastern Germany incidents like the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty and the arrest of William Oatis, Soviet military aid to North Korea and China—such things are uppermost in Americans' minds when they think of Russia today, and it is hard to remember the days when everyone was cheering Russian victories at Stalingrad. But as none of these events had happened in 1942, it is obvious that Mrs. Stewart could not include them in her book, nor could they have affected her attitude at that time. It is clearly unfair to judge an author in the light of events which had not occurred at the time she wrote, or to brand as Communist a hope and assumption which, though it was later to be proved illusory, was held by many patriotic Americans in the war years.

During a discussion of "Land of the Soviets" (Hearing, Vol. 17, p. 1786), Mr. Morris, counsel for the committee, said: "*It is important, Mr. Chairman, to know whether or not this ['Land of the Soviets'] is a typical publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.*" Nevertheless the committee failed to bring out in public testimony facts which clearly indicate that this pamphlet is *not* typical of the publications of the Institute, or even of the series of high-school

texts of which it formed a part. It is not typical of institute publications because (1) it is not a research volume, (2) it deals with the Soviet Union and not with a purely Pacific or Asian country.

Russia does not fall within the Institute's normal area of study, except for its policies in the Far East and that part of its territory which lies in Asia. Only a tiny fraction of the Institute's hundreds of publications deal with Russia as such, and in its research program it has never attempted to survey conditions, problems, and policies of the U. S. S. R. as a whole. The pamphlet, "Land of the Soviets", which is not a research publication, was prepared at the special request of the Webster Publishing Company, which wanted a pamphlet on Russia because of public interest in that country during the war years.

This pamphlet was one of a series of nine high-school texts published by the American IPR and the Webster Publishing Co. between 1942 and 1946. Some of them were written by well-known anti-Communist writers. The full list is as follows:

"Modern Japan" by William Henry Chamberlin (1942)

"Changing China" by George E. Taylor (1942)

"Peoples of the China Seas" by Elizabeth Allerton Clark (1942)

"Land of the Soviets" by Marguerite A. Stewart (1942)

"Land Down Under" by C. Hartley Grattan (1943)

"Twentieth Century India" by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal (1944)

"Behind the Open Door" by Foster Rhea Dulles (1944)

"Spotlight on the Far East" by Joseph M. Bernstein (1945)

"China Yesterday and Today" by Eleanor Lattimore (1946)

So far as the Institute is aware none of these pamphlets, with the exception of "Land of the Soviets," has ever even been accused of containing Communist bias. Yet this one pamphlet has been singled out for extended discussion by the committee and held up by it for public censure. The effect of this procedure is to undermine public confidence in the hundreds of Institute publications against which no charges whatsoever have been made or could be made.

W. L. HOLLAND,

Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations.

NEW YORK, October 6, 1951.

EXCERPTS FROM LAND OF THE SOVIETS

"* * * Even the Russians themselves admit that their results (of economic planning) have not been altogether satisfactory. They have had great difficulty keeping a balance between industry and agriculture. Faulty plans have led to breakdowns and waste. They have suffered from a shortage of skilled labor and have had difficulty preventing men from changing jobs too rapidly. Their overhead costs, overstaffing, and red tape are well known. Many more man-hours are consumed in a Russian factory than for a similar quantity of production in the United States. Spoilage and breakage, while declining, have been high" (pages 49-50).

"And all Europe was aware of the fact that many peasants in the Ukraine and other districts had bitterly resisted the Soviet farm program in the early 1930's. Hadn't they killed off most of their cattle and eaten them as a protest against efforts to put them on collective farms under the First Five-Year Plan? Hadn't they brought about a serious lack of foods in 1933 by refusing to sow sufficient crops to feed the cities? And, as a punishment, hadn't the Moscow government forcibly removed thousands of offenders to new farms in Siberia or to dig canals or fell trees in the far-off Arctic?" (page 53).

"* * * in the middle 1920's * * * the peasants suddenly took the position that they wouldn't sell their products unless they could be assured of an equal amount of manufactured goods in exchange. Since factory materials were still scarce and expensive, it was impossible to comply with these demands, whereupon the peasants—particularly the wealthier ones, who could afford to—hoarded their grain, refusing to sell it to the government at the price established by law" (page 55).

"As a result of this overenthusiastic organizing, the first year fifty-five percent of the peasants found themselves members of kolkhozes, when in all too many cases they were not sure they wanted to join. * * * The situation was made worse by the fact that the government, which had planned to collectivize only about twenty percent of the peasant population that year, was not prepared for such a large number. It didn't have enough tractors * * * fully half the

new collectives could not get equipment at all. The peasants felt tricked and cheated" (pages 57-58).

"People in other countries have been bitterly critical, not so much of the collectives themselves, as of the punishments the Soviets meted out to those who opposed the kolkhoz movement. The government made serious mistakes" (page 59).

"By far the most serious example of organized resistance with which the Soviets had to cope was the sabotage (sab-o-tazh), or intentional destruction of property, of some of the large peasants of the rich Ukraine. In protest against the large proportion of grain they had had to sell to the government, which was at that time storing grain as an insurance in case of a possible attack at the hands of Japan, they suddenly refused to cultivate more land than was necessary for their personal needs" (page 60).

"* * * the agricultural policy of the Soviets in the years following 1918 had been ruthless and drastic" (page 54).

"The Supreme Soviet, however, is not the national lawmaking body in the sense that our Congress is. The Supreme Soviet usually meets for a few days twice a year, during which time it takes many actions almost without debate. The real decisions are made elsewhere, and the Supreme Soviet does little more than ratify them. All important matters have been threshed out in advance within the Communist Party" (pages 65-66).

"In actual practice citizens are not yet always assured of these basic rights. Critics of the Soviet Union have charged that they were set forth in the Constitution solely for propaganda purposes. They declare that these rights have frequently been violated by the Government. What does freedom of speech amount to, they ask, when no Russian is permitted to criticize basic government policy or to form a capitalist party to rival the Communist Party? And how can you have freedom of the press when all newspapers and magazines are controlled by the government? And what about the purge (purj) of 1933-36 when thousands of Soviet citizens were seized and their homes searched—was this in keeping with the Constitution? These are basic questions. Few will deny that the Soviet press is rigidly controlled or that the Russians do not interpret freedom of speech to include opposition to government policies" (page 71).

"It is true, too, that Russians of every walk of life were caught in the net of the purge. No one knows how many were tried and sentenced. Charged with plotting with foreign agents to overthrow the government and committing acts of sabotage, they were spirited away from their homes and imprisoned. Scientists, engineers, writers were brought to trial. * * * There were competent western observers who, while convinced of the guilt of some of the prisoners, expressed the belief that many of those who confessed were not guilty but were being punished as a sort of political vengeance" (pages 72-74).

"People are still quite free to attend places of worship. But all possible means of propaganda were employed—through the press, the radio, theater, movies, lectures, and anti-religious museums—against the church. Sunday and religious holidays were done away with. A Society of the Godless was formed" (page 79).

"Both countries (Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany) are frankly dictatorships. Political opposition has been ruthlessly suppressed in both; each permits but one legal political party" (page 81).

"We don't want a foot of any other country's territory, but we'll fight to the death for every inch of our own. Ever since 1921 this slogan has been quoted widely in Russia. Westerners who had followed Soviet developments were amazed, therefore, at the Soviet occupation, in 1939 and 1940, of the territories taken from them in 1917—eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia (bes-a-ra-bi-a), and especially at the invasion of Finland" (page 87).

"Lenin and his followers had made no secret of the fact that they believed in the principle of world revolution" (page 89).

EXHIBIT No. 593-B

"WAR-TIME CHINA"

(By Maxwell S. Stewart)

During the Budenz testimony (Hearings, Vol. 10, p. 1099), after Mr. Budenz had testified that Maxwell Stewart was a Communist, Mr. Mandel read a short excerpt from "War-Time China," a pamphlet written by Mr. Stewart and pub-

lished by the American IPR in 1944. The excerpt, which dealt with the Chinese Communists, was described by Budenz as deceiving the American people.

A more authoritative opinion than that of Budenz is that of the late Dr. Tyler Dennett, noted authority on the Far East, member of the State Department before 1931, and later president of Williams College. In a letter to his son, Raymond Dennett, then Secretary of the American IPR, dated April 6, 1944, Dr. Dennett said:

"Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. * * * It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR."

Mr. Stewart's pamphlet is an account of the situation in China at the time of writing (1944). It describes the heroic efforts and achievements of China in her struggle with Japan, and also the deterioration of conditions in China as a result of 7 years of war. In discussing the problem of Nationalist-Communist relations, the author presents the positions of both parties as stated by themselves. Only 3 pages out of 61 are devoted to conditions in Communist-controlled areas, where the war effort against Japan is described as relatively better organized than that in the Nationalist area. The tone of the pamphlet is generally very friendly to China and to Chiang Kai-shek, as is shown in the following quotations:

"* * * the degree of national unity that has been achieved in China since 1937 under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership is truly remarkable" (p. 16).

"Even Chiang's enemies pay tribute to the skill with which he has maintained the stability of the National Government during the past 15 years. It is doubtful whether any other Chinese leader could have held the government together during this critical period. Chiang's real authority derives from his own outstanding qualities of leadership and from the enormous prestige which he enjoys among all factions in China and among the people at large" (p. 42).

"There is every reason to believe that the creation of a strong war government headed by Chiang Kai-shek and supported by positive assistance from the United Nations would be extremely well received within China" (p. 56).

"Today China is recognized as one of the 'Big Four' powers of the world" (p. 3).

"In the future, China will be counted on as one of the chief guardians of peace in the Pacific basin" (p. 5).

"We have been filled with admiration at the way in which the people of China, in the face of almost incredible hardships and disappointments, have stood up to the Japanese year after year without giving in" (p. 6).

"* * * the miracle of Chinese resistance—and it is miraculous—has not been accomplished without a price. China has suffered tremendous losses in men and materials. Her people have undergone physical hardships almost inconceivable to us. Not least is the psychological strain of seven years of unremitting warfare, with the hope of large-scale aid from her allies still unfulfilled" (p. 7).

"When measured against the handicaps which she has had to overcome, China's war effort is truly impressive" (p. 20).

"China is not as strong, either economically or politically, as she was in 1937. The drain on her resources has been too great. We must grasp this fact if we are to discharge our obligations as friends and allies of the Chinese people" (p. 22).

"Chiang's ability to take his country more actively into the war will rest on the concrete arrangements which are made to provide the Chinese armies with modern equipment and adequate supplies" (p. 56).

"At present, China is passing through a very difficult phase in her history—one in which she greatly needs the sympathy, understanding and forbearance of her friends abroad" (p. 58).

"With her vast population and undeveloped resources, China may be expected to take her place among the great powers of the world. * * * In the postwar period China will need American help—American capital, technical aid and diplomatic backing. China deserves our continued support, which, indeed, is in our own interest as well as hers" (p. 63).

"Most of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by trying to understand the magnitude of the task which she faces in transforming an ancient medieval society into a modern democratic nation. Only if we appreciate her difficulties as well as her achievements can we deal fairly with China. And we must remem-

ber that many of the difficulties which she faces today and in years to come are the result of seven years of war in which China fought our battle almost unaided" (p. 63).

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations.

OCTOBER 6, 1951.

EXHIBIT No. 593-C

MEMORANDUM ON "OUR JOB IN THE PACIFIC"

During the public hearing before the McCarran Subcommittee on September 26 Mr. Benjamin Mandel, the subcommittee's research director, read into the record several quotations from a pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific*, written by Henry A. Wallace and published by the American Institute of Pacific Relations in 1944. These quotations were torn from their context in such a way as to give a completely distorted impression of what Mr. Wallace had written. While the entire text of the pamphlet was put in the record as an exhibit, the Senators present had to rely on the bits that were read aloud. So did the press, and many newspaper picked up the Free Asia quotation mentioned below, so that newspaper readers throughout the country received a false idea of the nature of this Institute publication.

This quotation, as read by Mr. Mandel, was as follows:

"Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. * * *" (page 24).

The complete text of this passage quoted below, makes clear that Mr. Wallace was contrasting the independent countries of Asia with those which at that time were still under colonial rule:

"Whereas after the war we shall find Asia economically still largely in a stage of primitive agriculture, politically we shall find it divided in two parts: Free Asia and Subject Asia. While Lincoln's phrase cannot be applied literally, yet in the larger sense it is true that neither a country nor a region can indefinitely continue to exist half slave and half free.

"Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. It will include the Philippines, which has been promised its independence, Korea, which has also been promised freedom in due course, and Thailand, which though independent before Japan's conquest, is one of the small countries which could probably not preserve its freedom except as part of a larger structure of free nation.

"Subject Asia or Colonial Asia will include the countries whose present rulers have not yet committed themselves to definite dates for the emancipation of their colonial subjects. If peace came tomorrow, this would include India, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, and a great many small Pacific islands.

"This large bloc cannot be described as 'antifreedom', but rather as 'not yet having freedom'. It is to our advantage not to perpetuate this division but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of Free Asia will grow and the area of Subject Asia continually diminish" (page 24).

Another passage quoted out of context by Mr. Mandel was as follows:

"The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs" (page 28).

In the pamphlet, this is immediately preceded by the following (pages 27-28):

"Dr. Hu Shih [former Ambassador of the Chinese Nationalist Government to the United States] has described as follows the importance of Sino-Russian friendship.

"It is my sincere hope that the time will come when China and the Soviet Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common foe, but in all time to come. With a common frontier extending nearly five thousand miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, nonaggression, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet treaty. The historical example of 3,500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual benefit. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a mutual under-

standing between these two great countries which comprise three-quarters of the continent.'"

In all, Mr. Mandel quoted five short passages from the pamphlet, all of which mentioned Russia. They are completely unrepresentative of the contents of the pamphlet as a whole, in which only about three pages deal with Russia out of a total of 43 pages of Mr. Wallace's text. The principal argument advanced by Mr. Wallace was in favor of a program of economic aid to Asia, with main emphasis on agriculture. Many other postwar problems were also discussed, including the colonial problem (see above), the future of Japan, America's strategic needs, international organization, etc. In fact, many of Mr. Wallace's arguments were very similar to those which have in recent years been adopted as the underlying basis of the E. C. A. and technical assistance programs for the Far East.

In view of allegations (e. g. by Louis Budenz on August 22) before the subcommittee that institute publications had followed the Communist line by criticizing the Nationalist Government of China, it is pertinent to call attention to the following quotation from pages 28-29 of Mr. Wallace's pamphlet:

"[China] has maintained through seven years of war a unity which many doubted. She has also maintained steadily the pledge that she is fighting for the democratic order defined in Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People.' This pledge has been confirmed by a promise to call a constitutional convention within a year after the end of hostilities. China will then have her historic opportunity to refute the skeptics who have so long maintained that regionalism and factionalism are incurable blemishes of the Asiatic political heritage. The use which China makes of this opportunity will have an effect far beyond her own borders. The steadfast leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek, which has already made China a world power, is an assurance that China's political aspirations are not limited to her own but stand for the hopes and progress of all Asiatic peoples."

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations.

OCTOBER 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I suggest if you have anyone send in a statement, let's say other than a character witness or something like that, that it be sworn to.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, in affidavit form.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, fine.

And then the committee can consider it in a different light than just a plain statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you came in, Senator Ferguson, Mr. Holland had submitted this list of testimonials.

Senator FERGUSON. They are in a different category. They are not necessarily statements of fact. They are more character witnesses or testimonials as to what their opinions are. But if a person wanted to deny a statement that is in the record which is already under oath, at least he should do it by affidavit.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That leaves us with the question of what to do with these 19 people that we can't locate, Senator. We have asked Mr. Holland to make suggestions as to how to find them, and there will be at least those 19, Senator, who will not be called in here. We have made every effort to get in touch with them.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a situation that everybody faces.

Mr. HOLLAND. Might I comment, though, that as I recall one or two of them were people who it would seem to me can be reached fairly easily by the Senate committee. I seem to recall that Mr. Yakhontoff—I don't know his present job, but I happen just for the sake of finding out I looked up in the New York telephone book and find him listed there, so it should not be too difficult to locate him.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I think counsel suggested if you know of any information, you let us know.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any of the others you think are available, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think I gave all the information I could. Some of that is vague, I know. I would like to ask this question: In the case of the people who are in Europe, does the committee wish to write and ask them whether they wish to or propose to make a comment or denial?

Senator FERGUSON. If they want to make a denial and do it under oath——

Mr. HOLLAND. In their case is it permissible for them to get an affidavit from an American consulate?

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest they do it under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wondered what the legal status was.

Senator FERGUSON. When it comes in the committee will pass upon admitting it.

Mr. HOLLAND. In that case I take it it is in order for me to write those people and say, if you wish to make a denial, do so, but have it sworn to before an American consul.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sworn testimony.

Is there anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all.

Senator FERGUSON. You want to recess until what date?

Mr. MORRIS. We have an executive session at 10 tomorrow and we may open up after that.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, March 20, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before the subcommittee, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. CHI. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HARRIET LEVINE CHI, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL, JOSEPH FORER

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address, please?

Mrs. CHI. Harriet Levine Chi, 406 East Thirteenth Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I am an office worker.

Mr. MORRIS. What office do you work at?

Mrs. CHI. I decline to answer that question because my answer may incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. You decline to give your present employment to the committee because your answer may incriminate you?

Mrs. CHI. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occupation you held before your present position, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I had a gift shop.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, are you presently married?

Mrs. CHI. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your husband?

Mrs. CHI. Ch'ao-ting Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is he?

Mrs. CHI. In China.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what he is doing in China?

Mrs. CHI. I believe he is vice president of the Bank of China. Senator FERGUSON. That is Communist China?

Mrs. CHI. That is the bank in Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last hear from your husband, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I don't remember exactly when.

Mr. MORRIS. Has it been in the last 2 years?

Senator FERGUSON. Can you place it in years?

Mrs. CHI. Yes, within the last 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, have you ever been an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What year?

Mrs. CHI. 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you act as secretary to Mr. Owen Lattimore during that period?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you act as secretary to Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. CHI. In New York City and in Lee, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. In whose home in Lee, Mass., or whose office?

Mrs. CHI. Well, at Mr. Lattimore's office, home.

Mr. MORRIS. In New York City? Mr. Lattimore's office in New York?

Mrs. CHI. No.

Mr. MORRIS. His office in Lee, Mass.?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his office in his home?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record the China Daily News of March 12, 1952?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a copy of the China Daily News of New York dated March 12, 1952, and I have a translation from an article in that paper which has been certified by the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress.

CHINA WILL TAKE PART IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE PREPARATORY WORK BEING VIGOROUSLY PURSUED AT CAPITAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF NAN HAN-CHENG, MA YIN-CHU, AND OTHERS

[Special to this newspaper]

According to a Peking dispatch of the Hsinhua (New China) News Agency, for the sake of promoting international economic cooperation, an International Economic Conference, initiated by industrial and commercial leaders of many nations, is due to convene in Moscow in the early part of April. In China, national financial and economic workers, persons in the fields of industry and commerce, cooperative workers, trade-union workers, and students of economics, have organized a National Preparatory Committee. The National Preparatory Committee consists of 14 members; they are: Nan Han-Cheng—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you just give us the names of those on the committee relating to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Included in this list is member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Association, Chi Chao-ting, member of the board of directors and assistant manager of the Bank of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your husband?

Mrs. CHI. I believe so.

Mr. MANDEL. Further, we find also the name of Chen Han-seng, vice chairman of the Chinese Economic Society.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that gentleman?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question because my answer may incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will become a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit 594" and made a part of the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 594

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION OF ORIENTALIA,
Washington, D. C., March 19, 1952.

INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE,
424-C Senate Office Building, Washington 25, D. C.

(Attn: Miss Marion Walker.)

DEAR SIRs: We have carefully checked the enclosed translation, regarding the International Economic Conference, against the Chinese text, which was published in the March 12, 1952, issue of the China Daily News, New York. We find that it is an accurate translation. We may point out, however, that the names of some of the persons mentioned in the article are not transcribed according to the Wade-Giles system, which is generally used in this country. We have noted in the margins of the translation the standard Wade-Giles forms.

Sincerely yours,

[S] EDWIN G. BEAL, Jr.,
Acting Chief, Orientalia Division.

CHINA WILL TAKE PART IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE PREPARATORY
WORK BEING VIGOROUSLY PURSUED AT CAPITAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
COMPOSED OF NAN HAN-CHENG, MA YIN-CHU, AND OTHERS

[Special to this newspaper]

According to a Peking despatch of the Hsinhua (New China) News Agency, for the sake of promoting international economic cooperation, an International Economic Conference, initiated by industrial and commercial leaders of many nations, is due to convene in Moscow in the early part of April. In China, national financial and economic workers, persons in the fields of industry and commerce, cooperative workers, trade union workers, and students of economics, have organized a National Preparatory Committee. The National Preparatory Committee consists of the 14 members; they are: Nan Han-cheng, President of the Chinese People's Bank; Ma Yin-chu, President of Peking University; Liu Ning-yi, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Trade Union Association; Chang Nai-chi, Member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Association; Chi Chao-ting, Member of the Board of Directors and Assistant Manager of the Bank of China; Leo Jen-ming, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Trade; Chen Wei-chi, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Textile Industries; Meng Yung-chien, Vice Director of the Council of the Chinese National Cooperative Association; Li Chu-chen, Chairman of Tientsin Industrial and Commercial Association; Sheng Pi-hua, Chairman of Shanghai Industrial and Commercial Association; Hsu Ti-hsin, Vice Chairman of the East China Financial and Economic Council; Chen Han-seng, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Economic Society; Liu Tse-chiu, Director of the Culture and Education Department of the Chinese Trade Union Association; Lu Hsu-cho, Manager of the China Export and Import Company. The National Preparatory Committee is now making contact with the International Preparatory Committee and the Preparatory Committees of other nations, to carry on the preparatory work.

—CHINA DAILY NEWS, New York, March 12, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, when did you marry Chi Chao-ting?

Mrs. CHI. 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you live with Mr. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I don't think I want to answer that. It is a personal question. I am separated from him now.

I will change that after conferring with counsel; we were separated in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he living in this country at that time?

Mrs. CHI. No.

Senator FERGUSON. He was living in China?

Mrs. CHI. He was.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of your employment, at the time of the commencement of your employment with the IPR, who was it that recommended you for employment, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. You refuse to answer who recommended you for a position in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. CHI. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Who recommended you as an aide to Owen Lattimore while you were in the institute, do you know?

Mrs. CHI. That I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not remember that?

Mrs. CHI. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you work in Lee, Mass.?

Mrs. CHI. Three weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you work at there, the same kind of work that you worked—

Mrs. CHI. Secretarial work, typing.

Senator FERGUSON. Owen Lattimore was doing what kind of work there?

Mrs. CHI. I don't recall. He was writing I suppose, but I couldn't remember in any detail what he was doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he writing for the institute? The work you were doing was institute work?

Mrs. CHI. Yes; it was institute work.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he writing, these articles that you were acting as his secretary on, IPR work?

Mrs. CHI. I assume it was IPR work. I can't remember in detail what work he was doing.

Senator FERGUSON. But your salary was being paid by the IPR?

Mrs. CHI. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, have you done any writing on your own?

Mrs. CHI. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not write?

Mrs. CHI. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Y. Y. Hsu?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the previous reason because my answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Chen Han-seng?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been in China?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us to what extent you have traveled in various countries of the world?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Mrs. Chi, we have had testimony before this committee that you were a member of the Communist Party. Were you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Nathaniel Weyl?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever adhere to the principles of the Communist Party?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever advocate the principles of the Communist Party?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it that when you say "the same reason," you mean on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you?

Mrs. CHI. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record may be clear.

Mr. MORRIS. I cannot think of anything else, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 2 o'clock today.

Mr. MORRIS. This witness, however, is excused?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you are excused.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:45 p. m., pursuant to call, room 424 Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The witness will be sworn.

Raise your right hand. You do solemnly swear, in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. THORNER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL THORNER, BALA-CYNWYD, PA., ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH A. FANELLI

Senator FERGUSON. State your full name and your address and your occupation.

Mr. THORNER. My name is Daniel Thorner. My address is 127 Birch Avenue, Bala-Cynwyd, Pa., and I am employed at the University of Pennsylvania as an assistant professor.

Senator FERGUSON. What are you professor of?

Mr. THORNER. I am assistant professor of economic history, and I teach primarily on modern south Asia, which is primarily India and Pakistan, and I also teach economics.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, do you have something you want to put into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

All during the Lattimore hearings we did not take the time out to introduce this letter into the record, and it is part of the record in connection with our testimony about Alger Hiss.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the research director, Mr. Mandel, read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter dated February 21, 1952, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson, The Secretary of State, from Pat McCarran, chairman:

EXHIBIT No. 608

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A witness before the Senate Internal Subcommittee, Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, testified yesterday that, in the course of her official duties at the Department of State, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Alger Hiss taken at Yalta which were available to her in her work of postwar planning.

Dr. Fluegel was an employee of the Department from 1942 to 1948.

On the basis of this testimony, the Internal Security Subcommittee agreed that these hand-written notes of Alger Hiss should be made available in the original, or photostatic duplicate, to the committee.

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

(The document read by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 608" and was read in full.)

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the committee has not as yet received an answer to that letter.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Here is another letter to which we have received an answer, being dated March 19, 1952.

Mr. Mandel, would you read that letter?

MR. MANDEL. This is addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, from Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State, dated March 19, 1952:

EXHIBIT No. 609

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Reference is made to your letter of March 3, 1952, in which you inquired of the action being taken by the Department on the questions raised in your letter of August 27, 1951. Reference is also made to the Department's September 1, 1951, acknowledgement of your August 27, 1951, letter. In your previous correspondence you requested information concerning an alleged meeting held at the State Department on October 12, 1942, in which Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, participated.

I regret the delay that has occurred in replying to your previous letter, but it was found necessary to begin anew a complete search of the Department's files. As indicated in the Department's reply of September 1, 1951, a thorough but unsuccessful search of Departmental files for a copy of such a memorandum was made in response to a similar request from a member of Congress in 1950. More recently, research and inquiry among officers formerly with the Department have furnished some details regarding the meeting between Mr. Welles and Mr. Browder.

From the Department's investigation of this matter it would appear that:

(1) An interview did take place October 12, 1942, between Mr. Welles and Mr. Browder concerning United States policy in the Far East. We have been unable to determine from our records whether Mr. Robert Minor and Mr. Laughlin Currie participated in this meeting.

(2) Our information indicates that a memorandum reflecting United States policy in the Far East was prepared and handed to Mr. Browder by Mr. Welles at the conclusion of their meeting. While the Department has been unable to locate a verified copy of such a memorandum, it would nevertheless appear from the information available that the memorandum inserted into the Daily Worker by Mr. Browder was identical with the memorandum which was handed Mr. Browder by Mr. Welles.

In the event that further information is found bearing on this matter, it will be furnished you promptly.

Sincerely yours,

(For the Secretary of State).

(The above letter read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 609.")

SENATOR FERGUSON. Mr. Mandel, as research director of the committee in this matter, have you a copy of the memorandum that was inserted in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MANDEL. We have it. That has become part of our record.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you refer to the page number?

Mr. MANDEL. Page 599.

Senator FERGUSON. They do not, of course, say in this letter how they know that that was a copy that was in the Daily Worker, except that they verified that it is.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No other explanation has been made as to why they cannot find a copy of this memorandum in the State Department, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. No explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. Except this letter.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Thorner, this was not concerning your testimony. We will now proceed with your testimony.

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, do you teach now at the University of Pennsylvania?

Mr. THORNER. I do, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you teach there?

Mr. THORNER. I teach courses on the history of India, on contemporary India. At times I have participated in seminars, and they teach some economics. It isn't the same each year.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you a full professor?

Mr. THORNER. Oh, no. I am a research assistant professor of economic history.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you belong to any far eastern and Asiatic societies?

Mr. THORNER. You mean societies concerning—

Mr. MORRIS. Academic societies.

Mr. THORNER. Academic societies concerned with the Far East?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. THORNER. I belong to the Far Eastern Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that all?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that is so, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you in the past belonged to any others?

Mr. THORNER. I was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations for, I should say, about 4 years; perhaps 5. I joined in 1944. I continued to receive their quarterly journal, but I found that you can subscribe to the journal without being a member of the Institute of Pacific Relation and there is a considerable savings involved when you are on as low a salary as I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, did you hold a fellowship at the Walter Hines Page School at Johns Hopkins University?

Mr. THORNER. I did, Mr. Morris, in the year 1947-48.

Mr. MORRIS. Who arranged for you to have that fellowship at the Walter Hines Page School?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Owen Lattimore invited me to accept an appointment as a Page School fellow.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him prior to that?

Mr. THORNER. Very slightly.

Senator FERGUSON. Where had you met him?

Mr. THORNER. I had met him, I believe, in Washington, Senator, as I explained before, at public luncheons, which were held when visiting notables, say, from India or Indonesia would speak, such as the Prime

Minister or Ex Prime Minister of Indonesia, or a high Indian official would speak to a public luncheon. And I ran into him there. I did say that I heard him speak in 1941, but I didn't know him then.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him when you were working for the Government?

Mr. THORNER. Not at all, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. What positions did you hold with the Government, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I joined the Government in 1941 and I worked in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which was headed by Colonel Donovan.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was instrumental in your obtaining that position?

Mr. THORNER. In the fall of 1941, it was very difficult for anyone to obtain academic employment. I believe that selective service was under way, and teaching appointments were becoming short. I could not find one and I made inquiries through the American Historical Association, since I was trained as a historian, to find out what kind of openings there were generally in the Government. And I was told that there probably were vacancies——

Mr. MORRIS. Told by whom, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I believe by some of my former professors at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Notably——

Mr. THORNER. Notably, I believe, Carlton Hayes.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time did William Martin Canning, in his testimony, before the New York legislative inquiry testify that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I cannot answer that precisely, Mr. Morris, but I can say that I believe that insofar as there were any public hearings, my name is not mentioned. I am not acquainted with the private hearings at which Mr. Canning testified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, were you a contributor or a coauthor with Owen Lattimore to Pivot in Asia?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How many of you prepared that volume, Pivot in Asia?

Mr. THORNER. About seven or eight people prepared that volume.

Senator FERGUSON. Who asked you to help on that volume?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Lattimore asked me.

I should say that it was in connection with my special knowledge of India. I had been working on India from about 1936 on, and my work on that volume had nothing to do with the Far East as such, meaning China or Japan, but it did have to do with my own field of special interest. That is, the area to which the attention of that volume was directed, was Chinese Central Asia, which long has been an area of comforting pressures from China, from the Old British Empire in India, and from Russia. And the particular part to which Mr. Lattimore has asked me to direct my attention was that based upon the concern of India, particularly British India with the area. And my contribution in particular dealt with the period from 1800 to 1917.

It is a historical account, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time that you wrote that, I ask you the question as to whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline, Senator, on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and all other constitutional rights and privileges available.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the reasons in the fifth amendment is that it would tend to incriminate you, is that one of the reasons?

Mr. THORNER. That is right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question is, Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline, on the same grounds, Senator.

Mr. Morris, could I add something to that—if I may continue, Senator—that the grounds upon which I claim privilege have nothing to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations or with Mr. Owen Lattimore; nor did Mr. Lattimore have any reason to inquire as to any possible political connections of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. You are drawing the conclusion that he had no reason. Do you know what his knowledge was of your activity?

Mr. THORNER. He knew me very slightly, and what he did know was not for at least half a dozen years or more, perhaps even 10 years, one might say, I had been specializing on India. India is not an area which has received much attention in this country. There are very few people so qualified.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you write this book?

Mr. THORNER. Over the year 1947-48.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Lattimore ask you as to whether or not you were a Communist?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Lattimore did not ask me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that would have been a pertinent inquiry if you were going to write on a subject such as you and Mr. Lattimore were writing on, as to whether or not a person that was going to help him write the book was or was not a Communist?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that Mr. Lattimore was primarily interested in my scholarly record, which spoke for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. Do you think that a record indicates as to whether or not a man is or is not a Communist, that is, the scholarly part of the record, where he graduated, and so forth?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Lattimore particularly was anxious to have some one do a historical background of India's interest in Central Asia, particularly the British Empire.

I must say, Senator, if you will permit, sir—

Senator FERGUSON. I will permit you to say what you want to say.

Mr. THORNER. Thank you very much, Senator; I appreciate that. I don't know anyone else who has read for so long and tediously the records of British parliamentary debates, particularly concerned with India and its external neighbors.

At one time, Senator, if you will think that this is credible, I read every reference to India from the 1840's to the 1870's in the parliamentary debates, for a much larger work that I projected, but I have not been able to get around to completion.

Senator FERGUSON. I would say that would be quite a record of reading.

Mr. THORNER. It increased the strength of my eye glasses, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question as to whether or not you think that a Communist can write without displaying his Communist leanings?

Mr. THORNER. I believe, Senator, that in purely scholarly matters, people who are not Communists can make serious errors. I believe that no matter what a man's political convictions may or may not be, that scholarly work can be done regardless of those political connections.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel that a Communist can do that? Do you think that there is any freedom of thought with a real Communist?

Mr. THORNER. Senator, that is a very large question.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not so large.

Mr. THORNER. I would have to say, in answer to that, that some don't; perhaps some do.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known one that did have freedom of thought?

Mr. THORNER. Senator, I must respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. On the ground that it will tend to incriminate you?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize your reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, several years ago, Owen Lattimore appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he sent in your name as a person who wrote in a letter on his behalf, expressing respect and admiration for his writings at that time?

Mr. THORNER. I believe, Mr. Morris, to answer that question as precisely as I can, that I wrote Mr. Lattimore a letter at that time expressing my support of him. I believe that that was a personal letter; it was not a letter intended for a wider public.

Mr. MORRIS. Have I refreshed your recollection by showing you the appendix of the Tydings hearings, wherein your name appears on a list of those who had written such letters?

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir. What I thought you had asked me before was whether I had written a letter to this committee, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. No. You had written a letter to Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time, were you a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. As I explained before, Mr. Morris, I must respectfully decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, why did you volunteer a while ago the statement that your declination to answer had no bearing on the Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. Because I think that my connection with this inquiry is tangential in the sense that I never worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was never an employee of theirs.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write anything for them?

Mr. THORNER. I published one part of a work that was later published in full. That is a frequent practice so that you can draw attention.

Senator FERGUSON. You did do some writing for them?

Mr. THORNER. No; I wouldn't put it quite that way, if I may say so.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you put it?

Mr. THORNER. I submitted an article to one of their journals to publish. But it was not writing for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I publish articles in, I suppose, half a dozen to a dozen journals.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you publish it in their journal?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they pay you for it?

Mr. THORNER. I think they paid me \$25, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline, Senator, to answer that question, on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize your reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, may I draw your attention to exhibit No. 73 of our public hearings, which is a list of research fellows and students at the Walter Hines Page School in the years 1940 to 1951.

Mr. Chairman, this is already in the record.

Will you indicate to this committee how many of those people you know, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I do not know Dr. David F. Aberle. I do not know Dr. William M. Austin.

Mr. MORRIS. For the sake of brevity, will you just indicate those you do know, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I know Mr. Schuyler Cammann.

I know, or knew earlier, Mr. Chih-yi Chang.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a collaborator with you on the book *Pivot in Asia*, is that right?

Mr. THORNER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he now in Red China?

Mr. THORNER. To the best of my knowledge he is.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Dr. John DeFrancis?

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you see Dr. John DeFrancis very frequently?

Mr. THORNER. I have seen him from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us whether or not Dr. DeFrancis is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I have no reason to believe him to be a member of the Communist Party.

I do not know Mr. Clive E. Glover or the next gentleman.

I have known Dr. Chen Han-Seng.

The Dilowa Hutukhtu, I do not know.

Mr. Ike I have met.

Mr. Catesby Jones, I have met.

I have met Mr. Kahin.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you say you have met Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I have met Mr. Catesby Jones.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Ike in the Hoover Library now in California?

Mr. THORNER. I believe he is.

Mr. MORRIS. What does Mr. Catesby Jones do now?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that Mr. Jones is right now at the Walter Hines School of International Relations.

I have met Dr. Karl H. Menges.

I have heard Dr. Michael speak, but I do not know him.

I do not know Mr. Onon.

I have heard Dr. Pelzer speak and perhaps exchanged a word or two with him.

I do not know Mr. Ring.

I do not know Mr. Schraml.

We can skip myself.

I cannot pronounce and do not know the next name.

Mr. Vreeland I may have heard deliver a paper once, but I don't know him.

I do not know Mr. Waibel, and Mr. Thomas Wiener was one of the contributors to that book that has been referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, William Canning has testified before this committee that you were a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party. Were you in fact, a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Morris, I must respectfully decline, on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Prof. Karl Wittfogel has testified before this committee that you were active in what he called a Communist study group near Columbia University in the years 1937 and 1938. Were you a member of such a group?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that Mr. Wittfogel is under a major misapprehension. In 1937-38, the year to which he refers, I was president of the Graduate History Club at Columbia University, which held regular meetings on the campus and invited distinguished speakers to come and talk to it. One of the speakers that year was Dr. Wittfogel.

Now, I should say that he was either second or third speaker. The first speaker was a professor of American history; the last speaker was Mr. Carlton Hayes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of the first speaker?

Mr. THORNER. I believe it was the later Robert C. Bingham.

Those meetings, I should say, Mr. Morris, were held in the Men's Faculty Club at Columbia University. They were placarded with large signs all over the campus. Anyone who wished to come was perfectly welcome so long as he paid for his luncheon.

Our first meeting was very largely attended. There were about 60 or 70 people, many more than we expected. Mr. Wittfogel was our second speaker and we were confident that on an important topic like China, this being right after the fall of Nanking and the Japanese push into China, there would be a large attendance. And about 23 people showed up. There was a table as long as this room, and I can still see 35 uneaten grapefruits on that table. Mr. Wittfogel was considerably crestfallen at that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, do you know of a study group that met at the home of Moses Finkelstein?

Mr. THORNER. I think if you referred to informal Sunday evening music circles, to which different people came at different times, primarily to hear phonograph records from the excellent music collection of Mr. Finley, you would be more accurate in the posing of the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any Communists present at those groups?

Mr. THORNER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you present at those groups?

Mr. THORNER. I went to a few. I was fairly young at that time. I was not a senior person in any sense. It was an invitation for which I was grateful. Generally people there were older. They discussed things like Wagner's operas, whether they were bad or whether they were good. They listened to Gilbert and Sullivan. They discussed art appreciation and such topics.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know William Canning?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Canning was the reader of students' papers in my senior year at the College of the City of New York. He uniformly gave me A's.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Theodore Geiger?

Mr. THORNER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Moses Finklestein?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now Mr. Finley, is he not?

Mr. THORNER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What university is he connected with now?

Mr. THORNER. I believe he is at Rutgers University.

Mr. MORRIS. Does he have a fellowship with Ford Foundation, do you know?

Mr. THORNER. He may very well have.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Edward Rosen?

Mr. THORNER. He was one of my teachers at college.

Mr. MORRIS. And Benjamin Nelson?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I know Mr. Nelson. He was a student on a fellowship at Columbia when I came down to Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have in our record, exhibit No. 77, which was introduced in the public session of August 7, 1951, which mentions Mr. Daniel Thorner:

* * * Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Scholar Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner—

and that he was a New York man and he studied at Columbia University.

Have you read our exhibit No. 77, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the facts appearing in that letter, which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, accurate?

Mr. THORNER. I would have to reread the letter in this connection.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, read it.

Mr. THORNER. Have you indicated who signed this letter, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is a letter from Catherine Porter.

Of course, just read the portions that refer to you, Mr. Thorner.

Mr. THORNER. I thought you meant the entire letter.

Mr. MORRIS. No; just the facts that refer to you, the bottom paragraph of the first page.

Mr. THORNER. Let me say, first, Mr. Morris, that the statement that I probably know more about, the transport problem in India than any other person in this country, as of June 2, 1942, at which I was 27 years old, is a flattering statement, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. You think there may be some doubt about that?

Mr. THORNER. I think, depending upon your temperament, you will allow for exaggeration.

What I am saying is that, first, the news that such a proposal about me or that such a letter about me existed, came last summer. That is the first knowledge that I had of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know they were considering you for any job?

Mr. THORNER. No; I did not know at all, and no one mentioned that to me.

The facts of my salary are correct. I was getting either 2,600 or 3,200 at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend a luncheon for Michael Lindsay held under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on April 26, 1946, at Barker Hall at the YWCA?

Mr. THORNER. I have no recollection of ever meeting or hearing Michael Lindsay.

As I have said perhaps before, Mr. Morris, my particular field of interest is India rather than the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and call your attention to the fourth name on the second page of a list which purports to be a list of people who attended the luncheon and ask you if that refreshes your recollection?

Mr. THORNER. April 26, 1946. It is perfectly possible that I could make an error, but if you would indicate what topic he spoke on—

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing that says there that these people actually did attend. It could be people who were hoping to attend.

Mr. THORNER. I believe it was people who were invited to attend; that is my guess.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you want to receive that into the record, inasmuch as the witness does not recall about it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify it?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a list of names for the Michael Lindsay luncheon, Washington Office, Institute of Pacific Relations, held April 26, 1946, Friday, at 12:30 p. m., at Barker Hall, YWCA.

(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 610" and is as follows:)

MICHAEL LINDSAY LUNCHEON, WASHINGTON OFFICE, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, APRIL 26, 1946—FRIDAY, 12:30 P. M.—BARKER HALL, Y. W. C. A.

Dr. C. O. Arndt
Ellen Atkinson
Robert Barnett
Patricia Barnett
Milton Berger
Mrs. Boyden
Ardeth W. Burks
Elizabeth Burns
H. A. Butts
William Brown
Mrs. Alfred D. Charles
Irene Corttneff
Nicholas Cottrell
Mrs. Cabot Coville
Esther Crane
Ellery Denison
Karl de Scheinitz
Captain Domke
Eleanor Dennison
Joe Du Bois

Len De Caux
Dr. and Mrs. Leslie Falk
Mr. Duncan Hall
Dr. E. S. C. Handy
Mrs. E. S. C. Handy
Lowell H. Hattery
Mrs. Harrison
Mrs. Isabel Higgins
Mr. Janow
D. R. Jenkins
Shirley Jenkins
Mrs. Philip Keeney
Edward A. Kracke, Jr.
Mrs. Helen Lamb
Lewis Lorwin
Emmanuel S. Larsen
Robert M. Magill
G. W. Morris
George Masselman
Arthur Mayfield

Raymond Moyer
 Carl Nelson
 Ann Page
 Ruth Pardee
 J. K. Penfield
 Eleanor Perkins
 Edwin O. Reischauer
 Edward Rice
 Jay Robinson
 H. F. Seitz
 John Kita Sako
 Mr. Sassaman
 Lauriston Sharp
 Arthur W. Hummel
 Robert S. Hummel
 John Stenhouse
 H. M. Spitzer

Laura Thompson
 Daniel Thorner
 Elizabeth Ussachevsky
 Vladimir Ussachevsky
 J. Parker Van Zandt
 Dr. Harold Vinacke
 Benjamin B. Wallace
 Clifford Watson
 Guy P. Webb
 Mrs. S. M. Wheeler
 (handwritten)
 Bill Lockwood
 Henry Owen
 Mr. and Mrs. Bowen
 Smith
 R. C.

SPEAKER'S TABLE

Mr. Michael Lindsay
 Dr. C. O. Arndt—U. S. Office of Education
 Mr. Ralph E. Collins—Canadian Legation
 Mr. Len de Caux—CIO
 Colonel Dusenberry—War Department
 Mr. Hubert Graves—British Embassy
 Mr. Joseph Harsch—CBS
 Dr. Arthur W. Hummel—Library of Congress

Dr. William C. Johnstone, *presiding*
 Colonel and Mrs. William Mayer
 Mrs. Audrey Menefee
 Mr. Selden Menefee—NBC
 Mr. E. Herbert Norman
 Dr. John A. Pollard—IPR
 Mr. Arthur Ringwalt—Department of State

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations in October 1946?

Mr. THORNER. I believe I was, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a list of Washington, Maryland and Virginia members of the Washington Institute of Pacific Relations, but in view of Mr. Thorner's statement that he was a member, I see no need of introducing it at this time into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever used an alias of any kind at any time, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline to answer that question, on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments, as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the statement that you volunteered, that your declinations here in answer to certain questions bore no reflection on the Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore, did anyone ask you to volunteer that statement?

Mr. THORNER. I have no recollection of anyone from the Institute of Pacific Relations asking me to write an article under anybody else's name.

Mr. FANELLI. I don't think you understand the question.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question at all.

Mr. MORRIS. I said, did anybody make a recommendation to you, in connection with your testimony here today, that you add that voluntary statement to your answers?

Mr. THORNER. No. That is my own.

Mr. MORRIS. And nobody made that suggestion or request?

Mr. THORNER. That is my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone contact you in the last year about this committee?

Mr. THORNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or about your testimony?

Mr. THORNER. No, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not talked to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. I have relied upon my counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. Just your counsel?

Mr. THORNER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have not talked to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. I have not talked with Mr. Lattimore about my testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Lockwood, or Carter?

Mr. THORNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all?

Mr. MORRIS. Nothing further.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all of this witness.

Mr. FANELLI. Are we excused?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. THORNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Before we close the record, I want to say the place where the Welles statement to Browder appeared on page 599 of the record, it is exhibit 162.

I also wish that the research director would ask Mr. Humelsine how he accounts for a document that is as important as this not being in the files. In particular, it is a document relating to our policy toward communism in China, where this statement appears:

The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic context and publicity, that the United States favors complete unity among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.

With regards to the specific charges that "these officials continue the old policy of war against the Communists in China," this Government has had no such policy, either old or new. This Government has, in fact, viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the "serious menace" of "communism" in China.

How would it be possible that that would not be in the files? See if he has any explanation.

Mr. MANDEL. Are you directing me to write such a letter, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I direct that such a letter be written to obtain that for the record. It is a very important document, and how do they account for the fact that it is not in the records?

If those documents of that kind are not in the records of the State Department, then what provision do they have for destroying such documents as that?

The committee will recess now until tomorrow, the time to be set later.

(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. MORRIS. Will the record show, Mr. Chairman, that the witness has been sworn in executive session?

Senator WATKINS. Will you give his name?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you state your name, sir?

Mr. ROWE. David N. Rowe.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address?

Mr. ROWE. New Haven, Conn., for business. Residence, Hamden, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, what is your present occupation?

Mr. ROWE. I am professor of political science at Yale University.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. ROWE. I have been connected with Yale since 1943. I have been professor since 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. What other post do you hold in New Haven and in the United States Government?

Mr. ROWE. I am a member of various committees and things of that kind in the university.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you specify what they are?

Mr. ROWE. I am a member of the committee on international studies at Yale, which has general charge of the program of graduate studies in international relations.

I have been at various times director of graduate studies and far eastern studies at Yale, but am not operating in that capacity as of the present time.

As far as the Government is concerned, my history of employment by the Government goes back to the summer of 1941 in any significance when I was first attached to the Library of Congress in connection with the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications under Dr. Harold Lasswell.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Coordinator of Information assignment?

Mr. ROWE. No. That was before. That was before the Coordinator of Information Office had been organized.

Then I was attached to the Department of Justice in the fall of 1941 in connection with the Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice.

In the fall of 1941 I was taken on by the Coordinator of Information, which later became OSS, Office of Strategic Services, and in that capacity I was sent to China as the first OSS man to reach China in connection with the Pacific war, arriving there just 10 days before Pearl Harbor. I remained there until May.

I came back and got out of OSS in the summer of 1942 and resumed my connection with Princeton University, where I had been teaching up to that point.

During the war I was a consultant to various Government organizations, but the main work I did was in connection with our wartime training programs on far eastern languages and area studies in which we had a very large program at Yale University.

I am a lieutenant colonel in the Military Intelligence Reserve. My last tour of active duty was a period of about 6 weeks in the summer of 1950 just after the outbreak of the Korean war.

I have also been and still am a consultant to the Air Force in several different capacities, consultant to Air Force Intelligence, operating at top level in Air Force Intelligence; consultant to General Disosway, the director of Air Force training, and various Air Force assignments.

I have worked with the Department of State on several different occasions.

The assignment in Chungking under the Coordinator of Information involved an attachment to the Embassy in Chungking where I was officially listed as special assistant to the Ambassador for the purposes of carrying on the Coordinator of Information work.

In the summer of 1948 I took on an 8-weeks' assignment with the State Department in the consulate general in Shanghai, where I was a special consultant to the information activity, usually called, I believe, Voice of America.

I was employed to take a thorough look at the United States Information Service work in China and to make out a report commenting on it, criticizing it, and making suggestions for possible improvement, which I did.

This was rated as a confidential report and was turned in, and after I came back I had consultations with the Under Secretary for Public Affairs on this sort of thing.

Senator WATKINS. What has been your experience with China?

Mr. ROWE. My experience with China, of course, starts out with the fact that I was born in China of missionary parents and lived there almost all my life until I became of near college age.

Senator WATKINS. Do you speak Chinese?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; I speak Chinese fluently; have spoken it from early infancy, childhood, and grew up bilingual in English and Chinese. I cannot remember when I couldn't speak the language.

Senator WATKINS. How old were you when you came back to the States to live?

Mr. ROWE. I came back to go to school in this country. I was in my seventeenth year. I proceeded to go through my last year in high school and 4 years of college and a number of years of graduate train-

ing before I ever went back to China again, which was in the summer of 1937 when I went back under a Rockefeller Foundation grant to allow me to study in Peking, China, for a year.

Senator WATKINS. Were your parents still over there when you returned?

Mr. ROWE. No; neither parent was there in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, in the academic field have you been active in such organizations as the Far Eastern Association, Institute of Pacific Relations, and organizations of that nature?

Mr. ROWE. I have never been active in the Far Eastern Association, although I have been a member of the association since its earliest founding.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that organization?

Mr. ROWE. The Far Eastern Association is an association of people who study the Far East academically, and people who are interested in the Far East. It is modeled on the lines of the ordinary and regular scholarly organizations like the Political Science Association, the American Historical Association, et cetera.

It publishes a quarterly under the title of The Far Eastern Quarterly, which is filled with learned articles and book reviews, and so on, and it holds annual meetings.

The next one is to be held this coming week in Boston and Cambridge. It sponsors scholarly monographs. It helps to secure funds for sponsoring research in the field of far-eastern studies.

As far as the subject matter is concerned, it runs across all the normal lines of subject matter. It is not devoted peculiarly to any one of them, but is distinguished from the so-called the American Oriental Society by being less exclusively concerned with problems of philology and linguistics.

It is more humanities outside of language and literature, and social sciences.

Mr. MORRIS. What other such organizations have you been active in?

Mr. ROWE. The Institute of Pacific Relations, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. May I come back to that later?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any others, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. Of course, outside of the far eastern field I have been active in the American Political Science Association, the American Historical Association, the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, all of which I have held membership in and am still a member of the Political Science Association.

Mr. MORRIS. What positions have you held in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. Starting out with ordinary membership, I believe I entered in 1939—it was no later than 1940—and then I became a trustee of the American IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become a trustee?

Mr. ROWE. If you will allow me just a second here, I want to get the precise date on that.

I was elected to membership on the board of trustees at the annual meeting held February 18, 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain a member of the board?

Mr. ROWE. I remained a member of the board until the early part of 1950 when I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you resign?

Mr. ROWE. I resigned for a variety of reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. What reason did you give at the time of your resignation?

Mr. ROWE. At the time of my resignation I plead too many organizations, too many things to do, and got out on that basis.

In the spring of 1951 I was approached by Mr. Holland in a letter asking me to rejoin the board and at this time I told him that it would be futile to suppose or to act as though I had never had any dissatisfactions with the IPR, or my situation in it, and at that time I pointed out that I thought I had a rather anomalous position of the board of trustees and that I was rather convinced that the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations—and I use this word “staff” designedly; I do not wish to characterize the entire membership of the IPR, but that the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations was by and large fundamentally opposed to most of the things I stood for in the Far East.

I asked Mr. Holland in my letter whether there was any prospect of there being a different situation for me to be in in the IPR in the future, but there was no answer given to that in his subsequent reply.

I did not think it was likely to change.

Mr. MORRIS. So, therefore, on that basis you declined the offer to rejoin the board?

Mr. ROWE. To rejoin the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any letters covering those points, Professor Rowe, with you?

Mr. ROWE. I do not have here a copy of my letter of resignation or a copy of the subsequent refusal to rejoin, but I can supply you with those documents if you are interested.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would.

Mr. ROWE. I will do so.

Senator WATKINS. They may be inserted into the record.

(The letters referred to were marked “Exhibits No. 612A, B, and C,” and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 612-A

MAY 29, 1951.

DR. DAVID N. ROWE,

214 Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: Thank you for your note of May 28 returning Dutt's manuscript. I agree with you that some of the information in it might be usefully made available, possibly in mimeographed form, for limited circulation. However, before doing this, I have decided to get some further detailed criticism of the study from one or two other readers, including Harold Sprout.

I realize this must be a very busy time for you, but I do hope you will let me know sometime soon how you are coming along with your book on Far Eastern security problems. I suppose you will have material for a chapter or two in the current Washington hearings.

Later on, when you are not quite so pressed, I do hope you will consider writing an article for *Far Eastern Survey* on some aspect of American security problems in Eastern and Southern Asia. Is there any chance of your being able to do this during the summer months? If there is another topic which would be more convenient for you, please feel free to tell me. I may tell you quite frankly that in making this request, I am concerned not only to get the benefit of your long study of Far Eastern security questions, but also to see your general point of view on American Far Eastern policy expressed in an I. P. R. publication. I am still old-fashioned enough to hope that the I. P. R.

can be a platform on which a variety of responsible viewpoints can find expression. For that reason, I have long been a little sorry that you withdrew from the I. P. R., and I would very much like to have you consider the possibility of renewing your membership. Later on, if you approved, it would then be possible to reappoint you to the Board of Trustees. Since Ray Kennedy's death, we have lacked a representative from Yale on our Board. In many ways you are the appropriate choice. How about it?

All good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

P. S.—As you may have heard from Milton Sacks, Professor Latourette will be writing a short book on American Far Eastern Policy Since 1945 for the I. P. R. during the summer. Later on, when he has completed his revised outline, I hope to circulate it to a dozen or so Far Eastern specialists including yourself for comments and suggestions. I do hope you will be willing to give me your views on it.

(Signed) WLH.

EXHIBIT No. 612-B

JUNE 8, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
*American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street,
New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: Your letter of May 29 raised a number of questions. The first of these has to do with the possibility of writing an article for *The Far Eastern Survey* on some aspect of our American security problem in Eastern and South Asia. To give you an idea of my situation I need only point out what you must already realize, namely, that I have not published one word since the volume on Japan which I edited for the Yale Press and which came out last September. I now anticipate another full year during which I will do no work for publication. Thus the chance of writing articles for any journal is almost nil.

In this connection I would like to talk with you sometime about *The Far Eastern Survey* as a platform for the expression of a variety of responsible viewpoints, as you put it.

As to my withdrawal from the IPR somewhat over a year ago, that is also something on which I would be glad to talk with you. In this connection I wish to point out that I have also dropped my membership in the American Oriental Society. I retain membership in the Far Eastern Association. In this organization I am very much on the side lines, but I do not object to this as a thing in itself. What I objected to regarding my previous experience as one of your trustees was the rather anomalous position in which I found myself. I wonder if there would be any change in this respect if I were to come back on the board. I tend to doubt it.

I guess what all this boils down to is my strong feeling that over the years the American IPR has taken on a definite character. Quite apart from the contents of its publications or the bias of its writers, it seems to me that the American IPR is manned primarily by personnel up and down the line to whom the kind of thing I stand for in current Far Eastern affairs is probably abhorrent. Therefore, it seems to me that for me to rejoin your board would be a useless gesture at best.

As far as I am concerned American IPR can be anything it wants to be. I am not interested either in certifying that the American IPR is different from what it seems to me to be, or in trying to change it to something else. Within obvious limits, I believe in free association, with likeminded people. I hope you will find it possible to accept these statements in the spirits in which they are made.

I do not want to indicate that my resignation from IPR was essentially based on matters such as these. I also want to say that I would not have raised these matters with you at all except for your letter of May 29 in which you asked about my possible willingness to rejoin the American IPR. I do think that the position I take above is one on which I am inclined to stand at present. I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you about these matters if you feel inclined to do so.

Many thanks for your letter. I will be glad to look at the revised outline of the book you plan on American Far Eastern Policy Since 1945, by Professor Latourette. Incidentally, why not appoint him to the board of IPR? He is the senior member here at Yale in the field of Far Eastern studies. I do not need to tell you of the eminence he has attained in that field.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID N. ROWE,
Professor of Political Science.

DNR: me.

EXHIBIT No. 612-C

JUNE 26, 1951.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,
Department of Political Science, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: Many thanks for your letter of June 8 which I am sorry not to have answered sooner than this. I greatly appreciated your writing me in such a frank and friendly vein, and I very much hope we will have a chance to talk about the matter further before long. Do call me up if you find time when you are in New York. I would particularly like your suggestions on the *Far Eastern Survey*. I can quite understand your position in regard to membership on the American I. P. R. board, and for the present I suggest we let the matter ride, though I may want to revive the question with you next year. In the meantime, however, I hope you will take me seriously when I say that I am genuinely anxious to do everything I can to refute the impression that the American I. P. R. membership is pretty much limited to like-minded people of a similar general political outlook. I don't believe that is true today, but I would like to make it even more apparent to the outside observer by including in our periodicals contributions from more people like yourself.

In the meantime, let me say that I am grateful for what you are doing to aid Milton Sacks in his study of Communism in Indochina, which, as you know, I hope to have published under I. P. R. auspices.

All good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

WLH:abs.

P. S.—I thought you might like to see a copy of the enclosed recent pamphlet on the I. P. R.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations were you able to draw any conclusions about the position of the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to the international politics?

Mr. ROWE. This was something that I was very much interested in because of my special interest in international affairs. In the political science field I am not only a specialist on the Far East from the institutional point of view, but I have spent a great deal of my time working on the international relations of the Far East, both inside the Far East and of the Far East with other areas.

In my opinion there was a time when the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations took a very definite position in the international field. I have a feeling that a great deal of emphasis has been given to the possible efforts of the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence American policy makers on far-eastern affairs and on international relations.

I think less attention has been given to the position of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the American council, as one council among a large group of national councils, in which you have a sort of a little international society.

In this little international society, the American Institute of Pacific Relations always took pretty strong positions on issues.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us examples of that, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I will give you an example in the open fight which was waged between the American council and its people and such people as the British, French, and Dutch, for example, and this fight being waged on the issue of colonialism and anticolonialism.

There was a time when the whole International Institute of Pacific Relations was threatened with dissolution or at least with the resignation of important members. This, I believe, arose over the open policy on the part of important American IPR council members of attacking the colonial system.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I believe it came to a head about 1945, but these attacks had gone on intermittently for years before. I think it came to a head in two of the meetings that they held, one at Mont Tremblant and the other at Hot Springs, these being international meetings with all the various councils represented, and in which the American IPR publicly took a very strong position, or the members thereof at least took such a position in public against the British, French, and Dutch, attacking their position in the Far East.

You could say that this was merely the reflection of the positions of the individuals in the American IPR, reflecting their belief and indicating what they believed the facts to be, and so on, but the thin line between the expression of fact and the advocacy of policy is a very, very thin line indeed, and at times of this kind it seemed to me it almost entirely tended to disappear, so that the American IPR was labeled, and I think pretty accurately and justifiably, by the people in the other councils, such as the British, French, and Dutch, as being very anticolonial and therefore being very anti-British, French, and Dutch.

Remember, this happened when the war was still on.

The importance and significance of this in international affairs, I think should not be underestimated at all. The British threatened to walk out of the international IPR and so seriously did the Americans take the threat that they put up a compromise deal. They promised to tone down their utterances.

They, above all, got a new head of the international IPR in the person of Prof. Percy Corbett, who was a colleague of mine at Yale at the time.

Professor Corbett's position is an interesting one because, being a Canadian—I am not sure whether at this time he had yet acquired American citizenship—and working in an American institution, being very friendly to the Americans and very friendly with the American IPR, he was almost an ideal individual to mediate between the British and Americans.

All this I cite merely because I think it shows the significance of the IPR in international affairs.

These foreign councils, these non-American councils, that were members of the international IPR probably had a far better system of liaison with their own home governments than our IPR ever managed to build up.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, how does this attack on colonialism affect international politics? Would you develop that for us, please?

Mr. ROWE. Of course, the attack on colonialism is right down the Russian line from a doctrinal point of view.

If you go into Marxism, you find very early stated the view which they have solidly promoted ever since, that the place to attack capitalism is in the colonial areas. They are the marginal regions, the outer regions, the places in which empires tend to decay and where the British, French, and Dutch could be best attacked, and, of course, we know what has happened since the war along this line.

The colonialism in the Far East has suffered very serious blows.

It is not altogether without interest that Mr. Jessup who was so prominent with the American IPR was in his official capacity as an American representative at the United Nations so strongly in opposition to the Dutch and so strongly in support of Indonesian nationalism and eventual Indonesian independence, and I am sure that my colleagues among the Dutch would feel that this is a perfect illustration of how IPR not only affects American policy making, but how it plays international politics.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had any other experiences other than that of colonialism?

Senator WATKINS. May I go back to that in just a minute? I think it has been explained here by so many witnesses from the IPR that this organization did not take up the matters of support for any international policies.

Their whole objective was to get the information from the various groups so that people could be better informed. It was more or less a fact-gathering organization to get the facts to the people and discuss these problems without taking any particular line.

Mr. ROWE. I would like to present in the strongest terms—

Senator WATKINS. That is what I think has been testified. If you read these hearings I think you would find that in them.

Mr. ROWE. I would like to present in the strongest possible terms my own belief that no such framework as that is adequate to explain the terrific friction that arose in the international IPR over this issue of the Americans on the one side against the colonial powers on the other.

The business of pure factual information and fact gathering, no propaganda, no point of view, is completely irreconcilable with what happened.

Senator WATKINS. You understand, do you not, that that is the claim of the officials that have testified here in these hearings?

Mr. ROWE. I understand that.

Senator WATKINS. Do you take issue with that?

Mr. ROWE. I very definitely would take issue with it. Actually it is very difficult for any research organization to operate without some kind of a focus.

The best effort you make to focus research on problems commits you to some kind of a point of view at least by the significance and the importance of the problem.

Then, you proceed from there.

You may say, "All right, we are going to have Mr. A take this up from one point of view, and Mr. B take it up from another, so we will get all kinds of different approaches to the problem."

But supposing you only believe in the point of view that Mr. A is proposing. Then, you are going to allow a dominant position in your

publications and your allocation of funds, and all this to that single point of view.

It is very, very, very easy to manipulate these research programs in such a way that what you come out with is a homogeneous, unified, coordinated point of view, in spite of the fact that you can always go to the multifarious publications of as large an organization as the Institute of Pacific Relations and find something on the other side.

The problem here is not whether you can find something on the other side; the problem is what you have the most of and what is given prominent play and what the people talk about when they go into an international meeting such as was involved at Hot Springs.

This is the place where the point of view of the organization is given away.

Senator WATKINS. You are speaking of the American council only, or of the international?

Mr. ROWE. I am speaking of the American council in this particular case of where they had this fight with the British, French, and Dutch, but, of course, we have to understand that in spite of the fact that the international council is an international council, the operation was centered largely in New York. The money was largely American money.

Senator WATKINS. Who dominated it? The international?

Mr. ROWE. I would say the Americans dominated it to a large extent. If this would not be so, the British would not have threatened to get out of the organization as they did. That was the only recourse they had.

Senator WATKINS. Did that reach the print of the public press?

Mr. ROWE. I do not think it did to any great extent.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this issue of colonialism come up at any of the conferences?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; it came up very definitely at the conference at Hot Springs.

Mr. MORRIS. What about at Atlantic City?

Mr. ROWE. It didn't come up so much at the Atlantic City conference. That was an interim conference that was purely supposed to deal with operational and organizational functions.

It was not a subject-matter conference the way the other ones were, but at the Atlantic City conference the extent of the friction between the British, French, and Dutch, and ourselves, was perfectly clear; I think particularly the British and Dutch delegations.

I was a member of the American council delegation at the Atlantic City conference—this was in early '45, I believe—and I was very much interested in trying to cooperate with the British. I found this extremely difficult because the automatic reaction of the British was that any member of the American delegation was not out for their good and they were hostile, unfriendly, and in a formal, cold sort of way; not, of course, in an overt fashion, but I couldn't get to first base trying to cooperate with the British.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a unity of outlook among the American delegation?

Mr. ROWE. At the Atlantic City conference?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

In other words, did you caucus, or anything, there?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; there was a regular caucus system. I found myself very quickly in a rather embarrassing position. I had been invited to be a member of the American delegation by Mr. Carter, E. C. Carter; that is, when he visited us in New Haven one time, and I accepted.

At that time he asked me whether I would have any objection to Mr. Frederick V. Field being a member of the American delegation. I think this is a very interesting fact in itself, and I said no, but when I got to Atlantic City I found that Mr. Field was not only a member of the American delegation, but he was the spokesman for the delegation.

In these caucuses the point of view would be put up, Field would make the initial pronouncement at the open meetings, and then the American members were supposed to speak up in support.

I am afraid I proved rather uncooperative at this point. I refrained from supporting some of the things Mr. Field said, and I was taken to task for it at the time, but I am afraid that I was still rather obstinate and did not create a particularly good impression.

Senator WATKINS. Who were the other members of that delegation?

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Jessup was one of them. Mr. Carter, of course, was there. This was at the time when they were about to shift over from Carter to another general secretary of the American IPR. A guaranty that they would make such a shift was part of the arrangements which they made in an effort to placate the British, because the British recognized that Carter was the spearhead of the anti-British element in the American IPR.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think these proceedings and the discussion and the friction would be reflected in the minutes of the American Institute or of this international group, in the reported proceedings of their meetings?

Mr. ROWE. I doubt very much if it would.

Senator WATKINS. For policy reasons, it would be kept out of the public?

Mr. ROWE. That is right. I doubt if that would be reflected, although I can't certify on the basis of having read those minutes recently at all.

Senator WATKINS. You recognize the fact that what you are saying here has an important bearing on much of the testimony that has been given here?

Mr. ROWE. The relationship between this testimony and the previous testimony is, of course, something you people have to evaluate, but I say this in full willingness to accept the responsibility for what I am saying.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, in addition to colonialism, has there been any other element of international politics that you have noticed at the IPR as exerted influence?

Mr. ROWE. Now, you are speaking of an influence in international affairs?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. ROWE. Well, in the early years, of course, there was this whole matter of the attitude on the Japanese war against China.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. ROWE. The first contact I had with that was in the fall of 1938. I had just returned from China and had joined the faculty

at Princeton University and was invited to attend one of these American Council IPR meetings held at the Princeton Inn in Princeton, N. J., and at that point the general line seemed to be that the Chinese were bound to succeed in their war against the Japanese.

They were building the Chinese up very strongly, in other words, and it went so far that at least one member of the American group asserted that if the Chinese kept on fighting the Japanese the way they were at that point they would have the Japanese running back out of North China within a year's time.

Well, if this is the best result that fact-finding can give you, I submit that it wasn't very good. I took precisely the opposite point of view and asserted that the only way the Chinese could win the war against the Japanese was with an extensive external intervention by some third power in favor of the Chinese Government.

This was an unpopular thing to say with those people because whereas they were interested, I always though, in supporting and encouraging the Chinese, they did not want to dramatize the necessity for an overt kind of support and intervention if the Chinese were going to win.

They kept talking all the time about the guerrillas and how the Chinese could get all the arms they needed from the Japanese.

I thought it was a particularly romantic kind of view as far as the Chinese war was concerned; but it was the orthodox doctrine at this time by most of these people.

I was definitely in the minority on that business. I do not think this sort of thing ever had a serious impact in the international field as involving the other international councils. I may be wrong on that. It was very early in my association in the IPR and I wasn't even yet a member of the organization at that time.

MR. MORRIS. Was there any trouble with the Chinese council?

MR. ROWE. Oh, yes; they got into increasing trouble with the Chinese council because of the open opposition to the Nationalist Government by members of the IPR.

The open statements made against conditions under Chiang Kai-shek and all that increased more as the war wore on, you see, after Pearl Harbor. There wasn't so much of that before Pearl Harbor.

Senator WATKINS. Can you be more specific about those statements and say who made them; where they were made, and when, and under what circumstances?

MR. ROWE. I think that would be a matter of simply searching for the record of publications. I think you would find in various IPR publications critical articles of this kind. I cannot name you one offhand, but the Chinese IPR got into a very disturbed state over all this business because the Chinese IPR was composed largely of people affiliated with the Nationalist Government, or at least on its side.

MR. MORRIS. How do you know that the Chinese were disturbed by these developments?

MR. ROWE. I think available correspondence between the IPR members inside the organization indicates that they were taking measures to either avoid hostility toward the Chinese IPR or to mitigate the effects of their policy.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask about the Russian Institute and its connection with the international and its relationship with

the other institutes. How were they getting along with these others at that time?

Mr. ROWE. Which time are you speaking of?

Senator WATKINS. The time you were just speaking of when this discussion about China was going on.

Mr. ROWE. I don't think I could say much of much use along that line because I was never in on the inside of that particular thing, on the matter of the relations between the American IPR and the general IPR and the Soviet Council of the IPR.

Of course, we all know the Soviets became increasingly noncooperative, but in the early years of the war it seems that they did have a regular council and participated to a certain extent in IPR work, but as the war went on they increasingly withdrew and contacts diminished.

It seems to me that is the general history of the thing.

But I had no connection of any direct kind with these matters.

Mr. MORRIS. How active were you in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. I was a trustee. I did not attend meetings more than about once a year. That's about all it came to.

Mr. MORRIS. How many were held? They were held more frequently than that, were they not?

Mr. ROWE. I think so. I was for a while rather more active when Raymond Dennett was the executive secretary of the American IPR. At that point, Dennett asked me to join the research advisory committee and I did so and I participated rather fully in its activities.

This was the committee that had the job of promoting research activities, judging their desirability and undesirability, their value or lack thereof, and I attended quite a few meetings of that committee.

However, my activities on that committee came to a halt, I think about 1946. I never had any explanation of the reason for this, but my name was just dropped off the membership list.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you account for the difference that during the time that Dennett was secretary you were more active than after?

Mr. ROWE. I think Dennett made a real effort to broaden out the membership on these various policy elements in the American IPR. I think he very definitely wanted to get a more general representation of points of view. I got along very well with Dennett. I talked with Dennett about my failure to understand why I had been dropped off the committee. I talked with him about this matter at a considerably later date and Dennett said to me, "Well, what did you expect? You were different."

Mr. MORRIS. What did he mean by that?

Mr. ROWE. I don't know precisely what he meant by it; but he meant that I was in general not in conformity with the views and opinions held by the majority of the important members of the IPR, I suppose.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Owen Lattimore active in the IPR at that time?

Mr. ROWE. He got more active again after the war ended.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean, again, Professor?

Mr. ROWE. I mean he had been active before. He had been, of course, editor of Pacific Affairs and had been very, very active in the IPR, both the American IPR and the international IPR. After the war ended he came back from his activities in the OWI and he became

more active again in American IPR matters. I have theorized that maybe it was in connection with this that my name was dropped off that committee, but I have no way to prove whether this was so or not.

Mr. MORRIS. How well have you known Owen Lattimore, through the years, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I never knew him well. I first met him in China in 1937, in the fall of 1937, and I had various purely professional contacts with him from time to time. I have spoken on the same lecture platform with him, and I asked him, for instance, to read a paper at Princeton at one of the bicentennial conferences at Princeton, and so on, but I have never been a close friend of his. It's been that sort of contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you known Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. I have known Mrs. Lattimore considerably better, but a long time ago. My acquaintance with Mrs. Lattimore was first in China in 1921-22 when she and her parents and one of her sisters came out to Nanking, the city I lived in. Her father was a professor of mathematics and dean at Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., and they came out to spend their sabbatical year in Nanking and he taught mathematics in the University of Nanking. It was at this time that I became rather well acquainted with Eleanor Holgate, as she was then, and knew her quite well during that time and the period up through the early summer of 1924. At that point she and my eldest sister who had become very close friends, went to Peking, and I didn't see Mrs. Lattimore again to speak to her until the fall of 1937, a period of 13 years or more, and I have seen very, very little of her since that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any Communist associations that you knew of in her life at that time?

Mr. ROWE. The Communist associations that I knew of in her life were in the period 1923-24, around in there.

Mr. MORRIS. What were they?

Mr. ROWE. She was acquainted with such a man as Prof. Harry Ward, the late Prof. Harry Ward of Union Seminary, New York, and with such people as Anna Louise Strong, for example, and the way I know this is because at that time she and my sister were planning a trip to China from New York going by boat across the Atlantic and then planning to cross Russia and Siberia by train to get to Peking through Manchuria, and whereas the visa problem did not seem to be particularly difficult with Miss Holgate, it was difficult as far as my sister was concerned, and I understood that help on this matter was gotten from people like Harry Ward and Anna Louise Strong through Miss Holgate's intermediation in the matter.

I was present at one visit she made to Professor Ward's home in the spring of 1924. I did not hear all the conversation because part of it was conducted out in the garden where she and Professor Ward went, but I knew that it was in connection with this matter of a trip they were planning through Russia and Siberia.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, have you known the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations through the years? Are you well acquainted with them?

Mr. ROWE. The question of whether I am well acquainted with them is a question which would be hard to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, do you know them?

Mr. ROWE. I know them; yes. I know most of them, of the top level people.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us a general idea of what extent you know the leaders of the institute such as Mr. Jessup and Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. ROWE. If you want to introduce their names one by one I will be glad to comment that way, or do you want me to comment on the general group?

Mr. MORRIS. The reason for going into this is to show to what extent Professor Rowe has known the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations and therefore bears on the qualifications of discussing this general subject.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jessup?

Mr. ROWE. I have known Mr. Jessup both inside and outside of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He has at various times been associated with the Yale Institute of International Studies in informal ways, and I knew him in connection with this Atlantic City conference. I haven't seen him for several years now.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Biggerstaff?

Mr. ROWE. I know Biggerstaff fairly well. He is a professor of history, I believe, at Cornell University and was formerly a student at Harvard and studied in Peking. I first met him in this country. I couldn't tell you the precise year, but I see him every once in a while. I have been on a radio program with him.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. ROWE. I have known Fairbank ever since 1936 when he first came back to Harvard and joined the faculty there after a period of study in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROWE. Could I say one more word on Fairbank?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

Mr. ROWE. I would say that I know Fairbank quite well. He and I were together in the OSS. He went out to China in 1942 to take over the job that I had started up there in 1941 and I have had frequent professional contacts with him since that time. During the year 1936-37 I saw quite a bit of him in Harvard. He was taking some courses there at the same time as well as teaching there.

Mr. MORRIS. In your dealings with Professor Fairbank have you seen any manifestations of sympathy on his part toward communism or Communist movements?

Mr. ROWE. There is unquestioned sympathy on the part of Fairbank for the Chinese Communists. I say that and feel that very strongly.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. You know it from his writings. You know it from the way he talks about Chinese politics.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard him talk about Chinese politics?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; I've heard him talk about Chinese politics. The most recent time, of course, was out in Denver in January when we were on the same platform together and at that time the amount of disagreement that might have developed between us was diminished by the fact that we decided to get together and see what we could agree

on to say in public, but I think any analysis of Fairbank's writings shows a very sympathetic attitude toward what he calls the Chinese revolution.

This is one of these phrases that you have to know the meaning of. When, for instance, I wrote an article in 1947—it was published in the *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science* in January 1948—I sent a copy to Fairbank in which I advocated immediate American military intervention in favor of the Chinese Nationalists to prevent the Chinese Communists from coming down out of Manchuria and eventually to recover Manchuria. Fairbank wrote me a letter in which all he said of any great importance along this line was that I was 98 percent wrong because I failed to take into account the Chinese revolution. Well, if you don't know what the people mean by the Chinese revolution, this phrase they constantly use, you don't understand. But what this is is the agrarian revolution: the Communists have seized it; we have to back the revolution no matter who controls it. And that's the way in which these people push when they are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

Now, this is a different thing from saying that a man is either a Communist or is generally in favor of communism. It's merely to ask however the question: In a specific situation like that in China which involves Communists, does he or does he not back the interests of the Communists? And in this case there was no question certainly up to the Korean war but what I would say Fairbank was a consistent backer in the interests of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew Fairbank in China, did you not?

Mr. ROWE. I never knew Fairbank in China; no. My first acquaintance with him was in the fall of 1936 when he was at Harvard. Then I knew him in Washington when I came down to join the OSS. I have never been with Fairbank while we were both in China. Our paths have never crossed there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; not very well. I first met Rosinger in connection with IPR activities in New York, I believe, in 1938-39 when he was a student. I was present at a meeting at Mount Holyoke College in the summer of 1947 where he was. I never had much to do with Rosinger personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. William Lockwood one of the leaders of the institute?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. I think his position in the American council of the IPR has always been rather an important one and not always to be analyzed purely on the basis of what office he has held. Even when he is out of the organization, from a formal point of view, while he is still maintained as a trustee, for example, he has had a very important influence. As a matter of fact, I would say that the controlling people in the American IPR include the following names. These are the people that really run the thing and that really control the making of important policy decisions as distinguished, first, from the general membership that has no influence at all, and from the other people like the other board of trustee members—take me, for example—that have no real say in the American policy.

Senator WATKINS. Why would you say you did not have any?

Mr. ROWE. Because the important decisions are always in the hands of an executive committee and the committee will operate so as to

screen out the policy possibilities and then the results of the committee activity will be presented to the trustees and all boards of trustees tend to take on a rubber stamp character, and this was no exception.

Mr. MORRIS. As a member of the board of trustees would you ever take part in elections?

Mr. ROWE. I suppose technically, yes; but actually these things were never issues by the time they got down to that level.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were a member of the board did you ever take part in the election of a secretary?

Mr. ROWE. Not that I can remember; no. I remember one meeting of the American board of the IPR at which I was present at which the question of an executive secretary to the American IPR to succeed Mr. Carter was brought up. It was explained to us that this was in the hands of the executive committee or a special committee, I think it was in this case, empowered to handle the matter. They did not think it was desirable to mention the names of the various candidates they were considering. They did not want this to get out to the public and they were sufficiently secret about this so they didn't even mention these names before the whole board of trustees. Now, I had the impression that other members of the board of trustees who were not on this particular committee knew who the people were, but I never had any knowledge of it, and when Mr. Clayton was finally selected it was just as much news to me as it would have been if I had been a member of the general public with no connection of any kind with the IPR. It is things of this kind that led to my statement in the letter to Holland that I just never thought I really belonged.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "Clayton," you mean Clayton Lane?

Mr. ROWE. Clayton Lane; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were telling us on the basis of your experience who the leaders were.

Mr. ROWE. I got started on that: E. C. Carter, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Lockwood, Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Biggerstaff, Mr. Fairbank—these are the professionals. I want to point out one thing: That all these people are professional students either of international relations or primarily of Far East with the exception of Mr. Carter who came into this IPR thing from an entirely different approach.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he come into it?

Mr. ROWE. I understood that he had been YMCA secretary in his early life.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, I give you a list of names of the people in the Institute of Pacific Relations around whom our testimony has revolved for the most part through all these hearings. There is a list of 83 names here and this was a list presented to Mr. Carter at the outset of our hearings here on the general theory that these would be the people that we would be talking about. I ask you if this list was presented to you this morning in executive session and were you asked in executive session how many of that particular list you know of?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that is true. I replied to your question in executive session by marking this list with the marks to indicate which of these names were familiar to me from actual personal contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Familiar and known to you?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you supply those names for the record?

Again, Mr. Chairman, this again bears on qualifying this witness as being in the position of commenting on the various activities of these people through this hearing.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. ROWE. Do you want me to just read the names off?

Mr. MORRIS. Just indicate the name.

Mr. ROWE. I will do so: Solomon Adler, Robert Barnett, T. A. Bisson, Evans Carlson, Chen Han-seng, O. E. Clubb, Lauchlin Currie, John P. Davies, John K. Fairbank, Frederick V. Field, Julian R. Friedman—I am afraid that's one name I omitted this morning—Randall Gould—that's another omission—and Andrew Grajdanzev, Michael Greenberg, Haldore Hanson, Alger Hiss, Eleanor Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, Michael Lindsay, Lawrence K. Rosinger, Mr. K. Saionji, John S. Service, Edgar P. Snow, Mrs. Edgar Snow, Marguerite Stewart, Maxwell Stewart, and John Carter Vincent. I guess that's all the names that are on this list that you have just given me here.

Mr. MORRIS. And they are people you met and conversed with principally in your experiences with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. Some principally in connection with the IPR, but others in various capacities.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have dealings with Robert W. Barrett? Did you find him to be a leader, one of the people active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. I don't think Barnett was ever a leader in the making of IPR policy. He was closely associated with them and my contact with him initially was at a time when he was supported by a grant which was at least administered through the American IPR if it was not directly granted by them. I visited him in the IPR offices in New York at that time and I have since been in irregular contact with him.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with your experiences with Owen Lattimore during the course of years have you been in position to follow Chinese Communist policy and Communist policy in general on an international level?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, very much so; that's been one of the main interests in my study, in political study.

Mr. MORRIS. And to what extent do you follow that?

Mr. ROWE. It would be hard for me to tell you what precise proportion of my time I devote to following it.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try.

Mr. ROWE. I certainly try to keep up with the chief policy pronouncements, for instance, made by the top Chinese Communist policy makers. I read very carefully all the available translation I can get from the Chinese press and occasionally have to dip over into the Chinese material itself. I follow these writings in the content of Chinese propaganda and I would say in general I am fairly well acquainted with the Chinese Communist Party line over a period of years.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Chinese politics? Do you follow Chinese politics?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. That is getting increasingly difficult to do these days. In the first place, there is less politics and the kind of thing we talk about as normal politics. In the second place, the iron curtain is intervening and it is more and more difficult to get information out, but insofar as I can, I certainly try to keep up with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had an opportunity to follow and to read the works and the expressions of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; I have read various of his books, articles, and other publications as they have come out from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the experience this professor has had in following the Chinese Communist Party line, Communist movements and activities, and at the same time his knowledge of Chinese politics and the fact that he has followed the writings and the expressions of Owen Lattimore, if we could ask him on the basis of that experience to what extent he can say Owen Lattimore's writings and expressions have coincided with the Communist Party line.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you want him to pass some judgment as a specialist in this field?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right; qualified as he is by the experiences he has testified to here, whether he is in a position to give an opinion, an expert opinion in this case, on Owen Lattimore.

Senator WATKINS. I think that would be a proper matter to go into and a proper matter to testify to in view of his background.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about your conclusions of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. I have for a number of years labeled Lattimore as a fellow traveler. At the time when the original investigation of Lattimore took place in the spring of 1950 I was asked by Professor Fairbank to write a testimonial letter on behalf of Mr. Lattimore. I wrote Mr. Fairbank a letter, but I refused to try to establish through any such letter what I chose to call "innocence by association." I have heard of guilt by association. I think this business of trying to establish innocence by association is probably equally unjustifiable.

I said, "I will wait for the evidence to come in. I would be extremely surprised if proof were given that Mr. Lattimore was anything but a loyal American, but." I said, "since these questions are raised and since I can't state whether Mr. Lattimore to my knowledge is a formal Communist affiliate, and this seems to be one of the important elements in this business, I will wait for the evidence to come in."

I think in the last 2 years even more evidence has come in than we ever had before, and I will say now that my subjective opinion, which is not based upon a provable statistical approach, for example, to the writings of Owen Lattimore in which you could demonstrate this thing once and for all—it is not based on any such detailed analysis as that—but my subjective opinion for what it is worth, in the light of my knowledge of the subject matter, my 20 years of study in the far eastern field, is that as of today among far eastern specialists in the United States Lattimore is probably the principal agent of Stalinism. Now, I use this word "Stalinism" by design.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by "agent"? That is the important thing. You know, it has been charged that he is the chief architect of our foreign policy with respect to China and the Far East, and I think some have gone so far as to say he was actually an

agent, and by that word they meant that he was an official representative in a way in the background or under cover.

Mr. ROWE. To show you the meaning that I am attaching to that word in this case, I merely want to reiterate what I just said as to the fact that I have no positive knowledge by which I could identify this man as a formal Communist affiliate. In other words, I can't prove one way or another whether he was ever an agent of the Russians. I think I am now using the word "agent" with the meaning that you have in mind.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know whether you know what I have in mind. I am trying to find out what you mean. I am trying to find out what you have in mind.

Mr. ROWE. When I said he was an agent of Stalinism, I am talking about ideologies and ideas and that he is promoting these ideas and ideologies.

Senator WATKINS. That is what you had in mind when you described him as a fellow traveler rather than a Communist?

Mr. ROWE. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. All right; you may proceed now.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by Stalinism?

Mr. ROWE. That is the next thing I was coming to, and what I am talking about here is the Stalinist version or historical development of Marxism. Let us go back again to this statement I just made. As far as far eastern specialists are concerned—that is the area in which he operated—I don't mean to indicate at all that what you have here is a general operator in the Communist ideological field, but he is a specialized operator within the field of far eastern studies, Asiatic studies, and particularly of Chinese studies, and in this field I consider him principal agent for the advocacy of Stalinist ideas. Does that clarify my position on that?

Senator WATKINS. Are you tying that down to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that would be it, but it is not limited to the Chinese Communists. It would also involve, for instance, Japanese affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Through the years have you expressed yourself to various people on policy being pursued by the United States in the Far East?

Mr. ROWE. I have a considerable list of publications on this matter.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, you have expressed yourself on these?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; very much so.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us?

Mr. ROWE. I could make available a copy of my bibliography to you in which my articles have been published in which this point of view has been promulgated, my point of view on far eastern affairs. Over the years, of course, I have as a teacher, for example, promoted my point of view and pushed my own point of view on far eastern affairs. Long before the Pacific war ever began I insisted that you will never get a rapprochement of any kind between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. I am sure I could document that with the testimony of my colleagues in this field.

In 1947 in a public address given at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor I came out flatly for an American military intervention in the Far East subsequent to the collapse of General Marshall's efforts to bring the Communists and the Nationalists together. I

based this on the idea that we have tried this, I never thought it would succeed, but as long as it has now failed we must now pick somebody to back; since it seems impossible to pick the Chinese Communists to back we have to pick the Nationalists to back; nobody is going to advocate backing the Chinese Communists militarily in eastern Asia; we must back the Chinese Nationalists. And to this end I advocated—and this was an article published later in the January issue in the Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science—military intervention on the mainland of Asia in order to prevent the Chinese Communists from coming down out of Manchuria and in order to regain eventually Manchuria back from Chinese Communist control. I said that if we don't do this the Communists will win. I prophesied that they would be between a year and 6 months in causing the collapse of the Chinese Nationalists. This prophecy was, I think, clearly borne out by the developments and the facts of history. I foresaw that that would happen. Without it of course nobody would accept this point of view either inside of outside of the Government. I couldn't get any place with the people in the State Department on this.

Senator WATKINS. Did you try?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; copies of these articles were sent by me to State Department people, for example.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever appear in person before any of them, the Secretary of State or others?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes. I never appeared in person before a Secretary of State. I have had a conversation with Mr. Acheson, but it was before he became Secretary of State. I pushed these lines of policy with people like George Kennan, who is the head of the Policy Planning Staff, with John Davies in an earlier appearance before the Policy Planning Staff, the precise date of which I can't remember now, but could easily get out of my files. This was well before the emergency developed as it developed in 1948 and 1949, but I got nowhere with any of this.

Mr. NORRIS. Did you have any dealings with John Carter Vincent?

Mr. ROWE. Of course I worked in the Embassy with Vincent in Chungking in 1941 and 1942 during the time I was there. I have never had any dealings with him of this kind since I left Chungking. I talked once in a while on policy matters with him there.

Senator WATKINS. What was the reaction of the members of the Department of State when you presented these views?

Mr. ROWE. I would like to present as a very interesting case in point the reaction I got out of Mr. Kennan early in 1949. At this point the Chinese Communists had not yet taken all of China. There was a great territory still available. I came back from a 5½ months' trip to the Far East during the summer and fall of 1948 convinced more than ever that something had to be done militarily by this country to stem the Communist tide in eastern Asia.

I merely point out parenthetically at this point that eventually we had to do it and we did it in Korea and we are still fumbling away with it, but this has always seemed to me to justify any advocacy of an earlier kind of military intervention in the Far East. However, when I presented this argument to Mr. Kennan I got two very interesting reactions from him. I couldn't make sense out of the reaction, but for better or for worse here it was:

First, he said, "China doesn't matter very much. It's not very important. It's never going to be powerful." I attributed this kind of mistaken view to his complete history of involvement in European politics. He approached the Russian problem from the point of view of Europe.

Mr. Kennan said once in my hearing some years before this time that the struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union will be resolved somewhere on a line drawn between Stettin on the north and Trieste on the south. I considered this an extremely limited view and I questioned him at the time about where the Far East came in the settlement of our problem with the Soviet Union, but never got any satisfactory answer out of him. That was the first reaction: China is not very important, doesn't count.

The second reaction he gave me was in response to my response to this first one. When he gave me this I said, "China as a thing in itself, no, but China tied to the Soviet Union is an entirely different business. The Soviet Union and China are natural complements and supplements to each other, and you are going to find when the Chinese Communists get control the Russians are going to help them. They are going to build them up and make them dangerous and difficult."

At this point Mr. Kennan reacted this way. He said to me, "When the Chinese Communists get control over 450 million people,"—I began to pick up my ears at this, because he seemed to be making some implications in the field of power at this time—"the Russians will never be able to control them."

Now, if China is so weak that it doesn't count, this means that the Russians will be able to control. If China becomes sufficiently strong and gets control of 450 million people, strong enough to control the Russians, keep the Russians from controlling them, then you have to worry about China.

I say that you get yourself into a complete logical impasse at this point, and I said that if any of my students ever presented me with anything that was so completely illogical as this I probably would flunk him, but I couldn't flunk Mr. Kennan. That's the kind of response I got. I got this with amazing regularity and amazing pertinacity when I approached State Department people. There was a perfect piece of nonsense. These were the top brains of the Department of State. These are the people that are supposed to sit in rooms by themselves and think about policies on the highest possible level.

Senator WATKINS. I would say that you had company in that I recall very distinctly others taking that same point of view. In fact, without knowing very much about China I took the same point of view in my first speech in 1947, that we had to reverse our policy in China and make good on our guaranty for the independence of Korea, and that we should take a very vigorous, affirmative stand, and I know others were taking that same position.

Mr. ROWE. I had not been aware of that, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I am just a Senator from the sticks and you probably would not hear anything about it.

Mr. ROWE. It is my fault for not knowing what you said.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we have, I would estimate very roughly, from the questions prepared here, about an hour and a half or 2 hours more of testimony. Would you want to take a recess now, or would you want to go on some more?

Senator WATKINS. I think it would be a good idea to take the recess now and come back into session later.

Mr. MORRIS. When will you set the time?

Senator WATKINS. We will make it 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., Thursday, March 27, 1952, a recess was taken, to reconvene at 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in order. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID N. ROWE—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, in going back over the material that we covered this morning, you were present at the Atlantic City interim conference, were you not?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you present at the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. ROWE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jessup at the Atlantic City conference?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he take an important part in that conference?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he was very important. As I said this morning—I believe I said it this morning—Mr. Field was the leader, the spokesman, of the American delegation. Yes; I know I covered this. It was an interesting thing to me, the precise position that Mr. Jessup occupied in relation to myself, and it is sort of an amusing story.

I was there representing the American council's committee on Research, research advisory committee, and in the committee meetings of the whole conference at which these subjects were discussed, committee meetings organized by subject matter in which the representatives of the various national councils were included, I was of course a logical individual to represent the American council, but it seemed fairly clear to me that Mr. Jessup was asked to attend each one of those meetings, and in his extremely effective way acted as the spokesman on the subject of American research interests.

Now of course I had indicated my "untrustworthiness" as a member of the American delegation by refusing to follow the line laid down in the caucuses to the exclusion of my own point of view, and maybe this is the reason why they wanted to be cautious; but it was a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the difference in the line between that advocated by you and that proposed by the caucus?

Mr. ROWE. In general I was trying to take a most conciliatory attitude toward members of our other national councils like for instance I stated it this morning. I tried to be as friendly as I possibly could be toward the British. I found this extremely difficult because the British were extremely suspicious of any member of the American delegation.

As a result, when Field would make the initial leading statement, the other members of the American delegation would follow after and support what he said. I am afraid that there were times when I quite definitely hung back. I think I would characterize it that way: that was the essence probably of the difference.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Rowe, had you any opinion on whether or not Field was or was not a Communist?

Mr. ROWE. Well, at the Atlantic City conference I remember one incident. We were discussing informally matters relating to the Far East, and I cited as an authority on Chinese agriculture Prof. John Lossing Buck, of Nanking, probably one of the greatest authorities on Chinese agriculture. I was, I am afraid, rather startled by the reaction Field took toward some of the statements put out in Buck's book about the relation between Chinese agriculture and Chinese society.

It seemed fairly clear that Field challenged Buck's authority and in the course of doing so followed the Communist line on this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. ROWE. That was in the early part of 1945, during the winter of 1944-45.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known him prior to that time?

Mr. ROWE. Field?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. No; I wouldn't say I had known him. I am sure I had met him before, but this was the first time I had ever worked in an organization with him.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time in 1945 he did have a leading part in the American council?

Mr. ROWE. Very much so. As I said this morning, he was indicated by Carter to be the spokesman of the American delegation. I want to point out this fact, that no appointment, no other appointment than Field, could possibly have reinforced as this appointment did the suspicions of the British that the Americans were still going to be intransigent because Field was known to be a critic of the British on such points as colonialism.

Senator WATKINS. Was Jessup on the committee?

Mr. ROWE. He was a member of the delegation.

Senator WATKINS. He did not act as spokesman?

Mr. ROWE. No.

Senator WATKINS. When was that that you mentioned?

Mr. ROWE. That was on the subject, committee meetings at the conference. You would have a meeting discussing one of the particular subject matters of the conference, and in this case it was research plans. I went into this committee, being the American on the delegation who had been in the research advisory committee of the American IPR. They sent Jessup along, and Jessup did most of the talking.

Senator WATKINS. That was still in another group?

Mr. ROWE. This was in a subgroup of the Atlantic City conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Bill Johnstone at that conference?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he in the State Department at that time?

Mr. ROWE. I think he was still a dean at George Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now in the State Department, is he not?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he is connected with the business of the international exchange of persons. He supervises it if and when it happens and comes, the Japanese equivalent of the Fulbright business for Japan, exchange of students and professors both ways.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Carter himself at the delegation?

Mr. ROWE. Carter was there, and Mrs. Carter was there also. I remember Mrs. Carter giving voice to a very interesting expression one morning at breakfast, as I remember it, when she said in a rather positive way that the only good Chinese were the northern Chinese. I suppose this doesn't mean anything very much to any of you, but it is a fact that at that time instead of using the term Communist Chinese, people used this phrase, northern Chinese, or the Chinese of the north.

You have to get onto the lingo before you can even understand what is going on around you.

Senator WATKINS. They meant the Communists?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; the only good Chinese were the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that you indicate now it is not an easy thing at times to catch the plain intent of a person who wants to give the Communist line?

Mr. ROWE. You couldn't have said a truer thing. If you have been in the middle of the business, you have to study it constantly to know what the words and phrases are, the way in which they are used at the moment in order to know what people are talking about. That is why it is so easy for an uninitiated person or group to be hoodwinked.

Senator FERGUSON. And to adopt it as being fact?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Whereas as a matter of fact it is not fact but Communist propaganda and party line?

Mr. ROWE. That is right, it is perfectly possible.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to take you back to the subject that we were discussing just before we recessed. You spoke about appearing before people at the State Department, various ones, and talking to them about your views that we ought to get in and support the Nationalists and all that sort of thing?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. You mentioned Mr. Kennan. Did you finish what you had to say about your interview with Mr. Kennan?

Mr. ROWE. There is one more thing I would like to bring out about that, and I found it extremely interesting. I called for a sophisticated, important, and formidable program of political warfare involving propaganda, persuasion, even involving what we may term in nice language the judicious use of money. A lot can be done with it in the Asiatic framework.

Senator WATKINS. Silver bullets?

Mr. ROWE. Silver bullets.

When I put this up to Mr. Kennan, and I put this up as part of my presentation, I wouldn't want to leave anybody with the impression that I am a person who would rely wholly on military activity. When you put this up, Kennan said: "That is impossible. We can't do that kind of thing; we don't have people with the kind of know-how to conduct sophisticated political warfare."

I thought this was one of the most futilitarian, I repeat, futilitarian statements I ever heard from a Government official.

Senator WATKINS. Would you know any time in our history in the war when we did use so-called silver bullets to win our way?

Mr. ROWE. I would put it this way: I had always thought that the way to justify the use of substantial funds, substantial arms, and

things of that kind is on this kind of level instead of as we tried during the Pacific war to use them in order to help us fight the war, period. You see what I mean? In other words, that aid to the Chinese National Government should have been considered primarily as political aid and for its political impact and not in the expectation that you are going to get a heavy, strong, important addition to your fighting forces.

I said this from the start. I think that is the framework in which you always had to approach those people.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, we had been using a lot of money in Asia, had we not, with the Chinese?

Mr. ROWE. You mean at what period, before the war began, before Pearl Harbor, for example?

Senator WATKINS. After Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; we used money in the shape of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation work, famine relief, and all that sort of thing. There was a great deal of it used that way.

Senator WATKINS. We used direct help to the Chinese, had we not? We had given them cash?

Mr. ROWE. We made, early in 1942, a \$500,000,000 cash grant to the Chinese National Government.

Senator WATKINS. Are you acquainted with what went on between our representatives and the Communists during the time of the war when the Communists were also supposed to be fighting the Japanese? Did we not help them then? Did we not help the Communists as well as the Nationalists to fight the Japanese?

Mr. ROWE. I didn't think we had in the form of arms, but in the shape of medical supplies.

Senator WATKINS. Things that money could buy?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to have you tell us any other people that you approached in the State Department because that is a very interesting thing if this was called to their attention by a man who was qualified; it is very important to know.

Mr. ROWE. There are two other illustrations that I would cite. I would point out one feature: that there has not been much of this in the last few years.

Senator WATKINS. What?

Mr. ROWE. My getting into the State Department. I have been on the wrong side of the fence, so to speak.

Senator WATKINS. You are going the other way, the reverse of what they were doing?

Mr. ROWE. There is one thing people don't like, and that is to be reminded of advice they should have taken before.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that your remark means that the State Department seeks advice that is in compliance with what they desire to do rather than to get advice to aid them in the formulation of a proper foreign policy?

Mr. ROWE. I am glad you brought it out. You people have probably had brought out to you that a lot of attention was paid to the meeting at the State Department called in October 1949.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Stassen and others were there?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. Now it is a very interesting fact that, as far as the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned and the people in its office—people that operate it—only those people from the IPR were invited

to this conference with whom I would violently, for instance, disagree.

My colleague at Yale, Bernard Brodie, for whom I have great respect and admiration, was invited to go. Brodie came to me with a telegram which was sent to him over the signature of the Secretary of State and said, "What is this all about? Why are they inviting me to this conference and not you?"

I said, "Your guess is as good as mine, but I urge you to go, and I will help brief you and do everything I can to help you out."

Brodie is an expert on the atomic bomb and American armaments and military technology and all this, but he hardly knows one Chinese from another. I helped brief him, and I think it was Mr. Stassen—was it?—that said Brodie was on the right side in the conference. I wasn't there.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that during the testimony of Mr. Stassen he commented—Stassen commented—that he was surprised that Professor Rowe had not been invited in view of his experience in that particular field.

Mr. ROWE. Brodie went to Francis Russell, who, on behalf of the public-relations people in State, had organized this meeting, set it up, and asked Russell why I hadn't been included. Russell said that my name had been on two or three of the lists—preliminary lists—for the membership of the conference, but that when these lists went up to the far eastern desk that my name had been taken off in each case.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are an expert in the Far East?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I don't personally like the word "expert," but I say I am a specialist on the Far East. I spent 20 years studying it. I have lived in China almost half of my life, and so unfortunate in this particular framework as to write and say the wrong things.

Senator WATKINS. Wrong things from other people's point of view?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean as far as the State Department is concerned?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is your real belief now that you were left off because they did not desire your particular viewpoint?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; and they had reason to know what that particular viewpoint was because early in 1949 I had a conference with Mr. Butterworth, and this is another one of the contacts.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I wanted.

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Butterworth, accompanied by Mr. Sprouse, and the then executive officer of the Far Eastern Division, Mr. Weigle—the three of them—I had a talk with them in Mr. Butterworth's office, and I laid out the general line of recommendation that I had been laying out for 2 or 3 years before, and I didn't get anywhere with Mr. Butterworth on this.

It was rather interesting what happened because Mr. Butterworth, if you will pardon the phrase I use, treated me to the best illustration I could possibly have wanted to find of what is known as a filibuster. We were in there about 2 hours, during the course of which he took occasion to deliver me a long lecture on the difficulties that General Marshall had had in the negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists.

I interrupted him two or three times and told him I thought I knew that story pretty well, that he was giving me in fact detail

that I had not known before, but that I wanted to interrupt and interject my own statement. Then, about 10 minutes before I was due to go up for an appointment with the Under Secretary for Public Affairs, Mr. Butterworth turned to me and said, "Well," or words to this effect, "we thought you had something you wanted to say to us."

I more or less opined that I had had, but that time was so short that I would leave on his desk a document which I had brought with me in anticipation that I might not be able to get my "two bits" in, as we say. I walked out with the document remaining on his desk. That is the kind of luck I had with Butterworth. It was the most complete brush-off anybody could have had.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. ROWE. Early 1949, about January of 1949 just before Mr. Acheson became Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that it could be the reason that Butterworth had seen you and had your views that they did not invite you down to this other thing?

Mr. ROWE. That was the only reason I could figure out. Brodie was not the only one that remarked about my absence at that conference, because other members such as Quigley from Minnesota, Fairbank from Harvard, both asked Brodie why I wasn't there. Brodie, of course, did not have any answer.

Senator WATKINS. Is that all you have about Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Could you go on with the next one?

Mr. ROWE. Well, this is an earlier one, but it is also the policy-planning staff. I believe this happened about 1947 as well as I can remember it, 1946 or 1947. I could find the precise date in my files in New Haven, as I have all the correspondence. At this point the policy-planning staff decided that they would call in a series of Far East specialists to consult with them individually a day or so at a time on what to do about China.

I don't know who all these people were, but I do know that Professor Wittfogel was one; I was another, and Professor Biggerstaff and Professor Fairbank were the others. I don't know who all else. I received a very courteous hearing, but I got nowhere in trying to convince Mr. John P. Davies, who was running the particular show at the time, that we ought to keep on supporting the Chinese Nationalists. That was my line.

His line was in general that these people are disorderly; this government is disorganized; there is no stability in China, and the whole thing is going to break up. I said to him, as I remember it, "Well, when old Chiang Kai-shek wants to restore a bit of order by shooting a few people, you people get revolted by the idea, but in some cases there is nothing else you can do."

This evoked a very, very negative response. I am afraid what is happening in Korea today shows that there are times when that is just what you have to do; but, you see, this outrages the so-called liberal mentality.

Senator WATKINS. What were you urging at this conference?

Mr. ROWE. I was urging the continued support of the Chinese National Government by all means.

Senator WATKINS. You spoke this morning of military aid. Did you mean, by that, that we send our own Army, Navy, and Air Force to China to back them up?

Mr. ROWE. I never considered, Senator, that any large-scale involvement of this kind would have been required if the action had been taken at the appropriate time. If the action had been taken before the Nationalist collapse set in under Communist pressure, it could have been done with a very small representation of American personnel.

I want to give you another very interesting item on this. When I was in China in 1948, on that 5½-month trip I took through China, Japan, and southeast Asia, I had two private interviews with Maj. Gen. David Barr, who was the commanding general in charge of the American military advisory group in Nanking. Barr was telling me what I, of course, knew to be true; namely, that the great problem in material aid to the Nationalists was the same problem as was faced by Stilwell and Wedemeyer and all the rest of them of seeing to it that the aid get efficiently distributed and used in an efficient manner. Of course, Wedemeyer went a long distance in the direction of solving this by distributing American military personnel down to the company level, a one- and two-man number in each case.

I said to General Barr, "Would this sort of thing work at the present time?"

Barr said to me, "if I had 10,000 American military personnel in China, I could see to it that every bit of aid we give to the Chinese National Government would be efficiently and honestly used."

That was in September of 1948, mind you, just a few months before the Communist sweep down from Manchuria began. At that point he was convinced that that would work. He never got that kind of implementation. Of course, he never got the material either. The argument against distributing the material was based on that fact: That efficient use could not be guaranteed.

Senator WATKINS. You did not have in mind, as I understand it, that we send in a large force, either air force, ground troops, or naval forces?

Mr. ROWE. No; but the point is that, by refusing and failing to do it at the time when it should have been done, we have now got ourselves in the position in the Far East where what you are saying is precisely what we had to do. The difference is that we are fighting this war in Korea at very heavy cost with Americans. What is it? Well over 100,000 casualties, and fighting it in what I consider to be a small corner of Asia where, if you win a victory all the way to the Yalu River, you haven't done anything world-shaking from the point of view of strategy.

The fact is you do this after you have lost the main issue, which is China. I have never been able to make sense out of this sequence of events.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, we get into the fight in Korea when that is merely the tail of the dog?

Mr. ROWE. That is correct. Whereas, half of the military involvement that we have today, if it had been done 3 years earlier in 1947 instead of today, would have had the effect of preserving China, certainly China south of the Great Wall, which is bulk of China, from the Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not apparent that when you divided Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel and put the Communists on the one side and the people we were supporting on the other side that you were going to have just what has now happened in Korea? How could you keep from having a war?

Mr. ROWE. You either would have a war between North Korea and South Korea or you would have what neither the North Koreans nor the South Koreans could accept—that is, a division of their country.

Senator FERGUSON. That was inevitable?

Mr. ROWE. Precisely.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know whether with respect to this conference with Mr. Davies you advanced your ideas about the kind of help we should give.

Mr. ROWE. I don't think we ever got down to this kind of discussion of helping the Nationalists, because the whole topic of helping the Nationalists was so far out of his thinking, as I evaluated his thinking, that we never got to the question of how to do it.

Senator WATKINS. You never got down to what to do?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. As I remember, you said there were others there besides you and Mr. Davies?

Mr. ROWE. Other State Department personnel?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. One of the individuals was—I know his name will come to me in a short while. He was a Ph. D. from Chicago University in Far East history and studied at Harvard for a couple of years and was born in China of missionary parents. It is absurd; I will think of it before the afternoon is over.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not Ludden; was it?

Mr. ROWE. No, no. This man has since joined the policy-planning staff of the State Department. I will get it for you before we are through. It is just one of those lapses of memory.

Senator WATKINS. Have you finished with your statement of what occurred between you and Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. ROWE. I think that is all I need to say about that.

Senator WATKINS. Then the other gentleman was Mr. Davies?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. What about the other?

Mr. ROWE. These were the three outstanding cases of this kind where it involves conversations within the State Department office in Washington. Of course, in my service abroad I have had reason to discuss these matters with people, but never on a basis of being asked as an outsider to come in with advice, advice given by someone specializing in these problems as a civilian.

Senator WATKINS. Were you asked to make these contacts? Were you asked to come in and give them your advice?

Mr. ROWE. I was asked to come in, in the case of the policy-planning staff, under Davies. In the case of Butterworth, this contact was on my general initiative and was arranged from the outside. The same was true in the case of Kennan. I had met Kennan before, and I told him I would like to come in and talk to him.

Senator WATKINS. Did you get any satisfaction whatsoever with Mr. Kennan with respect to your suggestions about the Far East and China?

Mr. ROWE. No; my general impression was that he completely refused to accept any general approach to the Chinese problem in the Far East.

Senator WATKINS. Just what was your approach in some detail?

Mr. ROWE. My approach was that you have to do what is necessary to keep all of China out of control of the Chinese Communists. If you don't, then you are going to be faced with a Russian-Chinese combination which, although it may take some time to develop the results of it, will confront you finally with a shift in the world balance of power that will be castastrophic to the interests of the free world. That was my general approach.

As I said this morning, his response was a double one. First, he said China was not important. Then he said, "China can't win with Russia because the Chinese will become too strong for the Russians to dominate." I talked with him at considerable length trying to clear up in his own mind the confusion that I thought existed there on this business of talking as though the Russians and the Chinese could have only one kind of relationship; that is to say, one in which the Russians would dominate the Chinese. This is absolutely incorrect. It doesn't fit either the Russian psychology or the Chinese psychology.

I outlined briefly to Kennan at that meeting the Chinese traditional ideology on the subject of international relationships. I teach this stuff to my students every year, and it is standard with me to indoctrinate them and teach them this way, involving an entirely different feeling about relations than we westerners have. If you go back in Chinese history you find, for example, that there have been long periods of time in which the only international relations the Chinese have had have been with satellite states around the Chinese border.

There weren't any other nations with which the Chinese were in contact. Out of this centuries-long experience has come a system for the organization of relations between what we would call a dominant state, on the one hand, and a satellite, on the other, with this difference, namely, that the status of a satellite is an honorable status.

Senator WATKINS. They do not regard it as a subordination?

Mr. ROWE. No, indeed. You can't get anywhere a symbolism of that kind. The word "satellite" that we use has a denigrative meaning. When we use the word "satellite" it is with the implication that there is something wrong with him, but in the Chinese system, well, take their relations with Korea. The Koreans had an honorable relationship with the Chinese over centuries, and the same thing was true of Indochina.

I want to point out to you the fundamental meaning this has in the situation where the Koreans and Chinese were both satisfied with the relationship under which, for example, the Chinese had a viceroy in the Korean capital. This viceroy had as his function seeing to it that from the point of international relations Korea was on the right side. This was accompanied by a total ideological taking over and a total subordination of their foreign policy.

That is to say, they could not make any independent foreign policy, and with a total state of internal self-government. This is an honorable estate.

Now, let's switch the thing around, and let's point out that if the Chinese know how to do that with satellites, they expect it when they are satellites. This is the normal thinking about Chinese pattern

of their relationship with the Russians. It is: We don't care whether the western world thinks Russia is dominating us. That word doesn't express it at all. This is a workable, happy, satisfactory marriage for mutual adjustment, mutual interest; that is all it is.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, they would not feel that they were the inferior people simply because they were regarded as a satellite?

Mr. ROWE. Let us put it this way: The Chinese in their relationship of ideological subordination to the Russians feel privileged, they feel privileged. They do not feel that the fact that they swallow a foreign ideology puts them in some kind of bad light. They have the inestimable privilege of becoming disciples of Marx.

Senator WATKINS. How do you reconcile that with the Chinese family system?

Mr. ROWE. I reconcile it with the whole Confucian system. The essential feature of the Confucian system is their belief in authoritarianism. Here is where you have to study the tradition in order to understand what the Chinese Communists are doing. They are imposing a foreign ideology on the masses of the people who are accustomed to subordination, only they don't call it subordination, it is an honorable relationship of father to son.

That is the basis of the Confucian relationship of father and son. It takes a lot of explaining.

Senator WATKINS. For the first lesson in Chinese background I think you have done very well. If the students have done as well as you have, then they will be all right.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you.

Senator WATKINS. What other members of the State Department did you have contacts with in trying to get your views over to them?

Mr. ROWE. Well, I had this contact I mentioned with the Under Secretary for Public Affairs in early 1949 who later became I believe the Ambassador to—he had been in the Middle East as a State Department official and was at this time Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs, which meant that he runs—

Senator FERGUSON. Allen?

Mr. ROWE. Allen, that is the fellow. He runs the Voice of America, United States Information Service, and that is what he was doing at that time. With him I came back having had this 8-week contract with the consulate general in Shanghai in the summer of 1948, being asked, as I said this morning, to make a survey of their public information service in China.

Senator WATKINS. This is for the Chinese Government?

Mr. ROWE. No; for the American consulate general in Shanghai, United States Information Service. I reported to him on some of the, what I considered to be, obvious defects in our Foreign Service in China having primarily to do with the personnel problem, insisting that you have to have a team, at least a team comprised of specialists on China who know the Chinese language, people who understand policy from the official State Department point of view, and then pure technicians—that is, radio technicians, publishing technicians, and people of that kind—and particularly to break down in China a monopoly in the acquisition of Chinese language as a skill, which monopoly was held in the hands of the so-called political officers who were trained as so-called Chinese language officers. You see, the trouble

was that the United States Information Service could never get the necessary members of a team of this kind, although they wanted it because first they weren't allowed to draw at that time upon the body of trained Chinese language officers.

These people were preserved for the reporting function, the political function in the State Department. Second, they weren't allowed to train their own people. This was one of the defects I put up that had to do with State Department training policy. I didn't get anywhere much with Mr. Allen on that; as a matter of fact, as to the recommendations I put so much work into, I never saw that they had the slightest effect.

I wasn't too surprised because some of the things that I was asked to look at and report on and try to do in Shanghai in 1948 in the summer were the same things I had looked at, reported on, and tried to do in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and the situation hadn't changed a bit.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confer with Mr. Barnett when he was in the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. Never on this sort of thing. I don't think I have ever had a contact of this kind with Mr. Barnett.

Senator WATKINS. What was Mr. Allen's position in the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. At that time?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. He was, I believe, Director of Public Affairs, that is, Under Secretary for Public Affairs.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand it, that long tour that you had in China was under the auspices of the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. The trip in the Far East, 5½ months in the summer of 1948, was financed jointly by the Yale University Department of Area Studies, by the Yale Institute of International Studies, and by a grant to me by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Senator WATKINS. Did you at any time represent anyone besides yourself when you went into the State Department and tried to talk with these men about this program that you thought ought to be adopted?

Mr. ROWE. I represented the Yale Institute of International Studies; yes. As a matter of fact, the paper that I left on Mr. Butterworth's desk that afternoon was a paper on which I had the advantage of consulting all of my colleagues in the Yale Institute of International Studies, and it represented our joint agreement on what ought to be done.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have a copy?

Mr. ROWE. I have a copy in New Haven.

Senator WATKINS. I think it would be well if you could submit a copy to this committee.

Mr. ROWE. I will be glad to supply you with a copy. I am positive that I can locate it.

Senator WATKINS. When was it offered to the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. It was offered in January 1949.

Senator WATKINS. While we are on this subject, do you have any views now as to what ought to be done under the current circumstances that you could express here? This committee here would want to do some constructive work along the line of our internal security and I

presume anything that will preserve us from without as well as from within is of great interest to us.

Mr. ROWE. I think I would remove my focus of recommendation either directly from China or directly from Korea and point to the situation in Indochina as the most immediately dangerous one today.

Senator FERGUSON. Even more than Korea?

Mr. ROWE. We have, of course, a stalemate which is very unsatisfactory; we are not getting anywhere with a settlement. We have forces there that can stop anything that the Communists can throw at us.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the last that you had any real information on that point?

Mr. ROWE. If you mean by real information anything outside the public print, it has been a good long time. But I think in Indochina we don't have anywhere near as satisfactory a situation, if you call it that, as we have in Korea. I think Indochina bids fair to present us shortly with a very difficult decision, and the trouble with it is that if we make an arrangement in Korea by which we stabilize the situation there, the Chinese Communists may very well throw their entire force or a very, very large segment of their force into the war in Indochina.

Senator WATKINS. Would they trust us—that we will not attack if they did that?

Mr. ROWE. It is possible. They know we are more trustworthy in a situation like that than they are. They are sure of it.

Senator WATKINS. At least they know their own views, and we have gone along pretty well on our agreements.

Mr. ROWE. I think in Indochina if they do anything more than they are doing now, which involves several thousand technicians and personnel that they have in there, if they send in massive forces the French will be driven out and Hanoi taken.

Senator WATKINS. Have you ever been in that territory?

Mr. ROWE. I have never been there. If I were in a position to push buttons and get results pushing buttons, and this means that I am now talking entirely in unrealistic terms because I haven't any idea that I could do anything, I would recommend precisely this: The United States issues a positive and open statement that if the Chinese intervene that way, in Indochina, there will be a counterbalancing American intervention with whatever it takes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you send ground troops in?

Mr. ROWE. If necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is important enough, Indochina, to send American ground troops in?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think it was important enough to send them into Korea?

Mr. ROWE. Absolutely.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you advocate then a stalemate where we are at the thirty-eighth parallel as we now propose?

Mr. ROWE. Well, what I would advocate is that you make every effort that you can to get more than a stalemate—that is, a settlement, which means something that will result in the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists out of North Korea or withdrawal out of the

present defense line, combined with the policy of providing a South Korean defense force strong enough to hold that business.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that can be done?

Mr. ROWE. It can be done, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. How long?

Mr. ROWE. How long would it take?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to have the South Koreans able to maintain that line?

Mr. ROWE. That might take a year's time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that Russia would supply the North Koreans?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; they are supply them now.

Senator FERGUSON. In the future, though?

Mr. ROWE. They would continue to. That is the only place the North Koreans can get anything. They have no facilities to make anything for themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. And the South Koreans would have to get it from us?

Mr. ROWE. That is right. The manpower is what they can supply, nothing else.

Senator FERGUSON. Then suppose that your idea is right, that we say they are not allowed to go down into Indochina?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But they do go down in there after we make this settlement?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And they feel our pressure down there. What is to stop them from putting another army in Korea?

Mr. ROWE. Nothing can stop them from breaking a truce any time, no matter what you do any place.

Senator WATKINS. Is that not history?

Mr. ROWE. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not anticipate that that is what would happen?

Mr. ROWE. It is very possible. I don't have any feeling of confidence about any agreement we can make with the Communists, including the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans.

Senator WATKINS. Then it would be unsafe to trust them?

Mr. ROWE. It would be unsafe to lower your guard. If what you are talking about is lowering your guard and decreasing your military commitments, then I say it would be completely unsound, quite as unsound as was the previous withdrawal prior to the attack from the north under the conditions of a South Korean Army armed only with so-called defensive weapons. That was the most fantastic decision I ever heard of.

Senator WATKINS. Are you acquainted with any of the Communist Chinese leaders?

Mr. ROWE. I never met them.

Senator WATKINS. You were over there for quite a while with the Information Service?

Mr. ROWE. No; I was only attached to the Information Service during that 8-week period in the summer of 1949 in Shanghai.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have any service with the United States Intelligence Service?

Mr. ROWE. At present I am a lieutenant colonel in the Army Intelligence Reserve. My last tour of duty was 6 weeks in the Pentagon shortly after the opening of the Korean war.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, were you in the United States Embassy in China in 1941-42?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What position?

Mr. ROWE. I was listed as special assistant to the Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Carter Vincent there?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position?

Mr. ROWE. Counselor of the Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Stewart Service there?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Owen Lattimore come to China at that time?

Mr. ROWE. He was there when I arrived there. I arrived in Chungking about 10 days before Pearl Harbor. One of the first acts I performed in an official capacity was to call on Lattimore as a member of the American group.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in a position to observe that Lattimore and Vincent were closely associated?

Mr. ROWE. My opinion was, and this was observed only during the period of November to early February when Lattimore left to come back to this country, that Vincent and Lattimore were very friendly indeed, extending to the business of mutual exchange of information, and they were both, for instance, interested in the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what they were, Professor?

Mr. ROWE. The Chinese industrial cooperatives were an effort on the part of the Chinese and westerners to organize small-scale production and distribution behind the Japanese lines in free China in order to maximize the economic power of the Chinese to resist in free China.

Now one of the features of the Chinese economy is the fact that many of the industries were small-scale industries based on handicraft located in the villages, making use of surplus time of the farmer, for instance in the winter, making use of work and time of the farmer's wife and so on.

The Chinese industrial cooperatives tried to provide better techniques and better tools for this small industry, one of the features being that as the Japanese advanced territorially into China, these could be picked up and carried away.

Senator WATKINS. You did not mean a moment ago that they were actually behind the Japanese lines?

Mr. ROWE. Some of them remained behind the Japanese lines. I mean behind the lines in the free China area beyond the Japanese zone.

Senator WATKINS. You are differentiating there from occupied China?

Mr. ROWE. That is right, occupied China.

Now this Chinese Industrial Cooperatives was significant from a political point of view. You have to remember that the great task of the Chinese National Government was to preserve what little social

and political unity there was in China and to prevent this unity from being subverted by people in all kinds of organizations.

As they say about the Chinese, any time you get three of them together, you have an organization. They are very organization-minded, they come to that very naturally through a long history of social organizations typified by their guilds and associations, insurance systems and things of that kind.

In Chinese history these organizations have often played vital parts in Chinese politics. It is in these organizations that revolutionary tendencies accompanying the fall of dynasties can be located and centered and covered up by these organizations. As a result, the National Government had an iron-bound law for the regulation, registration of organizations of this kind. You see, they were faced with the fact that in a country like this, tied together as loosely as it was, organizations of this kind could be very easily used as centers of disturbance and political dissidence. They were afraid of these Chinese industrial cooperatives and they had some reason to suspect some of the people that were interested because if you take, for instance, Dr. Chen Han-seng, who has been mentioned in these hearings and in the testimony I had read as at least being a Chinese Communist sympathizer, he was strongly interested in the Chinese industrial cooperative movement.

I talked to these people very often and found that they were interested in more than the production of products. They were interested in using the organizations for political purposes.

Senator WATKINS. When you said "these people"?

Mr. ROWE. The Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Senator WATKINS. When you said "these people"?

Mr. ROWE. I am talking of the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, Professor?

Mr. ROWE. In Hong Kong, when I went there in 1941, Chen Han-seng was one of them. He was prominent in Hong Kong in support of the industrial cooperatives. His wife was there also at the time. In China the outstanding European in this business was a New Zealander by the name of Alley, A-l-l-e-y.

Mr. MORRIS. His first name?

Mr. ROWE. R-e-w-e, who described himself to me as an old-line New Zealand Socialist.

Mr. MORRIS. He is in Red China now, is he not?

Mr. ROWE. He is in Red China and has enthusiastically welcomed the Chinese Communists taking over.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Ida Pruitt there?

Mr. ROWE. She was not in China at that time, but she was active in this country and active in what at that time was called Indusco, of which I later became a member of their board, which was the American organization to support the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley there?

Mr. ROWE. I believe she was also on the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active?

Mr. ROWE. I never had any contact with her. Other members who were involved, other people who were involved were Edgar Snow and his wife, Eleanor Lattimore, Miss Gerlach, Mrs. Fisher, wife of a bishop in the Methodist Church, and a whole string of other people.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, I show you our exhibit 559 and ask you if that is the letterhead of the organization you are now talking about?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, this is it, dated November 1950, but this is a comparatively recent letterhead, and you will find that names of the board of directors change, of course, through time. This is not the board of directors as it was when I was a member of it.

Senator WATKINS. Had there been any Communist infiltration into these cooperatives?

Mr. ROWE. I can't certify as to that as far as inside of China, but I do think, and this is why I resigned from Indusco, and I have available a copy of my letter of resignation from the Indusco board, that Indusco was very, very heavily taken over by people who were in favor of the Chinese Communists—very strongly so. These were the people who acquainted me with a lot of this terminology like "Chinese of the north," and so on. They were always scheming as to how they could get their help given to the Chinese of the north. They sent it through Shanghai after the war and all that, but one of their principal objectives was to get it to the people of the north.

Senator WATKINS. When you say "they," who are you talking about?

Mr. ROWE. The general group on the board at that time—Miss Pruitt, Dr. Chen Han-seng, and so forth, the whole group.

Senator WATKINS. They seemed to show more concern over the people in the north than south and central China?

Mr. ROWE. Sir, I used that term, the "people of the north," and defined it in the terminology of these people as meaning the Chinese Communists. That is what they used the term to cover.

Senator WATKINS. What help were they in a position to give?

Mr. ROWE. Very important technical help involving, for instance, machinery, tools, and equipment like that that was hard to buy, medical aid, technical advice, they sent over technicians who knew something about small scale production to help improve the methods of production in the Chinese villages, and this was one reason why I was attracted to the thing in the first place, because it did strike at the roots of the Chinese production problem in the villages, at the roots of the village economy, but I got out of the organization because I saw the extent to which these people were interested in promoting the welfare of the Chinese Communists.

Senator WATKINS. Were they also interested in promoting the interests of the others?

Mr. ROWE. As little as they could get away with.

Senator WATKINS. Were there any arguments on the board?

Mr. ROWE. Never any arguments.

Senator WATKINS. You were on the board. Did you agree with them?

Mr. ROWE. I didn't agree with them, but you can't get an argument with one man. You can kick up a fuss.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean these people controlled the policy of Indusco?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. I wondered if it was a subject of discussion?

Mr. ROWE. Not very much discussion on that. They were also interested in evading the controls over their activities that the Chinese

Government tried to exert through their control of all kinds of organizations of this type, as I mentioned before.

Senator WATKINS. That would be substantially along the Communist way of thinking, too, at that time, would it not?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the Communists of the north, they were not actually physically under the control of the Nationalist Government at that time?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. They had their own type of government set-up there?

Mr. ROWE. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. How would you evaluate the effect of these cooperatives upon the Chinese political thinking?

Mr. ROWE. Well, I don't think that the effect that these people would have liked to have had ever was had. After all, the use of cooperatives as a method of organizing anti-Government, anti-Chinese Government, activity was a very small element in what eventually led to the downfall of the Nationalist Government, which was engineered by the top Chinese Communist command with Russia helping finally on a military basis. It was a large-scale take-over in Manchuria with the Russians equipping the Communist Chinese with the Japanese arms collected but tipping the balance of power against Chiang early in 1948.

You see, early, in 1945 Chiang won almost every battle he ever engaged in with the Communists. This is often lost sight of when we talk about the corruption and inefficiency of the National Government. He won as long as he had an even break in armaments. As soon as the Japanese armaments got distributed by the Russians, and as soon as the Communists got well organized in Manchuria, they then began to use against him positional warfare, using artillery combined with their normal method of attack, which was a very sophisticated use of combined economic warfare and guerrilla warfare.

The business of shutting the Government up in the cities, cutting rails, starving the economy, inducing inflation, inducing bureaucracy, all that helped to make the Nationalist resistance a hollow shell long before they pushed in and began to win full pitched battles which they had not done before that time. That is something people forget.

Senator WATKINS. Were you there while General Marshall was there?

Mr. ROWE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Were you there any part of the time he was there?

Mr. ROWE. No; I was in this country. I will say that I predicted flatly that Marshall would never be able to get the Communists and the Nationalists together. The fact that it worked out that way was too bad, but that is the way it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Getting back to John Carter Vincent, did you write the book, *China Among the Powers*?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that was written by me and published by Harcourt, Brace under the auspices of the Yale Institute of International Studies.

Mr. MORRIS. Did John Carter Vincent ever express criticism of your book?

Mr. ROWE. As a matter of fact, the book was sent to him in page proof. I want to correct at this point a statement which he made in his testimony, that I had sent the book to him. I did not; it was sent by the Institute of International Studies, and the indication which he seemed to leave in the testimony is that this book was published by the IPR, which it was not.

Those two things are both wrong, and I think should be corrected.

It was very interesting to me that Mr. Vincent, while he praised the book primarily, primarily he was in approval of it, criticized it at a point the significance of which I could only grasp later and as time went on. You may remember that Mr. Vincent accompanied Lattimore, Hazard, and Vice President Wallace on that long trip into China and Asiatic Russia, around the Chinese borders I think in July 1944.

It is an interesting fact that the primarily adverse criticism that he made of my book had to do with my treatment of Chinese border problems, problems of Tibet, Sinkiang, and Manchuria in connection with which he mentioned the serious difficulties connected with post-war Chinese policy and particularly in regard to Manchuria; made the significant observation that my statement that Manchuria is territorially a part of China does not cover the question; that Russian interests in Manchuria could not be so summarily disposed of in this manner.

Now this doesn't become terribly important until we see the Yalta agreement under which precisely Russian interests in Manchuria were recognized, and the Chinese Government was required to recognize those interests and to allow the Russians to come back in and reestablish their pre-1905 position in Manchuria.

At that point I read this letter and dug it up. Here is the genesis of this policy.

Mr. MORRIS. What letter are you referring to?

Mr. ROWE. I am referring to the letter written by Vincent to Professor Dunn commenting on my book.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you happen to have a copy of that letter?

Mr. ROWE. It was in the institute files, and I was asked to answer the letter on behalf of Dunn.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a copy of it?

Mr. ROWE. That is a photostat.

Senator WATKINS. That letter seems to praise your book?

Mr. ROWE. As I said, most of the letter supports the book, but the interesting thing is the places in which he doesn't support it, that is the significant aspect of it.

Senator WATKINS. Will you point those out?

Mr. ROWE. The places here in which he talks about Sinkiang and Tibet [reading]:

With regard to Sinkiang and Tibet, I believe that more serious problems than Mr. Rowe seems to anticipate will arise unless China adopts an enlightened policy for the treatment of minorities.

I didn't know what this enlightened policy could be, but the interesting thing about this is that this is Owen Lattimore. You couldn't express Owen Lattimore's views or his interest in Chinese policies better than they are expressed right there.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have in mind any part of the writings of Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. Sure, several books: *Inner Asian Frontiers in China*, *Solution in Asia*, *The Problem of Asia*, all those three books are very heavily concerned with what we call border problems. Of course, these borders happen to bound on the Soviet Union, which makes them a far more significant feature in international politics than any other part of China on which this letter was written.

The first Communist inroads into China were made into these borders and were worked out in the Yalta agreement of 1945 in which, as I say, the Russians were restored to their pre-1905 position in Manchuria, involving all kinds of derogation from Chinese sovereignty.

Another interesting thing about this is that as I read Mr. Vincent's testimony here before this committee, Mr. Vincent claimed that when he heard about the Yalta agreement he was shocked; that he said the Yalta agreement involves derogations from Chinese sovereignty but in September 1944 he was talking precisely in terms of taking very good account of Russian interests in what he agreed was Chinese territory in Manchuria.

It is obvious to me that this man must have been thinking in the very terms that gave rise to the Yalta settlement long before the Yalta settlement was made. This man was, as he signed himself, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. How anybody can be surprised that the Yalta agreement was arrived at would puzzle me greatly. Why Mr. Vincent should be shocked by it when he was fully intellectually prepared for it far in advance of it is something I can't make head or tail of.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever discuss the matter with him?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir. I just found his statement in the testimony he gave before this committee a few days ago. I think Mr. Vincent stuck his neck out on that; he really did.

Senator WATKINS. You mean when he wrote this?

Mr. ROWE. No; by saying he was so shocked about Yalta when months before he had indicated full intellectual preparation for, as he says, "not dismissing with such a statement or with the simple declaration that Manchuria is an integral part of China." You and I know what that kind of statement means. My statement would be that it is or isn't an integral part of China. If it is, you keep it a part of China, and if it isn't, sure, you let the Russians in.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter go into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It will be made a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a letter, Mr. Chairman, that John Carter Vincent sent December 4, 1944, to Mr. Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Director, Institute of International Studies at Yale University, of which this witness was a part and which this witness handled, discussed.

(Exhibit No. 613 was marked and is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 4, 1944.

MR. FREDERICK SHERWOOD DUNN,

Director, Institute of International Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR MR. DUNN: With reference to your letter of November 13 and my reply of November 15, I have received and read over the page proofs of David Rowe's new book, *China Among the Powers*.

I was very favorably impressed with Mr. Rowe's book. I could not pretend, of course, to know whether many of his statements of fact are correct (I assume

they are), but I do find myself in general agreement with his conclusions. If he errs at all, it seems to me he errs on the side of pessimism, but that might not be in effect bad, knowing the general optimism with which Americans usually view China.

With regard to the postwar industrial development of China, I think that Mr. Rowe, in view of developments during recent months, places too much emphasis on nationalization. It looks now (and I realize that such was not the case when Mr. Rowe wrote his manuscript) as if the tendency were away from nationalization except in a limited number of fields such as transportation, public utilities, and industries directly related to national defense.

I doubt that the situation in Outer Mongolia (I was there with Vice President Wallace in July) will lend itself to the "financial" solution suggested by Mr. Rowe. I cannot conceive of Russia's paying China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, but I do realize that a solution of the problem must be found.

With regard to Sinkiang and Tibet, I believe that more serious problems than Mr. Rowe seems to anticipate will arise unless China adopts an enlightened policy for the treatment of minorities.

With regard to Manchuria, I believe, as Mr. Rowe seems to, that the Russians do not have territorial ambitions with regard to that area, but I do not think the problem can be dismissed with such a statement or with the simple declaration that Manchuria is an integral part of China where over 90 percent of the population is Chinese. Manchuria, as you know, has for decades held a somewhat autonomous position in China and it will be up to the Chinese Government to adopt policies in the postwar period which will really accomplish the integration of that area with China proper.

But I end my letter as I began: Mr. Rowe has written a very good, very instructive, and very useful book, and I am mindful of his own statement that in the space allowed he could not cover adequately all the problems that may arise in relation to China in the postwar period.

Sincerely,

[s] JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs.

P. S.—I am returning the page proofs to you rather than to Harcourt, Brace & Co. for disposal.

Mr. ROWE. I handled this letter by Vincent. I wrote the reply of the Institute to Vincent.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have the reply?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. I think that also ought to go in the record if you have it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 613A," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 613-A

DECEMBER 12, 1944.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,

*Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Your letter of December 4th to Mr. Dunn regarding my book, *China Among the Powers*, has been called to my attention. I am naturally extremely gratified that you have been able to take the time to read the book while it is still in page proof, and also that you have found it possible to make such friendly comments respecting it. Coming from one who knows China as well as you do, such comments cannot help but be most pleasing to me.

I note your specific interest in the general field of Chinese border problems. As you note, I could not, for want of space, deal with all of these problems in much detail. I agree with you as to the complexity of the adjustments that must be made in case China's border regions are to be integrated into the body of the postwar Chinese state.

I would like very much to place a copy of my book in our Chungking Embassy. Would it be possible to secure your cooperation in sending this book to Amba-

sador Hurley? If this seems possible, could you let us know and we will send you a copy to be forwarded to Chungking.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID N. ROWE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has asked for a 5-minute recess at this point.

Senator WATKINS. We will take a short recess.

(A short recess was taken.)

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more that you can tell us about the Chinese industrial cooperatives?

Mr. ROWE. Well, there is a great deal, but I think I have mentioned most of the features that are relevant to what we have been talking about and what the committee might be interested in.

Senator WATKINS. There is one thing about them. Were they Communist creations?

Mr. ROWE. No; they were not Communist creations. In my opinion, they were definitely not Communist creations. But they were organizations that were made to order for subversive purposes.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, they were susceptible.

Mr. ROWE. That is right. They could be taken over.

Senator WATKINS. How do they compare with the cooperatives we have in this country? I take it you know something about them.

Mr. ROWE. I don't know anything much.

Senator WATKINS. Farm cooperatives?

Mr. ROWE. Well, there are marketing devices and insurance and groceries and things of that kind.

Senator WATKINS. In China?

Mr. ROWE. In this country; are there not?

Senator WATKINS. Well, they are largely farm cooperatives, buying and selling.

Mr. ROWE. I know in my home town in Connecticut there is a grocery store that is a cooperative.

Senator WATKINS. These farmers have nothing to do with a cooperative of that kind. Theirs is the buying of crops and the supplies they need for the operation of their farm.

Mr. ROWE. They get better prices for what they sell in bulk lots, and so on. Isn't that the essence of it?

Senator WATKINS. What I was trying to find out: Are they like our cooperatives here? So that we will have something to compare them with.

Mr. ROWE. Very little along that line. You see, they were mostly industrial, as their name indicates.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, they gathered together hand-crafts and so on and sold collectively for these people and bought their supplies collectively.

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. It is very much the same type. So that, as a matter of fact, they were not the creations of or organized by the Communists as a part of their Communist program?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, no.

Senator WATKINS. They just tried to use them, as I understand.

Mr. ROWE. You see, Senator, if they had been organizations of that sort, they would never have gotten organized in Nationalist territory in the first place.

Senator WATKINS. What was their history? How long were they in existence?

Mr. ROWE. I don't know precisely how many years. They were founded before the Japanese war.

Senator WATKINS. Were they in existence when you were in China, living there?

Mr. ROWE. They were certainly in existence when I was there in 1937 and 1938.

Senator WATKINS. I was referring to the previous time.

Mr. ROWE. I have no knowledge of that, but I am quite sure they were not.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have occasion to get out into the country when you were there before?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes. I traveled throughout the interior of the Yangtze Valley.

Senator WATKINS. How much did you get acquainted with during that time?

Mr. ROWE. All in the Yangtze area, roughly between Shanghai and a place called Kiukiang in the Yangtze Valley area.

Senator WATKINS. Now, going over to another matter that has been called to my attention, did you have occasion to get the views of Mr. Vincent, John Carter Vincent? I think he was over there with you at the time.

Mr. ROWE. This was in the period of my service in the Chungking Embassy in 1941-42, and he was counselor of the Embassy.

Senator WATKINS. You have already characterized what you thought about Mr. Lattimore. What about Mr. Vincent?

Mr. ROWE. In Vincent you have an entirely different sort of thing. Vincent never expressed any views on policy openly that I ever heard. I never discussed policy problems with Vincent. The main problem I had to discuss with Vincent was how I could foster and promote the work of the agency of the United States Government that I was there representing. That later became the OSS; was at that time called the Coordinator of Information—COI.

Senator WATKINS. Did that have anything to do with the information he would gather together as a part of the diplomatic corps?

Mr. ROWE. Not that he would gather together; no. I was there in an information-gathering capacity, but in the capacity, you might call it, of a librarian. I was supposed to gather books, pamphlets, articles, and material of that kind, open sources, because in Washington at that time we simply did not have that kind of material on China available. And I was sent by the Coordinator of Information to do just that job.

Senator WATKINS. To get this information?

Mr. ROWE. That is right. And in order to get it over here, since we could not send it over physically, on account of the transport problem out of western China, we photographed a lot of the stuff on film and sent it over in that form.

You know, that makes it possible to digest it down into a very small volume.

Senator WATKINS. How closely did you become acquainted with Mr. Vincent while you were there?

Mr. ROWE. I wouldn't say "closely." I had mostly business contacts with him in the Embassy, having to do with the conduct of my official business.

Senator WATKINS. Had you ever discussed with him the relative merits of the Nationalist and the Communist contentions?

Mr. ROWE. No; I had not, at that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, are you acquainted with the Far Eastern Association?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; I am a member of the Far Eastern Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you find that there is any identity of personnel between the association and the IPR?

Mr. ROWE. I think this is a pretty important topic. I would like to go back a little way on this one and sketch in some of the background.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. ROWE. There was a period when the people in the Institute of Pacific Relations were rather alarmed by the tendencies that they saw arising in Government regarding themselves as an organization. It was at this time, as you may know, that the IPR was put on some kind of list of subversive organizations in California, I believe, by the California Legislature, or a committee or organization thereof.

Senator WATKINS. What time was that? Would you remember the year?

Mr. ROWE. Let's see.

Mr. MORRIS. Maybe Mr. Mandel knows.

Mr. ROWE. I believe this was in the latter part of the war or immediately thereafter. I believe that is when it comes in.

Senator WATKINS. That would be along in 1945.

Mr. ROWE. Something of that kind, I believe.

Senator WATKINS. When you said that they were becoming quite concerned, who do you mean by "they"? The membership of the institute, or the staff?

Mr. ROWE. I am talking about the staff, the governing people, those who ran the thing administratively.

Senator WATKINS. How did you know that?

Mr. ROWE. It was common talk. I could not even cite to you who it was that talked this way. But I think of Mr. Holland's name in this connection. I couldn't certify that I ever heard Holland say this.

Senator WATKINS. Whom did you hear say it?

Mr. ROWE. It was general common talk among people in the Far East business and people connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. And the problem of what to do if this thing went on further and the Institute of Pacific Relations itself was put on, say, a list by the Attorney General, for example, and named as a front organization, alarmed these people at least enough so that they decided they would have to set up some kind of organization to hold the bag for them in case this happened.

Senator WATKINS. Well, now, just a moment. You are making some charges or statements there, where you ought to have some specific instances in mind on which you base that. That is very general. Do you know it of your own knowledge? Did you discuss it with anybody? Was it discussed in your trustees' meetings? Or were you a trustee at that time?

Mr. ROWE. This would never be discussed in trustees' meetings. It wasn't the kind of thing.

Senator WATKINS. How do you know they were concerned? What is the evidence? That is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. ROWE. Let's cite one little item. I don't know whether you will consider this the sort of evidence you are after or not, but it is the way this kind of information would be picked up.

At a meeting, I think, of the American Historical Association, at a luncheon connected with this, there were at the table several of us, including Mr. Biggerstaff and Mr. Fahs.

Senator WATKINS. These were men on the staff?

Mr. ROWE. No; Biggerstaff was on the board of trustees and was involved in the early planning.

Senator WATKINS. Were you at that time on the board of trustees?

Mr. ROWE. I don't believe so; no.

Senator WATKINS. You were a member, I take it, of the association?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. I have been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations between 1938 and the time I resigned in 1950.

Senator WATKINS. Pardon my interruption. Now go back to your statement.

Mr. ROWE. Where this matter of forming a new organization was brought up, this was what later became the Far Eastern Association, and the question specifically discussed was the question of how this organization should be differentiated from the Institute of Pacific Relations. At that time, I myself, for example, wrote a memorandum. I do not know where you would find this, and I do not know how I could ever produce a copy of it. It was on the need for a new organization in the Far East field. There was growing dissatisfaction with the Institute of Pacific Relations because of the very large part it was playing on controversial issues and the part that it took in talking about policy, instead of acting as a straight scholarly organization with the interest of promoting research and study, serving the interests of the scholarly fraternity, by affording them publication media, meetings at which they could read their papers, and all the activities of a learned society. And I remember writing that at that time in connection with this agitation for a new society.

Senator WATKINS. You said "writing." Did you write a letter, or an article?

Mr. ROWE. I wrote a memorandum on this. I believe this memorandum could be found in the IPR files if you look for it.

Senator WATKINS. It was sent to them; was it?

Mr. ROWE. I think I sent it to Holland. Or it may have been a letter or a memorandum I wrote to Biggerstaff and Fairbank and other people of that kind.

Senator WATKINS. The purpose, then, was, or it was being discussed at that time, to get away from charges like the one that had been made by this California committee of the legislature?

Mr. ROWE. That is the idea, as I understood it, at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, Mr. Mandel has the California citation.

Mr. MANDEL. According to the California Committee on Un-American Activities, in its report of 1948, the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations was cited as a Communist front which received funds from the American People's Fund, another front or-

ganized and directed by Frederick V. Field as a repository for funds to be distributed to Communist enterprises. As a result of later negotiations, I believe this citation was withdrawn by the California committee.

Mr. ROWE. It never went any farther than that, anyway. And the fears that it might, which naturally would be aroused by this kind of thing starting in a State legislature, never were justified by subsequent events. But the Far Eastern Association was set up, nonetheless.

Senator WATKINS. Who organized that? Do you know?

Mr. ROWE. The moving spirits in this were Fairbank, Fahs, and Biggerstaff. Those are three that I can name from memory.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have any part in this?

Mr. ROWE. None whatever.

Senator WATKINS. You joined it; did you not?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; I joined it subsequent to its organization, and I am still a member of it, but I have never held an office under it.

Senator WATKINS. Does it have close relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. That was the point, Senator, that I wanted to develop.

At the beginning you had a very strong interlocking directorate, so to speak, between these two concerns. And a lot of the people that you run across in your study of the Institute of Pacific Relations are involved on the control directorate of this association. This is February 1951.

The connection and the duplication of personnel, this interlocking directorate I talk about, is not as close now as it was at the original formation.

Senator WATKINS. Can you point out specifically what it was at that time?

Mr. ROWE. In February 1951?

Senator WATKINS. Or whenever you say it was when it was first organized, and there was a close interlocking directorate.

Let us have specific illustrations.

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Holland, for example, was represented on the advisory editorial board, I believe. And on an organization of the Far Eastern Association, which I think has since gone out of existence, which was the committee on research work. They now have a monograph series, and they have as editor of the monograph series Mr. Dirk Bodde, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, a very strong supporter of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He supports it all the time in the public press. Mr. Biggerstaff, who was and probably is on the IPR trustees, was secretary in 1950. John K. Fairbank was at that time vice president. Wilma Fairbank was at that time news editor of the quarterly.

Let's see if there are any other of these names. William L. Holland was a member of the board of directors in November 1950. Owen Lattimore was a member of the board of directors in 1950. George E. Taylor was a member of the board of directors in 1950.

Now, there is a great amount of duplication still at this point.

It may be said, of course, that the number of far eastern specialists in the United States is not very large, and the claim could easily be made that these are the most eminent people in the field. But I would say that as far as general political views are concerned, all those people I named probably share about a 90 percent consensus. And that is

the thing I am talking about. They agree with each other on current questions of far eastern politics very strongly.

Senator WATKINS. I am not quite satisfied in my mind about the evidence, as you say, that this new organization was organized for the purpose of having a place to go if the Institute of Pacific Relations became unpopular through it being named as a Communist front organization.

Mr. ROWE. Well, Senator, I doubt if I can satisfy you. I can't provide you with a document. I can't provide you with a copy of any statement on this. But I would like to call attention to the fact that if this were so, without assuming whether it is or not, it is extremely unlikely you will ever find any documentary evidence on it.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I thought maybe if you were present when this matter was discussed with any of these men who actually organized it, that might be evidence. But I will say to you that Professor Lattimore, when he was here, objected strenuously because we did not cross-examine the other witnesses like we did him. I am not trying to give you a workout, or anything of that kind, but if you do have evidence I would like to have it.

Mr. ROWE. Yes. It is perfectly understandable. You see, I was never closely connected with this new organization in its inception. I was in favor of a scholarly organization which would be highly differentiated from the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I always considered had gone off the deep end on trying to make policy, indicate lines of policy, engage in propaganda—or you can call it education if you want to.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think they were actually engaged in propaganda?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, absolutely.

Senator WATKINS. You have made a study of that, I suppose.

Mr. ROWE. As a matter of fact, propaganda and public opinion is one of my major technical fields.

Senator WATKINS. I do not want to ask you to do it now, but I wonder if you could supply for this committee a listing of the quotations from the various publications of the institute which, in your judgment, indicated clearly that it was engaging in propaganda.

Mr. ROWE. Well, I would say on that, Senator, that the best source on that is this pamphlet series, which has a very, very wide dissemination. If you do not like the word "propaganda," use anything else. Use the word "education" if you prefer it.

Senator WATKINS. Well, call it public information or something of that sort.

Mr. ROWE. All right. Public information. The persuasion of the public with a definite slant, a definite view on far eastern affairs, was indeed a major business of this organization. It was conceived of under the classification of contributing to general education in this country. And there has always been a great job to do in general education on the Far East in the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Has that been done, Professor, do you know?

Mr. ROWE. What are you referring to at this point?

Mr. MORRIS. I mean this analysis of the publications of the IPR.

Mr. ROWE. Well, there have been numerous cases in which analysis of the contents of the IPR publications has been done. I believe

Mr. Lattimore supplied you, for instance, in this formal statement that he made, with a copy of his analysis of Pacific Affairs during the years in which he edited it, in which he makes a tabulation of the material, indicating right wing, left wing, neutral authors, what proportion of the writings was done by each. But I do not think this is a very accurate analysis. I think it is far from satisfactory. As a matter of fact, one of my colleagues at New Haven has made an analysis, which is not mine. I have not done the work. He did it, but it seems to me it is probably a good deal more accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. ROWE. Richard Walker. He is assistant professor of history at Yale. He was a student of ours there and got his degree with us a few years ago, and then was appointed to the faculty in the history department.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with that study?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; I have read it, and I have here a portion of it in which he gives his statistical analysis of the editorial character, the editorial approach, to the Institute of Pacific Relations publications, and presents some rather startling figures.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably that ought to be received by the committee, for what it is worth. It is, of course, hearsay evidence.

Without calling the man who prepared it, unless the committee thinks he ought to be called, I think that ought to be put into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose we accept that and have that scrutinized by the director of research, and then if necessary we can call Professor Walker down to personally add testimony to what we have already done here.

Senator WATKINS. Who is the director of research? To whom do you refer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel. I mean, it may well lend itself to analysis that can be determined as a matter of fact, and we would not require Mr. Walker. Yet, if it is necessary to have Mr. Walker here, then let us consider that possibility.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we find out what it is from Professor Rowe before we decide what should be done with it.

Senator WATKINS. That probably is a good suggestion.

If you will leave a copy with Mr. Mandel, the director of research, that will be satisfactory.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe should explain it, though, Mr. Chairman. It will only take a few minutes.

Senator WATKINS. Very well.

Mr. ROWE. This is an analysis made by Mr. Walker on the basis of counting pages put in, contributed to IPR publications, Pacific Affairs, Far Eastern Survey, the inquiry series monographs, and the pamphlet series.

Using as a basis for this set of statistics, two lists of persons. In order to identify these persons, I am going to read from a copy of Mr. Walker's manuscript. And this is his manuscript as it reads:

On pages 679-680 of the "Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup" there is a table listing 37 persons as IPR personnel who have been identified during the course of the McCarran investigation as sympathetic to communism.

I want to put in a statement of my own at this point.

This identification of these people as sympathetic to communism is not precisely what the identification was in the testimony introduced before your committee here.

Mr. MORRIS. It was much more precise. It was either "Communist" or "identified with some Communist organization."

Mr. ROWE. Well, the precise identification of these is—

identified in sworn testimony by witnesses as a member or under the discipline or direction or influence of or rendered services to the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, or the international Communist movement.

And I am reading here from the document as it appears in the hearings on the nomination of Mr. Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. And that, Mr. Chairman, was not a complete list.

Mr. ROWE. That ends my parenthetical statement. I am going to resume reading from Mr. Walker's article.

To this list can certainly be added the names of three other persons who contributed to IPR publications and who were identified as Communists in the hearings printed by the McCarran subcommittee: Kate Mitchell, Mrs. Edgar Snow, and Philip Jaffe, bringing the list up to 40.

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups—

another parenthetical statement:

The first group is Mr. Holland's group of "47 writers well known for their active opposition to communism whose work the IPR has published."

Senator WATKINS. That was the group he gave to the committee?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. [Reading:]

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups to IPR publications in number of pages indicates that, even granting the need to weigh the reliability of some of the identifications involved, the McCarran probers should indeed look into IPR publications on a systematic basis. The following table represents a comparison of number of pages contributed by these two groups to the IPR publications listed between 1934 and 1947. The initial date marks Owen Lattimore's assumption of editorship of Pacific Affairs, and the terminal date is the year in which F. V. Field was asked to resign as a trustee of the IPR. The period of Owen Lattimore's editorship of Pacific Affairs is listed separately because of the controversy which has surrounded his name. It is apparent from the table that Mr. Holland's listing includes mainly those contributors whose works were published after the terminal date.

That is 1947.

Senator WATKINS. The terminal date, you mean, of Mr. Lattimore's connection with the institute in the capacity of editor?

Mr. ROWE. I believe that is so. Yes, Senator.

Now, here are the statistics that come out:

Pacific Affairs, volumes VII-XIV, No. 2, Owen Lattimore, editor, 13 of the 47 anti-Communists who contributed; and they contributed 196 pages, consisting of 21.4 percent of all contributed by either the 47 anti-Communists or the 40 listed as pro-Communist; only 21 percent. Number of the 40 pro-Communists who contributed, on the other hand, is 18, with 729 pages, comprising 78.6 percent of all the pages as between these two groups. In other words, over three times as many pages as the other people.

Then Pacific Affairs, volume XIV, No. 3, to volume XVI, No. 4, inclusive: 14 people from the 47 anti-Communists who contributed. They contributed a total of 146 pages, constituting 29.2 percent, as between these two groups; 14 of the 40 pro-Communists contributed,

but they contributed 354 pages, constituting 70.8 percent, as between these two groups.

Far Eastern Survey, volume IV, No. 1, to volume XVI, No. 21: Number of the 47 anti-Communists who contributed, 8. They contributed a total of 196 pages, comprising 34.6 percent of the total contributed by the two groups. On the other hand, 16, twice as many, of the 40 pro-Communists contributed, and they contributed 370 pages, consisting of 65.4 percent of the total contribution of the two groups. In other words, twice as much.

In the inquiry series monographs—these, of course, are books; not articles but books—4 anti-Communists listed contributed books of 488 pages, comprising 33.7 percent as between the two groups—5 of the 40 pro-Communists contributed, but they contributed 962 pages, comprising 66.3 percent of the total of the two groups, again twice as much.

In the pamphlet series, none of the anti-Communists contributed. You will remember, parenthetically, that I pointed to the pamphlet series as the prime vehicle for this persuasional activity.

Senator WATKINS. They had a much wider distribution?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. And they were used, some of them, in the indoctrination of our Armed Forces.

Mr. ROWE. That is right. None of these 47 listed as anti-Communist by Mr. Holland ever wrote in the pamphlet series, thus contributing zero pages, zero percent. Four of the forty listed as pro-Communists contributed a total of 261 pages, that is, 100 percent of all the work done in the pamphlet series.

The total, just the cumulative total, for the so-called—

Mr. MORRIS. That is 100 percent. But that is not of the whole—

Mr. ROWE. No. Throughout here this is 100 percent of the contribution as between these two groups.

The total pages contributed by the members of this group of 47 listed by Mr. Holland as anti-Communist was 1,026, constituting in the bulk 28.3 percent of the total as between the two groups. The total of the pro-Communist writers was 2,656 pages, constituting 71.7 percent, which comes to about two and a half times as much, cumulative.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest, in connection with these statistics—I mean, this is the third time it has come up here, Mr. Lattimore mentioned it, Mr. Holland mentioned it, and Professor Rowe mentions it. I understand Professor Walker raises the point in this article, that I believe comes out today. I understand it is offered by way of a criticism of the work of the committee, in the sense that the committee has not made such an analysis. I think the staff has been working on that for some time, Mr. Chairman. And may we receive this, just as a factor, as one of the many methods of approach to this task that the committee unmistakably has?

Senator WATKINS. I would say yes, we may receive it, and it may be filed with the committee, but not to actually have the whole thing made a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, it will not be for our conclusions, Senator, but for the approach that it takes toward our solving this problem.

May it be received with that understanding?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 613B" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 613B

In his lengthy statement to the committee, Mr. Holland gave a list of 47 "writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published. This should dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to Communism." Such an ability to distinguish between groups of writers for Institute publications evoked no comment by the counsel. On pages 679-680 of the "Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup" there is a table listing 37 persons as IPR personnel who have been identified during the course of the McCarran investigation as sympathetic to Communism. To this list can certainly be added the names of three other persons who contributed to IPR publications and who were identified as Communists in the hearings printed by the McCarran Subcommittee: Kate Mitchell, Mrs. Edgar Snow, and Philip Jaffe, bringing the list up to 40.

1. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PUBLICATIONS?

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups to IPR publications in number of pages indicates that, even granting the need to weigh the reliability of some of the identifications involved, the McCarran probers should indeed look into IPR publications on a systematic basis. The following table represents a comparison of number of pages contributed by these two groups to the IPR publications listed between 1934 and 1947. The initial date marks Owen Lattimore's assumption of editorship of *Pacific Affairs*, and the terminal date is the year in which F. V. Field was asked to resign as a trustee of the IPR. The period of Owen Lattimore's editorship of *Pacific Affairs* is listed separately because of the controversy which has surrounded his name. It is apparent from the table that Mr. Holland's listing includes mainly those contributors whose works were published after the terminal date.

Publication	Number of 47 anti- Commun- ists who contributed	Pages contrib- uted	Percent of total con- tributed by all 87	Number of 40 pro- Commun- ists who contributed	Pages contrib- uted	Percent
Pacific Affairs, vol. VII-XIV, No. 2, Owen Lattimore, Ed.	13	196	21.4	18	729	78.6
Pacific Affairs, vol. XIV, No. 3; vol. XVI, No. 4 inclusive.	14	146	29.2	14	354	70.8
Far Eastern Survey, vol. IV, No. 1; vol. XVI, No. 21.	8	196	34.6	16	370	65.4
Inquiry Series monographs.	4	488	33.7	5	962	66.3
Pamphlet Series.	0	000	0	4	261	100
Total pages:						
For anti-Communist writers.	1,026	-----	28.3	-----	-----	-----
For pro-Communist writers.	-----	-----	-----	-----	2,656	71.7

In these four published categories the 40 pro-Communist writers contributed over 250 percent more pages than the 7 more anti-Communist writers listed by Mr. Holland. The list given in the statement does not necessarily "dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to communism." These proportions would, it can easily be realized, depend in large measure on the sympathies of the editor of the particular publication involved.

Senator WATKINS. And I will also say for the committee that we, of necessity, cannot make an analysis of the evidence until the evidence is all in, and it would be very foolish for us to try to start making an analysis of it before we have finished the inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. As I say, as I understand it, the article mentions by way of possibly constructive criticism that something should be done and it has not been done.

Senator WATKINS. I anticipate that that is exactly what the staff is going to do. Since the charge is made that the over-all picture was

all to the good, and this is a very small percentage—a few writers came in, and that was necessary by way of objectivity. So that is very interesting. We are not accepting it as completely accurate, because we do not know, but it will help our staff in making their evaluation.

Mr. ROWE. I want to make my own reaction to this quite clear. I have never checked these figures. I haven't, in other words, done over again everything that he has done in doing this. So that I can't certify, you, see, that you are going to come out with the same percentage points.

But I will say this: In my opinion, Professor Walker is one of the most careful and conscientious research workers you could possibly want to have. And I personally, if I were being asked to prepare such a thing as this under my auspices, would be glad to accept a hundred percent what he says.

I just give that as a personal impression of what he says.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to make this observation also, that I do not think a case should be rested upon the number of pages that each group had, one or the other. One very effective writer might only have a hundred pages, and if he did a good job in that hundred pages, it would have more effect than all the hundreds of thousands or millions of words somebody else might write. So, after all, it may be a straw, may be some evidence, but it would not be conclusive, in my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. I point out that those facts are not facts that are available to Professor Walker alone; that the staff here may undertake to check that and come out with a conclusive answer. So it may not be necessary to consult with Mr. Walker at all on this.

Mr. ROWE. It would be very easy for you to check these results; no problem at all.

Senator WATKINS. I think that would be a problem for the committee to take up with the staff, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you any experience, Professor Rowe, of editors or editorial directors of the IPR editing articles in such a way as to reflect a pro-Communist bias?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; I have. I would like to cite two instances of this that are known to me, one from first-hand evidence and the other from a statement made to me by one of my students.

I think maybe I had better introduce the second of these first.

The first one I will talk about has to do with Mr. Rosinger, in this volume he has put out recently, called the State of Asia, I believe it is. One of the chapters in this was written by a former student of mine, a Dr. Paul Kattenberg, who is now employed in the Research Branch of the State Department, a very able and energetic fellow, who was asked to write this chapter, and you can refer to it in the published volume. The volume was edited by Mr. Rosinger.

When Mr. Kattenberg submitted his chapter to Mr. Rosinger, he was asked to come down and confer with Rosinger regarding it. He did so and he came back and reported to me in great excitement because, as he said, "Every change he wanted to make involved trying to get me to follow the Russian line."

He said, "I was absolutely amazed by this experience," and he dilated on this at some length.

Mr. MORRIS. This is what Kattenberg told you?

Mr. ROWE. This is what Kattenberg told me in my office at New Haven.

That, as I say, is second-hand, but it is the report of an available witness and you can check it. He is right here in Washington.

Senator WATKINS. Did the book come out under that sponsorship?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. And was it changed to meet Rosinger's idea?

Mr. ROWE. I never have seen the original manuscript. I don't know what changes were involved in Kattenberg's manuscript.

Senator WATKINS. It would be interesting to know what changes were made.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness is testifying to a conversation he had with Kattenberg.

Senator WATKINS. I realize that.

Mr. ROWE. The second instance is one on which I have documentary evidence. This is a manuscript written on communism and the Hukbalahap. You know, the Hukbalahap are the local Communist forces in the Philippines. They were a cause of great trouble. This was written by my colleague at Yale, Assistant Professor of Political Science Henry Wells.

Without commenting on the article—and he later got it published in the identical form in which he submitted it to the Institute of Pacific Relations—he first submitted it to the IPR, and Miss Miriam Farley edited it, and I have here the original editing of this in her handwriting, with the suggested emendations and suggested items to be struck out, indicated by pencil, and so forth.

Now, she has some written comments along the line, here, which are interesting in themselves, but the things that she wants removed from the article are striking. She wants removed from the article everything that identifies the Huks as Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us examples of that, Professor?

Mr. ROWE (reading):

Communist purposes in any locality are always to be understood in terms of the available data concerning the pattern of Communist activity the world over. Local Communist leaders, as is well known, normally take their cue from Moscow * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that recommended to be deleted by Miss Farley?

Mr. ROWE. Cut out; yes.

Senator WATKINS. Before you go any further, when was this manuscript presented, and when was this editing done?

Mr. ROWE. Let me see.

Senator WATKINS. Give us the approximate time.

Mr. ROWE. 1949, I would say.

Senator WATKINS. That was very recent.

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that was recent.

Senator WATKINS. That was after the so-called awakening of the American people to all these fellow travelers, to what has been going on.

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes.

Then, handwritten in here for insertion, instead of this sort of thing, is the following, written by Miss Farley. And I am quoting:

In one sense, the Huk movement may be viewed as part of a world-wide scheme of Communist expansion; in another sense it is a product of local conditions.

That is what she wants substituted.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the second was what she wanted substituted for the first?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Continuation of what she wanted cut out:

The Hukbalahap in the Philippines, like the Communist-dominated movements in the archipelagos to the north and south, Japan and Indonésia, is to be regarded as an advance guard, a propaganda-distribution center, and an organizational pivot in a campaign that looks to the eventual capture of the archipelago for the forces of communism.

This is to be removed from the article on her recommendation.

Senator WATKINS. Did she have any substitute for that?

Mr. ROWE. No substitute at this point. Just cut it out. As a matter of fact, half the article would have been cut if those recommendations were followed.

Senator WATKINS. No reason given as to why that was to be cut?

Mr. ROWE. No reason.

Next item recommended for omission is this, and you can see that about three-quarters of the page is to be cut out [reading]:

Though their grievances lead them into the Hukbalahap—
this is a recognition of the local grievances—

the ordinary peasants do not determine its policies and activities. As in all Communist-dominated movements, the leaders, not the rank and file, call the tune. Recent events have shown that the men who run the Hukbalahap are not interested in solving the agrarian problem on non-Communist terms. Their agitators use it as a means of gaining adherence for the Communist Party line, of spreading anti-American propaganda, and of provoking civil strife under a government committed to friendly relations with the United States. Like Communists everywhere, they seize upon the legitimate grievances of the oppressed to advance their own quite different ends.

To be omitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record?

But I think probably, in fairness to Miss Farley, we should ask her if that is her handwriting on the manuscript.

Senator WATKINS. Well, if it were a court procedure, I would say it would be admitted subject to further proof. I think we can receive it in evidence here as a part of our investigation.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 614" and is herewith inserted.)

Mr. MORRIS. But do you suggest that we find out from Miss Farley whether or not that is her handwriting?

Senator WATKINS. Certainly. We want Miss Farley here. She has been here once, has she not?

Mr. MORRIS. No; she hasn't.

Senator WATKINS. I think the suggestion is very well made.

Mr. MORRIS. At least for the limited purpose of asking her if that is in fact her handwriting on it.

Senator WATKINS. And you will probably want to know from her why, and she will probably want to have the right, and should have the right, to tell why. I do not think we should limit it as to whether that is her handwriting.

Mr. MORRIS. No; that is the minimum, Senator.

COMMUNISM AND THE RUKHSLAP

BY HEARY BELLE

In the Philippines, as in China, Southeast Asia, and the Malaya, the Communists have turned long-standing agrarian troubles to their own advantage. Using familiar Communist techniques of propaganda and of organization, they have won a following in the region where the peasants' grievances (poverty, usury, absentee landlordism) have long been most acute - i.e., in colonial Japan, where they control the present movement known as the Rukhslap.

Analysis of any Communist-controlled organization must proceed on two levels: (a) that of the hard core of trained Communists and their purposes in leading the organization, and (b) that of the rank and file and their purposes in joining it. The aims of these two groups should not be idealized, save on the basis of other evidence of their conduct. Communist purposes in any locality are always to be understood in terms of the available data concerning the pattern of Communist activity the world over. Local Communist leaders, as is well known, normally take their cue from Moscow; their policies in local situations are primarily tactical implementations of a global strategy. Backward-file purposes, on the other hand, tend to be reflections of pressing needs and desires on the part of the masses from whom the numbers are drawn.

This distinction should be kept in mind in considering the nature and significance of the Rukhslap. Viewed as a movement directed ultimately from Moscow, the Rukhslap is merely an instrument of Communist expansion. There is good reason to suppose that the Kremlin's Far Eastern strategy involves the progressive consolidation of the Asiatic continent under Communist control (a process now well under way, as witness the southeast push of the Chinese Communist armies) and piecemeal subjugation of the chain of archipelagos lying off the

epoch. The Bukharinists in the Philippines, like the Communist-dominated movements in the archipelago to the north and south, Japan and Indonesia, is to be regarded as an advance guard, a propaganda-distribution center, and an organizational pivot in a campaign that looks to the eventual seizure of the archipelago for the future of Communism.

From the point of view of the rank and file, however, the Bukharinist is a primarily local phenomenon - an instrument of mass protest and revolt. The ordinary members are peasant farmers who, in the strict sense, are not Communists. They know nothing about the subtleties of Marxism-Leninism, are largely unaware of the gold war, and are no allies, emotional or intellectual, to Stalin and his henchmen. They are in the main simple, illiterate (or at most semi-literate) country folk who have long suffered economic injustices and are now attempting to force long-overdue economic reforms.

Though their preferences lead them into the Bukharinist, the ordinary peasants do not determine its policies and activities. As in all Communist-dominated movements, the leaders, not the rank and file, call the tune. Recent events have shown that the men who run the Bukharinist are not interested in solving the agrarian problem on non-Communist terms: their agitators use it as a means of gaining adherents for the Communist Party line, of spreading anti-American propaganda, and of provoking civil strife under a government committed to friendly relations with the United States. Like Communists everywhere, they seize upon the legitimate grievances of the oppressed to advance their own quite different ends.

In order to explain the difference in aims between the leaders of the Bukharinist and its rank and file, we may occasionally begin with the latter; for it is the very legitimacy of the peasants' grievances that, undeniably, has given the Communists their opportunity.

The peasants' troubles have their origins in the distant past - in the quasi-feudal social system that prevailed even before the Spaniards arrived in the Islands. Then, as later, Philippine society was divided mainly into two classes, a small minority of landholding chiefs and aristocrats and a large majority of landless peasants, who were richer lords or slaves.

In Spanish times, most of the land continued to be held by a relatively small group - the native aristocrats (the *encomenderos*) and the Span Catholic Church, together with its monastic orders. The mass of the people continued to live as lords or the henchmen of the landowners. Relations between the two groups were governed by traditional understandings regarding tenancy; the tenant either shared his harvest with the landlord (the tenant kept at most half of the crop, and considerably less than half if the landowner supplied implements and work animals), or rented a plot of land for cash and retained all of the yield for himself.

These customary arrangements kept the peasants' standard of living at a very low level. The plot that the farmer tenant cultivated was so small (especially in central Luzon, where population pressures were great) and his methods of cultivation were so primitive that he could not earn enough to sustain himself and his family from one harvest to another. He was forced to borrow from the landlord at exorbitant (though well-established) rates of interest. ¹ Peasant debts grew to monumental

1 "In the Philippines, where money has become widely furnished in at least a dozen forms of commonly practiced credit, each one of which bears a specific name, the annual rate of interest sometimes exceeds 400 per cent." James S. Allen, "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 11, p. 58 (March 1938). See also Brian G. Hession, Agrarian Conflict in Southeast Asia, New York, 1936, pp. 187-81.

proportions and were passed on from one generation to the next. The peasant was, as a result, economically dependent upon the landlord.

he was in effect bound to the haciendero and he was defenseless against social servitude and those of the landlords chose to exact them.

Increasing realizations against these conditions first broke out on the haciendas owned by American landlords, notably on the great estates of the "Crislers" and the "Barnes", on their rich haciendas there occurred, particularly in the last half of the nineteenth century, frequent uprisings among the peasants. Elsewhere, by contrast, the peasant farmers appear to have been relatively content with their lot, hence tended to retain wherever the haciendero lived on his hacienda. The old-style enclave thus all of old haciendas and neighborhoods toward them a kind of paternalism that gave them a sense of security and "belonging." It was not of physical comfort. He kept them in debt, but was usually prepared to extend loans in planting season and to pay out of advances or financie - loans hostile undersold on both sides to be in the nature of compensation and not repayable in full. The peasants, though poor, had enough to satisfy their meager aspirations; and they felt they had in the enclave a friend and protector.

American annexation of the islands at the turn of the century set in motion changes that profoundly altered these traditional relations between enclaves and peasants. The former, as markets for Philippine sugar, copra, and other products opened up in the United States, became notably richer, and were soon a superior to a more luxurious way of life. For now this all the Americans gradually enlarged the sphere of local self-government, and the enclaves, once they had tasted the sweets of increased power that thus accrued to them, developed new interests of a non-economic character. Beginning as advisors and subordinate to their American governors, the enclaves (the only educated Filipinos) gradually acquired their present near-monopoly of political power in the islands.

Under the impact of these changes, the old paternalistic system began to break down. The sesqueros began to take up residence in Manila or in the provincial capitals, and soon they were living on the hacienda only during harvest seasons. The rest of the year their affairs were left in the hands of hired plantation managers, many of whom undertook to operate the haciendas on a "strictly business" basis. The managers tended to press the tenants for repayment of loans, to charge them for services rendered, to exact extra labor from them, and to substitute impersonal efficiency for the old-style easy-going paternalism.

Meanwhile, the social chasm between casique and peasant began to widen. The landowners began to enlarge and renovate their country houses, installing modern conveniences, while the peasants continued to live in their primitive huts. The landowners put their tenants to work constructing good roads (often using for this purpose the ofenda taxes collected from the peasants), one consequence of which was the spectacle of young bloods of the landed families speeding through the countryside in high-powered cars. The clothes worn by the casiques and (especially) by their womenfolk became more and more unlike the traditional garb of the peasants. These contrasts, while specially noticeable in the provinces of Pangasinan, where for centuries the extremes of wealth and poverty had been more marked than elsewhere, grew to be common throughout the central Luzon provinces.

2 One reason for the slow development of agrarian unrest in the sugar-plantation areas of Negros is the fact that many landowners continued to live on their haciendas and to practice the old-style paternalism. Tension between landowners and tenants in Negros is growing, as the latter become increasingly aware of the contrast between the wealth of the casiques and their own humble condition, but no revolts or organized political action on the part of the peasants has yet developed. It is significant, however, that peasant guerrilla bands which took to the hills during the Japanese occupation of Negros returned to the plantations under cover of darkness often enough to set fire to and destroy most of the great country houses.

The upshot of increasing absentee landlordism and of an ever-widening gulf between owner and tenant was a new attitude on the part of both. The saciques became indifferent to the welfare of their tenants, tended to regard them with suspicion, and suppressed demands for improved conditions. They began to hire private police, called "civilian guards," to protect their persons and haciendas and to enforce the now widely criticized crop-sharing arrangements. As legislators, executives, and judges, they did not hesitate to use the force of law to maintain the status quo.

The tenants, on their side, viewed the saciques with increasing resentment and distrust, and tended to rally credulously behind any leader who promised them a new order of things, whether economic or political. Three peasant uprisings burst briefly into flame; the "Colorado" troubles of 1923-24, the "Payug rebellion" of 1931, and the "Salda" revolt of May 3-4, 1935. Success of poor organization and irresponsible leadership, none of these came to anything. During the same years, however, peasant organizations were being formed under more competent leadership. The most important, the National Peasant Confederation, led by the early thirties came under the control of Communists, who continued to dominate this, and other peasant movements as well, until the outbreak of the war.

The Bakwilelap, ostensibly launched as a resistance movement against the Japanese, was a literal descendant of the earlier Communist-

3 For a thorough treatment of the early years of the Bakwilelap, see William A. Owens, "With the Ruby Cavalry" Asia and the Americas, vol. 46, pp. 55-67 (February 1942). A valuable but fairly inaccessible treatise in E. M. Manuel, A Manual for the Study of the Bakwilelap Problem, an M.A. thesis of April 1944, on file in the Silliman University Library, Dasmacruce, Oriental Negros, Philippines.

dominated peasant groups. Organized in March 1942, it functioned as a ~~partly~~ ~~as a~~ ~~very~~ ~~mediative~~ ~~effective~~ guerrilla operations against

the insiders and against Filipino collaborators, but were unsuccessful as an instrument of communist propaganda and of political and economic change.

6
Communists controlled the Philippines from the very beginning.

4 Though secretly organized by representatives of a wide variety of left-wing groups (including the Communist and Socialist Parties, the National Students Union, the Civil Liberties Union, and the Chinese Communist Association), the Subalterns was dominated by Communists from the start. Two members of the Philippine Communist Party, Luis Naron and Cato Alejandro, became Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, of the Subalterns Committee. Other members of the Communist Party were Juan Paler, Communist Party organizer and leader of the National Students Union (then known as Rural Worker Union), labor leader, who is today General Secretary of the Communist Party; and "Mr. Lee," a Chinese Communist. Closely associated with the Subalterns were Communist Guillermo Caycedillo and Helen del Castillo, both of whom had been trained in Moscow.

but they were careful at first to direct their efforts along lines that would attract a large following. In organizing the Subalterns they were able to evoke sentiments of nationalism and patriotism among the masses. In recruiting collaborators, most of whom were members of the native class, they were able to arouse the passions against both oppressors and betrayers. In pursuing a radical socio-economic program, they were able to win for the Subalterns a reputation of militancy in championing the peasants' rights.

Along with activities, the Subalterns placed priority. One aspect of it was indoctrination of the peasants. Sub soldiers received instruction in Marxist-Leninist doctrine from "political committees," one of whom was attached to each squadron. From a school established in the Cagayan camp, headquarters of the guerrilla army.

...hundreds of political propagandists went out, in some cases as far as such as Japan provinces. Usually they traveled in groups of from six to ten, including both men and women. On arriving in a barrio, they would call the people together with singing and dancing, or with a dramatic scene of the needs of one of their heroes. They would speak with verbiage, what they had learned in school. The peasants could not understand "dialectical materialism," but they could understand that the masses were dominated, that rich landlords took advantage of them, that they were exploited enough for their labor, and that taxes and interest rates were too high. 8

Under the leadership and protection of the Baks, the colonial Indian peasants translated these principles into action. Ignoring the pre-war share-cropping arrangements, they kept the entire harvest of the slave fields for themselves - less the amount requisitioned by the Baks to supply their forces. Most of the Jendomey had, meantime, fled to the comparative safety of their "hills houses". To the shame of duly constituted authorities, the Baks organized punitive and even provincial governments, administering their own brand of justice, enforcing their wishes, performing marriage ceremonies, and in essence, exercising full authority over the peasant population.

The wartime activities of the Bak leadership undoubtedly increased the political maturity of the peasants. Communist propaganda imbued in them a hitherto latent class consciousness and expressed their Bakistao nationalist demands. Furthermore, work in the Bak leadership (especially the use of firearms) gave them a new sense of power. As a result, they were willing to strike back when their former landlords sent troops into the field to suppress them. The anti-Bak forces, known as the "USAFV guerrillas," were led by men of the same class who had taken ROTC courses in the universities or had served in the United States Army toward the East. Psyched battles took place in campaigns and elsewhere between the Baks and the USAFV units prior to the arrival of American troops. When the Japanese came into the area in the spring of 1945, they recognized the USAFV guerrillas as allies, aided with them against the Baks, and seized the Bak leaders' arms and ammunition, holding them in custody for several months.

On the whole, the purposes of the Bak leaders and those of the peasantry did seem to coincide. They began to diverge, however, soon after the capitulation of the Japanese. The leaders' policy was to convert the war against the Japanese into a civil war, turning the Bak military forces against the returning landlords, whereas the peasants

7. why
of above

were more disposed to keep tight-lip and reserve the presidentialism of civil authority to the state.

The policy of non-interference revealed in the many military bids successfully resisted the rather feeble efforts of the Indian government to reassert control over central India. Resistance to authority seemed to have grown proportionally since the advent of Gandhi in the independence elections of April 1946. The viceroy in 1946 reasserted control over Madras State, leader of the Liberal Party and idol of the United Congress, was also hated by the establishment - so very unlike of his dubious threat to the Congress, and his associates - so very unlike of his dubious threat to the Congress, with whom he was believed to have collaborated. Some was a nationalist, he was rebuffed by marriage to one of the most powerful and revolutionary leaders of central India, and he had close ties with Congress, Congress, and further emphasis to the Congress. His attention to the President's and military-political is restricted to some return to the pre-war pattern of enclave domination.

One of the first acts of the Indian regime seemed to justify this interpretation. His Liberal Party majority in the House of Representatives refused to grant even Congressmen, including the "Supreme" India Congress, who had been elected from central Indian districts under the banner of the Congress Party Alliance, a coalition of left-wing groups including the Congress Party. This action provided for the leaders with an excuse to stiffen their resistance against the government. Refusing to obey in order to surrender their arms, the Congress seemed to indicate a relationship with government troops sent to force their compliance. Part was added to the Congress by the return of the Congress, some of whom brought with them private armies to protect their borders from the Congress, and the Congress seemed to indicate a relationship with government troops sent to force their compliance. Part was added to the Congress by the return of the Congress, some of whom brought with them private armies to protect their borders from the Congress, and the Congress seemed to indicate a relationship with government troops sent to force their compliance. Part was added to the Congress by the return of the Congress, some of whom brought with them private armies to protect their borders from the Congress, and the Congress seemed to indicate a relationship with government troops sent to force their compliance.

In July and August 1948 President Bhabha attempted to work out

with Suk leaders a plan for the restoration of "peace and order," but the negotiations broke down, each side claiming bad faith on the part of the other. The subsequent passage of legislation raising

8 See "Harm-Boss Correspondence," JAF Eastern Survey, October 8, 1946, pp. 314-15, for the points of tension between the government and the Subaklapp, as expressed by the leaders on each side. The charges and counter-charges in this exchange were clear why no rapprochement was possible.

the peasants' share of the rice crop from 50 per cent to 70 per cent did nothing to allay the armed conflict in central Luzon. Since the situation was, if anything, deteriorating, Gomez finally gave orders to the Military Police Command (a branch of the Philippine Army) to put down the Suk by any means necessary.

It must be supposed that this state of affairs suited the purposes of the Communist leaders of the Subaklapp. It was to their ultimate advantage that peasants should be in open rebellion against landlords, that the latter should retaliate with mercenary troops, and that the Government should wage war against its own citizens. For every fresh outbreak of violence in central Luzon tended to lessen the power and prestige of the enclave-controlled Republic of the Philippines, "Pacific partner" of the United States.

It seems clear, however, that the Suk leaders overestimated the extent to which they could carry the peasants with them in their program to foster civil war. As the months went by they progressively lost support among the rank-and-file. Many of strife and eager to resume the arduous rounds of life in their villages, rice paddies, and cane fields, the peasants gave increasingly grudging responses to Suk appeals and demands. They were becoming demoralized by the losses inflicted upon their families and friends as government forces took a mounting toll of Suk lives. Depleted by casualties, the Suk ranks were further dispirited by desertions, as more and more fighters

drifted home to help support their families.

This is not to say, however, that the Communists had lost their power to foment unrest. As late as March 1948, when Rosas formally outlawed the Hukos, their attacks on Constabulary outposts and patrols and their forays into populated sections in search of food, money, and recruits were still frequent enough to keep the rice-bowl provinces in a state of constant uneasiness. Constabulary raids on villages suspected of harboring or aiding Hukos were still a source of instability. Conditions were so unsettled that many schools remained closed. Certain cane plantations were as yet unwilling to cultivate their lands, and production of both cane and rice was far below normal.

On Rosas' death in April 1948, the situation in Mindanao temporarily entered a new phase, chiefly responsible for the change was the new President, Elpidio Quirino. Soon after taking office he launched

7 a plan for rebuilding the public life. Quirino is not a native. Born of a poor family in Ilocos Sur, a section of northern Luzon where the hacienda system has never taken root, he worked his way up the ladder of Philippine politics without ever closely identifying himself in the public mind with unique interests.

A plan for rebuilding the lateral influence of the hukobalabap taking advantage of the widespread desire for peace and of the Hukos' considerable loss of support, he entered into negotiations with Terop looking toward a truce between government forces and the Hukos. Although the negotiations dragged on for several weeks, an agreement was reached at Iloilo and on June 21 Quirino (in the presence of Terop) signed a proclamation granting a twenty-day amnesty to the outlawed Hukos. The proclamation specified that the Hukos and members of the PW would "present themselves with all their arms and ammunition" to government authorities within twenty days, whereupon the government would drop its charges against them.

8 New York Times, June 22, 1948.

The amnesty met with widespread approval. Both of the major political parties supported the measure, and the average citizen hailed it with enthusiasm and relief. The Philippine Congress quickly ratified the amnesty proclamation and placed a P2,000,000 "peace and order" fund at the disposal of the President. The House of Representatives meanwhile hastened to grant Taruc permission to take the oath that it had denied him two years before. The Manila press was euphoric at this turn of events. Portraits of "Congressman" Taruc appeared in every issue, and countless articles described his daily round of official conferences, receptions, luncheons, and dinner parties. Reports from the provinces told of mobs pouring into the towns, ready to present themselves to the authorities and to turn in their firearms. Old animosities had seemingly disappeared, and on all sides hopes were high that the ^{dividing line had} ~~division in Mindanao~~ was over.

It soon became obvious, however, that the terms of the amnesty were not being fulfilled. Leaders of the Hukbong Bayanabed outside the towns announced that their men were willing to register but would not be ordered to do so until the "go ahead" signal was received from Taruc. The instructions from Taruc were not forthcoming. Just before the deadline of July 16, the President extended the amnesty to the 31st.

Still the Huks did not sign up. In an attempt to secure their cooperation, President Delino called a conference between Huk leaders and government officials in which a six-point program of "social amelioration" was supposedly agreed upon. It committed the government to purchasing haciendas for conversion into model agricultural communities, opening up new agricultural colonies, building roads and bridges in rural areas, opening schools in Mindanao, extending crop loans to small farmers, and providing central ration pensions with immediate relief in the form of food, clothing, and medicine. Almost at once, however, the Huks began to insist upon further commitments

from the government as the price of their cooperation, demanding abolition of the post-war trade agreement with the United States, "expatriation of all fascists over fifty hectares," and "abolition of the plight of the populace,"⁹ characterizing as it was in "the clubhouse of American imperialism."

3 Manila Times, July 31, 1948; Manila Bulletin, July 26, 1948.

Being one excuse after another for postponing compliance with the terms of the amnesty, the Suk leaders seized time in which to carry their Communist propaganda to the masses. On the pretext of "instructing" their followers in the details of registration, they organized mass meetings in several of the rice-bowl provinces. Addressing such a meeting in turn, Taruc and other Suk leaders delivered scathing attacks upon the Quirino government, charging "graft and corruption" in high places and accusing Cabinet members of being "tools of fascistic and reactionary imperialism." In every speech Taruc attacked the United States as an "imperialist" power and "the source of all the economic ills of the Philippines." At a rally of some 15,000 peasants in Nueva Ecija on July 31, he urged unity upon the Suks and shouted, "Should democratic processes fail us, we shall know what to do."¹⁰

10 Manila Bulletin, July 29 and August 2, 1948; Manila Chronicle, August 1, 1948.

In spite of these unmistakable warnings that the Suks were not acting in good faith, the General Public clung to the hope that the amnesty laws could be complied with and that the temporary peace in central Luzon would become permanent. Hence popular approval greeted the news that Quirino had extended the amnesty for two more weeks - until August 15. Hopos were again disappointed, however, for the Suks continued to pursue their earlier tactics; now excuses for the delay in registration and further incendiary speeches before mass audiences.

As the final deadline approached, Tarcus made his position unequivocally clear. On August 12 he issued a press release which read in part:

...the Communist Party of the Philippines, of which I am a member, besides fighting for the eventual achievement of socialism, is also fighting for land for the peasants and other agrarian reforms and for the full and complete independence of our country from all forms of foreign domination. ...I have instructed my men to...refuse to submit to a fascist peace imposed by imperialist-fascist guns and bayonets. 11

11 Manila Bulletin, August 23, 1949. A few weeks later Tarcus stated in a letter addressed to the press that in case of war he would side with the Marxist Union, which "represents the cause of democracy, peace and progress in the world," against the United States, which "represents imperialist aggression, domination, and fascist tendencies." (Manila Times, September 7, 1948.)

When midnight of the 16th arrived, Tarcus had already taken refuge in the mountains of central Luzon. Almost immediately clashes began between the Huk and the Constabulary, and within a few weeks provocative action by Huk leaders led to large-scale military operations against them to the great chagrin of the government.

Civil war was condemned to central Luzon since last September. News dispatches from the Philippines during the fall and winter reported a series of government victories, including the capture of major Huk strongholds, but subsequent reports indicated that Huk units are still active and are, indeed, becoming more aggressive. This development, according to the press, has led to still more intensive military action on the part of the government.¹²


12 On April 28, 1949, Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon and party were killed in an ambush deep in Subulana. Although the playars have apparently not yet been identified, the government has responded to this action by intensifying the campaign against the Huk, using planes, mortars, and patrols against them. See New York Times, April 28, 1949, and New York Herald Tribune, May 2, 1949.

At present, at least, the Communists have every reason to feel satisfied with the expansion which their plans for the Philippines are working out. The advantages continue to be theirs in the side of the

pro-laboring Quirón administration, whose failure to cope with the movement made quite as clearly in terms of prestige and enables it to rely for support upon groups that oppose any steps calculated to solve the underlying agrarian problem in central Luzon. Continued unrest provides the Marx with ample opportunity to spread anti-Quirón and anti-American propaganda. The unsettled conditions have encouraged the opportunistic leaders of the "Socialista Party to bid for the support of the Reds and to reinforce their strictures against American "Imperialism" and the Quirón regime. José Laurel, Nacionalista candidate for President in the November 1948 elections, is campaigning on a platform indistinguishable on most counts from the Communist Party ^{is} also. There are all indications for the Communist leaders of the Sub-

13 New York Herald Tribune, May 23, 1949. Laurel served as puppet President under the Japanese, Laurel is reportedly willing to become a puppet President once again, this time as a tool of the Communists.

balabac, who have, for the most, received indirect help from political squabbles within Quirón's liberal party, now divided into two virtually irreconcilable factions and seriously handicapped in its campaign for reelection in November. It may well be that the days of friendly United States-Philippine relations are numbered. In any case, the future of the Philippines as a bulwark of anti-Soviet strength in the Far East hangs in the balance.



Senator WATKINS. Because that carries with it some implications that perhaps she would want to explain; and I think, in fairness, she should be permitted to explain it.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that published, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I will have to look that up. It will take a minute. But I have the necessary documentation on that.

As we go along, I will say that I have permission from Professor Wells to submit this in evidence before the committee.

Senator WATKINS. You mean this entire document?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

This is a letter from Professor Wells, 13 March 1952, with a post-script:

As you may recall, the article was published in the winter of 1950 issue of *American Perspective*, in substantially its original form.

May I interject a request at this point?

Would you make a copy of this and give me back the original? Is that feasible?

Senator WATKINS. We cannot do that until at least we have given Miss Farley that opportunity referred to.

Mr. ROWE. I was thinking of a photographic copy, which would contain all this.

Mr. MORRIS. We will give it back to you within a short time.

Mr. ROWE. I would be satisfied with a photostat, myself.

Mr. MORRIS. No; we will give you the original.

Did Andrew Grajdanzev study at Yale University under a grant?

Mr. ROWE. Andrew Grajdanzev, whose name at that time had been changed to Andrew Grad, was at New Haven during an academic year under a grant secured on his behalf by Mr. Holland from the Rockefeller Foundation, constituting in effect a subsidy to allow him to carry on his research.

The idea of having him come to New Haven was that we gave him the facilities of the library. We gave him consultative privileges with the members of the faculty. And we were supposed in general to supervise his work. This was in 1947 or 1948, I think.

He spent one academic year there only, although the original intent was to have him spend two academic years with us. The reason he left at the end of 1 year with us was that we disapproved of his work. This was a unanimous agreement on the part of all the faculty there.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you disagree?

Mr. ROWE. We considered his work not to have sound scholarly method in it. It was so bad from that point of view that we finally reported adversely to Mr. Holland in a letter signed by myself and at least four of my colleagues, everyone of whom, including an economist, a sociologist who specialized on Japan, the late John Embree, who was my colleague there at Yale; a geographer, Karl Pelzer, who is a great expert on Asiatic geography; Prof. Chitoshi Yanaga, who was associate professor of political science at Yale. And the general agreement was that the work simply did not stand up from a scholarly point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it show any pro-Communist bias?

Mr. ROWE. It is pretty hard to nail anything of that kind down in this particular manuscript. The bias of the manuscript was—I think you could call it left wing without any strain on the fact, or without

straining the interpretation too much. But that wasn't the fundamental basis of our objection to it. As a matter of fact, we wouldn't have raised objection from a point of view aspect. We raised objection from a methodology aspect, and we simply came to the conclusion that this man was not a sound scholar in the field. And, as I say, it was a unanimous agreement on our part.

Now, this grant from Rockefeller for Grad, administered through IPR and then through us, was a very unsatisfactory result, but it was typical of a number of others done at that time.

MR. MORRIS. Do you know of any other?

MR. ROWE. For instance, there was a grant for T. A. Bisson, secured by IPR from Rockefeller Foundation, and there was another one to help finance Rosinger, secured from Rockefeller Foundation through IPR.

MR. MORRIS. That last was the one that enabled Mr. Rosinger to publish this book, the State of Asia; was it not?

MR. ROWE. I believe that is what it was used for.

SENATOR WATKINS. All these three men did not work at Yale; did they?

MR. ROWE. No; Rosinger and Bisson worked in the IPR headquarters in New York, as I understood it. And then Bisson was later sent from New York out to Berkeley, the University of California, where he was supported by further grants from Rockefeller Foundation, and he is still there on the staff of the political-science department in the University of California at Berkeley, as I remember.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bisson has been subpoenaed to appear before this committee on Saturday.

Are there any others you care to mention?

SENATOR WATKINS. Mr. Rosinger has already been here?

MR. MORRIS. Rosinger has been here and has refused to say whether or not he was ever a Communist.

Professor, has the IPR been active in obtaining grants from the foundations?

MR. ROWE. Oh, yes, indeed. A great amount of money has been spent this way by the foundations through IPR. After our unhappy experience with Dr. Grad, we decided that we would never accept any other such grant again; that if a man were to work at Yale supported by a foundation, the grant would be made to this man directly through us and not through the Institute of Pacific Relations. Because, whereas Mr. Holland indicated that he wanted us to assist Grad in his work and to advise him and to generally supervise, when it came down to the question of what kind of manuscript this was, and what to do with it, Holland took the ball from us and proceeded to act as though our objections didn't cut any ice, and this was not going to be done by us any more.

We have had subsequently much more pleasant experiences with other people that have been sent directly to us by Rockefeller Foundation, and for whom we have the whole responsibility, and whom we control, and to whom our supervision has sanctions behind it and has meaning. But this was not the case in the case of Mr. Grad, which was a very undesirable arrangement from our point of view. And it meant that Grad was, in effect, controlled by Holland and not by us; with all that that implied in the nature of his work, approval of the product, further support. Because after Grad left us, with this bad

mark we gave him, Holland went right back and got more money to keep on supporting him, and sent him up to Columbia and had him affiliated there.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything, Professor, of the general tendency, to integrate studies and to bring about unanimity of agreement on any particular subject, with the foundation?

Mr. ROWE. If I start out on that, Mr. Morris, I hope you will restrain me from talking too long. This is one of the subjects that is of peculiar and particular interest to me, and on which I am in general disagreement with a lot of my colleagues.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you discuss it, Professor Rowe, with the limitations on it, to the extent that, say, Mr. Holland and the IPR have been a factor in this general tendency?

Mr. ROWE. Well, let's take a possible hypothetical case. Let's assume that organization A wants to promote point of view B and they get money from foundation C and allocate it to a lot of people. They want to have a place for these people to work. They want to maintain them. So they send them around to universities like Yale, Columbia, and California, three I have mentioned where this actually happened, you see. And they hold the final strings.

Now, of course, in the interests supposedly of efficiency, integration, coordination, and all these shibboleths of the American foundation point of view, maybe this is a good thing. From my point of view, the foundations and these research organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations have gone hog wild on the coordination of research. They have committed themselves so thoroughly to coordination of research that in fact instead of supporting a great variety of research projects, which would enrich the American intellectual scene through variegation, which is a value I very basically believe in, you have a narrowing of emphasis, a concentration of power, a concentration of authority, and an impoverishment of the American intellectual scene.

These people like organization. They like to have a man in a university, for example, who will take the responsibility for organizing research around a narrow topic. This means he acquires a staff, and you go to work on a special project. You may spend \$250,000 or \$500,000 working on some narrow field, which may or may not ever yield you any results.

If I were doing the thing, I would talk in terms of supporting individual scholars, and not in terms of supporting these highly organized concentrated narrow specialized research projects that are supported in some of the universities.

Now, as I said, I am off on a hobbyhorse at this point. But it is of particular interest, because by exercising power over research in this way, you see, by insisting on the integration of research activity, anybody who wants to, can control the results of research in American universities. And I think this is a very questionable business that the public ought to look at very, very closely, and see whether they want a few monopolies of the money, like, for instance, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., who have done immense amounts of good, to emphasize narrow concentration to the extent that they have.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, can you think of a particular example of how this would be applied, Professor?

Mr. ROWE. Well, I can cite cases in which I think this method has been overdone, this kind of an approach has been overdone, cases in which a quarter of a million dollars is allocated over a 10-year period for research on a narrow topic in Chinese history, let's say, in which the graduate students who come into this field in that university are pushed into confining their research to this narrow field so as to contribute to it; where the personnel drawn into the university is drawn into this framework; and where, as a result, the broad general interest in the whole field of Chinese history is made difficult to maintain. All this is done in the interest of efficiency, you know, the great American shibboleth.

I often say that if we try to become as efficient as the really efficient, supposedly, people, the dictators, then we destroy American scholarship and everything that it stands for. And I often wonder whether my colleagues realize who won the last war. Intellectually speaking, this country has a great danger of intellectually trying to imitate the totalitarian approach, in allowing people at centers of financial power—they aren't political powers in this sense—to tell the public what to study and what to work on, and to set up a framework.

Now, of course, as you know, scholars like freedom. Maybe they come up with a lot of useless information. But in my value standard, as soon as we diminish the free exercise of unhampered curiosity, free curiosity, by channeling our efforts along this line, we then destroy the American mentality. Because the great feature of the American mentality is the belief in allowing people to rush off in all kinds of different directions at once. Because we don't know what is absolutely right. You can't tell that far in advance.

If I may just continue one moment more, Senator, I would like to point out to you that Adolf Hitler very effectively crippled atomic research in Germany by telling the physicists what he wanted them to come up with. Now, this is true. And if you can do that in atomic physics, you can do it 10 times as fast in the so-called social sciences, which really aren't sciences at all, where really opinion, differentiation of opinion, is the thing that matters and what we stand for in this country.

That is why I become very much inflamed when I even smell the first hint of a combination in restraint of trade in the intellectual sphere.

Now, you see what I am talking about with this interlocking directorate? That is what bothers me about it. I don't mind if the boys go off and have a club of their own. That is their own business. But when you get a tie-in of money, a tie-in of the promotion of monographs, a tie-in of research, and a tie-in of publication, then I say that the intellectuals are having the reins put on them and blinders.

Senator WATKINS. Otherwise, they do not get on the team.

Mr. ROWE. That is right. They don't get on the team, and they don't get a chance to carry the ball.

Now, to the faculty member, this means money, income, what he lives on. It is vital. It is not just some recreational thing, you see.

Senator WATKINS. What I wanted to ask you was this: As a matter of practice, is it not true that in graduate schools of most of our American universities and colleges, the head of the department usually pretty well dictates to the young man who is working for his Ph. D. or

master of arts what he is going to write about or what field he is going to investigate?

MR. ROWE. No, sir, Senator, not in any department I have ever been connected with. The student is in an open market, where he can go and buy the specialty that any professor has got to offer.

Senator WATKINS. It has to be approved, though.

MR. ROWE. Oh, yes. It has to be approved. But remember this. At this point, you get into the activities of the club. And this is one of the ways in which the individual has a chance to assert himself, because, as you know, if Mr. X doesn't approve of Mr. Y's project, then Mr. Y doesn't have to approve his project. I mean, there is a trade back and forth business.

Senator WATKINS. There is an interlocking group.

MR. ROWE. In the interlocking group it is a different business. This has to do with monopoly of funds and support for research work in the large. I am not talking now about students and dissertations and things of that sort.

Senator WATKINS. This is more or less research when the student is taking his work for his Ph. D. and he has to write his dissertation.

MR. ROWE. But you see, actually, Senator, the only place I know of where all students in the field of Chinese history are integrated into the study of one 15-year period of Chinese history, is in connection with one of these research projects.

That is the only case in the United States that I know of. I have never seen it operate any place else.

This kind of thing is supported by foundation money. And, of course, the temptation is to bring everybody in and integrate, through a genteel process of bribery. That is to say, you support the student, you give him a fellowship, if he will buy your subject matter area. And if you do this for 15 years, the only Ph. D.'s you turn out will be people who know that 12-year period or 15-year period of Chinese history. I say this is intellectual impoverishment.

Senator WATKINS. You think that is not true, however, elsewhere?

MR. ROWE. It is not generally true.

Senator WATKINS. I hope it is not, because I thought maybe it might be in some universities I know about.

MR. ROWE. It is not generally true, but it is the inevitable kind of thing which happens with this hot pursuit of efficiency, integration. And, of course, remember this. The foundation people have to have jobs. They have to have something to administer. They don't want to give away the money to the universities and say "Go ahead and spend it any way you want." They want to see that the activity pays. That is, we have got to have a regular flow of the so-called materials of research coming out. We want to see this flow in certain quantity. It has to have a certain weight in the hand. And to see that this happens, we do not just give it to a university, where they are going to allow any Tom, Dick, and Harry of a professor to do his own thing. "No, we want an integration."

As I warned, Mr. Morris, you see—he set me off, here.

Senator WATKINS. I take it that is a pretty good plea for the university as against the foundation.

MR. ROWE. Absolutely. And, as a matter of fact, I couldn't find a better illustration of the dangers of consistently over the years do-

nating very large sums of money to organizations, you see, for research purposes, than is involved in the very Institute of Pacific Relations itself. It is a fine illustration of the fact that power corrupts, and the more power you get the more corrupt you get.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the Far Eastern Association work with the Institute of Pacific Relations on such projects, or is their function different?

Mr. ROWE. There is a general coordination back and forth.

Mr. Holland, at the outset of the Far Eastern Association, was on their relevant committee having to do with publications. Well, any banker can recognize that this is an interlocking directorate. At this point, the Institute of Pacific Relations, in coordination with the Far Eastern Association, has a great deal of influence in the field of publication, you see. Not so much sponsorship of research by local grants, and so on. They do some of that, too. But if you want to get your book published, you go to them, you see, and ask them for a subsidy to get it put out. This is done quite a bit. That shows an interrelationship between these two organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what part does Mortimer Graves have in the general field of grants and research?

Mr. ROWE. Well, Mr. Graves is connected with and has been for years, the American Council of Learned Societies. This is an organization with offices in Washington, and it is a council in which the interests of all the various learned societies are promoted and advanced.

For a long time, particularly in the early phases of the development of far eastern studies in the United States, Mr. Graves occupied an important position there, because of his interest in the training of people to become far eastern specialists.

Some subsidies are still given to people of this kind through the Council of Learned Societies, but this is now merely a trickle to what it used to be, and proportionately it is a minor proposition. Most of the subsidies are now given otherwise.

I will say that the biggest single subsidizer of recent far eastern studies has been the United States Government, through the GI bill of rights. That is a fact. But that is now running out.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, has Mortimer Graves, to your knowledge, been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. I don't know much about any activity he had in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a member of the present board of trustees, is he not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. ROWE. He is very closely involved in anything having to do with the far eastern field, far eastern studies. He knows all the people.

For years, he used to keep a card file of people in the field at varying stages in their preparation, and during the time when universities were expanding in this field, that is, when the university would want to set up a department or get a man in this field, they would often be referred directly to Mr. Graves for recommendations of personnel. And he did a very efficient job of keeping records along this line.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any inducement ever made to you in connection with your membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations that would indicate it would be favorable to you to—

Mr. ROWE. Well, I would say this. I was indoctrinated at some point in my education with a general distaste for joining many organizations. I have a feeling I got this from my former professor of politics at Princeton, Prof. William Starr Myers. But wherever I got it, it is a fact. And when I first came back from China and entered into my first academic job in Princeton in 1938, I refrained from joining the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I was approached and invited, but I refrained from joining. And I will say that the only reason I ever did join was on account of a letter I got from Mr. Lockwood, who was then in the organization, the general tenor of which was that young people just starting out in the far eastern field are "well advised to become a member of this organization." It was a very genteel statement, but the meaning of it was quite obvious. And I joined only because I got that letter. It is the sort of a letter that a young man beginning in a profession can hardly afford to disregard. Five dollars a year to protect yourself? O. K. You pay. You join. That is the only interest I had at the time.

I later got involved in the organization, and as I told you this morning became a member of the board of trustees in 1947. But in 1938, well, \$5 was pretty important to me in those days. On a salary of \$2,000 a year, I didn't join more organizations than I had to.

Senator WATKINS. You were not a professional joiner, then, at that time?

Mr. ROWE. No, sir.

Senator WATKINS. We have had some witnesses who apparently did not take that course.

Mr. ROWE. I only belong to two professional organizations now, the Political Science Association and the Far Eastern Association.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask your age.

Mr. ROWE. I was born in October 1905, which makes my next birthday coming up 47.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else in your experience that you think should be added to our record with respect to our inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. Let me take a moment to think that over, and see.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you told us completely about your experiences with INDUSCO?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, by far not completely, but I think I brought in the significant element.

I do think there is one thing I ought to take care of if I haven't done so already. And I don't believe I have entered this.

Two years ago, almost precisely 2 years ago, dated March 27, 1950, I got a letter from Professor Fairbank, circulated as a personal letter to various friends and colleagues in far eastern studies, and marked "Urgent" in capital letters, requesting that I write a testimonial in favor of Professor Lattimore. Did I mention that this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; you did.

Mr. ROWE. I wanted to cover that, to be sure that it was taken care of, precisely what I said at that time.

Senator WATKINS. What did he ask you to do? Just a generalization is all that we have for the record, I think, at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, will you put your answer in the record?

Mr. ROWE. I would be glad to put in, first, the invitation, second, the copy of the letter that Fairbank himself sent to Senator Tydings, and third, my reply to the letter from Dr. Fairbank. I will put that all in the record, if you want.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; please do.

Mr. Chairman, may that be received?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 615, 616, 617" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 615

127 LITTAUER CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Cambridge, Mass., March 27, 1950.

URGENT

A PERSONAL LETTER TO VARIOUS FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES IN FAR-EASTERN STUDIES

DEAR DAVE: Having known Owen Lattimore pretty well since 1932, I am naturally appalled at McCarthy's reckless and irresponsible name-calling and I have no doubt that Owen will give a good account of himself when he gets back from Afghanistan early in April.

Personally, I am thoroughly convinced that Owen Lattimore is a completely loyal American. I imagine McCarthy can extract sentences from his voluminous writings which, out of context, may sound "pro-Soviet" on some points or issues, since Owen has expressed himself freely on many controversial subjects and is creative rather than orthodox in his thinking; but this is far different from being actually "pro-Soviet" or disloyal to our country.

It seems to me all of us in the far-eastern field face the prospect that McCarthy's smear tactics in this one case may make our proper professional work more difficult for all of us. If Owen Lattimore, a leader in American research and writing on Asia and a member and officer of bodies like the Far Eastern Association and the Institute of Pacific Relations, remains publicly besmirched as of doubtful loyalty, the taint can easily spread to those of us who know him personally and/or professionally and we can all be put on the defensive in our efforts to contribute to realistic public understanding of our urgent Asiatic problems. If American scholars are intimidated or put under public suspicion, in their study of Asia, it can contribute to great disasters for the American people, in their difficult relations with Asia.

Naturally, if McCarthy produces some new and convincing evidence about Owen to support his sensational charges, I would rely on our government's appropriate action to judge the case on its merits. But if Owen is to be judged by the record of what he has said and written over the years, I feel a deep obligation to testify in some way concerning this record. After all, those of us in the field of Far Eastern studies are in a position to judge Owen's published views professionally, as Senators and the press and the public are not. It seems to me we owe it to our profession (to say nothing of the personal interests of Owen Lattimore and of ourselves as individuals), to put our individual opinions on record. Our primary object should not be to help a friend (though this may be a strong sentiment with you, as it is with me), but to help our country and perform our proper function as citizens who are also professional workers. If Owen's writings have been anti-American, disloyal, or the like, in our opinion as students of the Far Eastern scene, we should let our government and the American public know this opinion. Similarly, if we do not think he has been "pro-Soviet," as far as we can judge, we should let this be known.

I therefore urge that you state your opinion for public record at once in a letter to Senator Millard E. Tydings, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. Since his mail is already mountainous, it would help even more if you would send a carbon copy of your letter to Owen's attorney, Mr. Abe Fortas, firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter, Ring Building, Washington, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN K. FAIRBANK,
Professor of History, Harvard University.

EXHIBIT No. 616

MARCH 27, 1950.

COPY FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: Senator McCarthy's allegation that Owen Lattimore is a "top Soviet agent" seems to me completely incredible, on the basis of my long acquaintance with Mr. Lattimore and with his writings. I have specialized on Chinese history since 1929, have known Owen Lattimore since 1932, and in the course of my professional work have had occasion to read a very considerable amount of what he has written, both in books and in articles. I have also heard him speak many times and have had conversations with him many times. I have never heard him express views or make statements which were disloyal in character, and I firmly believe him to be a thoroughly loyal and law-abiding American citizen who is devoted to the free, democratic way of life of this country.

Among his writings, I recall having read in particular *The Desert Road to Turkestan*, *High Tartary*, *Manchuria*, *Cradle of Conflict*, *The Mongols of Manchuria*, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, *Solution in Asia*, *Situation in Asia*, and *Pivot of Asia*, the last of which (on Sinkiang province) I reviewed on the front page of the *New York Herald Tribune Book Review* two weeks ago. I have also read a great many of his articles in *Pacific Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, and other journals. I have not agreed with everything that Mr. Lattimore has said in this very extensive body of writing, but I am absolutely convinced in my own mind that its general tenor has been loyal and not disloyal to the United States and that it has not been "pro-Soviet" nor pro-Communist.

On the contrary, I regard Owen Lattimore as one of the most creative and independent-minded of American scholars on Asia. I further believe that his unusual capacity for thinking in terms of the broad and abstract principles of historical change and international relations, has undoubtedly led him to make statements in some of his books which can be extracted from their context and pointed to by some persons with suspicion, providing the context of such statements is disregarded. He has specialized (and I would say he has become a "national strategic asset") on the little-known frontier regions between Russia and China, where the Soviet record has to be compared with the Chinese record of recent years. As I have stated above, he has made some interpretative statements and comments with which I personally would not agree, but in no case have these statements seemed to me to involve disloyal, anti-American, or pro-Communist leanings.

Considering our urgent national need, in the dire struggle against Russia in Asia, for expert knowledge of Asia such as Mr. Lattimore demonstrably possesses, it seems to me the national interest demands that the accusation of disloyalty against him be thoroughly investigated and publicly disproved, as I am confident it will be, so that his future usefulness to his country will be impaired as little as possible.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK,

Professor of History, Harvard University.

EXHIBIT No. 617

Professor J. K. FAIRBANK,

*127 Littauer Center, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.*

DEAR JOHN: I received your round-robin letter of March 27 and the enclosure of the same date. I subsequently received from you the copy of Paul Linebarger's letter to Senator Tydings, all these documents having to do with the case of Owen Lattimore and the investigation of him initiated at the suggestion of Senator McCarthy.

I would like to indicate to you my view on the subject of your letter. Senator McCarthy may fail to prove his charges against Owen Lattimore. However, I must confess complete ignorance on the question of his most serious charges. I am certainly not qualified to state anything, either pro or con on the question of whether Owen is a Communist agent or not. I suppose that the investigation is intended to bring out proof one way or the other on this question. Since, however, I have practically no contacts which would provide me with any evi-

dence on affiliation of this kind one way or another, I believe I am completely disqualified to write Mr. Tydings a letter, since such a letter would be based upon subjective impression or belief, and not upon knowledge or facts in the case. Any such letter might lay me open to a charge of participating in an attempt to establish "innocence by association."

On this matter of subjective impression or belief. I would personally tend to follow your opinion that Owen Lattimore is a completely loyal American. This has nothing to do with whether Lattimore's writings or public utterances contain material which duplicates the Soviet line on Far Eastern Affairs, a subject on which I have as yet seen no evidence of careful, scientific investigation as a basis of generalized statement. Along this line, I would like to say that the second paragraph of your round-robin letter seems pretty much beside the point. The question of whether McCarthy can extract sentences from Lattimore's writings which, "out of context" might sound "pro-Soviet on some points of issue," at least *out* to be completely irrelevant to your case. It does seem to me that the McCarthy investigation so far, as it relates to Lattimore, has stressed this sort of thing, without, however, basing evidence upon any scientific content—analysis of Lattimore's writings.

The investigation now seems to have shifted to the question of whether Lattimore has had formal or direct affiliations with, or disciplined subordination to, established agents or agencies of the Russians. This sounds too fantastic to possibly be true. But as I said before it is a subject on which I personally have no information that I could offer Senator Tydings and his committee as evidenced one way or the other. Therefore, I believe the only course of action is to wait for the results of the committee investigation. If, as Owen claims, McCarthy's charges will fall flat on their face, all well and good. If, on the other hand, these charges should be proved then the fullest possible opportunity ought to be given for such proof to be submitted.

As far as Linebarger's letter of March 27 is concerned, I am fully in agreement with his views of Owen Lattimore's ideas on our Far Eastern policy. I must, however, state that in my opinion the third paragraph of his letter is completely irrelevant. Linebarger has used the old tactic, the reverse of the "guilt by association" idea, that of reduction to absurdity. The investigation itself may quite possibly reduce McCarthy's charges to absurdity, but Linebarger's efforts to do so in advance of the submission of whatever evidence there is, are to say the least, completely premature.

There is also no question but that an investigation of this kind may quite conceivably result in injury to an innocent person. If and when these charges against Lattimore are proved groundless, then I believe that the final paragraph of Linebarger's letter calling for a resolution of apology by the Senate to each individual who has been injured by this investigation, would become quite relevant.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID N. ROWE,
Professor of Political Science.

Mr. ROWE. These are stenographic copies I hasten to add, that is, copies from the originals. They are not photostatic copies. I have every reason to believe they are reasonably accurate.

Senator WATKINS. You have seen the originals, and you have read them through to see that they conform?

Mr. ROWE. You might find a few commas out of the way, but by and large, I believe the secretary did a pretty good job.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you able to testify that at that time Dr. Fairbank was organizing a defense for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. It seems to me the plain implication from this. He circulated this around to, as he said, friends and colleagues in the far eastern studies. And he asked us to write letters to attorneys for Professor Lattimore supporting Lattimore. And my answer I characterized this morning, and it is embodied in this document.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. I have none, either.

I want to thank Professor Rowe for coming here. I think he has given us a very intelligent discussion of the subject matter.

Mr. ROWE. I am glad to be of any service possible.

I think this is a very important investigation.

Senator WATKINS. I am not attempting to give any judgment as to the weight that ought to be given to your various conclusions, Mr. Rowe.

Mr. ROWE. I understand that, sir.

Senator WATKINS. But I think you have been fair and you have been responsive to the questions we have asked.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Professor Rowe, this will be returned to you in its original form. That is the Welles' article.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p. m., Thursday, March 27, 1952, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, March 28, 1952.)

INDEX TO PART 11

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

	Page
Abend	3923
Aberle, Dr. David F.	3961
Acheson, Dean (Secretary of State)	3813, 3955-3956, 3986, 3993
Adler, Solomon	3903, 3983
Afghanistan	3909, 4028
Agrarian Institutes	3934
Agrarian Problems in Southwest China	3916
Agrarian Reformers	3798, 3815, 3895, 3981
Alcatraz	3919
Alexander	3922
All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries	3934
Allen, G. C.	3867
Allen, George	3997, 3998
Allen, James S. (Sol Aurbach (?))	3842
Alley, Rewi	3791, 3793, 4002
Allied Labor News	3903
Allison, John	3894, 3900
Alsberg, Cary L.	3857, 3932
Amendments (first and fifth)	3959
Amerasia	3887
America and the Far Eastern War, World in Arms	3884
American	3723-3726,
3748, 3757, 3767, 3782-3783, 3797, 3802, 3810, 3812, 3814, 3816, 3850,	
3856-3857, 3864, 3866, 3874, 3876, 3879, 3882, 3917, 3932, 3942, 3974,	
3989, 4002, 4007, 4021, 4023, 4028-4030.	
American Communists	3790, 3856, 3873, 3895
American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. (See	
INDUSCO.)	
American Council of Learned Societies	4026
American Council on Education	3880, 3887-3888
American Freedom and Catholic Power	3830
American Historical Association	3969, 4011
American Labor Party	3841
American Military Adviser Group in China. (See MAGIC.)	
American Oriental Society	3969, 3971
American People's Fund	3879, 3880, 3888-3889, 4011
American Policy in the Far East	3883
American Political Science Association	3767, 3969, 4027
American President Lines	3879
American Publication Service of the American Embassy	3803
American Youth for Democracy (AYD)	3823-3824, 3843
Amsterdam	3934
Amsterdam News	3845-3846
Amtorg Trading Corp.	3928-3929
Anglo-French Negotiations	3931
Anglo-Japanese Struggle for the World Markets	3935
Ankara, Turkey	3757
Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science	3981, 3986
APO (Army Post Office)	3939
Archbold, Mrs. Anne	3794

	Page
Arita-----	3931
Arndt, Dr. C. O.-----	3964
Arnold, Fortas & Porter-----	4028
Aronson, Jack-----	3840
Asia--- 3767-3768, 3771, 3811-3812, 3815-3816, 3863, 3866, 3881-3882, 3885, 3887, 3893, 3908-3909, 3926, 3943, 3946-3947, 3955, 3959, 3970-3971, 3986, 3991, 3994, 4028-4029.	
Asia Institute-----	3903
Asia's Captive Colonies-----	3880
Asiatic----- 3758, 3815, 3947, 3957, 3990,	4005
Atkinson, Brooks-----	3757
Atkinson, Ellen-----	3903, 3964
Atlas of Far Eastern Politics-----	3937
Austin, Dr. William M.-----	3961
Australia----- 3851, 3881,	3936
Australian railways-----	3936
Austern, Hilda-----	3859

B

Badger, Vice Adm-----	3838
Baie de Cam Ranh-----	3936
Baile Memorial Technical Training School-----	3792-3793
Baker, Newton D----- 3851, 3857,	3881
Baldwin, Hanson-----	3801
Ballantine, Joseph W-----	3894, 3900
Baltic countries-----	3944
Bangkok-----	3815, 3936
Bank of China-----	3950
Barnes, Joseph F----- 3854, 3883, 3896, 3907,	3941
Barnes, Kathleen-----	3775, 3929
Barnett, Patricia-----	3964
Barnett, Robert W-----	3964, 3983
Barr, Maj. Gen. David-----	3994
Barrett, Edward W-----	3998
Berger, Milton-----	3964
Bassett, Ted-----	3826
Batangas Province-----	3815
Baxter, Dr. James Phinney-----	3805
Beech, Ethel-----	3841
Behind the Open Door-----	3948
Bentley, Elizabeth T----- 3730-3731, 3733, 3755-3756, 3758, 3774, 3781,	3875
Bernstein, Joseph M-----	3943
Bessarabia-----	3944
Biggerstaff, Prof----- 3980, 3982, 3993, 4011-	4012
Bingham, Robert C-----	3962
Bisson, T. A----- 3793, 3800-3804, 3883, 3895-3896, 3904, 3941, 3983,	4022
Black, Mrs. Hugo-----	3794
Blanchard, Paul-----	3830
Bliven-----	3923
Bloch, Kurt-----	3921
Bodde, Prof. Derk-----	4012
Book and Magazine Guild-----	3840-3841
Bordofsky-----	3828
Borodin, Michael-----	3907
Boston Post-----	3763
Boyd, Mrs-----	3964
Bradley, Rev. Dwight J-----	3793
Bridges, Senator Styles-----	3721
British----- 3788, 3813, 3837, 3922-3923, 3958-3959, 3973-3975, 3988-	3989
British Embassy in Stockholm-----	3931
Brodie, Bernard-----	3992
Brooke, Raymond-----	3911
Brookings Institution-----	3886
Brooklyn, N. Y-----	3903
Browder, Earl----- 3843, 3956,	3966

	Page
Brown, Percy S.....	3794
Brown, William.....	3964
Bruce.....	3923
Bruening (former German Chancellor).....	3917
Bryn Mawr College.....	3862
Bucholt, Joe.....	3846
Buck, J. Lossing.....	3867, 3989
Buck, Pearl.....	3801-3803
Budenz, Louis... 3760-3763, 3769-3770, 3773, 3778-3781, 3905, 3941-3942, 3944, 3947	
Bulgaria.....	3942
Burks, Ardeth W.....	3964
Burma.....	3837, 3936, 3946
Burns, Elizabeth.....	3964
Butler, Dr. Nicholas.....	3883
Butterworth, Walter.....	3894, 3900, 3992-3993, 3995, 3998

C

California.....	3831, 3904, 3961, 4010, 4011-4012
California Committee on Un-American Activities.....	4011
California Labor School Bookshop.....	3830
California Legislature.....	4010
Cambridge, Mass.....	3715, 3726, 3757, 3792, 3797, 3812, 3818-3819, 3821, 3851, 3903, 3938, 3939, 3969, 4028, 4029
Cambridge University, England.....	3903
Cammann, Mr. Schuyler.....	3961
Camp Sherwood, Monticello, N. Y.....	3825
Camp Unity Book Shop.....	3825
Canada.....	3851, 3881, 3919, 3946, 3973
Canadian Institute of International Affairs.....	3906
Canadian Legation (Washington).....	3965
Canberra.....	3880
Canning, William Martin.....	3958, 3962-3963
Canton-Hankow Railroad.....	3810
Capital Preparatory Committee.....	3950-3951
Carlson, Evans F.....	3835-3836, 3983
Carnegie Corp.....	4023
Carpenter, J. Henry.....	3794
Carter, E. C.....	3724, 3738-3753, 3742-3743, 3755, 3778, 3806-3807, 3854, 3858-3859, 3868, 3882, 3909, 3910, 3913-3918, 3920-3932, 3934, 3937-3938, 3940, 3966, 3976, 3982, 3989-3990
Carter, Mrs. E. C.....	3737
Carter, Miss Ruth.....	3860, 3886
Catholic Church.....	3830
Central Bank of China.....	3903
Central Daily News.....	3786
Central Executive Committee (CEC).....	3802, 3804
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).....	3763-3764
Chamberlin, William Henry.....	3943
Chamber of Commerce (Moscow).....	3934
Chambers, Whittaker.....	3828
Chang, Chih-yi.....	3961
Chang, Nai-chi.....	3951
Changing China.....	3943
Chapman, Abraham.....	3903
Charles, Mrs. Alfred D.....	3964
Chatham House (London).....	3922, 3927-3928
Chen, Han-seng.....	3790-3791, 3859-3860, 3874, 3903, 3910-3911, 3916-3918, 3938-3939, 3951-3952, 3961, 3983, 4002-4003
Chen, P. T.....	3916
Chen, Dr. Ta.....	3791, 3938
Chen, Wei-chi.....	3951
Chen, Y. G.....	3794, 3914, 3916
Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L. (retired).....	3805
Chi, Dr. Ch'ao-ting.....	3737-3738, 3860, 3874, 3899, 3903, 3913-3918, 3949-3952

	Page
Chi, Harriet Levine-----	3949-3953
Chiang, Kai-shek Generalissimo-----	3791, 3800-3802, 3804, 3811, 3814-3815, 3826, 3836, 3876, 3880, 3931, 3938, 3945, 3977, 3993, 4004
Chien, Prof. Tuanshend-----	3939
China-----	3725-3726, 3728, 2730-3731, 3735, 3738, 3740-3741, 3746, 3747, 3752, 3757-3758, 3767, 3782-3783, 3785-3788, 3791, 3798, 3796-3801, 3803, 3804, 3807- 3814, 3817, 3821, 3829-3831, 3837-3840, 3851, 3855, 3865, 3867, 3870- 3872, 3874, 3876, 3880-3881, 3885, 3892, 3897, 3903, 3906, 3909, 3910, 3911, 3914-3917, 3920, 3923, 3929, 3936, 3945-3947, 3949-3952, 3958, 3962, 3966, 3968-3969, 3976-3977, 3979-3980, 3987, 3990-4009, 4024, 4025, 4027, 4029.
China Aid Council-----	3730, 3732-3738, 3757-3759, 3790
China—America's Ally-----	3880
China Among the Powers-----	4004, 4006-4007
China Daily News-----	3788, 3833, 3834, 3950, 3951
China Digest-----	3826
China Export & Import Co-----	3951
China League for Civil Rights-----	3766
China Plans for the Future-----	3800
China Policy, in search of-----	3813, 3814, 3817
China Today-----	3832, 3836, 3839, 3843, 3874, 3906
China Yesterday and Today-----	3943
China Welfare Appeal and China Welfare Fund-----	3736, 3757-3758
China's New Democracy-----	3829, 3832, 3839
China's Part in a Coalition War-----	3895, 3896, 3904
China's Wartime Activities-----	3799-3800
China's Wartime Politics-----	3795, 3796, 3939
Chinese Communist-----	3730, 3739, 3746, 3782, 3783, 3790, 3792, 3797-3800, 3811-3816, 3829, 3837, 3860, 3875, 3895, 3911, 3945, 3980-3981, 3983-3987, 3990, 3994, 3996-3997, 3999-4000, 4002-4004
Chinese Communist Government-----	3731, 3800, 3803-3804, 3860, 3876, 3911, 3913, 3945, 3950, 3961, 4002, 4005, 4010
Chinese Communist Guerrillas-----	3766
Chinese Economic Society-----	3951
Chinese Government and Politics-----	3939
Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association-----	3834
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. (<i>See</i> INDUSCO.)-----	
Chinese Ministry of Finance-----	3883
Chinese National Cooperative Association-----	3951
Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Association-----	3950-3951
Chinese Nationalist Army-----	3804
Chinese Nationalist Delegation at the United Nations-----	3939
Chinese Nationalist Government-----	3737, 3767, 3787, 3788, 3794, 3797, 3800-3801, 3804-3805, 3895, 3897, 3904, 3930, 3945, 3947, 3977, 3981, 3985-3986, 3991-3995, 3997, 4001-4002, 4004, 4007, 4009, 4010
Chinese Nationalist Minister in Korea-----	3939
Chinese Nationalist Revolution-----	3907, 3981
Chinese Navy-----	3838
Chinese People's Bank-----	3951
Chinese Trade Union Association-----	3951
Christian Church (China)-----	3792
Chu, Teh General-----	3767, 3836
Chuchow (China)-----	3936
Chungking-----	3737, 3758-3759, 3790, 3801-3803, 3806, 3874, 3880, 3916, 3931, 3938-3939, 3968, 3986, 3998, 4001, 4007-4009
Churchill, Winston-----	3942
Civil Rights Congress-----	3834, 3841
Civil Works Administration-----	3907
Clark, Elizabeth Allerton-----	3943
Clark, Evans-----	3794
Clement, Harry G-----	3794
Clubb, O. Edmund-----	3983

	Page
Cogitations of a Spy	3758
Cohn, Dr. Alfred E.	3794
Colegrove, Prof. Kenneth	3883
Colins, Ralph E.	3965
College of the City of New York	3963
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)	3882
Columbia University	3842, 3868, 3883, 3958, 3962-3963, 4023
Columbia University—Graduate History Club	3962
Cominform Journal	3828
Committee Against American Intervention in China	3839
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy	3733, 3804, 3825-3827, 3832, 3834, 3835, 3836, 3838-3839, 3841, 3911
Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia	3758
Communism in Indo China	3972
Communist	3721, 3723-3726, 3731-3732, 3737-3739, 3741, 3748-3749, 3767-3768, 3798, 3800, 3808, 3813, 3873-3877, 3892, 3894, 3912, 3924, 3931, 3960, 3989-3991, 3994-3995, 3999-4000, 4004, 4006, 4008, 4015, 4019-4021, 4028-4029.
Communist Case in California	3718
Communist Party	3726, 3731, 3733, 3824-3825, 3827, 3829, 3831, 3836, 3874, 3891-3892, 3899, 3904, 3905, 3944, 3953, 3958-3962, 4015
Communist Party Book Club	3836
Communist Youth Movement in New York State	3846
Compton, Karl T.	3794
Comstock, Ada L. (Notestien)	3859, 3868
Conant, James Bryant	3751, 3812
Congressional Record	3721-3723
Cook, Admiral Charles Maynard	3813
Cooke, Morris L.	3794
Coolidge, Mrs. John G.	3794
Coordinator of Information (COI)	3805, 3817, 3958, 3963, 3967-3968, 4009
Corbett, P. E.	3751, 3860, 3869, 3886, 3973
Cornell University	3980
Corttneff, Irene	3964
Cottrell, Nicholas	3964
Coughlin, Edward J., Jr.	3812
Council on African Affairs	3834, 3841
Counselor with Ministerial Rank	3788
Coville, Mrs. Cabot	3964
Coy, Mrs. Wayne	3794
Coy, Wayne	3794
Cradle of Conflict	4029
Craigie	3931
Crane, Esther	3964
Cripps, Sir Stafford	3931-3932
Crockett National Bank	3879
Crouter, Errol Edgerton	3794
Currie, Lauchlin	3805-3806, 3887, 3956, 3983
Currie, Mrs. Lauchlin	3794
Curtis, Frances	3793
Czarowska, Mrs. Marta	3936
Czechoslovakia	3942

D

Dafoe, Dr. John W.	3751, 3881
Daily Worker	3828, 3835, 3843, 3846, 3847, 3956, 3957
Davies, John P.	3763-3766, 3771, 3772, 3983, 3986, 3993
Davis, Lord	3850
Davis, Michael M.	3794
Dayton News	3847
Dean, Mr. Arthur	3920
Deane, Hugh	3775
DeCaux, Len	3775, 3964
Decker, J. W.	3794

	Page
DeFrancis, Dr. John	3961
DeLacey, Hugh	3794
Demorest, Dana J.	3794
Denison, Ellery	3964
Dennison, Eleanor	3964
Dennett, Raymond	3798, 3942, 3945, 3978
Dennett, Dr. Tyler	3798, 3945
Department of the Army	3758
Department of Justice	3897, 3968
Department of State	3738, 3740, 3746, 3763-3765, 3786, 3806, 3808, 3813, 3816, 3883, 3884-3887, 3894, 3945, 3956, 3957, 3965, 3966, 3968, 3986, 3987, 3989-3992, 3995, 3997, 3998, 4006, 4007, 4018.
Department of State—Cultural Relations	3887
Department of State—Division of Chinese Affairs	4006-4007
Department of State—Far Eastern Division	3740, 3883, 3884, 3894, 3992, 4030
Department of State—Policy Planning Staff	3986
Department of State—Under Secretary for Public Affairs	3968, 3997, 3998
der Tag	3878
de Scheinitz, Karl	3964
Desert Road to Turkestan	4029
Digby, Simon Wingfield	3934
Dimantshtein, S. M.	3935
Disosway, General	3968
Domke, Captain	3964
Donovan, Gen. "Bill"	3801, 3958
Dooman, Eugene	3894, 3900
Doubleday Doran	3903
Downing, Miss	3937
DuBois, Joe (Josiah)	3964
Dulles, Foster Rhea	3943
Dulles, John Foster	3738
Dunn, Prof. Frederick Sherwood	4005, 4006, 4007
Durdin, Tillman	3757
Dutt, Mr	3970

E

East China Financial and Economic Council	3951
Eastern Germany	3942
Eastman, Nicholson J.	3794
ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration)	3947
Economic, Social, and Political Development of the Soviet Far East during the First and Second Five-Year Plan	3935
Economic Struggle on the Pacific Ocean	3935
Eighth Route Army	3836
Eliot, Thomas H.	3794
Elliott, Bill	3887
Eltenton, Charles	3920
Eltenton, Dolly	3918, 3919, 3920
Ely, Gertrude	3794
Embree, John	4021
Emerson, Rupert	3883
England	3775, 3786, 3903, 3906, 3907, 3917, 3932, 3935, 3968
Eppeisheimer, Daniel S.	3794
Epstein, Israel	3737, 3738, 3740, 3741, 3746-3748, 3754, 3785, 3790, 3791, 3829, 3830, 3831, 3834, 3840, 3899, 3903, 3938, 3939.
Espionage	3787, 3895, 3904
Establishment of the Autonomous Jewish District in Birobidjan	3935
Europe	3904, 3943, 3948, 3987, 4002
Executive Headquarters (Peiping) (U. S. Army)	3788

F

Faber & Faber	3937
Fahs	4011

	Page
Fairbank, John K.-----	3715-
3822, 3902, 3903, 3938, 3980-3984, 3993, 4011, 4012, 4027-4029	
Fairbank, Wilma (Mrs. John K.)-----	3766, 3771, 3794, 3887, 4012
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie (Mrs. Israel Epstein)-----	3737-3738,
3790-3791, 3874, 3903, 3917-3918, 3938-3939, 4002	
Falk, Dr. and Mrs. Leslie-----	3964
Far East-----	3742,
3745, 3746, 3758, 3765, 3782, 3805, 3811, 3812, 3826, 3838, 3850, 3863,	
3864, 3876, 3878, 3880, 3881-3887, 3892, 3894-3897, 3909, 3924, 3930,	
3932, 3943, 3945, 3956-3958, 3964, 3969, 3970, 3972, 3974, 3982, 3985,	
3986, 3987, 3989, 3992, 3994-3996, 3998, 4010, 4011, 4013.	
Far East Spotlight-----	3827
Far Eastern Association-----	3891, 3957, 3969, 3971, 4010-4012, 4026, 4027
Far Eastern Quarterly-----	3969, 4012
Far Eastern Scholars-----	3891
Far Eastern Survey-----	3797,
3800-3803, 3865, 3880, 3885, 3895, 3896, 3904, 3970-3972, 4014, 4016,	
4017.	
Farley, Miriam S.-----	3796, 3797, 3799, 3937, 4019, 4021
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-----	3724, 3824, 3897
Felles-----	3966
Fellow-traveler-----	3732, 3738, 3747, 3877, 3898, 3984, 4019
Fetter-----	3883
Field, Frederick V.-----	3775,
3776, 3777, 3834, 3843, 3844, 3854, 3856, 3858, 3859, 3862, 3864, 3868,	
3870, 3871-3875, 3877, 3878, 3882, 3883, 3887, 3888, 3895, 3898, 3918,	
3920-3922, 3928, 3929, 3976, 3983, 3988, 3989, 4012, 4015, 4017.	
Frederick V. Field Library-----	3834, 3835
Field, Marshall-----	3793
Filipino-----	3814
Finkelstein, Moses (also Finley)-----	3962, 3963
Finland-----	3932, 3944
Finley, Mrs. John H.-----	3794
Finley, Moses (<i>see</i> Moses Finkelstein)-----	3963
Finnish-Russian War-----	3931
First Five-Year Plan (Russian)-----	3943
Fisher, Mrs. Frederick B.-----	3793, 4002
Fluegel, Dr. Edna R.-----	3956
Flying Tigers-----	3805
Ford Foundation-----	3963
Foreign Affairs-----	3744, 3852, 4029
Foreign Policy Association-----	3796, 3885, 3886, 3895, 3939
Forer, Joseph-----	3949
Forman, Harrison-----	3829, 3831
Formosa-----	3811, 3931
Forsythe, Margaret-----	3794
Fortas, Abe-----	4028
Fox, Mrs. Manuel-----	3794
Friedman, Julian R.-----	3983
Fulbright Act-----	3980
Furfey, Msgr. Paul Hanly-----	3794
Furnivall, J. S.-----	3867

G

Galen-----	3919
Gandhi-----	3931
Gardner, Charles S.-----	3793
Garfield, John-----	3794
Geiger, Theodore-----	3963
Geneva, Switzerland-----	3903
George Washington University-----	3989
Gerlach, Talitha-----	3793, 4002
German Foreign Office-----	3917
Germany-----	3785, 3810, 3917, 3932, 3944, 4024
GI Bill of Rights-----	4026
Giannini Foundation-----	3913, 3916, 3921, 3924, 3931, 3936
Gilbert, Frank B.-----	3812

	Page
Gilbert and Sullivan.....	3963
Gilchrest.....	3920
Glazebrook, George.....	3920
Glover, Clive E.....	3961
Godere.....	3793
Goodrich, L. Carrington.....	3794, 3923
Goshal, Kumar.....	3943
Gould, Randall.....	3983
Grad, Andrew. (See Grajdanzev, Andrew.)	
Grady, Henry F.....	3880
Grady, Mrs. Henry F.....	3794
Grajdanzev, Andrew.....	3875, 3937, 3983, 4021
Grattan, C. Hartley.....	3943
Graves, Mortimer.....	3806, 4026
Great Britain (United Kingdom).....	3851, 3865
Great Victories in China, and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention, The.....	3826, 3839
Great Wall (China).....	3994
Greece.....	3838
Greenberg, Michael.....	3794, 3860, 3875, 3903, 3923-3925, 3937, 3983
Greene, Jerome D.....	3849-3862, 3872, 3902, 3903
Greene, Miss Katrine R. C.....	3859, 3868, 3937
Greene, Roger S.....	3869, 3870-3872
Greenspan, Jack.....	3841
Greetings to the Liberation Fighters of China.....	3839
Grew, Ambassador Joseph C.....	3880, 3894, 3931
Gurney, Ronald W.....	3794
Guthrie, Anne.....	3794

H

Hale, William B.....	3794
Halifax, Cord.....	3931
Hall, Duncan.....	3964
Hamden, Conn.....	3967
Hamilton, Maxwell M.....	3883, 3884, 3894, 3900
Hammond, Mrs. John H.....	3794
Handbook to the Soviet Union or Russia.....	3835
Handy, Dr. E. S. C.....	3964
Handy, Mrs. E. S. C.....	3964
Hangchow (China).....	3936
Hanoi.....	3999
Hanson, Haldore.....	3983
Hanwell, Norman.....	3921
Harcourt, Brace & Co.....	4004, 4007
Harmon, Francis S.....	3859, 3868
Harris, Helen M.....	3793
Harrison, Mrs.....	3964
Harvard Clubs, Associated in Chicago.....	3809
Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research.....	3883, 3887
Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.).....	3727, 3728, 3729, 3730, 3730, 3751, 3758, 3771, 3797, 3812, 3821, 3850, 3883, 3903, 3917, 3923-3926, 3939, 3980, 3981, 3993, 4028, 4029.
Harvard University Press.....	3939
Harvard Crimson.....	3809, 3810, 3812
Hatta.....	3758
Hattery, Lowell H.....	3964
Hawaii.....	3745, 3851, 3882, 3907, 3927
Hayden.....	3883
Hayes, Carlton.....	3958, 3962
Hazard, John N.....	4005
Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup.....	4014, 4017
Hedges, Marion H.....	3794
Herod, William R.....	3859, 3868
Hersey, John R.....	3794
Higgins, Mrs. Isabell.....	3964

	Page
High Tartary-----	4029
Hinder, Mr-----	3919
Hindustan Times-----	3903
Hiss, Alger-----	3795, 3796, 3887, 3888, 3939, 3955, 3956, 3983
Hitler, Adolph-----	3917, 4024
Hobson, Dr., Rt. Rev. H. W-----	3794
Holbrook, William S., III-----	3812
Holcombe, Arthur N-----	3794
Holland, William L. (pseudonym—Sinicus)-----	3742,
3750, 3775, 3791, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3798, 3854, 3864, 3867, 3889-3948,	
3970, 3972, 4010-4012, 4015-4017, 4021-4023, 4026.	
Hong Kong-----	3757, 3791, 3826, 3903, 3910, 3912, 4002
Honolulu-----	3851, 3906, 3907, 3927, 3929
Hoover Library-----	3961
Hornbeck, Ambassador Stanley K-----	3894, 3900
Hsia, Dr. C. L-----	3896
Hsinhua (New China) News Agency-----	3950, 3951
Hso Ti-hsin-----	3951
Hsu, Y. Y-----	3860, 3876, 3899, 3903, 3913, 3914, 3915, 3952
Hu, Shih, Dr-----	3766, 3881, 3923, 3946
Hu, Chung-han Gen-----	3804
Hudson-----	3937
Huff, Henry-----	3905
Hukbalahap-----	4019, 4020
Hull, Cordell (Secretary of State)-----	3884
Hummel, Arthur W-----	3794, 3965
Hummel, Robert S-----	3965
Humelsine, Carlisle H. (Deputy Secretary of State)-----	3956, 3966
Hurley, Gen. Patrick J-----	3788, 3839, 4007-4008
Hutukhtu, Dilowa-----	3961

I

Ideological War Preparation in Japan-----	3935
India-----	3758, 3882, 3931, 3946, 3955, 3957-3959, 3963
India, Special Economic Mission to-----	3880
Indochina-----	3936, 3946, 3999, 4000
Indonesia-----	3814, 3816, 3837, 3957, 3974
INDUSCO, Inc. (American Committee for Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives)-----	3791-3794, 3939, 4001-4003, 4008, 4027
Ingraham, Mrs. Henry A-----	3794
Inner Asians Frontiers in China-----	4006, 4029
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)-----	3721,
3723-3725, 3738-3744, 3746, 3749-3754, 3765, 3774, 3775, 3777, 3778,	
3784, 3785, 3792, 3794-3798, 3802, 3806, 3809, 3832, 3840-3842, 3849,	
3850, 3852, 3853, 3855-3863, 3865-3874, 3877-3882, 3884-3887, 3890-	
3905, 3912-3943, 3950, 3952, 3957, 3959-3961, 3963-3965, 3969-3980,	
3983, 3991, 4005, 4010-4015, 4018, 4019, 4022, 4023, 4026-4028.	
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council)-----	3743,
3753, 3775, 3797, 3798, 3859, 3862, 3865, 3870-3874, 3876, 3878-3881,	
3883-3885, 3890, 3893, 3897, 3904, 3905, 3918, 3920, 3922, 3929, 3935,	
3942, 3943, 3945, 3946, 3969, 3971, 3972-3979, 3981-3983, 3988, 3989,	
4011, 4021, 4026.	
Institute of Pacific Relations (American delegation to Atlantic City)-----	3975,
3976, 3980, 3987-3989	
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Board of Trustees)-----	3870-3872,
3969, 3971, 3972, 3978, 3982	
Institute of Pacific Relations (American officers in 1941)-----	3859, 3868, 3869
Institute of Pacific Relations (China Council)-----	3797, 3916, 3918, 3927, 3939, 3977
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Council)-----	3743, 3869, 3973, 3975
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat)-----	3860,
3872, 3917, 3922-3924.	
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japan Council)-----	3825, 3927, 3928
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mexico Council)-----	3924
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council)-----	3751,
3852, 3859, 3877, 3918, 3928-3929, 3934	

	Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco office)-----	3918, 3932
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Council) -- 3928, 3930, 3934-3936, 3977, 3978	3978
Institute of Pacific Relations (Banff Conference)-----	3851, 3862, 3881
Institute of Pacific Relations (Ilot Springs Conference)---	3870, 3973, 3975, 3988
Institute of Pacific Relations (Kyoto Conference)-----	3857
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mont Tremblant Conference)-----	3887,
	3924, 3925, 3930, 3973
Institute of Pacific Relations (Stratford-on-Avon Conference)-----	3918
Institute of Pacific Relations (Virginia Beach Conference)-----	3881, 3917
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference)-----	3881, 3883
Institute of Pacific Relations (History)-----	3881
Institute of Pacific Relations (Inquiry Series)-----	3880, 3924, 4014
Institute of Pacific Relations (Notes)-----	3934
Institute of Pacific Relations (pamphlet series)-----	4016, 4017
Institute of Pacific Relations (publications)-----	3887,
	3892, 3893, 3897, 3927, 3935, 3970, 4015, 4017
Institute of Oceanography-----	3934
Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas-----	3934
Institute of Soviet Construction and Law-----	3934
Institute of World Economics and World Politics of the Communist Academy-----	3934
Intelligence, Air Force-----	3968
Intelligence, Military Reserve-----	3968, 4001
Intelligence service (American)-----	3758, 4000
Interim International Information Service-----	3817
International Children's Emergency Fund-----	3931
International Economic Conference-----	3950, 3951
International General Electric Co-----	3868
International Journal-----	3906
International Labor Office-----	3851
International Peace Hospitals (IPH)-----	3758
International Publishers-----	3829
International Research Fund-----	3916, 3924
International Status of Manchoukuo-----	3935
Ives, Senator Irving M-----	3738

J

Jaffe, Philip J-----	3794, 4015, 4017
Jaffe, Mrs. Philip J-----	3793
Janow, Mr-----	3964
Japan-----	3758, 3785,
	3801, 3804, 3810, 3811, 3814, 3817, 3851, 3857, 3865, 3867, 3870, 3876,
	3881, 3882, 3885, 3907, 3909, 3910, 3912, 3917, 3919, 3929, 3936, 3944-
	3947, 3958, 3962, 3976, 3977, 3985, 3991, 3994, 4001, 4004, 4009, 4021
Japanese Cabinet-----	3850
Japanese Embassy in London-----	3925, 3926
Jefferson School Book Shop and Camp-----	3825, 3926
Jefferson School of Social Science-----	3825, 3829, 3832, 3833, 3835, 3843
Jenkins, D. R-----	3964
Jenkins, Shirley-----	3964
Jenkinson, Anthony-----	3794, 3903
Jessup, Philip C-----	3857, 3859, 3868,
	3881, 3883, 3923, 3974, 3976, 3980, 3982, 3988, 3989, 4014, 4015, 4017
Jessup, Mrs. Philip C-----	3923
Johns Hopkins University-----	3924, 3957
Johnson, Hon. Nelson T-----	3794
Johnson, Mrs. Nelson T-----	3794
Johnstone, Mrs. Anne Hartwell-----	3794
Johnstone, William C., Jr-----	3794, 3965, 3989
Jones, Catesby-----	3961

K

Kahin, Mr-----	3961
Kane, Albert E-----	3794
Kantorovitch, A. J-----	3927, 3928, 3930, 3934

	Page
Kass, Rudolph.....	3812
Kattenberg, Dr. Paul.....	4018, 4019
Keliber, Alice V.....	3794
Keeney, Philip O.....	3775
Keeney, Mrs. Philip O. (Mary Jane).....	3775, 3964
Keesing, Mr. and Mrs.....	3907, 3909
Kennan, George.....	3986, 3987, 3990, 3995, 3996
Kennedy, Ray.....	3971
Kerr, Clark.....	3931
Kittredge, Mrs.....	3932
Kizer, Benjamin H.....	3859, 3868, 3896, 3904, 3905
Know Your Enemy—Japan.....	3882
Knox, Lucy.....	3906, 3907
Kohlberg, Alfred.....	3752-3754, 3920
Korea.....	3758, 3811, 3837, 3851, 3946, 3986, 3987, 3993-3996, 3999, 4000
Korean War.....	3968, 3981, 4000, 4001
Kowloon.....	3910
Kracke, Edward A., Jr.....	3964
Kramer, Aaron.....	3841
Kuling, China.....	3788
Kung, Dr. H. H.....	3737, 3791, 3874, 3939
Kunning.....	3806, 3916, 3936, 3939
Kuomintang Communist Relations.....	3800
Kuomintang Party (KMT).....	3737,
	3755, 3782, 3783, 3800, 3802, 3803, 3809, 3814, 3815, 3836, 3931, 3939
Kweilin.....	3790, 3791, 3936, 3937, 3939

L

L., Dr. Franklin.....	3910
Labor Youth League.....	3846
Lahey Clinic in Boston.....	3767
Lamb, Mrs. Helen.....	3967
Land Down Under.....	3943
Land of the Soviets.....	3896, 3941-3944
Landres, Mrs. Rose W.....	3859, 3869
Lane, Clayton.....	3878, 3894, 3982
Lang, Olga.....	3793
Larsen, Emmanuel S.....	3964
Lasker, Bruno.....	3884, 3907
Lasswell, Dr. Harold.....	3967
Latourette, Professor.....	3971, 3972
Lattimore, Owen.....	3718-3720, 3727-
	3729, 3741, 3753, 3793, 3818-3822, 3829-3831, 3877, 3880, 3899, 3907,
	3909, 3923, 3950, 3952, 3955, 3958-3960, 3965, 3966, 3978, 3979, 3982-
	3984, 4001, 4005, 4009, 4012-4017, 4027-4030.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (nee Eleanor Holgate).....	3793, 3819, 3943, 3979, 3983, 4002
Lawyer's Guild, National.....	3841
Leach, Mrs. Henry Goodard.....	3794
League of Nations.....	3851, 3930
League of Women Voters—National Council.....	3885
Legal Status of Aliens in the U. S. S. R.....	3935
Lehman, Governor.....	3887, 3888
Lenin.....	3739, 3944
Leo Jen-ming.....	3951
Letters from China.....	3826
Lewis, Fulton, Jr.....	3726
Li, Chu-chen.....	3951
Li, Peng.....	3786, 3787
Liberty Book Club.....	3836
Library of Congress (U. S.).....	3786, 3787, 3805, 3950, 3951, 3965, 3967
Library of the Communist Academy.....	3929
Lieu, D. K.....	3916
Life Magazine.....	3801
Ligutti, Msgr. L. G.....	3794
Lithienthal, Philip.....	3918

	Page
Lin, W. L.....	3910
Lin, W. Y.....	3916
Lindsay, Michael.....	3903, 3964, 3965, 3983
Linebarger, Paul.....	4029
Littell, Bishop S. Harrington.....	3793
Little, Herbert S.....	3902, 3903
Little Brown & Co.....	3739, 3842
Litvinoff, Maxim—Commissar of Foreign Affairs.....	3857, 3934
Liu, Ning-yi.....	3951
Liu, Tse-chiu.....	3951
Liu, Miss Wu-Kou.....	3791
Yiu, Yu-wan.....	3910, 3929, 3939
Livingston, Mrs. Goodhue.....	3794
Lockwood, William W.....	3807-3809,
	3854, 3862-3889, 3902, 3903, 3965, 3966, 3980-3982, 4027
London.....	3880, 3903, 3907, 3909, 3927, 3929, 3931, 3932
Longfellow, Mrs. Frederick W.....	3794
Loomis, Mr.....	3909
Lorwin, Lewis.....	3964
Lothian, Lord.....	3917
Lowdermilk, W. C.....	3794
Loyalty and Security Boards.....	3724
Lu, Dr. Gweidjen.....	3794
Lu, Hsu-cho.....	3951
Luchnow, India.....	3866
Lushan, China.....	3788
Lytton Commission.....	3906

M

Ma Yin-Chu.....	3950, 3951
Macao.....	3910
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas.....	3811, 3875, 3942
MacVeagh, Ewen Cameron.....	3902
MAGIC (U. S. Military Advisor Group in China).....	3837, 3994
Magill, Robert M.....	3964
Main Stream.....	3835
Maisky, Mr.....	3931
Malaya.....	3837, 3946
Malayan and Thailand Railways.....	3936
Manchuria.....	3809-3811, 3836, 3838, 3979, 3981, 3986, 3994, 4004-4407, 4029
Manchurian and Korean lines.....	3936
Manchurian Incident.....	3906
Mandel, William M.....	3775, 3835
Mangahas, Mr.....	3917, 3918
Mao Tse-tung.....	3739, 3815, 3829, 3832, 3836-3837, 3839
Marks, Stuart.....	3849, 3862, 3889
Marshall, Gen. George C.....	3724, 3738, 3740, 3746, 3775, 3783, 3788, 3985, 3992, 4004
Marshall Plan.....	3837
Martin, Charles E.....	3883
Masselman, George.....	3964
Masselman, George.....	3964
Masses in Main Stream.....	3835
Mather, Rufus G.....	3794
Matsue, Mr.....	3937
Matsumoto, Mr.....	3925, 3926
Matusow, Harvey M.....	3824-3847
Mayeda, Mr.....	3925, 3926
Mayer, Col. and Mrs. William.....	3965
Mayfield, Arthur.....	3964
McCarran, Senator Pat.....	3797, 3891, 3896, 3955, 3956
McCarthy, Senator Joseph.....	4028, 4030
McGill University.....	3869
McGovern, Prof. William M.....	3727-3729, 3747
McIntyre, Harry.....	3842

	Page
McNutt, Mrs. Paul V	3794
Medina, Judge (New York)	3718
Meet the Anzacs	3880
Melish, Rev. William H	3793
Menefee, Mrs. Audrey	3965
Menefee, Selden	3965
Meng, Yung-chien	3951
Menges, Dr. Karl H	3961
Michael, Dr	3962
Migration of Capital into Southwest China	3916
Militarism in Japan	3883
Military Weakness and Military Invention	3800, 3985, 3986
Miller, Mrs. Helen Hill	3794
Millikan, Clark B	3794
Millikan, Robert A	3794
Mindszenty, Cardinal	3942
Minister of Finance (Japanese)	3850
Ministry of Textile Industries (Chinese)	3951
Ministry of Trade (Chinese)	3951
Minor, Robert	3956
Minton, Justice Sherman	3777
Mississippi Valley Historical Association	3969
Mitchell, Kate L	3926, 3934, 3943, 4015, 4017
Modern Japan	3943
Moffatt, Abbot Low	3894, 3900
Mongolia	3909
Mongols of Manchuria	4029
Moore, Harriet L	3775, 3934
	3858-3860, 3862, 3868, 3888, 3908, 3909, 3929, 3930, 3933,
Morris, G. W	3964
Morris, Homer L	3794
Morris, Stephanus V. C	3934
Morse, Senator Wayne	3738
Moscow	3815, 3828, 3857, 3880,
	3892, 3908, 3909, 3927-3929, 3931, 3932, 3934, 3943, 3950, 3951, 4019
Moscow Daily News	3906, 3907
Moscow New Times	3758, 3767, 3768
Motion Picture Producers Association	3868
Motylev, V. E	3881, 3933-3935
Mount Holyoke College	3981
Moyer, Raymond	3965
Munson, Lyle M	3763-3766, 3771, 3772
Murray, Philip	3794
Myers, William Starr	4027

N

Nan, Han-cheng	3950, 3951
Nanking	3788, 3836, 3962, 3979, 3989, 3994
Nash, Walter	3881
Nation, The	3903
National Broadcasting System	3965
National Negro Council	3847
National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the Northern Regions of Siberia	3935
National Preparatory Committee	3950, 3951
Nazi	3721, 3774, 3862, 3917, 3944
Negro Question in the United States	3843
Nehru	3931
Neiman Foundation	3757
Nelson, Benjamin	3963
Nelson, Carl	3965
Nesi, James	3825, 3826, 3832, 3836
Netherlands Indies	3881, 3936
New Century Publishers	3829
New China	3839
New China Daily News	3832-3834

	Page
New Deal.....	3907
New Delhi.....	3880
New Democracies in China.....	3839
New Masses.....	3835, 3920
New People's Republic of China.....	3834
New York Herald Tribune.....	3755, 3828, 3883
New York Herald Tribune Book Review.....	4029
New York State.....	3824, 3826, 3828, 3836, 3839, 3958
New York State Communist Party.....	3835
New York Times.....	3741, 3744, 3757, 3828, 3938
New Zealand.....	3791, 3851, 3881, 3936, 4002
Next Step in Asia.....	3758, 3767
Ningpo, China.....	3936
Norma, Winifred.....	3841
North China.....	3757
Northwestern University.....	3727, 3729, 3979
Norway.....	3932
Nobel Fund, Trustees of the.....	3932

O

Oakie, John.....	3878, 3923
Oatis, William.....	3942
Obstacles to China's War Effort.....	3799, 3800
Office of Strategic Services.....	3805, 3807-3809, 3817, 3824, 3845, 3846, 3968, 3980, 3981, 4009
Office of War Information.....	3758, 3805, 3807, 3808, 3817, 3978
Ohio State Assembly.....	3823
Ohio Un-American Activities Commission.....	3823
Okinawa.....	3838
Oldham, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton.....	3794
Onon, Mr.....	3962
Osaka Building (Tokyo).....	3927, 3934
Oslo, Norway.....	3932
Our Far Eastern Record.....	3880
Our Job in the Pacific.....	3832, 3896, 3946, 3947
Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events in China.....	3826
Owen, Henry.....	3965
Ozaki, Hotzumi.....	3785

P

Pacific.....	3856, 3857, 3863, 3865, 3866, 3867, 3880, 3881, 3929, 3935, 3943, 3945, 3968, 3985
Pacific Affairs.....	3728, 3775, 3865, 3888, 3907, 3918, 3923, 3978, 4014, 4015, 4017, 4029
Pacific coast.....	3851, 3879
Pacific Theater and War.....	3839, 3991
Page, Ann.....	3965
Pakistan.....	3955
Pardee, Ruth.....	3965
Parker, Philo W.....	3859, 3868
Pearl Harbor.....	3836, 3850, 3880, 3968, 3977, 3991, 4001
Peck, Graham.....	3794
Peffer, Nathaniel.....	3794
Peking.....	3727, 3729, 3747, 3766, 3813, 3814, 3821, 3826, 3836, 3870, 3950, 3951, 3969, 3979, 3980
Peking Union Medical College.....	3870
Peking University.....	3951
Pelzer, Dr.....	3962
People's China.....	3826
Peoples of the China Seas.....	3943
People's Liberation Army or Armies.....	3836
People's Songs, Inc.....	3841
Perkins, Eleanor.....	3965
Persia.....	3909
Philippines.....	3837, 3851, 3882, 3884, 3909, 3946, 4020

	Page
Pierson, Mrs. Warren Lee	3794
Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford	3793
Pivot in Asia	3958, 3961, 4029
Point 4	3815
Poland	3931, 3942, 3944
Poland, Fred W.	3903
Polish-Soviet delegation	3930, 3931
Political Affairs	3835, 3845
Political Consultative Conference	3788
Pollard, Dr. John A.	3965
Pope, Arthur Upham	3794
Porter, Catherine	3937, 3963
Praesidium of the Soviet Council	3934
Price, Mildred (Coy)	3733, 3736, 3738, 3775
Princeton University	3869, 3883, 3903, 3968, 3977, 3979, 4027
Princeton University Press	3796, 3939
Principle of Economic Reconstruction in China	3916
Problem of Asia, The	4006
Problems of the Pacific	3933
Problem of Unification of China	3935
Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court	3932
Progressive Party Bookshops	3827, 3830, 3831, 3841
Pruitt, Ida	3793, 4002, 4003
Puerto Rico	3834

Q

Quigley	3993
---------	------

R

Radcliffe College	3868
Rajchman, Dr. Ludwig	3930
Rand, Christopher	3742, 3757
Ratner, David L.	3812
Rauschenbush, Stephen	3794
Rautenstrauch, Walter	3793
Reader's Digest	3801
Reasons of the Denunciation of the Washington Treaty and the Situation in the Far East	3935
Red Cross	3827
Red Star Over China	3829, 3831, 3840
Reischauer, Edwin O.	3727, 3728, 3965
Relations between Japan and China during the World War	3935
Reporter, The	3813
Research and Analysis Branch of Strategic Services	3805, 3807, 3808, 3809
Results and Prospective Plans of Socialist Construction in the Soviet Far East	3935
<i>Rex</i> , steamship	3931
Rhodes scholar	3917
Rice, Edward	3965
Richardson, Gerald	3794
Ring, Mr.	3962
Ringwait, Arthur	3965
Robeson, Paul	3835, 3842
Robeson, Paul, Jr.	3842
Robinson, Dr. G. Canby	3794
Robinson, Jay	3965
Rockefeller Foundation	3795, 3850, 3887, 3916, 3969, 3998, 4021-4023
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research	3850
Roe, Gilbert E.	3766
Rogers, Daisy Fiske	3794
Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D.	3794
Rosas, Sr. (Mexican Embassy)	3924, 3925
Rosen, Edward	3963
Rosinger, Lawrence D.	3775,
	3794-3796, 3895, 3939, 3980, 3981-3984, 4018, 4019, 4022, 4023

	Page
Roth, Andrew	3903
Rowe, Prof. David	3967-4031
Rowell	3923
Royal Institute of International Affairs	3775, 3929
Rumania	3942
Russell, Francis	3992
Russia. (See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)	
Russian	3767, 3768, 3782, 3811-3813, 3816, 3817, 3856, 3857, 3870, 3871, 3892, 3896, 3931, 3942, 3943, 3985, 3987, 3996, 3997, 4004, 4030

S

Sacks, Milton	3971, 3972
Saha, Art	3842
Saionji, Kimikazu	3925, 3983
Sako, John Kita	3965
Samoa	3909
Sandan Baillie School	3793
Sansome, Sir George	3920
Sarrant, Mr.	3933
Sassaman, Mr.	3965
Sayre, Mrs. Francis B.	3794
Scharf, Lee	3824
Schraml, Mr.	3962
Schumpeter, Mrs.	3887
Schweinfurt	3811
Science and Society	3843
Secretary of State	3740, 3741, 3749, 3955, 3956, 3986, 3993
Seitz, H. F.	3965
Service, John S.	3983, 4001
Shahrir	3758
Shanghai	3757, 3766, 3814, 3838, 3857, 3881, 3903, 3919, 3929, 3997, 3998, 4000, 4003, 4009
Shanghai Industrial and Commercail Association	3951
Sharp, Lauriston	3965
Shattuck, Mrs. George C.	3794
Sheean, Vincent	3794
Sheik, Julie	3824
Sheng Pi-hua	3951
Shepherd	3922
Shotwell	3923
Shridharani	3931
Siberia	3909, 3943, 3979
Sidwell, Alfred E.	3793
Sigal, Marlowe A.	3812
Significance of the Great Northern Sea Passage	3935
Silver Problem and the Colonial Countries in the Far East	3935
Simmons, William M.	3812
Sinicus. (See W. L. Holland.)	
Sinkiang	3931, 4005, 4007, 4029
Sino-Japanese War	3866
Situation in Asia	4029
Smedley, Agnes	3763, 3765-3767, 3831, 3840, 3909, 3912
Smith, Mr. and Mrs. Bowen	3965
Smythe, Lewis S. C.	3794
Snow, Edgar	3765, 3829, 3830, 3840, 3983, 4002
Snow, Mrs. Edgar. (See Nym Wales.)	
Social and Economic Consequences of the War and the Crisis in Japan	3935
Society for Cultural Relations	3857
Solution in Asia	3829, 3831, 3840, 3899, 4006, 4029
Soong, T. V.	3800, 3939
Sorge, Richard	3785
Southeast Asia	3758, 3816, 3882, 3892, 3936, 3994
Southern Conference for Human Welfare	3735

	Page
Southwest Associated University of Kunming-----	3939
Soviet Union. (<i>See</i> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)-----	
Soviet Ambassador (Chungking)-----	3931
Soviet Consulate (New York)-----	3928, 3929
Spitzer, H. M.-----	3965
Spotlight on Asia-----	3880, 3882
Spotlight on the Far East-----	3839, 3943
Sproul, Robert G.-----	3857, 3859, 3868, 3881, 3920
Sprouse, Philip-----	3992
Sprout, Harold-----	3970
Spykman, Nicholas J.-----	3883
Stachel, Jack-----	3905
Stalin-----	3739
Stalin-Hitler Pact-----	3856
Stalingrad-----	3942
Stalinism-----	3984, 3985
Standard Vacuum Oil Co.-----	3868
Standley, Admiral W. H.-----	3880
Stanford University-----	3914, 3932
Starobin, Joseph-----	3828
Stassen, Harold-----	3991, 3992
State of Asia (symposium edited by Lawrence Rosinger)-----	3795, 3895, 4018, 4022
State Department. (<i>See</i> Department of State.)-----	
State Planning Commission in the Soviet Far East-----	3935
Steele, A. T. (Arch)-----	3731, 3742, 3755, 3756, 3757
Steiger, Andrew-----	3903
Stein, Guenther-----	3806, 3809, 3903
Stenhonse, John-----	3965
Stevens-----	3886
Stewart, Marguerite A.-----	3798, 3896, 3905, 3941, 3942, 3983
Stewart, Maxwell S.-----	3793, 3796, 3797, 3798, 3799, 3800, 3942, 3944, 3945, 3983
Stilwell, General Joseph-----	3801, 3994
Stimson, Henry L. (Secretary of War)-----	3816, 3876
Stone, Wm. T.-----	3883, 3885
Straight, Michael-----	3794
Strong, Anna Louise-----	3763, 3765-3766, 3828, 3903, 3979
Stuart, Ambassador Leighton-----	3742, 3788
Study of Wartime Communications-----	3967
Subversive Activities Control Board-----	3719
Sun, Fo-----	3742
Sun, Yat-sen, Dr.-----	3755, 3814, 3947
Sun, Yat-sen, Madame-----	3730, 3731, 3734, 3742, 3755, 3757-3760, 3790
Sunday Worker-----	3844
Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage-----	3934
Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP)-----	3895
Swing, Betty Gram-----	3794
Swing, Raymond Gram-----	3798, 3799
Swope, Gerard-----	3897

T

Takayanagi-----	3933
Tarr, Dr.-----	3751
Tasks of All of the Clubs-----	3826
Tass-----	3828
Tawney, R. H.-----	3881
Taylor, Deems-----	3794
Taylor, George E.-----	3805, 3817, 3943, 4012
Taylor, Margaret-----	3931
Terlin, Rose-----	3794
Thirty-eighth parallel-----	3999
Thompson, Laura-----	3965
Thornburg, Mrs. Pherbia-----	3794
Thorner, Daniel-----	3955-3966
Three Principles of the People-----	3947
Tibet-----	4005, 4007

	Page
Tientsin Industrial and Commercial Association	3951
Tokyo	3855, 3907, 3925, 3926, 3927, 3929, 3930, 3931, 3934
Toledano, Lombardo	3924, 3925
Tomorrow's China	3827, 3828
Tong, Mr. Chu	3832, 3833
Townsend, Peter	3792, 3903
Trans-Siberian Railway	3936
Trials of the Soviet generals	3930, 3932
Truman Administration and Truman Policy	3838
Tsingtao	3838
Tsuru, Mr.	3925
Tsuru, Mrs.	3925
Tugwell	3883
Turkestan	3909
Turning Points in China	3829, 3832, 3837, 3839
Twentieth Century India	3943
Tydings Hearings	3960
Tydings, Senator Millard E.	4028, 4029, 4030
Tyson, Russel	3794

U

Ukraine	3943, 3944
Ulanbator	3936
Unfinished Revolution in China, The	3738, 3829, 3840
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Russia)	3775,
	3787, 3790, 3835, 3856, 3881, 3907, 3908, 3909, 3917, 3929, 3931, 3932,
	3935, 3942, 3943, 3944, 3945, 3946, 3958, 3979, 3987, 3996, 4000, 4006,
	4015, 4018, 4029, 4030.
Union Seminary, New York	3979
United China Relief	3730, 3734, 3880
United Front	3931
United Nations	3813, 3880, 3881, 3945, 3974
United Nations Economic and Social Council	3903
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation	3991
United Office and Professional Workers Association	3840
United Revolutionary Front	3839
United States of America	3742,
	3787, 3790, 3835, 3856, 3881, 3907, 3908, 3909, 3917, 3929, 3931, 3932,
	3935, 3942, 3943, 3944, 3945, 3946, 3958, 3979, 3987, 3996, 4000, 4006,
United States Army G-2 (Intelligence)	3731
United States Army, Navy, Marines, Air Corps	3800,
	3806, 3823, 3837, 3838, 3880, 3994, 4016
United States Congress	3769, 3779, 3944, 3956
United States Consulate General in Shanghai	3968
United States Embassy in China	3735,
	3787, 3788, 3801, 3805, 3968, 3986, 4001, 4007, 4009, 4010
United States Far Eastern Policy	3721,
	3891, 3894, 3896, 3897, 3900, 3956, 3970-3972, 4030
United States Government	3723, 3724,
	3763, 3790, 3844, 3854, 3862, 3880, 3892, 3966, 3967, 3986, 4010, 4013
United States Government Agencies	3880, 3885
United States House Un-American Activities	3847, 3920
United States Information Services	3797, 3798, 3818, 3968, 3997, 3998, 4000
United States News and World Report	3896
United States Office of Education	3965
United States Senate	3722, 3818
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee	3960
United States Senate Judiciary Committee	3862, 3889
United States Senators	3902, 3946
United States Supreme Court	3784
Universal Trading Corp.	3913, 3914
University of California	3868, 3881,
	3913, 3916, 3921, 3924, 3929, 3936, 4022, 4023
University College of Wales (England)	3850
University of Michigan	3985

	Page
University of Nanking	3979
University of Pennsylvania	3903, 3955, 3957, 4012
Universtiy of Washington	3883
Urumatsu	3927, 3928, 3929
Ushiba	3925, 3926
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth	3965
Ussachevsky, Vladimir	3965
Uveda, T.	3867
Uzebeks	3907

V

VJ-Day	3814
Vandenberg, Senator Arthur	3738-3740
Van Mook, H. J.	3881
Van Zandt, J. Parker	3965
Veatch, Roy	3794, 3882
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade	3834
Viet-Nam	3816, 3837
Vinacke, Dr. Harold	3965
Vincent, John Carter	3738, 3740, 3796, 3799, 3939, 3983, 3986, 4001, 4004-4007
Voice of America	3968, 3997
Voitinsky, G. N.	3934
Von Trott	3917
Voorhis, Jerry	3794
Vreeland, Mr.	3962

W

Waibel, Mr.	3962
Wales, Nym (Mrs. Edgar Snow)	3793, 4015, 4017
Walker, Richard	4014-4016, 4018
Wallace, Benjamin B.	3965
Wallace, Henry	3832, 3837, 3946-3947, 4005, 4007
Walter Hines Page School (John Hopkins University)	3957, 3961
War Department	3872, 3965
War Minority and Capital	3843
Ward, Angus	3814
Ward, Mrs.	3921
Ward, Prof. Harry	3979
Wartime China (by Maxwell S. Stewart)	3944-3946
Wartime China (book by Rosinger)	3796, 3799-3800, 3896
Washington Bookshop	3833
Washington, D. C.	3771, 3795, 3807, 3809, 3814-3815, 3819, 3830, 3832, 3844, 3856, 3878, 3880, 3882-3888, 3931-3932, 3939, 3957, 3965, 3970, 3981, 3995, 4007, 4009, 4019, 4026, 4029
Watson, Clifford	3965
Watts, Richard, Jr.	3793
Way, Madame Dow Ming	3737
Webb, Guy P.	3965
Webster Publishing Co.	3942-3943
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C.	3994
Weigle	3992
Welles, Benjamin	3742
Welles, Sumner (Under Secretary of State)	3956
Welling, Mrs. John Paul	3794
Wells, Henry	4019, 4021, 4031
Western Powers	3867
Weyl, Nathaniel	3776, 3953
Wheeler, Mrs. S. M.	3965
White House	3805-3806
White Paper on China	3813
Whitney, Gen. Courtney	3895
Whittlesay	3883
Wilbur, C. Martin	3793
Wilbur, Dr. Ray Lyman	3851, 3857-3859, 3868, 3881

	Page
Wiener, Thomas	3962
Wiley, Robert L., Jr.	3812
Willett, Mary Jane	3794
Williams College	3945
Willkie Award	3767
Willoughby, Gen. Charles A.	3807-3808
Wilson, Geoffrey	3931
Wilson, Woodrow	3850
Winter, Ella	3903
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl	3875, 3917-3918, 3962, 3993
Women's University Club in New York	3920
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs	3903
Worcester, Mass	3870
Work Together	3793
Workers Book Shop	3825
World War II	3823
Wright, Mrs. Quincy	3794
Wright, Thomas	3793


Y

Yakhontoff, Victor A.	3903, 3947
Yale Institute of International Studies	3980, 3998, 4004-4006
Yale Press	3971
Yale University (New Haven, Conn.)	3751,
3883, 3967-3968, 3970-3973, 3992, 3998, 4014, 4019, 4021-4023.	
Yalta Agreement	3956, 4005-4006
Yalu River	3994
Yanaga, Prof. Chitoski	4021
Yangtze	3838
Yangtze Valley	4009
Yankee Stadium	3827
Yardumian, Rose	3792, 3903
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E.	3793
Yasuo	3925-3926
Yen, W. W.	3881
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA)	3745, 3758, 3982
Yoshizawa	3933
Young, Arthur	3883
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)	3964


Z

Zhdanov, A. A.	3839
---------------------	------

O


3 9999 05018 355 5

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 05018 521 2

Boston Public Library
Central Library, Copley Square

Division of
Reference and Research Services

Social Sciences
Department

The Date Due Card in the pocket indicates the date on or before which this book should be returned to the Library.

Please do not remove cards from this pocket.

